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THE EMPIRE OF THE TSARS AND THE RUSSIANS.

By ANATOLE LEROY-BEAULIEU, Member of the Institute of France. Translated (from the Third French Edition), with Annotations, by ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN, author of "The Story of Chaldea," "The Story of Assyria," etc.

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BY

ANATOLE LEROY-BEAULIEU

MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE

TRANSLATED

From the Third French Edition

WITH ANNOTATIONS

BY

ZÉNAÏDE A. RAGOZIN

MEMBER OF THE "ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND," OF THE "AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY," OF THE "ANGLO-RUSSIAN LITERARY SOCIETY," LONDON, ETC.; AUTHOR OF "THE STORY OF CHALDEA," "THE STORY OF ASSYRIA," ETC.

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

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

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THE EMPIRE OF THE TSARS

AND

THE RUSSIANS.

BOOK I.

RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS FEELING IN RUSSIA.

CHAPTER I.

Why this Volume is Devoted to Religion—Scientific and Historical Interest of Religious Questions—Their Peculiar Interest in such a Country as Russia—Revolution and Religion—Religious Character of Nihilism and the Revolutionary Movement in Russia.

THIS third volume is entirely devoted to religion and matters bearing on religion. This may excite wonder both in France and in Russia. In the opinion of many of our contemporaries, the time for such studies is past; they can see nothing in them to interest and attract. To take up such studies is, in their eyes, to be behind the times, to parade ideas and a curiosity befitting another age. In reality we might turn the tables on such persons, and tell them that they never got beyond the eighteenth century. What more is needed to demonstrate the importance of religious questions than the history of the years that have come and gone since the Revolution? The nineteenth century at first flattered itself that it had done with them, and treated them with contempt—it was nevertheless deeply stirred by them, and is now forced to admit

that they will survive it. By all tokens, the coming century will not in this respect differ greatly from that which is going.

This recalls to my mind something that occurred in my boyhood, under the Second Empire. Mr. Guizot had just published his *Religious Meditations*. Mr. de Morny took occasion to remark: "How can anybody, in our times, take up such questions?" True, the occasion was a banquet to celebrate the opening of a railway line. Many Russians will be found, to this day, of the great stateman's opinion. Yet in no country is such an opinion, to our mind, more out of place. Religion in Russia is deserving of attention if only because it has retained such a hold on the masses. Had it no other attraction for our curiosity, a study of it enables us to know the people, to gain an insight into their feelings and instincts, a knowledge of their most intimate and spontaneous traits.

Religions are like moulds in which succeeding generations are cast, and of which the imprint frequently endures after the mould itself is broken. Sometimes it is the other way; and religion moulds itself on the people it started to fashion after its own image. This is especially true of the Russian sects. In Russia, at least with the people, this fact is all the more marked that religion has remained so national and popular; that it has taken on in the sects something so essentially Russian and personal. It was in the vast field of religion, in the aërial and misty regions of theology, that the as yet untutored mind of the people could, so far, disport itself most freely. To study it in its beliefs is to study Russian ethnography from the life—not merely in the customs or the garb of the peasant, but in his spirit, his soul, his conscience.

Is this half scientific, half literary aspect the only interest such a study offers? By no means. There is another at least equally great—the political aspect. It is our firm conviction that by examining into the religion of the people, by scrutinizing their beliefs, by studying the Church which has taught them and the sects which lure them away from that Church, we shall be studying the Russian State and Russian society in one of their chief com-

ponent elements—indeed, in that which is really their base and support.

"It were as easy to build a city in the air as to construct a state without belief in the gods." This saying was penned by an ancient writer—Plutarch, I believe,—and on this point most modern thinkers, including Rousseau and Robespierre, have been of the same mind. In spite of appearances, this ancient maxim does not appear to us obsolete even yet. Science has done her best to emancipate human thought, and still human societies find it hard to live without higher beliefs—by which we assuredly do not mean an official cult or a State religion, but worship and religious feeling. How sublimely presumptuous are those who, like the founder of positivism, think the time has come to escort God to the frontier of their republic and there dismiss him "with thanks for his temporary services!" God can do some service still. Let God be exiled from the commonwealth, and a thing or two might go out with Him which we might not like to miss.

Such is, in our view, the main difficulty with which our civilization, now it has reached its adult age, has to contend. Far from decreasing with time and habit, this difficulty is more and more intensified by the weakening of religious beliefs and the loosening of those moral bonds of which those beliefs were the nerve and strength. The perilous condition of our modern states, their incessant agitation, the periodical revolutions, the restless money-making spirit which torments almost all nations, come in the first place from the fact that modern nations have in great part lost their old faith, and found nothing to take its place. Hence all the upheavals in Western Europe, all those popular commotions which threaten our societies with changes unheard of for the last fifteen centuries.

Socialism, or anarchism, or, to use a more general term, the revolutionary spirit, is the eldest-born of unbelief. Earthly utopias take the place of faith in heaven. There is everywhere in our days a correlation between religious and social questions which must be

apparent to the least wide-open eyes, and this connection will become more evident with every generation. We can only repeat here what we recently said in another work*: robbed of Paradise and of the hope in a future beyond the grave, the masses are anxious to secure the only compensation they can perceive. Eternal bliss being taken from them, they demand the delights of this world. Revolutionary socialism, with them, takes the place of religion; and the more the latter loses its hold, the greater influence accrues to the importunate heir. Religious feeling once taken away, class strife becomes fatally inevitable, and against popular appetites let loose social order has no defence but force.

In some countries, especially in the West, society, when the religious base is taken from under it, finds another, even if a more or less shaky one, in science, in the increase of material comforts, above all in material interests. A state comparatively poor, like Russia, with a people as yet but little cultured, is, for a long time to come, debarred from even this resource. With such a people, as has been the case elsewhere through many centuries, religion is still the main, if not the only, stay of society and social peace.

And truly, so it is with the Russian people. The great obstacle to revolution lies in the conscience of the masses.† The entire ponderous building of Russian power rests on a sentiment—the people's respect and affection for the tsar. Now this feeling, as we shall see, is, of its nature, essentially religious.

This people, if we look at certain sides of it,—its communal customs, some of its ideas or traditions,—appears to have a vocation for socialism; it is pregnant with revolution. ‡ If it has, so far, proved impervious to doctrines which are often at one with the peasant's own instinct, it is in great part because of an invisible curb, more powerful than all the authority of the police,

* See *Les Catholiques Libéraux, l'Église et le Libéralisme*, Paris, 1885, p. 15.

† See Vol. II., Book VI., Ch. I. ‡ See Vol. I., Book VIII., Ch. VII.

and the genius of bureaucracy; that curb is religious faith. Without it, Russia would, even now, of all the states of both hemispheres, be the most arrantly revolutionary, and the most disorderly.

If, on the other hand, the revolutionary spirit, under its most radical form, has so deeply permeated Russian thought, it is because there are whole classes over which religion has lost its hold. There, as in the West, the place vacated by Christian faith was taken by the utopian spirit and by socialistic dreams. There also the cult of the invisible was succeeded by that of tangible realities, and the promise of a heavenly Jerusalem by visions of a humanitarian earthly paradise.

It has been noticed long ago that revolution, with modern nations, acts after the manner of a religion. This is nowhere so noticeable as in Russia. We have frequently had occasion to make this now trite remark.* What is the reason? It is that, in Russia, the commotion has been more violent, and the conversion more rapid; that the Russian mind has passed more quickly from the Christian to the revolutionary faith, and put into the sudden transition all the fervor of a neophyte, while the Russian spirit remains through it all profoundly religious, and retains, unconsciously, in the midst of all its revolts and negations, the habits, the emotions, the self-denial, which go with faith; so that there has been, in reality, only a change of religion.

Such, as we have seen, is the most original feature of Russian nihilism.† This originality lies in the feelings far more than in the ideas. Never has the human soul, that great adept at self-deception, shown itself so religious while denying religion. This is why women took so prominent a part in the Russian revolutionary movement. They went to the meetings of secret societies and heard the missionaries of socialism as they would have gone to the Messiah or his prophets. Hurled down from the pinnacles of

* See Vol. I., Book IV., Ch. IV.

† See Vol. I., Book IV., and Vol. II., Book VI., Ch. II.

Christian hope, Russian women turned to humanitarian dreams, bringing into their new faith the same longing for ideals, the same ardor, the same passionate self-renunciation, the same intoxicating joy of sacrifice.

The young maiden said to the goddess Revolution: "Thou shalt be to me in the stead of husband and in the stead of children." And she vowed herself to this fierce deity as others vow themselves to Christ, forsaking for it father and mother, offering up to it as a burnt offering beauty, youth, love, sometimes almost modesty. The tresses which others yield to the priest's shears at the altar, she severs for the greater glory of this unfeeling Moloch. For that same Moloch's sake she spurns the adornments dear to her sex and the apparel befitting her rank. She renounces the habits of the world, and dons a coarse gown; she knocks at the door of the needy, and shares their fare and manner of life. She takes, in a way, the vow of poverty, in order to consecrate herself to the service of the humble, to the enlightening of the ignorant, serving and adoring the new deity in its suffering members.

The youth, on his side, obeying the call of the same voices, lays aside his studies and his books. He concludes, as did the writer of the *Imitation*, that too much knowledge brings only pride and affliction of the spirit. He, too, has discovered that only one thing matters—salvation; that only one doctrine deserves to be taught—that which can redeem man out of bondage and want. Perish all else, if need be—even art and civilization! One thing, and but one, is needful: the deliverance of the oppressed masses. Such is the new *Evangel*, and if it demands confessors and martyrs, the pick of Russian youths will strive for the honor,—hundreds, thousands of them.

To this religious exaltation Russian nihilism owes its force and virtue. It might have made wider conquests, might have been even harder to deal with, had it been true to its original inspiration,* and abided by its idea of a peaceable apostolate, instead of

* See Vol. II., Book VI., Ch. II.

going into the bomb-and-mine business. But then a man, to have no ambition but self-immolation, to intrench himself within the serene protest of the martyr, must have more than an apology for a religion without either God or heaven—he needs a faith that has a God, that looks to that God for all things, abiding by His ways and His time.

Now, let revolution become a sort of human religion, as fervent, as believing, in its way, as the old one,—let it inspire its followers with as much enthusiastic zeal, as much abnegation,—it never can be long proof against the demon of violence. It is, of its very nature, bound to exchange moral force for brute. On this point it is precluded from rivalling the old teachings which it means to supplant. It was only for Christ to order Peter to restore the sword to the sheath. And yet, how often religion itself has armed the lean fanatic's hand! To minds of a certain cast, fanaticism appears as a necessary feature of religious exaltation. If so, who more religious than the Russian nihilist? The heroes of nihilism—a Jeliábof, a Sophia Perôfsky—can match the most hardened fakir, and that with no God to see, no paradise to receive them.

Of all the revolutionary movements of the present age, Russian nihilism is that which has most clearly shown the distinctive traits of a religious movement, and that is why it has surpassed, in intensity and moral grandeur, political movements of far greater importance as to results. All its force lay in its faith—true Russian faith. For the sake of their revolutionary dogmas, atheists have defied want and exile, suffering for the new faith with a patience distinctively Russian, just as, for centuries, their countrymen of low degree, the *Raskôlniks* (Dissenters), have suffered for the "Old Faith." What wonder if the revolution sometimes puts on the semblance of a sect, in a country where sects abound? So that, even where religion seems wholly discarded, revolutionary zeal, which has taken its place, still shows religiosity at the bottom of the Russian soul.

BOOK I. CHAPTER II.

How Religious Feeling Remains in Full Force among the People—Causes of this Phenomenon—State of Culture in Russia—History and the Mode of Government—Russian Mysticism and Fatalism—Where are the Springs of them to be Sought?—In the Race or in the Soil and Climate?—Influences of Nature and Environment—The Plain and the Forest—The Seasons—Historical Evils: Epidemics and Famine—Russian Mysticism should not be Overrated—Its Character and Limits—Frequent Combination of Realism and Idealism.

WITH the Russian people—meaning not the peasant alone, but the working-man, the poor townsman, and the city merchant—religious feeling has retained its pristine simplicity and directness. Religion among them shows one undoubted sign of life—fruitfulness: it is forever giving birth to sects, the quaintest, most peculiar, and so numerous, that it is difficult to keep count of them. The man of the people does not seem to have got beyond the stage of culture at which every conception spontaneously assumes a religious form. In this respect, as in so many others, he is the contemporary of generations long extinct in the West. If there are, in Europe, states where religion has once held as broad a place, there is hardly one where it holds a place quite as broad now. The harshness of the soil and climate had prepared its rule; the vicissitudes of history, the form of public and private government, have strengthened, and the state of culture upholds it.

Whenever, in some village out on the steppes, I saw the church raising its green cupolas above the dingy cabins of the peasants, I seemed to behold an emblem of religion's time-honored royalty in the Russian land. If we are asked how and

why religion has there retained, over the people and their mode of life, the ascendancy it has lost in most European countries, we can give reasons many and various. In the first place and above all, the average grade of culture, or, as we might term it, the nation's intellectual age. This people, so youthful still with its thousand years of history, has just reached adolescence, and the beliefs of its long childhood still retain their authority nearly unimpaired. It has not arrived (the lower classes are meant, of course) at the stage of skepticism, at that spiritual crisis which all Western societies have been going through for the last century. It has not yet passed through that dangerous intellectual moulting period which has, for many years to come, ruined the health of modern peoples. It has been visited by Diderot; it owns Voltaire's library: no matter! it is still at the theological age, and there is no sign of its outgrowing it soon, notwithstanding the numerous proselytes gained in its own midst by Comte's disciples.

In Russia the centuries, like the rivers, seem to have a slower flow. For the great mass of the people, the Middle Ages have not yet passed away. I often had that impression. When I had, with a crowd of pilgrims, entered the tall gates of the monastery of St. Sergius, or had descended, between two long files of beggars, into the catacomb galleries of Kief, I felt as though I could better understand our own Middle Ages. And anybody who has not yet trod the almost virgin soil of Holy Russia, can best form some idea of the people by receding in thoughts beyond the Reform, and the Renaissance, to the times when belief in the supernatural held under its domination the whole of the people's life, where crude and naïve heresies comforted the boldest spirits.

This people's great charm and great power lie in the fact that it is untouched by our barren scepticism. This is why, under its seeming coarseness, it has a soul frequently far less coarse than that of externally polished peoples. All that was noblest and loftiest in its heart of hearts has not been withered by contact with a spirit of negation which is not suited to the poor and the lowly,

which, as it descends from the learned and the literary classes into the masses, dries up and withers into senseless and brutal materialism. This, it will be said, is simply because Russia is several generations behind. That is, at least, one of the reasons, and whether we commiserate or congratulate her on the fact, it is certain that it is a fact pregnant with results, all the more that, if we consider the thickness of the popular layer and the thinness of the coating known as the "well-informed" classes, it will take a long time for what we style "modern ideas" to get to the bottom of the former.

Russia is probably the only European country where man has not lost the sense of the invisible, where he truly and really feels himself in touch with the denizens of the unseen world. In her wooden villages, railroad lines notwithstanding, an old-time saint would feel less out of place than anywhere else.

The low culture average is not the only cause of this persistent predominance of religious propensities. History, and the social as well as the political status, have much to do with it. Hard was life under the tsars' paternal rule; rare and precarious were the joys which life held for this people of bondsmen. With the whole weight resting on him of one of the most ponderous social structures ever known to the Christian world,—with no outlook into free life opening before his eyes in the flesh, the man "of the people" was all the more inclined to seek for glimpses of the Beyond. He had sore need of a kindlier world, where he might at all times find a refuge. Such a haven religion opened to him. Faith was to him the great comforter—the Paraclete—the great promise of compensation. The harder this life, the more he lived for the other. The ignorance of the masses, the total lack of comfort, the twofold tyranny of the bailiff and the police—the representatives of State and Master—all the dreariness and sadness of Russian life, pointed one way, turned the people's hearts in one direction.

This historical influence secretly extends to the cultivated

classes—the classes which for more than a century have been in touch with Western scepticism. On them also history and life have weighed heavily. Hence, in great part, the peculiar strain of melancholy that pervades them, their precocious disappointment with a civilization that does not come up to their standards, their convulsive efforts, in the wreck of their old beliefs, to grasp a new faith. Hence, in so many of those who toil through the waste of Russian life, a leaning towards pessimism, mysticism, nihilism—those three bottomless pits that yawn close together for weary and hopeless souls. Hence, in great part, the sudden and pathetic beatings of captive wings which startle us in their literature, where faith shines through unbelief, where feeling survives its object, and the old yearning still takes wild but powerless flights towards a deserted heaven.

We Westerners are apt to seek the key to the religious and mystical instincts of the Russians in the race, the Slavic blood. This view is in vogue even in Petersburgh and Moscow, yet it appears to me more in the nature of an assertion than an explanation. Some have taken pleasure in tracing a likeness between the Slavic genius and that of the Hindus, between Nihilism and Buddhism, and even gone so far, both in the West and in Russia, as to ascribe this likeness to the kindred between the two races and the purity of the Russian blood.*

In spite of the fact that the mystical nihilism professed by some of our Russian contemporaries (we do not mean revolutionary nihilism) offers some points of contact with the Buddhism of the Ganges, there are between the Russian and the Hindu spirits, one of which is essentially realistic and the other essentially metaphysical, at least as many contrasts as resemblances. Taken all in all, the difference between them is not less great than between the tropical jungles of the Dekhan and the pale forests of the North. If a trained eye nevertheless perceives hidden affinities

* See, for instance, Mr. E. M. De Vogüé's fine book, *Le Roman Russe*, Ch. I.

between them, it is only another proof that extremes touch ; that nature can, in the most dissimilar regions and by opposite means, produce similar effects, that man, under the most different skies, may experience the same feelings. And even so, history and the culture average, social, religious, or political conditions, possibly have more to do with the matter than nature.

As to drawing conclusions from such similarities in favor of a close race-kinship, setting up the Russians as the direct descendants of the Âryas and crediting them with pure Aryan blood—this system cannot stand for a moment before the showing of ethnographical science. If it is unjust to the Russians to deny their claim to the name of Aryans, it is certain that the modern Slav, especially the Great-Russian, is considerably crossed with Finno-Turkish elements. The great resemblance of the Old-Slavic tongue to Sanskrit is no proof to the contrary ; if it were, the Lithuanians on the Niêmen would have even higher claims. The Celts—remotest in space from the supposed cradle of our common progenitors—also might, by certain sides of their character, claim close resemblance to their cousins on the far away Ganges ; yet neither the Bretons nor the Welsh can boast of purer blood than others.

In this, as in many other questions, appeal to race clears up nothing, the less that the mystical instinct is far from being common in equal measure to all the peoples of Slavic stock. The Slavs of the Danube and the Elbe have rather less of it than their neighbors of Teutonic blood. It really has a strong hold only on the Russians and the Poles. And even, as regards the Poles in this nineteenth century, the agonizing mysticism which pervades their literature—the writings of Mickiewicz, the great Lithuanian poet, and Krasinsky, the anonymous poet—has its root as much in patriotic as religious exaltation.

If such investigations be not wholly idle, the theory of "environment" (to use a modern word) appears in this question less deceptive than that of race. Why not look for light to those two

great factors in the fashioning of a people's character: history and climate; in other words—moral and physical environment?

We have once before attempted to analyze the leading physical features of Russia, and the manner in which her sky and her land react on the national character.* The word "contrast" sums up the impressions we receive from that tame and pallid nature. On these vast plains, now bare, now clothed with meagre forests, man feels small, even though the scenery is not what we are wont to call grand. He feels weak and poor, even though nature does not always make him realize her power or her wealth. Such a land, under the cold northern sky, easily wakes the sense of the Infinite as well as that of life's inanity; its immensity, joined to a certain feebleness, attunes the soul to melancholy, humility, introspective meditation—and the result is mysticism.

The boundless plain—whether forest or steppe—exerts over the Russian an influence not unlike that of the desert over the Arab. Viewless space produces on man two different impressions, according to times and moods, and to the man's temperament. At one time the flat and monotonous expanse will cause him a sensation of fear, make him feel small, shrink within himself, will breed in him the wish to live in close companionship with his fellow-men, and give him the sense of God's presence beyond that all-encompassing sky. At another time the same vastness will fill him with the craving for a freer life, will tempt him forth to long tramps, endless rides, arouse in him the love of independence, of enterprise, and adventure. Both these impressions are produced in the Russian as in the Arab, sometimes separately and often combined. The one has for centuries made a wanderer of the migrating and colonizing *mujik*, and a roamer of the Cosack, the wild son of the steppe, who could not tolerate a check to his liberty or a limit to his raids. The other has filled the monasteries or *skits* of the northern forests and fostered the dreams of the mystical sects of

* See Vol. I., Book III., Ch. II. and III.

Great-Russia. Both together have led to distant shrines the long lines of pilgrims, ever on the march from the remotest ends of the empire, and set in motion sects of vagrants; for vagrantship, like spiritual vagaries, is one of the forms which popular piety and mysticism are apt to take.

Seen from an elevation,—from the top of the steep downs and the wooded hills along the Dniepr, the Don, or the Volga, from the towers of Kief or from the walls of Nijni,—these Russian plains give one the same sense of the Infinite as elsewhere the sea. In these entirely horizontal landscapes the sky generally takes up most room. Frequently it fills the picture: so flat is the earth that you lose sight of it; nothing arrests the range of the eye, and it loses itself on all sides in the sky. The widespread forests of the Centre and the North produce a similar impression, though in a different way. Through the dark boughs of the half-denuded pines and the thin foliage of the aspen and the birch, the eye is again irresistibly attracted towards the heavens. The forest, like night, is ever mysterious. Dreams haunt the breathing solitude of the woods. Their silence, made up of a confusion of light noises, enwraps the soul with deep solemnity; and when the wind that comes from the pole rushes overhead, the forests of the North sigh and roar as the breakers on the beach.

To these impressions born of the scenery, let us add those which the seasons bring,—the seasons which, by their violent opposition, appeared to us to account for all that is abrupt, unbalanced, exaggerated in Russian thought and character,—whose contrasts account for the perpetual antithesis in the Russian soul, by turns resigned and rebellious, gentle and harsh, indifferent and passionate, somnolent and feverish; by turns, and often at one and the same time, realistic and mystical, positive and dreamy, brutal and ideal, ever ready to pass from one to the other extreme with equal sincerity and conviction, with strange rushes and jerks. This want of equilibrium, of measure, as striking in the people as in the climate, might alone make us understand those sharp at-

tacks of mysticism, those sudden flights and falls of thought, violently rebounding from earth to heaven and back again.*

Has not the intensity of religious feeling in the North been rather underrated? A general prejudice notwithstanding, the North is by no means less religious than the South—if anything, rather more so, on history's showing. In what countries of Europe, setting Spain aside, have religious beliefs held the most absolute and most enduring sway? In the three most northern ones, different in race and church: Scotland, Sweden—the Sweden of Swedenborg,—Russia. Nowhere did religious tolerance—or its highest visible expression, the equality of all denominations before the civil law—find it more difficult to gain admittance. Nowhere did the respective ruling churches gain such ascendancy over private life and public manners. Presbyterian Scotland has, in this respect, been compared to the Spain of the Inquisition, and justly so; Poland, Ireland, even England, have at all times been among the most believing of nations. The religious feeling of Northerners differs from that of Southerners in the same way that the lakes of Scotland or Finland differ from the blue gulfs of Naples or Valencia. From northern nature it takes a sombre and austere hue; it leans more towards melancholy and dreaminess, and is, possibly, all the deeper.

The far North, to which the Great-Russians have long been confined, is the very birthplace of their mystic sects. Under this latitude the long nights of winter, the long days of summer, tend almost equally to open the soul to mystic impressions and religious yearnings. It is not a mere figure of speech to say that darkness begets superstition. Night, all over the world, is the time of mysterious shudderings and fears which, like moths and bats, hide in the daytime and begin to hover around men soon after sunset. In summer-time the long June evenings, with their diaphanous gloaming, which is neither night nor day, lend the northern atmosphere something ethereal, immaterial, unreal;

* See Vol. I., Book II., Ch. III.

while during the frosty nights of winter, the Two Bears, inclined towards the pole, and the innumerable host of stars scintillate on the black-blue sky with a haunting splendor.

All that puzzles the mind, troubles and thrills the senses, arouses, together with the sense of the unknown, that of the supernatural. It seems at first sight as though Russia is entirely denied those grand phenomena, those commotions of nature which, in Java or Peru, or even in Europe, on the slopes of the Vesuvius or the summits of the Alpujaras, set popular imagination working from time to time. For vast as Russia is, she has neither volcanoes like Italy nor earthquakes like Spain; neither snowy peaks, nor avalanches, nor glaciers; neither fjords, with beetling stone walls, nor surf-beaten rocks. She has neither serpents nor tigers like India; wolves, indeed, she has in her woods, bears in the wastes of the North. These two brutes have for centuries been the terror of her rural life; both have bred many superstitions; but both have become comparatively scarce. Yet it were a mistake to think of the Russian plains as offering nothing in the way of phenomena and sights at all capable of arousing, through terror, superstitious ideas. Only they are supplied not by the soil, but again by the seasons.

In winter there is the snow-storm, in no wise less terrible than storms at sea. The drifted snow, violently lifted from the ground, mixes with the thickly falling flakes so that heaven and earth seem to become one. All things vanish in a sort of blurred darkness; the roads are lost in the whirling dance which buries men and flocks. In spring there is the thaw—less terrifying, but very striking still. The gulfs, the lakes, the wide rivers, transformed by the wizard winter into solid plains, burst open with a dull thunder, break up into huge masses of ice which drift slowly seaward, clashing and hustling one another for hundreds of miles. Then come the floods—one of the natural visitations in which man thinks he can most clearly see the hand of God. The rivers, swelled by whole oceans of molten snow, flood the plains and flats, and make of

them vast sheets of water. At this time of the year nothing can equal the majesty of Russia's rivers; they are miles—sometimes many miles—wide. The Volga then carries her steamboats of many tiers up to the very walls of Kazàn, more than seven miles away from her usual bed. Petersburgh, imprisoned between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, seems in yearly danger of submersion. The Neva, swelled by the waters of the great lakes, at times sweeps over her granite embankments and beats against the rock which bears the equestrian statue of Peter the Great, the work of the French sculptor Falconnet. The cities built along rivers are safe only by leaving a few miles between themselves and those rivers, like Kazàn, or by climbing the downs, like the two Nòvgorods.

No less terrible, but more mysterious, are the phenomena which summer ushers in, and they must awaken a vague dread in the hearts of simple men. Over the innumerable marshes of the North and Centre, many of which bear the name of "Devil's Marsh," so often given to such places in Western Europe, flickering will-of-the-wisps hold their nightly dances, and the peasant crosses himself, taking them for unblest souls. Farther north, the *aurora borealis* sets the heavens in a blaze, and its blood-red or fiery rays seem to convey sinister omens. In the South, and even in the Centre, on the steppes and denuded plains, another phenomenon arrests the imagination—mirage, which, there as in the deserts of Central Asia, gives distant objects a moving, shifting appearance and creates fantastical optical delusions. In several parts of Russia many a miraculous apparition, commemorated by some chapel, might probably be accounted for by a similar natural cause.

Setting aside these phenomena, the people of Great-Russia have for centuries been held under the ban of three scourges, which were still more calculated to incline them towards superstition or fatalism: famines, epidemics, conflagrations. This country, so rich in cereals, has at all times found it hard to supply the

food for its scant population. Soil and climate combined make the North and Centre unproductive; a tardy spring suffices to keep the crops from ripening during the short summer. In the South and most of the Black Mould lands the Tatars made cultivation impossible or precarious for over two hundred years. Besides, even there, owing to the insufficience or irregularity of the rainfalls, drought, against which the peasant vainly prays to heaven for months, can at any time cause wretched crops to succeed splendid ones. It has, in consequence, been long considered necessary to have an emergency granary in every commune; but, from neglect, they fail the people at their greatest need. No country in Europe has suffered longer and more horribly from this scourge, from which the West is freed once for ever by the facilities of communications. Russia has endured famines like those of Asia or Africa; like those which have, within our recollection, visited India or Persia—the kind of famine which carries off in a year one fifth or a quarter of the entire population. In this very decade Russia has endured, from this cause, sufferings which would be deemed impossible in Europe.

The rigor of the climate inflicted frequent famines on old Moscovia; her geographical position entailed on her as frequently a no less dreadful scourge. The contact with Asia has, for centuries, subjected her to invasions fraught with greater danger than those of the Mongols or Tatars—the invasions of deadly Asiatic epidemics. Innumerable are the plague epidemics registered by the Moscovian chroniclers side by side with famines, and the cholera, under the name of Black Death, gained a footing there even earlier than it appeared in Western Europe. To these should be added the no less deadly epizoötics which also come from Asia: the so-called "Siberian cattle-plague" is to this day the terror of the peasants. These visitations, which generation after generation has suffered through several centuries, have affected the nation's moral temperament not less than the national wealth.

All that makes life precarious, all that makes it apparently de-

pendent on causes extraneous to nature, inclines man to implore with greater fervor supernatural assistance. Stricken by sudden plagues, without visible or intelligible cause, the people ascribe them to the anger of heaven at the sins of the earth. Nothing so fosters the primitive conception of disease as the result of spells or divine punishment, with no remedy but prayer or counter spells.

This is one of the historical sources of the fatalism and superstition which distinguish Oriental nations. To the assistance of the physician, to the uncertain relief promised by a science which he knows nothing of, the Russian peasant frequently prefers mysterious conjurations, an amulet, or a pilgrimage. Against every one of the epidemics which visit his village—against small-pox, against cholera, and cattle-plague,—he has traditional spells, magic rites, handed down, some of them, from ancient paganism. On the other hand he has frequently been known, through a mistaken idea of religion, to refuse the most efficient remedies as being of the Devil. He seems to keep his faith for the wizard and his unbelief for the doctor. Thus, in some parts, vaccination has long been resisted as sinful—it was said to be the seal of Antichrist. And quite lately still, during the diphtheritic epidemic, the villagers of the government of Poltàva stubbornly opposed disinfection, because the sanitary proceedings appeared to them in the light of a desecration of their dwellings, while fumigation was to them a diabolical performance. And when the peasant does have recourse to the doctor, he expects from him much the same kind of help as from the wizard. If his remedies prove ineffectual he treats him as an impostor. Accordingly, in many epidemics, the physicians' lives have been endangered by the blind anger of the people.

Pestilence and famine, those two pallid sisters, so long the blood-suckers of Russia, are slowly disappearing there as in the rest of the civilized world. Not so another scourge, of which the West can scarcely realize the ravages and the disheartening effect on the people: fire, the Red Rooster as the peasants call it. It devours forests, cities, villages—they still being almost entirely

built of wood ; it is started by accident ; it is kindled by criminal hands. The losses from fire mount up to hundreds of millions every year, but that is not the worst it does for the country ; it not only ruins the people, it demoralizes them, it does its part in fomenting fatalism and superstition. Where does the fire come from ? That is a question as mysterious, as puzzling as "where does the plague come from?" Sometimes the lightning strikes and sets fire to a building. No wonder that popular imagination sees in a conflagration a punishment sent from Heaven, against which nothing but prayer or a miracle-working *eïkon* may avail. Quite lately still this feeling was strong enough to paralyze men in view of the flames. Many have been seen to get their movables out of the burning houses, carry out their clothing and utensils, take down their double window-frames, and leave the village to burn down, exclaiming "It is the will of God!" The establishment of a system of insurance, more urgently indicated in Russia than in any other country, met with unexpected opposition, on account of this very feeling. Many communes would have dispensed with insurances had not the provincial assemblies made them obligatory.

The peasants mostly accept with equal resignation the new diseases which thin their cattle and their families, as also the insect plagues which suddenly invade their fields. The south is not always safe from locusts. They came about 1880, and the peasants of the government of Kherson would do nothing. "God is angry," they said, "and He has sent them." And they would sit there, motionless, looking on, and say, "When the day of punishment is past, the locusts will go." To overcome this fatalistic apathy, the civil authorities had to have recourse to the clergy ; but on such occasions the village people are by no means sure to obey the exhortations of their pastors.

Fatalism is one of the most marked features of the national character. It is universal among the peasantry, and frequently persists in classes or men who, owing to their education, should

be exempt from it. The Russian soul is saturated with it. It shows in the Russian's bravery as well as in his resignation, in his revolts as in his submissiveness, in his recklessness as in his discouragement, in his fits of feverish activity as in his long spells of apathy and supineness, in his passionate negations nearly as much as in his religiosity. If there is anything Oriental in him, it is that.

With fatalism mysticism frequently goes hand in hand—unconscious or unavowed, and shamefaced, nay anxious to deny its own existence. Europe was slow to discover this mystic vein, which was long unperceived of the Russians themselves, but now seems inclined to overrate it in its appreciation of Slavic character, thought, and literature. Not all Russians by any means are touched with it. Mysticism is rare all over the world, which is growing old ; and one is all the more astonished to find it in Russia that it often appears mixed up with instincts seemingly incompatible with it. Nevertheless it does hover over the land, like some subtle haze. It is far from universal, but it permeates certain souls—those more finely strung, more ardent, or—more morbid ; and, strange to say, mature age seems more liable to it than youth. Many a choice spirit which was exempt from it at twenty-five succumbs at fifty. Such was the case with Gògol and Leo Tolstòy. This is a sort of moral evolution which is not limited to Russia. But there it can be accounted for not merely by the everlasting discontent with human life, but also by certain fatal disappointments specially inherent to Russian life. The narrow limits set to intellectual effort under an autocratic form of government ;—the barriers against which individual enterprise knocks its head on all sides ;—the inaction forced sooner or later on every independent spirit ;—the ill-dissembled emptiness of official life and the too-apparent vacuity of all that is not State service ;—in one word the powerlessness to act and the weariness of thwarted will, the uselessness of exertion—all these things, being more intensely realized in mature years, at times plunge into contempla-

tion and mysticism robust souls, which in other countries would have been absorbed in action. The wear and tear of climate may also have something to do with it, for the moral powers do not always stand it better than the physical, and the less resisting natures grow old early.

Perhaps that is why mysticism in Russia makes its home rather in the North than in the South, and in the peasant's *izbà* preferably to the lordly mansion ; for the peasant stands nearer to nature, and nature is more melancholy and mysterious in the North. Russian mysticism, however, retains a local flavor of the soil and people. Nothing there like the bright and exquisite poetry of the sweet dreamer of Assisi, whose love enfolded all living nature, who preached to the little birds and "to his sisters the swallows." On the other hand, Russian mysticism rarely falls into the stern asceticism of the East. It is less sombre and fierce, but rather heavy, quaint, prosaic. It rarely quite cuts itself adrift from reality ; it takes thought of practical things even in its most extravagant flights ; even then it scarcely lets the earth go out of sight. With the wildest dreams of religious illuminism or political utopias, the Russian frequently combines the most practical calculations : a curious combination, which is found in other northern countries—in England, and especially in the United States. We may see in this one of the few points of real resemblance between the Russians and Americans.

We have already had occasion to dwell on the latent positivism, the often unconscious realism, which underlies the Russian character and shows through all coverings and disguises.* It is not only in their literature, their novels, that we encounter the combination of what Westerners call positivism and mysticism, naturalism and idealism—it is in their souls, their lives, their character. The contrasts pointed out by Joseph de Maistre in Russian ideas and manners crop up everywhere †—we are always brought back to that when we speak of the Russians. It is this very

* See Vol. I., Book III., Ch. II. † See Vol. I., Book III., Ch. III.

union of contraries which gives originality to their national character; something unforeseen, puzzling, elusive, which lends such fascination to a study of them because it always leaves something to be discovered, some enigma to be solved. All these contrasts find expression in Russia's religion, and perhaps in nothing so much as in her popular sects. A study of their beliefs, rites, superstitions, of their crude and ignorant heresies, would therefore, even did it offer no other interest, still form a curious chapter of national psychology.

BOOK I. CHAPTER III.

What is the Nature of Religion in Russia?—Is it True that the Russian People are not Christians?—Characteristics of their Religiosity—In what Way their Christianity has in Many Respects Remained an External Thing, and Why—In what Manner Russia was Converted—In what Way Polytheism Survived under Cover of Christianity—Slavic Gods and Christian Saints—In what Sense the Russians may be Called a Bi-Religious People—Christian Rites and Pagan Notions—Persistency of Witchcraft—Religion Viewed as a Sort of Magic—Why the Russian People must nevertheless be Accounted Christians—Influence of the Gospel on their Ideas, Manners, and Literature.

We have undertaken the study of religiosity in Russia. But are the Russian people really religious, really Christians? Are the peasants' vague and crude beliefs deserving the name of religion? Do their confused ideas on life and the world really spring out of Christianity? Many of their own countrymen think not. Many Russians hold that Russia is neither Christian nor even religious at all. Men, otherwise wide apart in their opinions, are agreed on this point, in Petersburgh and even in Moscow. They would have us believe that the peasant has only the externals of Christianity, the appearance of religion. Certain circles not only consider the point settled, but are disposed to glory in it on behalf of their country. Already under Nicolas, Bielinsky, one of the oracles of Russian thought, wrote—if I mistake not—to Gògol: "Look closely at the people, and you will find them, at bottom, atheistic; they have superstitions, but no religion." To this many in Petersburgh say, "All the better." They deem it all gain that, from the religious as well as the political point of view, the Russian mind should be a *tabula rasa*.

A Russian, a friend and disciple of Littré, has forcibly ex-

pressed the opinion of many of his countrymen on this point; he found fault with me for attaching too much importance to the admission of Russia among the Christian nations.* According to Mr. Vŷrubof, there have been churches in Russia, but no religion, unless we understand under this name the original polytheism. The Church gradually did away with that, but never succeeded in substituting anything in its stead. The people, left without beliefs answering to their needs, were ready to grasp at any superstition, any wild freak. As a matter of fact, he contends, Russia never really was Christian or Orthodox; never received anything but a sham baptism.

This, in other words, means that the Russian people have a form of worship, but no religion. Observe, however, that this censure might be extended to almost any other nation, any other epoch. A dip in the Dniepr was certainly not sufficient to make Christians of Vladímir's Varangians. In Kief and Nòvgorod, as later in Moscow, unconscious paganism could lurk for centuries under the shadow of the Byzantine cross. But neither the Franks of Clovis nor the Saxons of Charlemagne appear to have understood Christianity much better than the *drujínniks* of Vladímir and Yaroslav. A parallel between the Franks as depicted by Gregory of Tours and the Slavs as described in Nestor's Chronicle would result in curious revelations. Of the two, it is not always the monk of Kief and the Rùrikovitches who would be found most wanting in religion and Christian feeling. In the Russia of the Appanage period, the influence of Church and faith over the Grand-*Kniàzes* was not less great than over the Karolingians and the first Capetians in the West. Only read Vladímir Monomakh's instructions to his sons†; the Emperor Louis the Good, nor King Robert, could not, in their testaments, have shown more respect for the Evangelical spirit or greater tenderness for the Church.

And if we come down to modern times, Russia is not by any

* See *Philosophie Positive* for November, 1873, and May, 1881.

† Translated by Mr. L. Léger in his *Chronique de Nestor.*

means the only country on either side of the Atlantic where Christianity is frequently reduced to external practices and grossly material notions. What certain Russians say of their own people, has been said, by natives or foreigners, of many a people of Europe or Southern America. Has it not been repeated over and over again that with all their devotion, all their veneration for saints and images, the Neapolitan or the Andalusian, and, in a still greater degree, the Mexican or the Peruvian, are not really Christians? that the old polytheism shows everywhere under the thin varnish of their Christian veneer? To an unprejudiced mind the case of Russia is by no means as singular as it appears to many Russians. There is no occasion to refuse the *mujik* the name of Christian—or else we shall have to refuse it to a great many others. Such strictness might lead us to the curious discovery that those countries where religion is still held in highest honor, where its rites and precepts have retained most influence over the masses, are unacquainted with Christianity, or religion in any sense.

Religion—and that is true of the sublimest as of the humblest—is purified or debased by the environment into which it is received. Where it cannot spiritualize, it becomes materialized; those it is powerless to raise, lower it to their own standard. Religion takes hold of men either from within or from without, according to their grade of culture, and it is usually from without that its sway begins, as it is the externalities of worship which outlast religious spiritual authority.

And here often arises a confusion of ideas which it is very important to avoid. Because a religion is outwardly grossly material, because forms and rites predominate in it, it does not always follow that it is *all* form. It may be—or rather seem—made up of externalities without being superficial. These are two very different things. Many a practice which, to an outsider, is mere form, may have grown out of the deepest subsoil of popular ideas, and be bound up with the people's very heartstrings; centuries

will not tear it out. The importance attached to rites and observances is no proof that a given form of worship has no hold on a man's inner being. Far from it, at a certain stage of culture, as at a certain time of life, the inner being is in a state of subjection to externalities. Only that reaches the soul, which first strikes the senses.

Under this reservation, it is a fact that religion in Russia is to this day more material in its forms than in this or that other country, and that Christianity is there tainted with paganism. Aside even from those tribes of Finno-Turkish origin who have nothing Christian about them beyond being entered in the church registers, the peasant, though always religious, does not always appear Christian. Christianity has indeed succeeded in obliterating from his soul the names and memory of the heathen gods, but has not been as successful in stamping on it its own dogmas and beliefs. The old paganism and the new teaching form two distinct layers, which are clearly distinguishable to this day. It is not alone that heathen rites have been preserved in places,—the very spirit of paganism is alive still, under a coating of Christianity.

This phenomenon is easily accounted for by the people's grade of culture, by their want of historical education, and also by their character; by their inveterate realism, their traditional attachment to ceremonials and customs. It is accounted for, also, by the spirit of the Church which brought them to the Gospel, by the shortcomings of the Byzantine Christianity, which had already sunk into formalism, and also by the manner in which the new faith was substituted for the old polytheism. The Greek missionary was inclined to present religion as a mere aggregate of rites, and his protectors, the *Kniàzes* of Kief, owing to their own heathen bringing up, naturally were quite content that the people whom they converted should show merely outward respect to the observances of the new religion.

One of the things which strike us most in Russian history is the ease with which Christianity gained a footing among the

Russian Slavs. Between the Gospel and paganism the struggle was brief, and by no means sharp. In Kief, where there were churches long before Vladímir, there seems to have been scarcely any struggle at all. Polytheism somehow abruptly pales and vanishes before the foreign invader.* Now it is an established fact that those victories only are complete and lasting which have been fought for.

Christianity triumphed the more rapidly from the fact that the Russian Slavs' polytheism was rather vague and primitive, without much system. The Slav of the Dniepr had gods indeed, even images,—statues of them,—but no temples to shelter them, no body of priests to serve and defend them. The worship—the cult—was only just taking shape. Slavic paganism had not reached the stage of decadence like classical polytheism, but was rather still in that of elaboration. It was therefore at a disadvantage when pitched against a religion superior to it not only intrinsically, but by its organization, its forms of worship, and its perfect priestly hierarchy. Only, as pagan feeling was still alive in all its force, and the people's soul was thoroughly imbued with it, the triumph of the One God was more apparent than real, and that for a long time. What Vladímir overthrew was the wooden idols with the gilt beards, not the ancient conceptions which they represented. The old idols, convicted of being powerless before the God of the Byzantine missionaries, were succeeded by the Christ and the saints of Christianity. The Gospel's victory, therefore, was easy in proportion as it was shallow. It quickly took possession of the hills of Kief and of the Varangian homes for the very reason that it did *not* take hold of men's souls; hardly disturbed them or made a change in their ideas. They understood Christianity so little, that they often remained half pagan without knowing it. Such, after centuries, still frequently is the

* In Nòvgorod the resistance opposed by paganism was rather longer and more determined; but even there it has been shown by later researches not to have been as serious as Soloviòf and Kostomárof had thought.

mujik's religion. And as this latent paganism offered but little resistance, and was more than half unconscious, neither Church nor State took much pains to eradicate it.*

The popular religion thus became a sort of Christian paganism —or rather of pagan Christianity,—polytheism representing the substance, and Christianity the form. And even when Christian ideas began gradually to permeate the heathen ones, the old heathen ceremonial, with its songs and its dances, long survived under cover of the church rites.† So it came to pass that it could be said of the Russian people that they were a "bi-religious" people. The remark was made already by the old chroniclers. All who have ever studied the Russian peasant have been struck by this duality ; it still survives, after all these centuries, in his songs, his traditions, his folk-stories—and in his imagination. The Christian and the pagan element are mixed up and intertwined in such a way that his religion is like a material shot with two colors. ‡

The great Slavic gods, indeed, have become obliterated from the people's memory ; but they have retained a recollection of the minor deities—of those at least who, by their names and attributions, represented most clearly the forces of nature. As in all countries, it is the lower rank of the mythological hierarchy which

* It seemed to me useless to give Nestor's narrative of the Russians' conversion ; for a great part of it, especially the alleged investigation by Vladímir of Judaism, Islamism, and Christianity, Greek and Latin, bears all the appearance of being a legend.

† Under Ivan the Terrible the bishops publicly complained of the frequency of pagan ceremonies. The same complaint would be justified in many parts of the country now.

‡ See especially Afanàsief's *Russian Folk-Legends*, p. 6, and Ralston's *Russian Folk-Tales*, p. 325. Many of the songs of Great- as well as Little-Russia are what Russian scholars call "bi-religious." The same is the case with the magic incantations, rhythmic and sometimes rhymed, in which Russian folk-lore abounds. Some are Christian and pagan, both even in form : Christ is repeatedly invoked together with the Sun and "Moist-Mother-Earth." Appeals to elementary forces—the rivers, the winds, the "thrice-holy sun"—frequently occur in the Russian popular poetry of all periods. See Rambaud, *La Russie Épique*.

has best resisted time and influences. So we find that Christianity could not, in the course of nearly a millennium, suppress either the *Vodianòy* or Water-Sprite—an old fellow with bloated face and long dripping hair who dwells in rivers and especially haunts the neighborhood of mills ;—nor the *Russálkas* or Water-Maidens, with silver-gleaming bodies and long green tresses, who fascinate people and draw them down into the deep waters, especially the young ; —nor the *Liêshi*, the Forest-Sprite, a sort of goat-footed satyr, who delights in teasing and playing tricks—assuming various forms and voices to scare travellers and make them lose their way ;—nor the *Domovòy*, the House-Sprite, whose favorite place is the oven, that Russian form of the domestic hearth. All these fantastic beings play a great part in the folk-songs and folk-tales. The rivers, the swamps, the lakes, and the forests have kept them alive in the popular imagination.

In Russia even more than in other countries, polytheism has survived chiefly in the reverence paid to saints. The Slavic gods were forgotten only because they took the disguise of Christian saints. Such transformations are habitual enough in the Greek East as well as in the Latin West, but nowhere do they occur more frequently than in Russia. It is in this way only that the great popularity of certain saints can be accounted for, as well as the queer hierarchy of the Russian heaven. The place assigned by popular devotion to its favorite saints has nothing to do with their rank in the Orthodox liturgy or in ecclesiastical history. It has been remarked that the greatest reverence is often paid to those saints who are least human or least historical, who have been most freely handled by legend. The reason is simple: the preferred of Russian devotion, be they angels, saints, or Old Testament prophets, have almost all retained a mythical character.

Several saints are only degraded or purified gods who, from the barbaric Olympus of primitive Rùss, have stolen into the Orthodox Paradise. Sometimes, under cover of a similarity of names, they have transferred to a saint their attributions and functions. It is thus that St. Blasius—Vlàs in Russian—has assumed the duties of

Russian State Library.

Vòlos or Véles, the former guardian god of cattle. The Slavic Jupiter, "Perùn, the Thunderer," has resumed his place under the name of Elias the Prophet—Ilyà—who was translated to heaven in a fiery chariot (the same who in Greece has everywhere succeeded the sun-god, Helios); and the thunder is, to the peasant, the rumble of the prophet's chariot as it drives about in the heavens.* This dispenser of storms not only wields the thunderbolt, but also sends hail. There is a story in the government of Yaroslàvl of how he destroyed the crops of a peasant who celebrated St. Nicolas' Day and neglected St. Elias' Day.†

Not less marked is the mythical character of such holy personages as St. Nicolas, the Archangel Michael, or St. George, the patron saint of the empire, whose equestrian presentment, a heathen relic, adorns the national escutcheon. St. George and Michael, with the addition of St. Andrew and St. Peter, are, with Elias, the inheritors of the Slavic Thunderer, Perùn. At springtide, on his own fête-day, George—Yuri or Yegóri the Brave, the knightly dragon-slayer, the Christian Perseus or Bellerophon—becomes the protector of flocks and castle, and, like St. Blasius or Vlàs, the successor of the pastoral god Vòlos. Thus pagan memories and Christian ideas get confused and intermixed, just as among the Greeks and Latins.

The same may be said of St. Nicolas, the saint most in request and the most powerful of the Russian calendar,—he who, it is said, is to succeed God, when God grows old. The greatest variety of duties devolves on St. Nicolas. He is, as in the West, the patron of children; further—the protector of seafaring people, of pilgrims, the rescuer from danger. Unlike Elias, who often shows himself harsh and vindictive, he is always kind, obliging, and helpful. Wherever the Russian goes, he takes his reverence for St. Nicolas, and propagates it. The natives of Siberia have made of him a sort of agricultural deity, who presides at the beer-

* See Afanàsief; Ralston; and Mr. L. Léger's "Brief Sketch of Slavic Mythology," in his *Nouvelles Études Slaves*, 2d series, 1886.

† Afanàsief, Ralston.

carousals with which harvest time is celebrated. The heathen tribes beyond the Uràl, such as the unbaptized Votiàks and Ostiàks, pay him the same homage as the Orthodox, and call him "Kòla, the Russian God." In Europe as in Asia, several Finno-Turkish tribes officially converted, hardly know of any other Christian god. The religion of the Tchuvàshes of the Volga almost entirely consists of pilgrimages to his shrines, of which there are many all over the country; so that it is easy, to this day, to follow out in Russia itself the various phases of religious evolution from paganism or fetishism to Christianity.

The manner in which the peasant honors his saints, the idea he has of their power, their protection, their grudges, is still to a great extent pagan. He dreads their vengeance, and is careful not to give offence; he tries to win their favor, and resents their neglect; he has a saying: "If he is any good, pray to him; if he is no good, make a lid for your cooking-pot of him." It is well known that in every room the place of honor, the right-hand corner, is occupied by the holy *eïkons* or images—a wholly Oriental custom. Every visitor's first salutation is addressed to them. When a person intends to commit a sinful act which must shock them, he or she is careful to draw a curtain before them. Fast women always do it.

One way of doing honor to the saints and to Christ himself, is to burn wax candles before their *eïkons*. During the services, the little tapers are passed from hand to hand, from back to front of the congregation, to be stuck in the big candlesticks before the *eikonostàs*.[1] Once, on St. George's Day, a peasant handed on two candles. "Why two?" he was asked.—"One for the saint," he replied, "and one for the dragon."[2] Not a few would be inclined

[1] The screen which divides the sanctuary from the body of the church, and in which *eïkons* are set, panel-wise—whence the name, which means "*eïkon*-stand."

[2] This is not an actual occurrence. It is one of those stories that are told everywhere. I have heard it, years and years ago, in Rome. The scene where it was laid was the Church of the Capuchins off Piazza Barberini, and the picture Guido's famous one of the Archangel Michael and the Dragon.

to pay the same compliment to the vanquished dragon as to the victor saint or archangel. There is in their belief a sort of unconscious dualism. Life appears to them as a struggle between two opposing principles. In the popular traditions can be traced a recollection of two hostile gods: *Biêlbog*, "the White god," the Good One, and *Tchernobog*, "the Black god," the Evil One. Mythologists will tell you that this is quite in accordance with the ideas and religion of numbers of peasants. It would almost seem as though there lurked under their Christianity a latent spirit of Manicheism. More than one popular sect is forever discovering in everything Christ and Antichrist.[3]

It has often been noticed how readily the Russian peasant, the colonist, when transferred into the midst of idolatrous tribes, assimilates their superstitions, and sometimes even adopts their heathen rites. Especially in Siberia, a great many Orthodox peasants yield to the gross fascinations of Shamanism, and become regular clients of the Shamans, or sorcerer-priests. Along the banks of the Lena, many frequent the Buddhist sanctuaries of their neighbors, the Buriàts. Even in the environs of Irkutsk, the capital of Eastern Siberia, the seat of an Orthodox archbishopric, Buriàt idols may be found in Russian *izbàs*, as well as images of St. Nicolas in Buriàt huts. Nay, in European Russia, in the Volga region, the peasant is often contagiously affected by the superstitions—polytheistic or fetishistic—of his neighbors of alien race, the Tchuvàshes or Tcheremìss. It looks as though the peasant, only half emerged out of paganism, is always ready to relapse into it, if there is no hand by to keep him out of it. The immensity of the land, the remoteness from one another of

[3] This dualism is universal. In connection with our race alone it would take us very far back to trace it to its sources (as discoverable to even prehistoric research)—farther than the dualism of Zoroastrian Mazdeism, to the everlasting antagonism between Erân and Turân, as embodied in the war waged by the bright religion of the Âryas—their Champion of Light—against the Serpent, the weird symbol of the gloomy Turanian Earth-worship. (Hence Apollo and the Python, Michael or St. George and the Dragon, etc., etc.)

intellectual and religious centres, the inefficiency and carelessness of the clergy, whose members are not numerous enough, and who are generally deficient in education—are some of the causes which lead to the corruptness of religion. Under these conditions, the wonder is, not that Christianity should be so much tainted with paganism, but rather that Christian faith should live and have endured, that it should not have been entirely choked and smothered by the weeds of paganism.

Under the *mujik's* Christian polytheism there is a religious layer of still lower formation, the same that a little digging will lay bare in all Western peoples also—witchcraft. It were unfair to expect the peasant of the Don and the Volga to have lost his old faith in spells and incantations, when we find it alive still in the rural portions of the countries which boast the most ancient civilizations. But in no modern country is the belief in magic spells, the fear of the evil eye and evil omens, the faith in dreams and incantations so universal and robust. Few indeed are the villages that have not their wizard or "wise woman," and one of the books most widely circulated among the people is the "*Sónnik*," the interpreter of dreams.

These superstitions are so deeply rooted that, did we not know how hard culture found it to overcome them in countries far more favorably situated, we should be tempted to hold the soil or the race responsible for them. The North has always been the nursery of magic, and sorcery has retained there an unusually sombre character.[4] Among all the races or nationalities of Europe, the *Finns*

[4] Scarcely the nursery. The nursery of this, as of most things, lies far away in the East. The Finns are of the same Turanian stock as the Shumìro-Accads, the oldest known settlers of Chaldea, whose culture was at its height some 4000 years B.C. Sorcery of all kinds formed an important part of their religion, and it has been proved that the most striking affinities exist between their witchcraft and that of the Finns, who were as surely a branch of a Proto-Turanian race as the Âryas of Erân and of India were branches of a Proto-Aryan race. This, again, would take us very far ; for instance, to India (in the times of the Vedas and Brâhmanas), where the two races—Âryas and Turanian Dravidians—confronted each other, and mutually reacted on one another, very much as the same races—Russian Slavs and Finns—did in a later age in the north of Russia.

have always held a sort of pre-eminence in this respect. Never had people more faith in the power of spells and incantations. The Tchùd sorcerers are as renowned as in old times, both in Russia and Scandinavia. The Finnic traditions, the poetry gleaned in the villages of Finland, confer on sorcery a place unique in literature. The great Finnic poem, the *Kalevala*, put together out of skilfully welded *runot* or songs, is the epos of magic and conjuring. In this sombre Iliad, this misty Odyssey of the North, the heroes, instead of fighting with steel or bronze weapons, slam at each other with incantations and talismans, overcoming their foes and conquering the elements by the might of their spells and invocations. The chief personage, the old *runoia* Wäinämöinen, is nothing but a divine sorcerer, the very Achilles or Odysseus of witchcraft. Lönrot and the scholars who have collected the *runot* of the *Kalevala* have also published exorcisms and set forms of incantation, designed to conjure all the dangers with which the anger of malevolent beings threatens men.

The modern Finns—those at least who are Protestants—have been freed by religion and culture from the bondage of at least the grossest of these superstitions. Not so the Russians. The Great-Russian, in whose veins there courses so much Finn blood, and who has gone to school to the old Tchùd diviners and wizards, has remained more true to the beliefs of his fathers and his masters. In all public or private calamities, in sickness, in times of famine or epidemic, the peasant regularly has his field exorcised by the wizard—after having had it blessed by the priest, so he feels safe on both sides. In Siberia and certain northern regions, the sorcerers and Shamans collect a sort of insurance tithe for protecting the villages against disease and epizoötics. Nor are they isolated peasants who individually consult the masters of the Black Art, but whole villages, publicly, and, in a way, officially, sometimes after a regular debate in the communal assembly.

Even in Central Russia, in the provinces surrounding Moscow, we see the rural population resorting to their ancestral rites, to

drive away the cattle plague. The women assemble at dead of night, in the dark, the men staying at home the while, and perform, half clad, a nocturnal procession. It is headed by the holy *eïkons*, Christianity being thus strangely associated with the old heathen ceremony. Two young girls are hitched to the plough ; they trace a furrow all round the settlement, reciting traditional incantations which forbid the plague to cross it. At other times, this or that disease, personated by a straw mannikin, is drowned in the river, or solemnly burned, along with a dog or a cat. In times of cholera, peasants of the central provinces have been known to compel their priests, clad in full church vestments, to bury, according to the rites of the Church, a doll of this kind representing the cholera.

It was against sorcery, not against the pagan gods, that the Church and the clergy have had the hardest fight. In this struggle of many centuries, Christianity, far from invariably triumphing over its hidden antagonist, conquered only by dint of degrading concessions ; it became, for the peasant masses, a sort of sacred magic, officially consecrated by Church and State. In the eyes of many a peasant, the rites of the Church are merely a peculiarly solemn way of casting spells, and her prayers particularly efficient incantations, capable of conjuring dangers, real or fancied. The priest is, to him, in the first place, one who knows the sacred forms of invocations with which to influence the heavenly powers. Christ himself appears to him as the mightiest and most benevolent of conjurers, and God is the supreme magician.*

One of the most marked features of the peasant's religion is not external formalism alone, but a great attachment to rites or ceremonial—*obriàd* is the Russian word. This peculiarity, which caused a schism and gave rise to numerous sects, has its root firstly in the innate respect for forms, which is a part of the national character in worldly as well as in religious matters ; then

* *El Mágico Prodigioso*—as goes the title of Spanish Calderon's miracle-play.

in the conception the people has formed of religion. The ritual and the sacred words it looks on as in themselves possessed of a magic virtue of which the least alteration deprives them.[5] Thus only can we account for the endless controversies about the proper spelling of the name of Jesus, or the manner of making the sign of the cross, which is to this day so much used by Russians of all classes. If a difference in the way of putting the fingers together to cross oneself could divide old-time Moscovia and, later on, modern Russia into two hostile camps, it is because, to the masses, the sign of the cross was not merely a reminder of the Crucified One, and a profession of Christian faith, but a sort of magic sign, a preservative against the evil eye and against the dangers threatening either body or soul.

Crude as such a religion seems, we repeat it *is* religion, it is even Christianity; a Christianity, too, which is not much worse than that of a good many nations of both hemispheres. Many practices for which the *mujik* is scoffed at by Catholics, and especially Protestants, are nothing but survivals of a time they have been through as well,—bits, as one might say, of religious archaïsm.

There are, moreover, by the side of wizards suspected of intercourse with the Evil One, men and women who make a profession of piety, and whom popular credulity has made into a sort of Christian conjurers. Such are certain pious women, called *sviatòshi* ("devotees"), or pilgrims home from the Holy Land, who make a business of expounding to the "simple" the phenomena of nature and the mysteries of Scripture. These illiterate seers are in great demand, and frequently invent or spread new sects. As usual in such cases, it is not easy to discriminate between real visionaries and impostors, all the more that with the former, as

[5] This describes, word for word, the belief of the Aryan conquerors of India, as embodied in the theory and practice of the Brahmanic ritual of worship and sacrifice, and applies with equal accuracy to the later Aryan conquerors of Italy, whom we know under the name of "the Ancient Romans."

with the sufferers from hysteria, the will is frequently the dupe or the accomplice of hallucination. There is, in all this, nothing that cannot be matched in other countries, and traced to times by no means remote. The same may be said of the "possessed," whom their relatives carry to the shrines of popular saints to cure them; also of the "innocents" (complete or half idiots) to whom the people still show a sort of religious reverence similar to that shown them in the Mussulman East.

Is it merely the guilelessness of their ideas or their childlike practices which entitle the Russian people to the name of Christians? By no means. They are Christians not externally only, in virtue of those rites to which they attach so great a value, but also internally, in mind and heart. In this respect, indeed, they probably deserve the name better than many of those who would deny it to them. Shining through this obscuring outer crust of ignorance and crudeness, we often find the noblest Christian feeling. Through all this paganism, and even through the vagaries of preposterous sects, the Christian spirit breaks forth in all its intrinsic beauty and purity as it hardly ever does among the lower classes in the West.

In no other people do we so frequently meet the aspirations characteristic of Christianity and the virtues which make it the *one* religion unlike any other—charity, humility, and (a thing more uncommon still, a thing almost unknown to the lower classes of other countries), the spirit of asceticism and renunciation, the love of poverty, the craving for self-sacrifice and self-mortification. The *mujik* may misapprehend the Christian doctrine, may be little versed in the dogmas of the Church—for which he may be the more readily excused that his clergy not unfrequently omits to teach them to him,—but he grasps the moral and the teaching of Christ; he feels the spirit of them with his heart. His intellect or imagination may be pagan, but his soul is Christian. Through the impure dross of countless superstitions, through the rust of sects, the pure gold of the Gospel shines forth. There seems to

exist a secret affinity between the Christian faith and the hidden depths of the Russian soul. Tertullian's sublime paradox—that the human soul is naturally Christian—never came nearer the truth than when applied to the Northern Slavs. Between the Gospel and the Russian nature the conformity is so great that it is frequently hard to make out what should be credited to religion and what to the natural temperament.

One thing is manifest: the mystical seed, when it was dropped on Russian soil,—on the peat swamps of the northern forests, among the tall grass of the steppes,—did not fall on unproductive ground. The thistles of paganism and the thick undergrowth of superstition have not kept it from yielding here and there its most delicate blossoms and its most exquisite fruits. This people, whom some of its own sons are pleased to place outside the pale of Christianity, is one of the very few who have treasured and kept alive the notion of *holiness*,—so lofty, so unfamiliar to Western crowds, sublime and strange to us. The Russian peasant is almost alone in Europe in seeking for the pearl of great price and looking with veneration on the hands that seem to have found it. Above all—and that is the very essence of Christianity—*he loves the Cross*. He wears it not only round his neck, he rejoices to wear it in his heart. He has not unlearned the value of suffering; he knows the good of expiation and tastes with delight the bitter-sweet flavor of it. One of the attractions which draw him to sects is the longing to suffer for truth, the hunger for persecution and martyrdom. "Suffering is a good thing; may be Mikalka is right that he wants to suffer," says one of Dostoyèfsky's heroes.*

These feelings are reproduced in literature, ever since literature has begun to study the people, not indeed in the works of those "demophil" writers with revolutionary tendencies who extol the peasant without knowing or understanding anything about him, but in those of the great novelists whose soul has looked deep into his, who at times, in order better to identify

* In *Crime and Punishment.*

themselves with him, have not shrunk from doffing the outer garment of high culture. Such is Leo Tolstòy, such was Dostoyèfsky, and even Ivàn Turguénief, although he differed from his great contemporaries in this, that he was, personally, free to the last from all fumes of mysticism.

Strange, that this contemporary Russian literature, almost entirely produced by free-thinking sceptics, should in many ways be one of the most religious in Europe. At bottom it is frequently, though unconsciously, profoundly Christian. The novelists' chief preoccupation is the soul, conscience, the heart's peace; they ponder anxiously over the riddle of life and the mysteries of human destiny. Behind their transparent rationalism, they are persistently haunted by religious broodings. To them is applicable the beautiful simile of one of our great thinkers: like unto a vessel still impregnated with the fragrance of an evaporated perfume, Russian literature, like the Russian soul, is imbued with the sentiment of a vanished faith. From the people, as from the soul, there emanates a sort of religious mist, which reaches up to the cold layers of the literary atmosphere.

BOOK I. CHAPTER IV.

The Dualism of Lettered and Popular Russia from the Religious Point of View—If the People are still in the Middle Ages, the Higher Classes mostly have Stopped at the Eighteenth Century—In what Way the Religious Condition of Russia is the Opposite of that of France—In what Way the Diffusion of Revolutionary Ideas Tends to Modify this State of Things—Efforts of the State to Strengthen the Influence of Religion—Governmental "Clericalism"—Part Played by the Church from a Political Point of View—The Bond between Orthodoxy and Nationality—Russia the Guardian of Orthodoxy—In what Manner the State, like the Nation, has a Religious and Confessional Character—In what Sense Russian Autocracy is a Sort of Theocracy.

In Russia, as in the rest of Europe, the era of moral unanimity has passed away probably never to return. Religion no longer binds all souls together; it has lost its etymological meaning; it no longer enfolds all minds in one common atmosphere. Here we meet with another of those contrasts which face us everywhere in Russia—the same dualism, which, ever since Peter the Great, has severed the nation in two. Religion nowhere possesses so much influence and nowhere so little. While the bulk of the nation still owns its rule, whole classes boast that they have shaken it off. This opposition would alone account for the difference in the judgment we hear on the action of Christianity and the importance of religion.

In this respect the cultivated classes—"the intelligence" they call them there—and the people, the two Russias which are almost strangers to each other, seem to belong to two different ages; yet neither is quite contemporary. If the one appears to linger on in the Middle Ages, say the fifteenth or sixteenth century, the other, in most cases, does not seem to have gone beyond the eighteenth,

beyond the frivolous incredulity or *naïve* philosophizing of the days before the Revolution. In the drawing-rooms of Petersburgh a Mesmer, a Saint-Martin, a Cagliostro, or any of the dreamers and tricksters of the end of the last century, would stand a good chance of meeting with the same reception now as they did from the contemporaries of Catherine II. "Society," though it may be more or less sceptical and give but little faith to the dogmas of any church, has not for that renounced all intercourse with the supernatural. Among the most determined contemners of metaphysical vaporings and religious delusions there are those who will indulge in the wildest dreams of a humanitarian millennium. Others, like their great-grandfathers before them, go into theosophism or a sort of nebulous illuminism. Many there are who, while scorning the doubtful glimmering of religion and the twilight of faith as a help towards piercing the gloom which enwraps human destinies, eagerly resort to the dim light held out by visionaries and magnetizers. They discard Christianity, but welcome spiritism.

Petersburgh is one of the cities where "mediumism," as they used to say, has become the most decided fad. There is nothing in that to wonder at. Fashion, the craving for novelty and entertainment, all contribute to the craze. But what one will hardly see anywhere except in Russia, is the number of professional scientists who become passionately interested in similar questions. I hardly think that, in any other country, naturalists or chemists ever have expounded dogmatically the proofs of spiritism, or serious reviews have undertaken to demonstrate the theory of the "materialization" of the spirits who operate for the edification of believers.*

Between the religious condition of Russia and that of a notable portion of the West, there is nevertheless a difference amounting to contrast. It is, in fact, reversed. The axis is displaced, the centre of gravitation is shifted. While in several old countries,

* This has been done among others by Professors Wagner and Butlerof in the *Russian Messenger (Russkiy Viêstnik)*, 1875 and 1876.

especially in France and in England, religion, after having long comforted the lower classes, has become an object of suspicion to them, and has in a great measure found shelter with the higher classes, which, in the eighteenth century, had heaped contumely upon it, in Russia it is the other way. Down below, in the masses—peasant, tradesman, workingman even—we find faith ; up on top, in the cultivated classes—scepticism or indifference. The social status and history are chiefly responsible for this. When faith is strong in the people, when they cling firmly to the beliefs of their fathers, the higher classes incline to look on religion as something that is good for the common herd, but hardly feel called upon to support it by their own example. Aristocratic feeling then falls in with the pride of knowledge, and both help to lift life and thoughts above common rules. The check on society is then so solid, that there seems no harm in the few eluding it. Thus it was in Russia : the rule of religion appeared so strong, that the cultured classes, while shaking it off themselves, were not afraid to weaken its hold on the lower rungs of the social ladder. Should there be in Russian society—possibly at no remote period —a religious revival similar to that which has taken place in the present century in England, in France, in sundry parts of Germany, we need not feel astonished. There, as everywhere else, one effect of the revolutionary propaganda must be to win back for the old faith the sympathies of those minds, those professions, those classes, which are getting alarmed at the progress of democracy and the threats of socialism. Assailed by some as a hindrance, religion is defended by others as a bulwark. Only let the revolutionary tide rise higher or come nearer, and religious faith will appear as a dyke against the subversive flood, and the very hands which undermined it in reckless play, will bestir themselves to strengthen it.

Already there are in Russia symptoms of such a change of front. They are noticeable in the higher, aristocratic spheres of society. Though a certain latitude is considered quite proper, it

is "the thing" to show respect to religion, if not to join in its practices. Impiety, rank atheism, are left to the less refined. This is especially noticeable in the official world, where religion is always held in honor, out of policy. The more trouble the revolutionary propaganda makes for the government, the more the latter affects religious fervor.

This has been the case at various epochs, more especially under Nicolas and now under Alexander III. Nihilism has brought down on Russia a recrudescence of this official zeal. The State has made every effort to strengthen the ascendancy of religious beliefs, not only over the people but over all classes of the nation, in all educational institutions, from the village school to the universities. In this respect the policy followed by Alexander III. as formerly by Nicolas, would, in any other country, be dubbed "clerical."

Many Russians, it is true, assert that "clericalism" of any kind is incompatible with Oriental Orthodoxy. But will the facts bear out the assertion? "Clericalism," indeed, is a term which is ill-defined even in the West, and appears particularly unsuitable to Russia, in the first place because Church and State are too intimately connected there for the activity of the Church to be exerted against and at the cost of the State; in the second place, because the clergy is far from possessing there, or even laying claim to, the same influence as in Catholic countries. Being entirely isolated within itself, forming, as we shall see, a sort of caste, the Russian clergy has little intercourse with the other classes, and consequently little influence over them, at least over the higher ones. In the eyes of the nobility, of the State itself, the Church has long been a peasant church, her priesthood a peasant clergy. But has the State been deterred thereby from giving her the support of its authority and—what she is refused almost everywhere in the West—the protection of the law and the secular arm? If the word "clerical" is unacceptable, let us say (not to quarrel about words) that the Russian government has re-

peatedly struck a "pietistic" line of policy, from political calculation as much as from religious conviction; perhaps from an instinct of self-preservation, in its own interest (whether rightly or wrongly understood), not in that of either church or doctrine. Even in Catholic countries, the majority of those men who are called "clericals" by their opponents, aim much less at the profit of the clergy or the defence of faith than at the welfare of the State and of society.

The Russian Church has retained rights and prerogatives such as no other church in Europe enjoys. The union between the temporal and spiritual powers is nowhere so close; nowhere is religion so protected. It is true that, in accordance with the law of compensation, the Church has had to pay for these privileges by greater subserviency to the temporal power.

One of the reasons for the intimate bond between Church and State is that, in Russia, religion has always been essentially national. That is why the Church arouses so little animosity even in those circles which rebel most strenuously against her dogmas. Scepticism is a common thing in the cultivated classes; the spirit of negation among them is often hard and trenchant; but the Church is seldom attacked. It is not mere indifference, as in the West, that keeps within its pale men who have long ago leaped the barrier of dogma. The Russian Church, even while she forfeited her children's faith in her, as a rule still retains her sympathy and affection. The greater number of them yield her a share of the love they have for their country. The two appear to them indissoluble. A Russian who dares to renounce the faith of his ancestors is disgraced less as an apostate than as a traitor to his country. For the Church is to them a part of Russia, first and foremost a national institution, the oldest and take it all in all, the most popular one; and not only has it helped to mould the nation and make Russia, but to this day it is the cement that holds both together.

The Russian people have not yet quite emerged out of the

stage where religion takes the place of nationality and the two are convertible terms. In the eyes of the masses, indeed of the highest classes and the government itself, no one is a true and thorough Russian who is not orthodox. "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, nationality," was Nicolas' motto, and it has now been taken up once more by Alexander III. The second and third terms, being considered as equivalent, are the least contested. To the peasant, "Russian" and "Orthodox" are synonyms. The peasant whose name—*Krestiànin*—means "Christian," when he speaks to his brethren, addresses them as, "ye Orthodox." If anybody would arouse the national feeling in the masses, just let them touch the religious chord. This has always been done when it was required to incline Russia in favor of an Oriental war. It was the sufferings of the Orthodox Christians oppressed by the Mussulmans which moved the people's hearts in 1878, under Alexander II., just as it did twenty-five years before under Nicolas. It is only at a comparatively recent period that the idea of race affinity has tended, in cultivated circles, to take the place of religious brotherhood; with the masses the latter always comes first. To arouse belligerent passion, it is not the trumpet that must be sounded, but the three hundred church bells of Moscow must be rung. The old crusading spirit is not extinct in the people's breast.

This bond between religion and nationality was tied by history and made fast and faster by time. In this respect Russia puts us in mind of Spain, with this difference that all her national struggles, all her political wars, be it in West or East, have been looked upon by the people as religious wars. Whether Asia or Europe was to be dealt with, the North or the South, the Mongol or the Turk, the Swede or the Pole, the German or even the French, the enemy was, first and foremost, the infidel, the heretic, the schismatic, the foe and contemner of God himself. This feeling survived the Tatar domination and preceded it. Already in the Appanage period, baptism was regarded as the distinctive mark of

the Russian, as opposed to the tribes of alien race with which he was surrounded. The Orthodox faith already was the pledge or stamp of nationality. The converted Finn or Finno-Turk was regarded as a Russian. In the baptismal font the elements were combined out of which the new people was to emerge. Russian unity was founded by Orthodoxy no less than by autocracy ; Orthodoxy created and became the keeper of the national conscience.

How then could the upholders of the nationality theory, the Slavophils and their followers, bent on extolling everything Russian, fail to become the panegyrists of the Eastern Church? They did not. Such men as Samàrin, Khomiakòf, the Aksàkofs, have vied in celebrating the merits and services of Eastern Orthodoxy. They went so far as to hold up the Russian people as the representative of the true Christian civilization, because, they alleged, it possesses the only true form of Christianity. In fact some of the more eminent Slavophils overdid it in their zeal, so as to arouse the suspicions of that very Orthodox Church, whose champions they had constituted themselves, and great was their astonishment at being censured by the Holy Synod.* They had taken up the matter not as apostles, but more as patriots.

All Russians, of course, are not given to such systematic exaggeration as the Slavophils, but most of them deem it a duty they owe their country to sacrifice their personal religious views to what they consider a question of national interest. "As far as religion is concerned," a society woman said to me in Moscow, "I am simply a Christian, unattached to any denomination. If anything, I am rather drawn towards Protestantism. But, as a Russian, I am passionately Orthodox." Most of her fellow-countrymen might say the same.

It is too much to Russia's advantage to pose as the patroness of Orthodoxy, as she has done for centuries, for any patriot to dare to sneer at the part. There is usually quite as much profit as

* This is why several of the works of Samàrin and Khomiakòf had to be printed in Germany.

honor in such missions. Politics and popular instinct are at one on this point. Religion is the only bond between Russia and the East, whether Greek or Roumanian ; it is the only at all solid one between them and their race-brethren on the Danube, for once the Slavs are set free by the Moscovite eagle, race feeling will soon pale before that of nationality : the Slav will go out of sight, and we shall have the Serb, the Bulgar, the Bosnian. If the Bulgars heard mass in Latin, Russia would have no more hold on them than on the Poles. Whatever sympathies still exist in favor of Russian policy among the Greeks, the Roumanians, even the Serbs, they are found principally among the clergy. And should the edge of this religious weapon wear off in Europe, it would still be of use in Asia, where it has already opened Georgia and Transcaucasia to the tsars. Orthodoxy has brought the Russian people a sort of primateship, which the Northern Empire is not minded to relinquish.

To return to where we started from—religion has always been and still is the corner-stone of the empire. The old Russian laws frequently give the emperor the title of "Christian sovereign," and it is as such that they endow him with unlimited power. The Code—*Svòd*—begins by proclaiming the autocratic power and demanding obedience to it in the name of the Divine law, in the Apostle's own words.* But, we repeat, it is not so much the law and official instruction which make of Russia a Christian state on a religious basis, as the conception entertained by the immense majority of the people. To the peasant, the tsar is the representative of God, delegated by Heaven to rule the nation. That is the source of the devout feeling with which the peasant regards the anointed of the Lord. This is why he renders to the sovereign an homage almost superstitious, why he bows to the earth before him and sometimes crosses himself as he passes by, just as at

* "The Russian Emperor is an autocratic monarch with unlimited power. God himself commands subjection to the supreme power, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience sake." (See Romans xiii., 5.)

the passage of holy *eïkons*. This also accounts for the extreme docility which abides in the masses, for the distaste which a large portion of the nation manifest for political liberties. If the tsar rules in the name of God, is not resistance against him impiety? And does not the Church, each year, anathematize those who dare to doubt the divine mission of the tsar and to rebel against his authority?* Is not "subjection" commanded by the Apostle, and are not obedience and humility the first of Christian virtues? Nor are these sentiments confined only to the uneducated. One of the Slavophil leaders, Constantine Aksàkof, placed in Alexander II.'s hands a petition in which he besought him not to lay any restrictions on the fulness of autocracy, on the ground that, of all forms of government, this is the most in conformity with the spirit of the Gospel.†

A survivor of the great Nihilist struggle deplores the many privileges accorded to the clergy and attacks what he calls Russian theocracy.‡ The word was lightly spoken as a bit of revolutionary phrase, but it might, in many ways, be taken literally. For theocracy is really the base on which autocracy rests. It has been so in other countries also, whether Christian or Mussulman. The Church, indeed, is apparently subordinate to the civil power, but the latter rests wholly on religious faith. One is tempted to draw a parallel in this respect between the Russian form of government and that of the Hebrews, who, under both their judges and their kings, believed themselves to be ruled by God and the Divine

* "To those who do not believe that the Orthodox monarchs have been raised to the throne by virtue of a special grace of God—nor that, at the moment the sacred oil is laid on them, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into them anent the accomplishment of their exalted mission; and to those who dare to rise and rebel against them, such as Grishka Otrépief, Yan Mazeppa, and others like them: Anathema! anathema! anathema!"

These imprecations, peculiar to the Russian Church, are solemnly recited once a year in a special service, in which they follow on anathemas hurled against atheists and heresiarchs.

† This petition was written on occasion of the accession of Alexander II., and published in 1881, for the edification of Alexander III.

‡ Stepniàk *(nom de plume)*: *Russia under the Tsars*, London, 1885.

Law. The parallel fits all the better that the Russians also have for centuries been in the habit of regarding themselves as the chosen people, God's own people, and have for their sovereign a feeling much akin to that of the Hebrews for their kings David and Solomon. Tsarism—this anachronism in the midst of modern Europe—is in reality nothing but a patriarchal theocracy, disguised, through the compelling needs of the times and neighborly influences, as military and bureaucratical monarchy.

BOOK II.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH.

CHAPTER I.

General Character of Eastern Orthodoxy—Can we See in it the Slavic Form of Christianity?—Of the Inferior Position Taken by the Greco-Russian Church in the History of Civilization—What is the Reason of it?—Of the Dogmatic Differences between the Two Churches—Their Opposite Points of View—In what Way the Immobility of Eastern Orthodoxy may be Favorable to Free Thought—The Constitution of the Greco-Russian Church—Absence of a Central Authority—Its Consequences—Tendency to Form National Churches—Annexations Made by the Russian Churches and Dismemberment of the Byzantine Patriarchate—How, in the Eastern Orthodox World, Religious Conflicts usually Cover Political Quarrels.

THE Russian Church, like the Anglican, is a national church; like the ancient Gallican Church, it is, at the same time, a branch of a vast Christian community erected above the divisions of peoples and states. This community gives itself the name of *Holy Catholic Apostolic Orthodox Church;* we shall give it the latter designation as it is preferably used by its followers, that of Catholic being left to its great Western rival.

At the time of her rupture with Rome, the Eastern Orthodox church probably did not number twenty millions of adherents; at the present day, she has about a hundred millions, some eighty millions of whom are Russian subjects*; of the remaining twenty

* From this number should be deducted several millions of Russian sectarians; but the precise figure is difficult to find out, as will be seen later; and, besides, the greater number of them rebel not so much against the Orthodox Church as against the official church of the Empire.

millions, one half are Slavs of ancient Turkey or Austro-Hungary. In one word, although the Orthodox Church is entirely of Hellenic origin, and still goes under the name of Greek, it has passed to the Slavs in point of numbers, and among these Russia claims the first place, both as to civilization and power.

It has often been said that Catholicism was the Latin form of Christianity, and Protestantism the Teutonic form ; the Russians take pleasure in pointing to Orthodoxy as its Slavic form ; yet it strikes one at the first glance that the Slavs have not fashioned it for themselves but, true to their assimilating instincts, have taken from another nation a ready-made religion, after which they divided themselves almost equally between the two rival churches.

The truth is that religion has cut the Slavic world in two. On the showing of history, Eastern Orthodoxy is not more Slavic than Roman Catholicism. If the Russian, the Serb, the Bulgar have made of it their national form of worship, the Latin form is no less national with the Poles, the Slovacks, the Croats—even the Tchekhs. Of the Slavs, ordinarily regarded as thoroughly orthodox, many have wavered a long time between Byzance and Rome. This was the case not so very long ago, and on Russian soil, with the Russians, and also with the Bulgars at the time of their greatness. If, among modern Slavs, numerical superiority belongs to the Eastern rite, it is by no means on account of a secret racial sympathy, but entirely on geographical and political grounds. It is nothing but gravitation. As bodies are attracted in opposite directions, so the Slavs of the East and those of the West, in going, the former to Sofia and the latter to St. Peter, merely obeyed the laws of attraction.

In spite of certain doctrines in great vogue at Moscow, the Catholic Slavs are quite as much Slavs as the Orthodox ones. True, the former have generally been subjected to more foreign influences ; this is a fact it would be hard to dispute. Nor can we deny the Slavophils of Moscow the satisfaction of admitting that

religion has had something to do with it, yet only as an indirect cause. The chief reason lies in the superiority of the Latin culture transmitted by Rome over the Byzantine culture bestowed by Constantinople.

For the Greek term "orthodoxy," the Russian language has substituted the Slavic word "*pravosláviyé.*" The word is simply translated from the Greek, but it is misleading to foreigners, who are apt to conclude from it that Orthodoxy is Slavic in nature and origin. This mistake is based upon a mere phonetic coincidence, and Eastern Orthodoxy is in no way specially Slavic. Not only is there no Slavic confession of faith, there is not, properly speaking, even a Slavic rite, for the Slavs have a liturgical language, but no liturgy of their own. There is a Russian Church, a Serbian Church, a Bulgarian Church : there is no Slavic Church. Mere numbers do not give the Slavs the right to force their name on the ancient Greek Orthodoxy. Had the nations of Teutonic stock all remained true to Rome, the Catholic Church would not, for that have been a Teutonic Church. In point of fact, the Orthodox Slavs have only been proselytized by the Greeks, just as the Teutons and Anglo-Saxons have been by Rome. And the faith which they received from their Byzantine teachers they merely preserved as a sacred deposit, without in any way imprinting on it the stamp of the Slavic spirit : they never had either a Luther or a Reformation. Neither the Bulgarian *Bogomils* of the Middle Ages nor the Russian *Raskólniks* of our days can be named as an equivalent. To find a religious movement which can truly be described as Slavic, we must step out of the Orthodox world and point to John Huss, the heretic leader of Catholic Tchekhs. The Orthodox faith was and has remained Greek, no matter how intimately it became allied with the Russian nationality, and although the people have taken it to their hearts as really and truly national. Translating into old Slavic the Credo and the ritual was not enough to divest them of their Hellenic character.

Greek in origin and spirit, Slavic in numbers, Eastern Ortho-

doxy has long been carried by the Russians beyond its ancient historical limits. Though it never became as truly universal as the Latin Church, it far overlapped the boundaries of its original area. It is limited neither to one race nor to one state. Like Catholicism and Protestantism, Orthodoxy numbers among its flock nations of all known races: in Europe the Greeks, the Roumanians, Slavs crossed with various elements, many Albanese, and in Russia itself Finnic half-Russified tribes; at the threshold of Asia the Gruzins (Georgians); in Syria and in Egypt, Arabs and other Semites; in the heart of Siberia, peoples of Turkish or Mongolian origin converted by their rulers; and farther still the Aleüts, who formed the bond between the new and ancient worlds. Orthodoxy has proselytes as far as northern America; for when the Russians handed over Alaska to the United States, they left there an Orthodox bishop. Thanks to Russia, the Eastern Church has missions in China and in Japan. A resident Russian bishop in Tokio has under him a native clergy already numerous. From the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean the Eastern Church sends off a diagonal line through Asia. If Christianity ever gains a hold in these most ancient countries, it is probable that Russian propaganda, both religious and political, will make room largely for Orthodoxy in these newly conquered lands.*

And yet, all this notwithstanding, this great church has not held in the history of civilization a place comparable to that of Latin Catholicism. There has been in this respect an unfortunate coincidence between the Orthodox Church and the Slavic race. Our European culture would easily have done without either or both; while the part played by the Protestants or Catholics, the Teutonic or Latin peoples, could never have been suppressed without mutilating it. The question now is whether this strangely subordinate position, from which Russia has suffered so much, is really due to the form of worship or to the race.

* The Russians have even attempted to start relations in Africa with the old Jacobite Church of Abyssinia.

The relative superiority of Protestant and Catholic nations has often been discussed. The inferiority of those who follow the Eastern rite has seldom been doubted or disputed, and their religion has always been made more or less responsible for the fact in the West by both Catholics and Protestants. Eastern Christianity has been looked upon in the light of a narcotic,—a sort of stationary Islamism, smiting with immobility the peoples which it held in its bonds.

In thus settling the question, it seems to us the effect has been mistaken for the cause. We forget that religions do not have inert matter to act upon; that if they frequently mould a people they still more frequently bear the stamp of that people. In the fifteenth century the inferiority of the Eastern Church is manifest; not so in the tenth century. Was it the faith of Byzance which, as has been said so often, mummified the East, or was it the Oriental spirit that petrified Greek Orthodoxy? Was it indeed the Church which hampered civilization in the lands of the Russian, the Bulgar, and the Serb? In our opinion, external influences, dependent neither upon religion nor race, arrested or delayed the progress of culture among the Orthodox nations.

The blame so commonly laid upon the Eastern Church should, in great part, be shifted to the political experiences of her children, their history, so full of storm and stress, left incomplete and, so to speak, truncated at a certain time. History in its turn passes the blame on to Geography, to the position occupied by all these Orthodox nations at the outposts of Christendom, in the regions of Europe the least European and the most exposed to inroads from Asia.

In the Byzance of old, as nowadays in Russia, the evils from which the Church suffered possibly had their root in things of a political rather than of a religious nature. Orthodoxy did not create the stationary despotism of the Lower Empire, but was its first victim. The schism between the two churches increased the evil by separating the East from the West, where the classic and barbaric

elements had best amalgamated. Geographical isolation was thus intensified by religious isolation. Forsaken, nay, occasionally assailed by the West, the peoples who followed the Greek rite —Russians, Bulgars, Serbs—fell prone before the barbarians of Asia. Then the progress of their national evolution was broken in upon and interrupted for several centuries.

It is therefore not in the Greek or Russian Church itself that we must look for the original cause of the subordinate position it has so long held as compared with the Latin Church ; or at least, it is not in its dogmas, nor in its discipline, nor in its rites, but in the schism,—that schism from which the East has suffered far more than the West. Nevertheless, the usages, traditions, and spirit of Eastern Orthodoxy account, in a great measure, for the different historical part it played as compared with Roman Catholicism. Only if we examine into the differences existing between the two churches shall we be enabled to pronounce judgment on the difference in the action of each on the communities it ruled.

We do not mean here theological divergencies, but only their consequences—intellectual, social, and political ; and, in this respect, beliefs apparently foreign to practical life frequently exercise on the manners and mode of life of nations a hidden but decisive influence.

Separated at first by mere questions of pre-eminence and discipline, the two churches are now divided by dogma. From being merely schismatic, they have become, each in the other's eye, heretical.

For a long time there was no other dogmatical difference between the Greeks and Latins than that on the question of the procession of the Holy Ghost, the East refusing to add in the Nicene Creed the *Filioque* of the Western Creed. Yet the Greeks, be it noted, even while not admitting the Holy Ghost to have proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father, never explicitly proclaimed the contrary belief. This merely theological difference, which has proved so disastrous both to Europe and the

East, was due, in reality, like most other differences between the two churches, to the fact that Rome had brought down to a greater nicety the definition of the dogma, carefully and precisely wording that which Byzance left vague and obscure. As one of the two churches refused to stop on the road of dogmatical definitions, while the other refused to advance, they had necessarily to get gradually farther and farther apart. Then national passions came into play as well as school prejudice, enhanced by a mutual antipathy of long standing, and the theologians of both camps—or at any rate those of the East, whether Greeks or Russians—incessantly labored to deepen the chasm between Byzance and Rome, striving to multiply the points of divergence, to magnify them or bring them into relief. The least important differences in dogmatic formulas, in rites, in discipline, were carefully picked up by the Greeks with the object of constructing out of them a national doctrine opposed to Rome's, and enabling themselves to reply to the accusation of schism-making by flinging in the Occidentals' face that of heresy. This line of action, formerly followed by the Greeks of the Lower Empire, the Russians, as followers and imitators of the Byzantines, took up in their turn. Thus it came to pass that Rome and Constantinople, which, in spite of occasional and intermittent anathematizing on the part of popes and patriarchs, still were in communion in the eleventh century, and even in the beginning of the twelfth,* ended by forming not only two separate churches, but two distinct and hostile confessions with two different rituals.

Thus it was that, to the old quarrel on the question of the procession of the Holy Ghost, there was added another, less ancient, concerning the Purgatory. Here again the difference arose in great part from the fact that, with the Greeks, the dogma was less

* This fact of inter-communion, which existed long after Photius accounts for the marriages between Russian princes and princesses from Kief with members of the Latin Church; for instance, that of Anna, a daughter of Yaroslav, and granddaughter of Vladímir, with the French king, Philip I.

clearly defined. The Orientals, as well as the Latins, had always prayed for the dead; but their theologians never determined, with any precision, the state in which souls are before being admitted to eternal bliss. Not content with rejecting the entire indulgence system of the Roman Church, they will not admit the purification by flames, nor even allow the souls of the deceased any means of expiating their misdoings except vicariously through the prayers of the living and the holy mysteries. To these two dogmatical differences, the former of which is of a wholly speculative nature, the Vatican, under Pope Pius IX., added two more, by instituting two dogmas which Russian and Greek theologians alike reject—that of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin and that of the Infallibility of the Pope.* Of all these points of divergence, ancient or recent, only the last has a religious and political importance. In it are summed up all the disagreements between the two Churches.

The very fact that the Latins go on adding new dogmas, while the Greeks will not hear of any new dogmatical definitions, is of material importance, for it betrays a radical difference in the conception of what the Church and the progress of Christianity should be. For the Catholics, the period of doctrine-making remains always open; for the Orthodox, it was closed long ago. They have nothing to add to the decisions passed by the great councils held prior to the rupture between Rome and Constantinople. Some Roman theologians have reduced the successive promulgation of dogmas to a theory. They represent it as a sort of gradual manifestation of the truth, becoming more and more clearly unveiled before the eyes of the faithful. This application to theology of the modern ideas of evolution and progress is rejected by the Greco-Russian Church. It refuses to allow anything to be either

* While the Russians tax the Vatican with having introduced an innovation in creating the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, Catholic writers assert that they have discovered this very belief in the Russian liturgy and in the traditions of the Old Believers of Moscow.—See Father Gagárin in *L'Eglise Russe et l'Immaculée Conception*, 1876.

added to its creed or taken from it. "Our Church knows nothing of evolution," Seraphim, the Metropolitan of Petersburgh, said to an English theologian in the reign of Nicolas. In this respect Orthodoxy is almost as far removed from the Catholics as from the Protestants.

The area covered by Oriental dogma being originally more narrow and incapable of increase, the space left for discussion is, for that very reason, ampler and less in danger of being trespassed on. More room is left to variety of views and schools. Greek Orthodoxy having no central authority invested with the right either of condemning errors or proclaiming truths, there is a two-fold reason why the horizon open to thought or individual interpretation should be a wide one.

If we admit that liberty of thought is an element of progress, it will not be on this point that we shall find the Greek religion in any way behind the Latin; but if this theological latitude has become an advantage in our days, we can scarcely help seeing in it in the past a cause, or more correctly a sign, of inferiority. For, this dogmatic immobility, while it is now, in a way, becoming a pledge of liberty, was originally produced by a sort of spiritual somnolence. It was one of the effects of that intellectual numbness which has for centuries held the East paralyzed. Christian Greece, in the flush of the first Christian age, was deeply in love with speculation and abstractions; and if she ceased to dispute and split hairs on dogma, was it not because, under the Turkish yoke which succeeded Byzantine despotism, her worn-out genius had lost the taste for lofty research, and was fain to come down to idle subtilities, or become absorbed in a narrow and petty formalism? If Moscovite or Petersburghian Russia has not dug deep into the abysses of higher theology, but has been content piously to preserve the deposit of Church tradition, is it not because the Russian spirit does not incline towards metaphysics? because Moscow never possessed men like those whose memory the Greeks gradually lost—men like Origen, Athanasius, Gregory? If the

Eastern Church became frozen in her dogma, it was because she had lost the warmth of youthful blood.

A brilliant and at times paradoxical apologist of Eastern Orthodoxy, Khomiakòf, has taken pains to detect in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism a common principle, developed in opposite directions. What the Russian slavophil disapproved of, both in Rome and the Reformation, under the name of Latin Rationalism, was the liking for logical deductions, definitions, abstractions. He did not seem to realize that this very taste has been one of the motor principles of modern science and philosophy as well as of mediæval scholasticism and the Reformation, while the absence of it left a blank in the spiritual life of the nations that follow the Greek rite; but now, when safer fields than theology open out before the mind, the disciples of the Greco-Russian Church may find it to their advantage that these obscure regions should not have been explored in the East.

The Latins and the Greeks differ considerably as to the manner of conceiving the Christian dogma; they differ still more deeply as to the organization of the ecclesiastical power. With their parallel hierarchies of priests and bishops, the two churches are in diametrical opposition as to the mode of church government. Eastern Orthodoxy knows of no living authority before which it should bow in all things. The Russian and Greek Catechism teaches that the Church has no head but Christ, and does not acknowledge any vicar in his place. In view of the controversies so lately aroused in the Catholic world by the proclamation of the Papal Infallibility, the Greeks, and especially the Russians, showed great pride in never having submitted to the spiritual over-lordship of Rome. Times and again I have heard them insist upon this contrast between the two churches, delighting in emphasizing all the consequences thereof.

"You call Russia the native land of autocracy," they would say to me; "yet you in France acknowledge one far more absolute—the religious autocracy of the Pope. We may not follow in

our State your principle of the division of powers, but we do in our Church. In this Orthodox world, which you look down upon, the legislative power reserved to the Councils, and the executive and administrative power vested in the bishops or National Synods, are never united, while they are so, indissolubly, on one head in Rome. Being unprovided with a visible head, our religion cannot interfere, in the same way that yours does, with the consciences and lives of the nations. The entire power it has received from heaven is not centred in one voice, alone lifted in command. The collective authority of the Church, which, with us, takes the place of the personal infallibility of the Pope, has no permanent organ of expression. None of our prelates have the right to speak to us in the name of the whole Church : this is the privilege of the Œcumenical Councils, and such assemblies are often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to bring together. It would have been far more difficult to establish an Inquisition with us than it was in the West, and still more to keep it up. Not that our clergy did not frequently have recourse to the secular arm ; not that it does not meddle with approving or prohibiting opinions or books, but all these things are done less logically, with a less overwhelming weight of authority. Our Synod, indeed, has its spiritual censor, to which all works treating of religious matters are subject. The liberty of the press in these matters is therefore not as great in Russia as in most Catholic countries. Not with Orthodoxy, however, lies the blame, but with the State, which still thinks it necessary to give to the ecclesiastical decision, the support of its sanction—a support which, in the West, has generally been withdrawn by the civil power. Even when we are condemned by our bishops, or reduced to silence by their censure, our opinions, our consciences, still remain freer than yours. The decisions of the Holy Synod of Petersburgh, or of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, can have only a local value : neither claims to be infallible. We have no equivalent for your *Roma locuta est :* we have no judge with authority over consciences to be compared

with that of the Pope or of the congregations instituted by him: we know nothing of those censures without appeal to which a Fénélon submits, and which a Lamennais resists only at the price of leaving the Church. Here, in Russia, our spiritual censure is hardly more than a matter of ecclesiastical police."

Thus speak the Russians, and on this point the adversaries of their Church are at one with its panegyrists. "At this present time," wrote a man who knew Orthodoxy for having been brought up in it,* "the strangest anarchy prevails in the Russian Church. So you take the sacraments in the first or last week of Lent, no ecclesiastical authority will dream of asking you what you believe or what you do not. You may reject the most essential dogmas; so long as you do not exclude yourself from the communion of the Church, she will not exclude you." This last assertion of a Russian prince who died a member of the Society of Jesus may seem rather exaggerated. Every follower of the Orthodox Church is in conscience bound to conform his faith to the decisions of the Councils and the Fathers of the Church. It is, nevertheless, true that the Councils not having defined or the Fathers foreseen everything, and modern controversy or exegesis often passing by the old theological quarrels, the Orthodox religion enjoys a latitude which could scarcely be taken from it. In this respect, as in several others, the Greco-Russian Church is not unlike the Anglican Church, and yet the latter, with its Thirty-nine Articles, has really more closely determined its doctrinal boundaries.

In Russia, as in England, this liberty allowed on the border lands of faith is not equally to the taste of everybody. There are souls that feel the need of some authority to tell them whether they are in the right and spare them the anguish of doubt. To such, the Greco-Russian Church appears lacking in one of the chief advantages of faith. "Should some difference arise to-day on purely theological matters, let us say like the two questions which have divided France in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

* Father Gagárin, *L'Église Russe et l'Immaculée Conception*, p. 51.

turies, Jansenism and Quietism, what tribunal of the Greek Church could be looked to for a decision?" So spoke a woman of lofty nature, who, though having left the national church, was not less a Russian in mind, culture, and appearance. "Scripture," Madame Svetchin went on, "the Œcumenical Councils, the Fathers, could not have foreseen or sufficiently developed all the points which, in the course of time, might arouse dispute." Such a line of thought leads to the foot of the Roman throne. For such souls the Papal Infallibility is an attractive magnet, but it must be admitted that they are considerably less numerous in the land of autocracy than in free England. The Russians want their liberty of faith, even if they make little use of it. Their clergy itself does not care much for the theological problems which have agitated the West. Their priests complacently repeat that they are content with the faith of the Fathers, and to the Fathers they refer you on all possible questions. One of the things for which they most find fault with Rome is what they call her passion for over-defining and over-regulating. "We believe," said a Russian church dignitary to an Oxford doctor who, like Madame Svetchin, was inclined to seek rest under the shadow of papal authority, "we believe there are many things which the Church should confess to not knowing, because they were not revealed, and because, in such things, definition should end somewhere."

The lack of a sole and supreme head, invested with the glamor of infallibility, produces consequences of more importance still to the external constitution of the Church and the position she holds towards peoples and governments. Having no such head, the Eastern Church has no need of temporal power. Having no local centre, she does not require an international capital, a Holy City, or an ecclesiastical State placed, for the safeguard of religion, outside of the international common law, and above the casualties of current events. The Eastern Church thus escapes one of the great difficulties which beset the Latin Church, who is compelled, by the principle underlying her existence, to claim an earthly

royalty which the modern ideas on liberty and nationality do not any longer seem to admit of. She escapes, at the same time, all temptation to grasp at a theocratic suzerainty. In a Church which has no monarchical unity, there can be no question of raising a representative of the Deity high above peoples and crowns. For this reason, the East deems itself safe from that strife between the two powers which, for so long a time, and under so many forms, has distracted the West, and which, even in our days, still deeply troubles a portion of the Catholic world. As the system of compensation holds good in politics, so the Orthodox Church, as well as the Reformed Church, has seldom brought the State into subjection, but more often been encroached upon by the State.*

The Greco-Russian Orthodox Church, for the same reasons, could not but tend towards decentralization and variety, in opposition to Roman uniformity and centralization. No local church had the right to force upon the others its own usages, its liturgy, its language. Even while gathering peoples into one fold, Eastern Christianity never could subject them to one jurisdiction, for none of them would brook a foreign rule: so the one Church naturally had to constitute itself into several national and independent churches—"autocephalous" ("being their own heads") is the word used by Greek theologians.

This is the main fact which dominates the entire ecclesiastical history of the East, that of Russia in particular, and which is alone sufficient to account for the intestine dissensions and revolutions of the Byzantine Church. Religious autonomy for the vari-

* Still, the East has supplied one instance of an ecclesiastical principality in Montenegro. The Black Mountain was long governed by its bishops —its *vladỳkas*,—who succeeded one another from uncle to nephew. This singular arrangement was a product of local conditions. Through their long struggle against the Mussulman invaders, the Christians of the Black Mountain naturally rallied around their bishop. The sovereign power was not secularized until 1851, when Prince Danìlo, reserving to himself the civil authority, transferred the episcopal dignity to one of his cousins.

ous nations dwelling within its pale is the national and rational form—indeed the only possible form—for Greco-Russian Orthodoxy. It has an insuperable tendency to mould itself on the people; to adapt the ecclesiastical organization with perfect exactness to political divisions, and the limits of the different churches to those of states and nations. There is room for uncertainty, rival claims, and local contention only where the two terms, Church and Nationality, do not cover each other, for then the Church does not know to which to conform.

This tendency is exactly opposed to that of Latin Catholicism, and this opposition it is, owing to which the destinies of Constantinople and Rome have been shaped so differently: there is all the difference between centrifugal and centripetal force.

Although, even now, the East does not dispute the primacy of the Roman See,—the New Rome does not disallow the precedence of Old Rome,—yet she never recognized the other's jurisdiction in the slightest degree. According to the Eastern theologians, Rome and Constantinople, as first and second capital of the Roman Empire, could each claim the primacy, one in the East, the other in the West. The Roman Pontiff is, in their eyes, only the Patriarch of the West; and the suzerainty which they refuse to him they certainly will not allow to any of their own patriarchs. The title of "Œcumenical" assumed by the See of Constantinople was unsubstantial, except in so far as it was supported by imperial authority and pretensions. Being unable to rest her supremacy on the right of inheritance from the Head of the Apostles, the Byzantine Church had, sooner or later, willingly or forced thereto, to sanction the emancipation of her spiritual daughters.

The Russian Church was the first to establish her independence; her example was followed by all the Orthodox states—Greece, Servia, Roumania. For these, as for ancient Moscovia, the state of dependence in which the Ottoman Porte holds the Patriarchate served only as a pretence for throwing off the ecclesi-

astical suzerainty of Constantinople. The jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople is tied to the authority of the Sultans, as it formerly was to that of the Greek emperors: every dismemberment of the Turkish Empire brings about a dismemberment of the Byzantine Church. The enfranchisement of Christian peoples always narrows, by so much, the spiritual domain of the Eastern Chief Pontiff, for Greco-Russian Orthodoxy does not allow the clergy of an independent state to recognize the authority of a foreign head. So that, with their pompous title of Œcumenical Patriarchs, the Bishops of Constantinople will soon hold, in the Eastern community, a merely nominal primacy.

This individualizing tendency of the churches raises delicate questions often misunderstood by the West. Once that the frontiers of a state are also the boundaries of its church, ecclesiastical divisions must answer to national divisions, religious annexation follow on political annexation. Russia offers two instances of this —in Grúzia (Georgia) and in Bessarabia. In coming under the Russian domination, these two countries passed under the jurisdiction of the Russian Church.

Especial interest is added to this ecclesiastical incorporation by the fact that the Roumanians of Bessarabia, like the Gruzians of the Caucasus, were in possession, if not of a liturgy, at least of a national liturgical language. While subjecting them to the synod which rules her own clergy, Russia has not yet forced upon these alien peoples the old Slavic tongue, the only one in use in Russian churches. The Roumanians of Bessarabia have no bishops of their own: they depend upon the Russian bishop of their province, but in their own churches, the services are carried on in Roumanian. The little Gruzian Church, older by five or six centuries than the great Russian Church, and possessed of a most ancient ritual, is not placed much more favorably. It does, indeed, form a separate church unit, headed by a prelate who bears the title of Exarch, but there is nothing national about him

but the name. The Exarch is a Russian; and in his Cathedral of Tiflis mass is said in old Slavic. To the great sorrow of patriots, the Gruzian language has been entirely relegated to a few convents and to a few parishes.

The annexations of the Russian Church have their counterpart in the progressive dismemberment of the Church of Constantinople. The Bulgarian schism, which, ever since 1873, has so greatly disturbed Russian diplomacy, is an instance to the point. Until that year, the Christian populations of Turkey used to wait until they had obtained political emancipation before they signified to the Patriarch their religious independence. The Bulgars began at the other end. Before it was given to them to form themselves into a nation, they demanded of the Porte and the Patriarchate the institution of an autonomous Bulgarian Church. The Phanar, which, under cover of the Turkish domination, had rebuilt a sort of Hellenic hegemony as far as the Danube and the Save, could not but oppose with all their power a claim which, if assented to, would have annulled, at one stroke, their work of many centuries. They could not bear to witness the revival, under a form more threatening than ever, of the ancient Bulgarian Metropolitan Church, the very memory of which their prelates have done their best to obliterate by everywhere substituting Greek for Slavic in the churches, and systematically burning up the Bulgarian missals. The opposition of the Patriarchate was the more intense that it would have been no easy task to establish the boundaries of this ecclesiastical district. For, to determine the precise line of demarcation between the young Bulgarian and the old Greek Churches would have been the same as determining the line between the two nationalities, and settling beforehand the share of Slavs and Hellenes in the Ottoman inheritance. Rather than consent to this, the Phanar preferred to break with their Bulgarian flock, and excommunicated the revolted Slavs.

The Patriarch and Synod of Constantinople contended that the claims of the Bulgarians were contrary to the canons of the

Church: that ecclesiastical boundaries should answer exactly to political boundaries; that, in one and the same state, there cannot possibly be more than one Orthodox Church. The demand of the Bulgars was therefore solemnly condemned as heresy, under the name of "phyletism." *

The anathemas hurled by the great Church of Constantinople did not prevent the Porte, which was displeased with the Greeks at the time, from issuing a *firman* erecting the Bulgarian communities into an autonomous church. Only a few years later Bulgaria became an independent principality. Had the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch been limited to the new state and to the province of Eastern Roumelia, which was annexed to Bulgaria soon after, the Œcumenical Patriarchate would have been compelled, in accordance with its own principles, to acknowledge it. But the jurisdiction of the Exarch is extended by the *firmans* of the Sultan beyond the Bulgarian frontiers over dioceses situated in Thracia and Macedonia, these countries being politically subject to the Porte and still a matter for contention between Hellenism and Slavism. So the Bulgaro-Greek schism has been kept up, and the Russian Church never ventured to commit herself on one or the other side, being unwilling, on the one hand, to alienate her Slavic brethren, and, on the other, to scandalize the faithful by a rupture with the mother church.

When the ecclesiastical independence of the Serbs, the Roumanians, and the Hellenes was to be proclaimed, similiar difficulties arose.† So long as the mutual limits of Eastern states and

* From the Greek "*phylê*, tribe, race, nation." In spite of this condemnation, phyletism—or, as we should say, nationalism—has triumphed among the Orthodox subjects of Austro-Hungary as well as in Turkey. The Roumanians of Hungary have obtained the institution of a Roumanian autocephalous church, under a Metropolitan residing at Herrmannstadt, while the Serbs of the same kingdom remain subject to the Patriarch at Carlovitz. The Austrian government has entered into a concordate with the Patriarch at Constantinople on behalf of its Orthodox subjects of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

† It was only in 1885 that the Œcumenical Patriarch and his Synod recognized the entire independence of the Roumanian Church and her

nationalities are not finally determined, the Orthodox Church remains exposed to similar schisms, only religion has nothing to do with them, except externally. They are, in reality, entirely of a political nature, essentially local and temporary.

In spite of these transient disagreements, Russia, the small Christian states of the East, the Orthodox churches of Austro-Hungary and the ancient Patriarchates still pretend that they form but one Church. Nor are they altogether wrong; all Orthodox nations belong to the same confession, only the bond between them is not as close as that which keeps Catholic countries riveted together as with chains. They merely form a confederacy; and nothing short of the political unification of the entire East could ever bring the Eastern Church under one supreme authority—in other words, the annexation to Russia of all the Orthodox peoples, the secret dream of Moscow. Once let the Byzantine Patriarch become a subject of the Tsar, and he would, in very truth, be once again the Œcumenical Patriarch.

The different churches of the Orthodox world have, indeed, no need of a common centre, their unity being insured by the immutability of the dogma. Faith being a matter of tradition, not liable either to addition or to curtailment, the churches which profess it can do without either Pontiff or Synod or Congress, whether permanent or periodical. This organization of the Church in peoples and states has, in the eyes of its panegyrists, the advantage of combining two things which do not usually go together—religious unity and ecclesiastical independence, the œcumenical principle and the national. They flatter themselves that they can, in this way, escape what they call Roman Cosmopolitism without falling into what they designate as the anarchy of Prostestantism. The Russian Slavophils were so delighted with this constitution of Greco-Slavic Christianity that they were ready

equality with the other autocephalous churches. Up to 1883, the Roumanian clergy sent to Constantinople every year for the Holy Chrism, and the Patriarchate would fain have maintained the usage as a sort of token of supremacy.

to see therein the germ of the religious renovation of Europe—just as in the semi-socialistic commune of Great-Russia they fancied that they had discovered the only means of Europe's economic renovation. History's verdict will be that the nationalization of the Eastern churches has caused both their weakness and their strength. In no country is this so manifest as in Russia.

BOOK II. CHAPTER II.

Consequences of the National Constitution of the Orthodox Church—Interference of the Civil Power—How the Close Relation between Church and State has been rather an Obstacle to Liberty of Thought and Political Liberty—Of the Use of a National Language in the Liturgy—Church Slavic—It Favors Nationality but Hinders the Progress of Culture in Russia—In what Sense Eastern Orthodoxy Occupies an Intermediate Position between Catholicism and Protestantism—Scripture and Biblical Societies in Russia—The Two Currents in the Russian Church.

The first consequence of the national constitution of the churches belonging to the Greek rite was the interference of the civil power with their affairs. Each of them, though independent of all the others, is not independent of its own State. This is a feature common to all Orthodox countries, to Greek democracy as well as to Russian autocracy. In this respect, Russia in no way differs from the other countries of the same faith; only, her government being stronger, the bond which ties the Church to it is closer. The Russian Church has been, and is, just what a national church can be in an autocratic state.

The conditions in which the Byzantine Church was placed under the Lower Empire were a premonition of what awaited her daughter. In Constantinople, also, the imperial power made itself felt in the sanctuary, and the hand of the Greek *autocrator*, especially under the Comnenians, frequently was heavier and more intrusive than that of the tsars ever was.

To most Russians, as to many Westerners, the subordination of religion and the Church to the civil power seems a pledge of political liberty as well as of liberty of thought. History does not confirm this view; what we know of Russia and the Greek Em-

pire would rather incline us to the opposite opinion. If the Eastern Church in Moscow, no less than in Byzance, helped to create intellectual stagnation and political despotism, it was precisely through her dependence on the State, and because her inability to withstand and combat a civil power left it unbalanced and unchecked. While in the West the conflicts between the two powers, which the Russians so complacently boast of having escaped, left ample space to freedom of thought, to political liberty, to the claims and rights of those they governed, in the East, on the contrary, the civil power, having no rival to keep it in check, found it much easier to attain absolutism. Civil authority, propped up and supported by religious authority, weighed heavily both on souls and bodies. To lift this double weight, superhuman strength was needed. There was always more or less confusion between spiritual and temporal things. The commands of the sovereign were issued as though they had been those of God; while the dictates of the Church were, in their turn, reinforced by all the weight of the sovereign's authority. In this sense religion may be said, if not to have created autocracy, to have made it possible in Moscow, as well as in Byzance, by opposing no barrier to it. In a Catholic country possessing an ecclesiastical hierarchy subject to an independent head residing outside of the country, autocracy either would never have come up or could not have endured any length of time; the Church, unless crushed, would have resisted. It is thus that Catholicism, which in many ways seems less favorable to liberty, in reality fostered its development. It is, so to speak, liberal in spite of itself, because it opposes a limit to the excessive power of the State, let the sovereign be emperor or people. This is what a national church cannot do; or can do in only a very slight degree.

Russia lacks none of the advantages usually credited to national churches—concord between the two powers, strength of the government, moral unity of the nation, harmony between the noblest inclinations of the human heart, religious feeling and

patriotic feeling. In great historical crises, the strength of the State has always been doubled by the co-operation of the Church. Yet that same Church always has been a hindrance to the progress of Russian culture. If the civil power has, on one hand, easily checked any encroachment attempted by the spiritual power, it has, on the other, frequently yielded to the temptation to oust the Church from the sanctuary. The priest has often been transformed into the functionary; while the layman could always expect to be treated by the Church more as a subject than as a member of her flock. By making a legal obligation of religious duties, the State has fashioned for itself a weapon out of religion, sometimes even a real police. The jurisdiction of the Church, curtailed on one side, was extended on the other to the seeming benefit of the State, to the real damage of the nation and of religion itself.

This intimate connection between Church and State has inoculated Russia with the disease peculiar to the East—stagnation, and aggravated the evil peculiar to Russia—isolation. Not content with repressing every stirring of the national mind, the two united powers put a stop to the inroads of ideas from abroad, and religion intensified national prejudice just as much as patriotic feeling. Old-time Russians used to fly from contact with Europe as from contagion; a trip to foreign countries was all but a sin, endangering the soul. There is a well-known story of a great Russian lord whom Peter the Great sent abroad to visit Germany or Italy, and who, after having made quite a stay in one of the great cities of those countries, returned home without having seen anything of it. As soon as he arrived, he had shut himself up in his lodgings, and never stepped outside of them, nor allowed anybody inside. He had in this way obeyed both the Tsar and his conscience. There still are in Russia many sectarians capable of just such scruples.

One of the things which during the Middle Ages favored most the blossoming of modern civilization was having a scholarly

clerical language for international use: the East had no such language. The Greek Church, more than any other, seemed entitled to impose her language upon her spiritual colonies, for was it not that of the New Testament and the Septuagint? She did not do so, but left each people in the possession of its ancestral tongue.

Ever since their conversion at the end of the tenth century, the Russians celebrated divine service in Old Slavic. The Greek missionaries who baptized Vladímir's Varangians introduced among them the language created in the preceding century by the apostles of the Slavs, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who were themselves two hellenized Slavs from Thessalonica. This Church-Slavic, written down by the two brothers for the Slavs of Moravia, was the liturgical language adopted by the neighbors of the Russians, the Bulgars, at that time the most redoubtable and most cultivated of Slavic peoples. It was brought to them with Christianity by Cyril and Methodius' own disciples when the Magyar invasion swept away the Church of Moravia.

The Bulgarian Empire, which extended to the very gates of Constantinople, served as intermediary between Byzantine culture and the Slavs, whether Serbs or Russians. Religious literature, at that time the only literature existing in almost any country, was already in high honor there and was fed by translations from the Greek. When the Byzantine missionaries of the tenth and eleventh centuries took their books to the Russians, they naturally used the Slavic versions in vogue among the Slavs of the Balkans. Long after that, Bulgaria, then Russia's elder sister, was still the fountain-head of Orthodox Slavic literature. Even when she had succumbed under the Turkish scimetar, her religious literature still continued to defray that of Russia.

Church-Slavic, the language still in use among all the Orthodox Slavs, is not the mother of Slavic tongues in the same way that Latin is the mother of Latin languages. It is nearest akin to Old Slovenic and Old Bulgaric, and is only an ancient form of the

dialects of the vast region that might be called Danubian Slavia, before the invasion of the Bulgars broke it up into scattered tribes and isolated peoples. More or less corrupted through the ignorance of copyists, Church-Slavic underwent in each country the influence of the local language.* Up to the time of Peter the Great this was the written language of all Russia, and now is still that of the Church. In this sacred dialect, the devotion of the people finds forms sufficiently like their own language to be understood by them, and, at the same time, sufficiently ancient and different to lend an additional dignity to worship.

Have Russia and her culture been greatly benefited by this substitution of Church-Slavic for a foreign liturgical language? One might think that the use of Slavic in the place of Greek or Latin would have been an advantage to the national language, to national eloquence and poetry, which would naturally find in it idioms and a phrasing invested by time and religion with a peculiar majesty. Yet Russian critics doubt it. Several, and not the least eminent, make Church-Slavic responsible for the tardy development of the Russian language. They accuse it of having stifled the spoken language at its birth, along with popular national literature. The greater the resemblance between the vulgar tongue and the solemn language of the Church, the harder it was for the former to shake itself free from the latter. Had they been more unlike, they would have separated more easily. Closely linked to a dead language, the living language could not grow and take shape freely. The sacred dialect tended to lower it to the rank of a boorish *patois*. While France, Germany, Italy, Spain, under the rule of the Latin of schools and clerks, have had a national literature as early as the twelfth or thirteenth century, nothing could grow in Russia under the shade of Church-Slavic.

Nor is this the only or even the principal harm done by the

* Accordingly, in Slavic manuscripts three different forms may be distinguished: the Bulgarian—which is the oldest, the Serbian, and the Russian.

Slavic liturgy to Russian culture. It has hampered it in still another way by doing its share in aggravating the historical evil —the isolation of the country. It is by separating Russia almost equally from West and East, not only in space but also in time, by leaving it outside of the two great classical civilizations, that Church-Slavic has contributed to Russia's isolation and stagnation. Having no literature or history of its own, the Slavic language, even while taking the place of Greek or Latin, could not open to the Russians the treasures of antiquity, and thus supply them with the means of intellectual emancipation. It became one of the causes of the inferiority of Slavic clergies, cutting them off equally from the Christian and the classical sources.

This question of a liturgical language, secondary as it apparently is, had on the development of Russia an influence perhaps equal to that of the Eastern Church itself. How many centuries would the Teutonic world have fallen behind had one of its dialects—say the Gothic of Ulphilas—held in its churches through the Middle Ages the place of Latin, if the Roman tongue had not, before Luther ejected it from its temples, prepared Germany for her Renaissance as well as for her Reformation? For Russia to be brought nearer to Europe, it was necessary that our vulgar tongues should have almost everywhere supplanted Latin, even while incapable of filling its place. No nation has been so much given to wielding the great vehicle for the knowledge of the modern world—the living languages. Nevertheless, the absence of intercourse with classical antiquity and the Latin Middle Ages will always be a dividing line between the Russians and other nations, whether Protestant or Catholic.

On the other hand, however, the rule of Slavic in the Church, and, for a long time, in civil life, has been fraught for Russia with great national and political advantages. The language of Cyril and Methodius, in spite of local alterations, has proved a firm bond between Orthodox Slavic peoples. It has kept alive among them the consciousness of a common origin; while the extreme diffu-

sion of Latin has long ceased to form a bond of kindred between the neo-Latin nations. If *Kyrie Eleïson* were sung in the Russian Church instead of "*Gòspodi pomíluy*," there might never have been such a thing as Panslavism. Should this wild dream ever materialize, the Slavic liturgy will have much to do with it; and even should the Serbs and Bulgars now substitute their own national languages for the Cyrilian Old Slavic, the latter would have rendered Russia priceless service in the past. It helped to prevent the denationalization of the Little-Russians and the White-Russians when both were subject to Lithuania and Poland, and paved the way for the reunion of White-Russia and Little-Russia with Moscovite Russia. More than that, it has helped make the Russian nationality equally with Orthodoxy itself. In the interior of Great-Russia, long overrun with Finno-Turkish tribes, the sacred language gave to the Slavic element an immense advantage over the alien elements. As Soloviòf has said, the language of the Church greatly helped to slavicize the Finnic tribes of which she made converts. Liturgical Slavic has been, in the past, a means of russification; so it is to this day after a lapse of eight centuries. The Emperors of all the Russias used the *pravoslav* rite to cement their power in the East and West over Asia and over Europe; just as the *Kniàzes* of Kief, of Nòvgorod, or of Vladímir, and the Tsars of Moscow did before them. Cyril and Methodius, when they translated the Greek liturgy for their Slavic proselytes, and invented an alphabet for the purpose, were working, all unconsciously, for a people whose very name, possibly, was unknown to them.

The Slavic language, as used in the liturgy, may be taken as symbolical of the position held by the Russian Church in the midst of the other Christian denominations. The Russians are like the Catholics, inasmuch as in their sacred books they make use of an ancient language, and like the Protestants, inasmuch as that language is a national one, a dialect inherited from their Slavic forefathers, not borrowed from another race. At the same time,

they are, on this point, equally remote from Rome and from the Reformation. The Russian Church herself is in exactly the same position as her liturgical language. Contrary to common opinion she comes, perhaps, less near to Roman papacy than to the Episcopal churches which have issued out of the Reformation. The poor Prince of Anhalt, father of Catherine II., was not really far from the truth when he allowed his daughter to be converted to Russian Orthodoxy on the ground that between that and Lutheranism there was not much to choose.

All this does not mean that the Eastern Church is anything like a compromise between Catholicism and Protestantism ; it has its own original tendencies which make it a thing quite distinct from both, and opposed to both. "The Orthodox Church" its apologists will tell you, "remains fixed in the centre of Christendom, equally remote from its opposite poles : because it is the Primeval Church, from which the Westerners having swerved, could arrive at only one of two things—Catholic autocracy or Protestant anarchy." This immutability is the pride of the Eastern Church ; and both Catholics and Protestants are much mistaken when they imagine her attitude toward its Western antagonists to be humble and almost shamefaced. Her theologians, holding their stand on this immutability as on a rock, look down with a haughty pity on the religious dissensions of the West. The way in which members of the Russian Church met the advances of the old Catholics or the Anglicans is very instructive on this point. They have never shown any eagerness to meet either of them half way, and have always repulsed any compromise which they thought contrary to the traditions or usages of their own Church.

Such advances have been repeatedly made and have always come from the West. As early as the sixteenth century, the Lutherans entered into communication with the Patriarchate at Constantinople in the hopes of getting the Patriarch Jeremiah to give his sanction to the Confession of Augsburg which had been translated

into Greek for his benefit. These appeals have always been barren of results, yet they are repeated from time to time. It is naturally the Church of England and in this Church the historical school which is reacting against Protestant influences and likes to call itself "English Catholic," which has cherished most this dream of a union between the rebel daughter of Rome and her recreant Eastern sister.* Of all such attempts, the most worthy of attention was that made by an Oxford theologian, a friend of Dr. Newman, W. Palmer, who, in the reign of Nicolas, and with the approval of his ecclesiastical superiors, undertook a journey to Russia not so much with the object of studying the Russian Church at home as of entering into communion with her. Palmer came to believe the Orthodox and Anglican doctrines to be almost identical. He did not see many difficulties concerning the use of *eĭkons*, as it was sanctioned by the second Nicene Council. On these grounds the English doctor expected to be admitted to communion by the Orthodox Church. He had interviews with the highest dignitaries of the Russian Church, but could not get them to share his views.† In the eyes of the Russian prelates, there could be no communion between their church and the Anglican unless an understanding were previously established between the hierarchies of both churches; indeed, they doubted whether the authority of a council were not needed. In point of fact, such a question must be always more difficult to decide for the Orthodox than for the Catholic Church; as, in the case of the latter, the papal authority can always settle the point. By consenting to treat the Anglican like Orthodox brethren, the Russians would run the risk of scandalizing their Eastern brethren, and so losing on

* Anglicans have long shown great interest in the Eastern Church. It has been the subject of numerous works, among which we will mention those of J. Neale, *History of the Holy Eastern Church* (4 vols.), and of Stanley, the illustrious Dean of Westminster, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church.*

† Palmer left an account of this curious negotiation in the form of travelling notes, which were published forty years later by his friend, Cardinal Newman, under the title of *Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church.*

one side what they would gain on the other. The question, therefore, of inter-communion between the Episcopal churches of the East and West will probably long remain open, notwithstanding their mutual sympathies, and independently of divergencies in doctrine or discipline.

The Old-Catholics of Switzerland and Germany have made similar efforts with as little success. Although, in their Congresses, they expressed, time and again, their hope of a reunion with the Eastern Church, the latter has shown little wish to open her arms to them. Once, a society formed in Petersburgh and composed of both churchmen and laymen, under the name of "Society of the Friends of Religious Instruction," entered into communication with the Old Catholics of Germany by means of writings and delegations. No movement could be more pleasing to the Russians, to whom papal infallibility is as repulsive as to the German Protestants; yet they observed the greatest reserve in responding to the advances of the Latin apostates, always speaking in the tone of a church which believes in its fundamental principles, and will not yield an iota of them. Even while encouraging these Old Catholics, the Russians did not spare them plain speaking. "If you really wish to be united to us," one of the master spirits of the Slavophils said to them, "you will not have done enough by rejecting the last Vatican Council; you will have to overhaul ten centuries of Latin traditions."

With all her impassibility in the face of the adversaries who attack her from the two opposite sides, the Russian Church can not entirely escape their influence. True, this double attraction in two contrary directions, if well balanced, must contribute to keep her at an equal distance from the two extremes. This double attraction can be traced to the earliest time when Russia came into contact with the West. This is one of the most curious aspects of European influence over Russia, yet it has been very generally overlooked. Under Peter the Great, these two tenden-

cies are embodied in the two most influential members of the Church: Stepàn (Stephen) Yavòrsky, the representative of the Patriarch during the interval left by Peter between the death of the last dignitary invested with the title and the institution of the Holy Synod; and Theophanus Prokópovitch, the counsellor of the tsar in the matter of his ecclesiastical reform. Hence there are, ever since Peter's time, two schools in the clergy, one of which insists more on the opposition of Orthodoxy to Catholicism and the other on that to Protestantism. This controversy passed into the Catechisms and theological treatises, and sometimes crops up even in questions of rite and discipline, the one party being more strictly conservative, and the other less averse to reforms and innovations.

Under the reign of Nicolas and the administration of Count Protássof, Procurator of the Holy Synod, there was a reaction against the Protestant influences which had prevailed in the Church through the eighteenth century. The government based all its acts on the principle of authority and tradition; it did not fail to enforce it in the Church against the school of Prokópovitch, Peter's spiritual collaborator. Protestant or Evangelical tendencies might be detected in the writings of the two most illustrious prelates of modern Russia, Plato and Philaret, who both held the Metropolitan See of Moscow. The eloquent Philaret was forced, under Nicolas, to rewrite his celebrated Catechism, so as to make it differ more widely from the theologians of the Reformation. The Russian Church, from that time, ceased to turn its helm towards Luther or towards Anglicanism; it stopped midway on the road on which Peter the Great and his successor had started it, and has been careful ever since to keep strictly to the principle of traditional immobility. If it could not suppress entirely the two opposing tendencies, it has striven, through the latter half of the present century, to keep them nicely balanced.

Yet Protestant ideas are, to this day, in great favor with a portion of the clergy: as a rule, the most cultivated. This comes

from studying Protestant schools and books, and partly also from the late revival of theological studies generally, and the efforts which have been made to raise the intellectual level of the clergy. The spirit of the Reformation is quietly stealing its way into seminaries and ecclesiastical academies along with the works of German theologians. The same with laymen—at least, those of the educated classes. Many of these—and often the most devout—are nothing but Protestant ritualists, though they do not know it. It must be admitted, however, that society men and women, in religion as in all things, show the widest eclecticism. In foreign countries they may be seen to frequent all and any churches, almost indiscriminately, appreciating, after the manner of impartial amateurs, the best preachers of rival denominations.

The Church is restrained in these innovating tendencies by the spirit of tradition and discipline, in which has always lain her strength; by the necessity of keeping up her communion with the East; by the fear of scandalizing the people and of strengthening the dissident sects. She is kept from school quarrels and factions by the hand of the State, which ensures the cohesion of the Church; so that the currents which underlie her surface scarcely cause it to ripple, and certainly do not result in any deep-reaching perturbation. There is nothing there to compare to the antagonism of the two or three parties into which the Anglican Church is divided; the national institutions and manners would still less admit of parties in the Church than in the State. If Russia may be said to have a High Church and a Low Church, it is only in the form of the latent rivalry which exists between its two clerical bodies—the Black Clergy and the White Clergy: the High monastic and celibate clergy and the Low married lay clergy. In accordance with their respective positions and mode of life, the High clergy is naturally more conservative and more aristocratic; the Low clergy, more inclined to levelling and innovating.

One of the most curious episodes in the struggle between these two parties in the Russian Church—*les Protestantisants et les Catho-*

licisants as J. de Maistre called them—is undoubtedly the history of the biblical societies. In principle, the Orthodox Church takes very much the same stand towards Scripture as the Latin. Both hold that the authority of tradition is equal to that of the sacred books themselves. The Scripture can be interpreted only conformably to the teachings of the Church, the Councils, and the Fathers.* Practically, dogma being less accurately defined, tradition having no supreme authority to confirm it, the Orthodox Christians have more latitude in their interpretation; besides which, Church-Slavic being much less remote from the spoken language than Latin is from the neo-Latin tongues, the question of translating the Scriptures into the popular language could not have the same importance in Russia that it has in the West. The people, indeed, long preferred to read the Gospel in the sacred language; the version into the popular dialect seemed to it derogatory to the sacred text, almost a profanation.

With the Russians, as with the Greeks, this question has given rise to several changes of opinion. On one hand, the wish to be as unlike the Latin as possible combined with Protestant influences to encourage translations into the vulgar tongue; on the other, the hierarchy was held back by the fear of lending a hand to innovations and seeming to sanction the ignorant sects of Great-Russia. It was under Alexander I., the friend of the mystic Mme. de Krudener, that the people were invited to adopt a Russian translation of the Bible. True, very few could read at that time, and among those few, peasants or small tradesmen, the Lives of the Saints, the Prayer Book and sundry treatises by the Fathers, along with apocrypha of all kinds, were more widely read than the two Testaments, with the single exception of the Book of Psalms, which has always been a favorite with devout Russians.

* It should be noticed that, among the Eastern Christians, especially the Greeks, the number of canonical books has not been as accurately fixed as among the Catholics or Protestants. At the present time, however, the Russian Church agrees with the latter in rejecting the books of the Old Testament considered as apocryphal by the Jews.

In some parts of the country, the people even considered it a sin to have the Gospels in their houses ; the Church alone seemed to them worthy of sheltering the sacred books.

As early as 1812, the English Biblical Societies attempted to establish branches in Russia ; they succeeded in 1813. The Emperor Alexander I. had his name set down among the members of the new Russian Biblical Society. Prince Alexander Galítsin, who held the portfolio of Public Worship, became the president thereof. Under such a patronage, in a country so fond of all things official, the work just started could not but rapidly increase : nigh upon three hundred branch societies grew up in a short time all over the empire. At a given moment, a Catholic archbishop was seen to occupy a place by the side of Orthodox prelates and followers of the illuminism then in vogue. The Bible, translated into twenty different tongues, was distributed by the hundred thousand of copies. A French version was especially reserved for society. Under cover of the two Testaments, the Anglican missionaries who were promoters of the undertaking, hoped to see the spirit of the Reformation gradually insinuate itself into the Russian Church. But some members of the clergy took alarm, and the Russian Biblical Society was short-lived in consequence. Its imperial patron, the versatile Alexander I., himself took umbrage at it. His friend, Prince Galítsin, had to yield up the presidency to the Metropolitan of St. Petersburgh, Seraphim. Though repeatedly weeded out, the Society did not survive the Emperor Alexander : one of Nicolas's first acts was to abolish it (1829).

In order to appreciate the part played by the Biblical Society, and the quarrels it gave rise to, we should remember that, at the same time, the Jesuits, who had been admitted by Catherine, had been bringing up, in their colleges, a portion of the young Russian aristocracy ; while Joseph de Maistre and the French refugees were introducing Catholic ideas into several aristocratic *salons*. The foreign influences which were striving against one another in

Petersburgh, reached even religion: under the breath of the winds which blew from abroad, two opposing currents were agitating the surface of a usually stagnant church. The authorities, both ecclesiastical and civil, could not help being perturbed thereat. With the Jesuits on the one side and the Biblical Society on the other, time-honored Orthodoxy found itself between two fires: Holy Russia was threatened with a twofold foreign invasion. An autocratic government, of its nature distrustful of any independent impulse, could not for any length of time look on with equanimity at the stir of ideas which were likely to trouble the habitual calm of the Church. Accordingly, to ensure her repose, it struck a decisive blow, first at the Biblical Society, and, almost immediately after, at the Society of Jesus, the headquarters of the two opposing tendencies.

Since the suppression of the Biblical Society, the Holy Synod has come strangely near to the practices of the Roman Church: while it encourages the diffusion of the New Testament in the vulgar tongue, it does not favor that of the Old Testament.* As with the Catholics, the Book of Psalms is the only exception: the Psalms have at all times been very popular in Russia. In some parts there was a belief that by reading the whole book through forty times the remission of the greatest sins could be secured. It is also used for purposes of fortune-telling (after the manner of the *sortes virgilianæ*), especially the copies in Church-Slavic.

Like the Roman Church, too, the Holy Synod jealously watches over the translation of the sacred books. It has secured a monopoly of the Russian versions, even those sold to Protestants, Catholics, or Jews; and whenever it admits into the country New Testaments printed abroad, they are only reprints from versions it has approved.

* The Patriarchate of Constantinople proceeds very much in the same manner. It was only as late as 1817 that it authorized the publication of the New Testament in modern Greek; and though some years later it did sanction the translation of the Old Testament, it was not without a lively controversy.

Under Alexander II., in 1863, was formed a Society for the Propagation of the Scriptures ; it is still in existence. Like the old Biblical Society, though in a lesser degree, it is under official patronage; but in every other respect it differs from its famous predecessor. The only books which it exerts itself to circulate are the Psalms and the New Testament—especially the Gospels. It has no resources to speak of, and what it has, comes in great part from foreign Protestants. In some twenty years it has hardly got rid of a million volumes; at the present time, however, it sends out a hundred thousand every year ; besides which, it is authorized to distribute the copies sent to it from the wealthy Biblical Societies of London and the United States. The Russian Society carries on its propaganda after the American fashion; it sends its own peddlers to the fair at Nijni-Nòvgorod and has offices at all the expositions in Moscow, and its merchandise is well received of the people. Its members are quite *habitués* of the railroads. I have myself come across ladies in railroad carriages who held out to me a collection-box with one hand and Testaments in Russian and Slavic with the other.*

Bibles are seldom seen in Russia, possibly more rarely then certain apocrypha. Not so the New Testament, which is probably in greater demand there than in any other part of Europe, except the Protestant countries. The Gospels are undoubtedly the book dearest to the Russian. It is to be found in the workingman's room as well as in the peasant's cabin. Those who can, read it to the others. Every new step gained by popular instruction brings new readers. All that the people have in the way of

* From statements of the Society I see that, out of the one hundred thousand volumes sent out by it in one year, the number of the Old Testaments scarcely passes two hundred; the greater part of the copies—nine-tenths in fact—are in Russian, the remainder in Russian and Slavic. This seems to warrant the conclusion that the people nowadays prefer to read the Gospels in the vulgar tongue,—the sectarians called "Old-Believers" always excepted.

religious or moral training they get there. The influence of the book upon the Russian soul is not to be denied; in spite of ignorance and superstitions, the faith of the people deserves the name of "evangelical," if, to be that, it is enough to be nourished upon the very marrow of the Gospels.

BOOK II. CHAPTER III.

Worship and Ritualism—Importance of Rites and Ceremonials in the Eastern Church—Russian Formalism and the National Character—The Rite of Prayer—Ceremonies and the Liturgy—How the Russian Church has Fulfilled the Æsthetic Mission of Religion—The Reverence for *Eikons*—Precautions Taken against Superstition—Miraculous Virgins and Popular Devotion—Byzantine Art in Russia and *Eikon* Paintings—Characteristics of the Moscovite School of Painting—Attachment to Traditional Types—Difficulty of Renovating them—Church Music and Sacred Singing.

If, as regards the constitution of the Church, Greco-Russian Orthodoxy occupies an intermediary position between Rome and the Reformation, such is by no means the case with her rites and the externalities of her worship. On this side, the Eastern Church stands in opposition to both the great parties between which the West is divided. As regards forms and the importance given to ceremonial, Greco-Russian Orthodoxy is, in a way, situated at the extreme right of Christianity; it is rather Roman Catholicism which occupies the centre.

The usages of Christian antiquity, repeatedly simplified by Rome before they were still further modified or entirely rejected by the Reformation, were, for the most part, religiously preserved in the East. Strictly attached to the ecclesiastical forms of the fourth and fifth centuries, Orthodox worship is essentially ritualistic. This fidelity to practices abandoned or modified by the Western churches makes it appear, in comparison, archaïc and old-fashioned. On account of this ritualism, the Greek Church has been simultaneously attacked from both opposing camps. Catholics and Protestants, who usually find fault with her for different things, have, in this case, united in accusing her of choking re-

ligion under externalities. The main cause of this Byzantine formalism, transmitted to the Russian Church by her parent on the Bosphorus, lies, first of all, in the latter's Oriental spirit: next, as already said, come historical causes, ages of ignorance, and a low average of culture in most Orthodox nations; lastly, with the Russians, the realistic character of the people, their innate attachment to rites and ceremonies, so that the best-justified liturgical corrections became, for them, the point of departure of an obdurate schism.

The reverence for rite—*obriàd* is the Russian word—is so natural to this people that it is found everywhere, in domestic almost as much as in religious life. For all the acts of human life, the peasant has forms and formulæ to which he religiously holds. Besides the feasts and ceremonies of the Church, he has for such occasions as birth, marriage, and death, traditional ceremonies, often with veritable civil rites superadded, which he observes almost as punctiliously as those prescribed by the Church. So marriage, for one thing, gives occasion to domestic ceremonies which constitute a genuine acted poem, a sort of drama with several persons, conventional songs and choruses, after the manner of the ancients, a drama which has been acted for centuries, from generation to generation.[1]

It will be easily seen what such a spirit could produce in the matter of religion. The Russian has, in a way, improved upon Byzantine formalism; he has not been content with mere fidelity to all the rites of the Church; he has added more, even when the Church did not demand them of him. So with prayer itself. Prayer, the communion of the soul with its Redeemer, is to him a sort of rite: it assumes consecrated forms, wholly national, for they are in great part foreign to the Greeks.

[1] One would have to go as far as Brahmanism to match this excessive love of ritualism and conventional ceremoniousness—both rites and ceremonies, it should be remarked, being replete with originally beautiful significance and symbolical meaning.

The Orthodox Christian, especially the Russian, usually prays standing, in conformity with the custom of the primitive church; but the Russian does not stand in repose while he prays. The peasant continually crosses himself, with a large and comprehensive gesture, raising high his head and his right hand, then bends low between times, quickly straightening himself, to begin the same proceeding over again, which he keeps up to the end of the service. The more devout kneel, and touch the ground with their foreheads at regular intervals; then rise to their feet and kneel and prostrate themselves again, as though they were performing a sort of penance. To us Westerners there is something fatiguing and disagreeable in these profound inclinations and rapid prostrations. A foreigner is, at first, absolutely dazed in a Russian church, by the continual swaying and oscillations in the crowd around him. The cultivated classes, indeed, under Western influence, have given up this sort of religious pantomime; but the common people are very much attached to it: it is their way of praying. Many seem embarrassed and at a loss what to do with themselves when, in the course of a particularly long service, they are forced out of sheer fatigue to suspend their crossings and genuflections.

They do not read in Russian churches, or read very little. It is not customary. It would scandalize the majority, who would consider it highly improper to sit down in a church and read out of a book. That is what most shocks them in the Latin churches. Very devout people read the service at home, to enable them the better to follow it in church. The bulk of the faithful are content to light candles, to cross themselves and kneel and repeat, over and over again, the same formulas. Feeling themselves in thorough spiritual touch with the priest, they follow his acts with their eyes, listen to the majestic intoning, and take into their souls the sublime beauty of the divine service and sacred singing.

The *pravoslav* liturgy is well calculated to command the people's attention and respect: it has but one fault—the excessive

length of the services, which compels the officiating priests to slur portions of them. The ancient ceremonial of the Greek rite is, as a rule, carried out with imposing dignity; the Russians, in this respect, are far superior not only to the Latins but also to the Greeks, their own co-religionists. In the humblest village church, the priests, many of them most ignorant, and intemperate in private life, appear before the altar with a truly sacerdotal majesty. The people, as well as society men and women, attach a great importance to the priest's manner of officiating; a dignified presence, handsome features, beautiful long hair, and a fine voice are qualities much appreciated in the clergy. The more mystic portions of the liturgy being celebrated out of sight of the crowd, behind the dividing partition of the screen or *ikonostàs*, it becomes a veritable sacred drama, and the greatest care is given to the setting and acting of it. The priests and deacons are, first and foremost, actors in the Mystery; they are conscious of the solemnity of their part and bear themselves accordingly.

Nor does the Church admit of any curtailing or shirking. She knows nothing of the conventions or fictions which have frequently helped the Latins to simplify the divine service: so there is nothing like our low mass, where the priest goes through a dialogue with a child who responds in the name of an absent congregation. All these fictions, all these abbreviations, are contrary to the spirit of the Eastern Church; she looks upon them as a desecration, a mutilation of the Holy Mysteries. The services are always public, held for the benefit of the people. The priest celebrates them only for the faithful; accordingly, he usually officiates only on holidays.[2] He has no more notion of saying mass under his breath without an audience, than of reciting a sermon in a whisper in an empty church. The liturgy can only proceed amid the solemnity of a public ceremony.

On the other hand, while preserving all the ancient observ-

[2] In the country, *i.e.*, in village churches. In the cities, the services (both matins and mass, early and late) are performed daily.

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ances and rites uncorrected and uncurtailed, the Eastern Church, as a rule, adds nothing to them. In her services and her prayers, as well as in her practices, she resists innovations: so that, if the liturgy has not been simplified, the worship generally may be said to have remained more simple than in the West.

This antique Greco-Slavic rite impresses by its outward forms even when the symbolical sense escapes one. In Rome, where, at the feast of the Epiphany, it was usual to celebrate mass according to all the rites admitted by the Vatican, I have more than once heard it remarked that the noblest, in its austere beauty, was the Ruthenian rite, which, in substance, is only the Greco-Slavic rite as preserved almost integrally by the Uniate-Greeks of the former kingdom of Poland. Though the Russians and the Greeks have really the same rite in two different languages, the Slavic form is, without any comparison, really the finer, the Russians not having adopted the nasal chant of the Greeks and Armenians.

Voltaire used to say that mass was the opera of the poor. This is no less true in Russia than in the West, although in a different sense,—for never, in the East, has the Church taken anything from opera, nor ever allowed profane art to influence sacred art. If it be admitted that religion, especially in uncultured times, should not limit itself exclusively to dogma or ethics, it may be said that scarcely any church has ever comprehended better what I would call the æsthetic side of it—*i. e.*, all that side which most Protestant sects have neglected or ignored. Differing from the dry doctrine of certain reformers, the Russian Church gives to the masses not merely the substantial bread of the Gospel, but also that delicate nourishment which no human being can entirely do without—sentiment, beauty, the ideal. In this, indeed, this much abused church pre-eminently excels; in this it has fallen least short of its lofty mission. To ignorant and oppressed masses she has revealed what Religion alone could reveal to them—Art. These generations of serfs she has treated

to shows and concerts which, through the magic of the senses, have kept their souls fresh. In this respect, the Russian Church can stand comparison with the Roman Church, which has carried so high and so far the art of reaching the soul through the senses.

Yet there is, even here, a notable difference between Rome and the East. While addressing herself to the ear and the eye, the Eastern Church has always had before her the fear of pleasing them too much. While making use of the senses, she has always held them, as it were, under suspicion. She has taken against all charms of the flesh, against art itself, some of those precautions which the Byzantines carried to excess. Between the sacred and the profane, between lay and church painting, between lay and church music, she has always kept up an impassable barrier; never have her temples been invaded by the worldly pomp and the theatrical display against which the Catholic Church has, at times, found it so difficult to protect hers.

The austerity of the worship is apparent even in the setting of the sacred action. When most sumptuous, it still is always simple; there is nothing to disturb the impression of the oneness of the church and service. In the apse, turned toward the east, there is one altar, as there is one God and one Saviour. Between the altar and the nave rises the barrier of the *ikonostàs* with its Royal Gate, which the priest has alone the right to enter, and which is closed during the consecration of the bread and wine, so that the Holy Mystery is enshrined in a sanctuary within and separated from the temple. Of laymen, the Tsar alone is admitted to enter it to receive communion, and that only on the day of his coronation. In the old cathedrals of great cities or the churches of great monasteries, the screen which symbolizes the veil of the temple is resplendent with gold and precious marbles; Siberian jasper vies with malachite and lapis-lazuli. The most revered *eïkons* are set in it, whence its name: *ikonostàs*.* The coming

* Russian churches are sometimes disfigured by the height of the *ikonostàs*, which is considerably greater than in Greek churches, and cuts off the apse in a disagreeably abrupt way.

out and going in of the priest,—the transferring of the elements from the credence-table to the altar,—the progress of the deacon, with the New Testament or the chalice raised above his head,—the opening and closing of the Royal Gate,—form so many scenes of the liturgical drama, and lend it more of life and motion than the Latin rite presents. All this slow ceremonial is in harmony with the severe splendor of the old Byzantine churches, with the dull gold in the background of paintings and mosaics. This archaïc character, which brings out so well the solemnity of the rites performed, is preserved even in the sacred implements: we find there the *flabella*, — those metallic fans which the deacon waves about the tabernacle; the golden spoon for the communion wine; the lance and sponge which recall Calvary; and sundry others long since fallen into disuse in the West.

In spite or, more correctly, by reason of their antiquity, the long Greco-Russian Church ceremonies teem with symbolism—a symbolism both simple and profound. Thus marriage, for instance: in no other church is the nuptial consecration, which so many flatly practical people would rob of anything like a mystical character, surrounded with more poetical allegories. The religious ceremony is called "Crowning" or "Coronation," because the groom and bride, whom the people, in ancient songs, honor for a day with the titles of *kniàz* and *kniagìnia* (Prince and Princess), wear a crown—or rather, it is held poised above their heads. After the exchange of rings and the kiss of betrothal given before the open tabernacle, on the invitation of the priest, the newly-wedded couple are made to drink wine alternately three times from the same cup, as a reminder that they will have everything in common. Then the priest, after joining their hands and covering them with his stole, leads them three times around the altar, to signify that they are to go through life closely united. To the kiss of betrothal corresponds the farewell kiss in the funeral service. The friends and relatives, after carrying the bier on their own shoulders into the church, approach one by one to

kiss the dead face. Out of all the Russian ceremonies and festivals it were easy to create a new *Génie du Christianisme*, no less poetical or picturesque than Chateaubriand's.

As regards the feasts and holidays, especially the Easter feast, Moscow may well be said to rival Rome, or, better still, Seville; always with this difference—that the Russian feasts are less theatrical and more popular. The midnight Easter service has scarcely any equal in Europe. Though both churches have a midnight mass, the Eastern one prefers to celebrate the night of the Resurrection. The crowd pressing around the belfry of Ivan Velîki (the great), as it towers above the old Cathedrals of the Kremlin, waits, taper in hand, for the announcement that the Saviour has risen. On the stroke of midnight the bells, which until then gave out a sort of dull hum, burst all over the city, into joyous chimes, the tapers are lit, and every head is bared while the cannon roar in the distance. The liturgy of this Easter night is an excellent specimen of the historical symbolism inherent in the Greco-Russian rite. At the appointed hour, after the Psalms have been sung, the officiating priest or bishop goes up to the *ikonostàs*, which conceals the Holy Sepulchre. The Royal Gate flies open, he approaches the Sepulchre, lifts the winding-sheet and finds it empty. Then, instead of at once announcing the Resurrection, he halts and hesitates, as the disciples did of yore. He leaves the church with his clergy, and goes forth to seek for the vanished Saviour; then, on re-entering it, he proclaims the news that "Christ is risen," and the choir bursts into a triumphal pæan. The symbolism, indeed, cannot always be as transparent as in this case—and the people do not always understand it. Nevertheless, they take their share of rejoicing and mourning with the Church. On Easter Day there is something touching in the sight of men of all classes embracing, to the joyful salutation "Christ is risen," and exchanging Easter eggs—that ancient symbol of resurrection.

In spite of the beauty of her rites, so well calculated to inspire

the poet and the artist, the Greco-Russian Church has not opened to art the same scope as her Roman sister. Her splendid *ikonostàsses*, her sombre apses, have produced nothing at all comparable to the Madonnas of a Raphael or a Correggio, to the Angels of a Botticelli or a Fra Angelico. Here again it might be said that the fault lies less with the Church than with the people she has educated and the tardiness of their development. That, certainly, explains some things, but by no means all. Even had the Tatars not arrested for the space of three or four centuries the growth of Russia, the Russian Church would not have given the same impulse to art as the Latin Church. This is owing, in a great measure, to the precautions taken in the East against the inroads of the spirit of worldliness and the allurements of perishable beauty. Even while appealing to the senses, the Orthodox Church has always distrusted them—distrusted all that flatters the eye or pleases the ear; so that, in the very home of antique art, under the sky that shone on Phidias before the face of the gods of the Parthenon, sheltered by Byzance, this distrust of the flesh has choked life out of art.

True, the Church did not condemn art—not painting and music, at any rate—but she kept it strictly under control. She did not, like the Latin Church, treat it as a child—at one time as a spoilt child—pet it as would a mother or a nurse; she treated it as a servant, as a slave, with the sternness of a contemptuous mistress. In her attitude towards it, something seems to have survived of the spirit which animated the Iconoclasts. She strove, by a sort of asceticism, to reduce it to a symbol, to an immaterial emblem, to a conventional hieratic sign; she forbade it from following any independent aspiration, grudged it anything like individual life. Fearful lest it should swerve from its mystical uses and become too human by trying to please the eye, she swathed it in conventional types as in bands, and kept these types unchanged for all time. Such were the religious teachers of the Russians, the Greek monks of the Lower Empire. Most in-

geniously did they strip sacred art of every sensual charm, banishing from their music, as from their painting, all that was of the flesh, until they had succeeded in obliterating every trace of their original beauty. Looked at from this point of view, Byzantine art, with its contempt of life and nature, is pre-eminently the religious art, the spiritualized art, not to say the Christian art. These lifeless figures, these emaciated bodies, are the product of Oriental asceticism ; these long, gaunt, immovable saints would have edified the fastidious anchorites of Thebaïs or the Stylites of Syria. Christ Himself, the sight of whose face is to ravish the souls of the blessed through all eternity, becomes, under the brush of the limners of Mount Athos, an apt illustration of the teaching of a certain Father of the Church who asserted that the Saviour had been the homeliest among the children of men.

The only art in which the Byzantine Church really excelled is the least plastic, the least sensual of all—architecture. It is also the art in which Moscovite genius has shown the greatest originality. It is the first in which, by producing a mixture of the European and the Asiatic, it created something national. And yet one would hardly think of this Russian style of architecture as in any way comparable to the French-Gothic or the Greek-Byzantine. Architecture was the only art to which the Oriental Church allowed a certain degree of freedom ; but in Russia many things were arrayed against it, to prevent it from attaining its full development—the rigor of the climate, the dearth of stone and other materials, the poverty of the country.

The other arts—painting, sculpture, music itself—were loaded, by dogma or Orthodox discipline, with heavy fetters and penned within narrow limits. This church, whom some accuse of sacrificing everything to the forms and externalities of worship, really and from the earliest times took the greatest care not to let the soul dwell on forms or become absorbed in externalities. Contrary to common opinion, she fenced herself in with wall after wall against the errors of superstition as well as against the

aberrations of the senses. In this respect again, as in so many others, we find her, in spite of appearances, occupying an intermediate position between the Protestant sects, especially Lutheranism and the Latin Church.

From the point of view of dogma, the position taken up by the Greeks in regard to images is not quite the same as that occupied by the Latins. After the long troubles with the Iconoclasts, those Calvinists of the East, the Greeks struck a sort of compromise by banishing from the sacred precincts statues, but not paintings. They literally observed the biblical prohibition against images in stone, wood, or metal, which the Catholics, and even the Lutherans, did not. On this point they are at one in principle with the Reformed Lutherans, but they greatly differ from them in the interpretation; for they proscribe as idols only such images which, by their form, lend themselves to confusion with the persons represented. That is why they reject statues and high-relief sculpture, but not painted images and low reliefs in which the most grossly untrained eye cannot possibly discover anything more than an artificial presentment. There is no doubt that this distinction rests on a rational basis. People have been simple enough to worship idols as living gods; but the confusion is possible only in the case of plastic images—of statues. The most ignorant boor could not take a painting of the Virgin for the Virgin's own person. All over the world, among barbarians as among classical people, among the Varangians of Kief as among the Greeks of Athens, it is the statue—the *eidolon* with the body made of wood, marble, or brass—which has become the chief object of worship; it was before the statue that incense was burned and victims were offered. Painting has undoubtedly something more spiritual, for the very reason that it is based upon illusion.

Justifiable as it seems in theory, this distinction has hardly accomplished any other object than placing the art of Orthodox countries in such conditions as made it, of necessity, inferior to that of the West. Sculpture, banished from the church, was

robbed of its natural home, and Russia not having inherited any antique marbles, it could not be reborn of the imitation of the antique. By its condemnation of statuary, Eastern Orthodoxy arrested the development of art in its entirety; for in all countries —in mediæval France and in modern Italy as well as in Ancient Greece—sculpture, being comparatively not a complex art, grew and matured more quickly than painting. Ever since Falconet and other artists of the eighteenth century imported it into Russia, the Russians have done their best in making room for statuary in their churches; not daring to admit it within the sanctuary, they have to be content with giving it house-room on the outside. Thus it was that Montferrand, the French architect of St. Isaac, was allowed to place bronze angels at the four angles of the cupola.

It is art, and art alone, which has been the victim of the precautions taken by the Church against superstition. As to superstition itself, it does not seem to have been much affected by them; the solemn immobility of the figures on the *eïkons* only seems to have strengthened the attachment of the people. In spite of the scrupulous care which has been taken not to place any images on the altars, lest they should seem to be presented for worship, and to keep them confined to the pilasters of the nave and to the *ikonostàs*, they are the object of unbounded veneration and faith. The bishops promise under oath at the time of their consecration to have watchful care that the holy *eïkons* shall not receive the adoration due to God alone. Their watchfulness does not prevent the grimy Byzantine paintings from receiving a superstitious attention amounting to worship. The *contadino* of Southern Italy does not lavish more homage on his bright Madonnas than the *mujik* on his smoke-blackened virgins; the difference is all in the manner.

Russian devotion appears to be more formalistic and less imaginative. The *mujik* seems less inclined to talk to the image, to commune with it; his chief pre-occupation is to acquit himself towards it, to render it what he thinks is its due. He lights a candle be-

fore the *eïkon*, he does it reverence by multiplied signs of the cross and inclinations of the body. Apart from a few *eïkons* of exceptional renown, the Russian, like the Greek, pays equal honor to all. One often sees pilgrims walking around a church kissing the hands or feet of all the painted figures in succession, without so much as looking at the faces of the saints or asking their names. The feet of the figures on Russian *eïkons* are often kissed away by their votaries, like the foot of the brass statue of Saint Peter at Rome, and have to be repainted from time to time. In Kief, as also in Palestine, I have seen Orthodox pilgrims who, having entered a Catholic church by mistake, walked all around it with the same punctilious care not to pass by any one of the saints in possession. The *mujik* is singularly impartial in this matter, his principal anxiety being not to neglect or slight any of the dignitaries and officials of the heavenly court.

Above what might be called the anonymous *plebs* of *eïkons* whose names and attributes are not of much account, rank the so-called "miracle-working *eïkons*." Russia has, perhaps, more of them than either Italy or Spain ; few cities or convents but glory in one or two. As everywhere else the most venerated ones are usually the oldest and blackest. Some are reputed "not made by hand of man" ; others are said, like so many in the West, to have been painted by Saint Luke. A great many have been miraculously discovered, and have a legend ; many more are associated with local or national memories—the end of a famine or of an epidemic, a victory gained and so forth.

The Russians have always, in all their wars, carried some holy *eïkon* into the field. If victorious, they ascribe to it the success of their arms. Smolensk owns a Virgin dear to the entire Orthodox West. Peter the great had one he never parted with ; it is now in Petersburgh in his little wooden house, which has been transformed into a chapel. There is no lack of patriots who ascribe to it the victory of Poltàva. Another Virgin helped the Orthodox in 1812 ; it was the Virgin of Kazàn, one of the most popular in

the empire. It won its reputation under Ivan the Terrible at the taking of Kazàn, and has been invoked ever since in every national crisis. The Boyar Pojàrski and the cattle-dealer Minin, went to Kazàn to get it in 1611, and it helped them drive out the Poles, then the masters of Moscow under Vladislas. A hundred years later, it was transferred by Peter the Great from the old capital to the new, the wise Tsar being desirous to give the consecration of its presence to his city on the Neva. It was to shelter it that Alexander I. built the magnificent church, which bears its name (Our Lady of Kazàn). Kutúzof came thither to pray for the divine help before he left for the field of Borodinò, and ever since a *Te Deum* is sung there every Christmas in memory of the great deliverance. All the silver taken from the grand army by the Cossacks of the Don was melted to adorn the *ìkonostàs*, and the Napoleonic eagles, together with the French flags, tattered and faded, still decorate the walls of the church.

Renowned *eïkons* are usually adorned with gems and precious stones of all sorts; the most famous ones wear priceless treasures such as the West, so often laid waste by revolutions and religious wars, could never match. Some have lent the country their *parures* of diamonds and emeralds in times of national danger. The *mujik* takes great delight in the splendor of his *eïkons;* he loves to see imperial diadems sparkle on the veiled brow of his sombre Byzantine virgins: where precious stones are wanting, glass and false pearls take their place; but everywhere—even in the humblest villages—Christ, the Virgin, and the Saints are encased in plates of gold and silver. On most of the Russian *eïkons* the head and hands alone show, while the rest of the figure is entirely covered with a plating of precious metals, which reproduces the painted drapery beneath.

Religious art in Russia has preserved the Byzantine character; the types and methods of the Greek limner are in as great honor among the Moscovite monks as among those of Mount Athos. It almost seems as though this art, brought from

the Holy Mountain, congealed among the snows and ice of the North. In the commonest paintings, copied over and over again through centuries from copies, and frequently repainted, one still can trace the grand primitive types of the fourth and fifth centuries ; so that, from a barbaric Christ on his throne in the midst of some convent fresco, the mind is led, step by step, all the way back to the famous Christ of St. Prudenziano in Rome, while the Virgin, with outstretched arms, with the Child at her breast, still reproduces the Virgin of the catacombs of St. Agnes. In the bits of popular goldsmith's work, in the brass crucifixes and triptychs, the archæologist recognizes archaïc types which have almost vanished out of painting ; but in all this there is not the least trace of early Christian art—that art which was so young, so fresh, yet replete with the classical grace of antiquity. All these types have sojourned in Byzance, and taken on the prim stiffness of the Eastern capital. The symmetrical drapery has never been stirred by a breath of life ; the staring eyes have lost every gleam of soul ; no smile has ever played around the discolored lips. It is notorious that Byzantine and Russian art has always made a point of avoiding youth and beauty in its women ; indeed, it decidedly prefers masculine types, especially those of old, or at least mature men, with those long beards which are a feature of Russian iconography. These are the only figures that show anything like life, and whose features are sufficiently marked to present, at times, almost the individuality of a portrait.

Art in the Eastern Church remained, like the rites, essentially symbolical. The *eïkons* are, in a way, a part of the liturgy. This emblematical character clearly shows in the great mural frescos, as well as in the small brass *bas-reliefs*. The Trinity is represented by Abraham before the three angels : the Seven Councils personify the authority of the Church and the purity of faith. Scenes from both Testaments are sometimes given as companion pieces, as types and anti-types, as we still see in some of our own old churches. The lives of Christ and the Virgin are represented in a series of

mysteries, in conformity with invariable rules and a once-for-ever established order. The saints and the angels, arranged in choirs, review the battalions of the heavenly host, each group having its own attributes—patriarchs, apostles, martyrs, virgins, bishops, not forgetting the troop of Stylites poised on the top of their pillars.

These painted types differ from architectural types in this—that no Asiatic element whatever, whether Mongol or Hindu, has affected them. The only way in which the Moscovite artist has been able to show any originality is in his methods of work, especially his handling of wood and metal. Under his hands even more than under those of the Greeks, this rigid art, with its long, lank figures incased in silver, has something that is both childlike and old-fashioned—a sort of naïve pedantry which is not devoid of charm ; its very rigidity gives it something foreign to earth and time, unreal and immaterial, which is not, after all, unbecoming denizens of the heavenly abodes. Besides, with all its contempt for beauty and nature, as though it took literally every evangelical curse against the world and the flesh, this art has a splendor and beauty of its own, especially in Russia. It corrects the simplicity and meagreness of its forms and coloring by the richness of the material and a sumptuous ornamentation. This is what renders it so eminently decorative and, in the eyes of the people, so eminently religious. Emaciated saints, in a golden glory—would not that answer pretty well the *mujik's* idea of paradise ?

In Old Russia—in Nòvgorod, Pskof, Moscow—painting has always been a purely monastic art, confined within convent cells. The painter was usually a monk, who devoted his life to the production of holy *eikons*, just as others made a specialty of copying sacred books. Church dignitaries, even bishops, did not always disdain the brush ; an illustrious example in point is the Metropolitan Macarius. This art, impersonal as it appears, is not always anonymous ; among these men who painted as they prayed, repeating the same figures as they repeated the same orisons, there have been some for whom the delicacy of their brush and the finish of

their execution have won enduring fame. One of these was a certain Andréy Rublòf, whose pictures were held up as models as early as the sixteenth century. To this day the Old Believers of Moscow strive with one another for panels ascribed to Rublòf, giving for them their weight in gold.

It was only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that religious painting and chiselling became secular industries; but the Church never ceased to exercise a vigilant supervision over sacred art, even when it left the convent precincts. Manuals of iconography were compiled, similar to those of the Byzantines, for the use of lay *eïkon*-painters. The Council of the *Stoglàf*, or "the Hundred Chapters," held about 1550, enjoins on the bishops the duty of carefully watching paintings and painters and of dictating to the latter both their subjects and the manner of treating them. It was not enough for the artist to possess a cunning hand; it was demanded of him that that hand should be sufficiently pure to be not unworthy of delineating presentments of Christ and the Virgin.* The painting of *eïkons* was still considered, at that time, as a sort of sacred ministry; and even in our day have there not been Russians who demanded that the sale of them should be permitted only to the Orthodox, and not to the Jews?[3] One of the things most persistently impressed on *eïkon*-painters is that they should always scrupulously copy their models. The *Stoglàf* reproves as undue license any liberty that a too frivolous hand might venture to take with the figures of saints. The Moscovite, like his descend-

* The Council sets forth, with a *naïve* quaintness, the qualities which the painters should possess. "A painter," we read in Article 43 of the Hundred Chapters, "must be humble, meek, reserved in his speech, serious in his demeanor, not given to quarrelling and drunkenness; he must be neither a thief nor an assassin, and above all he should guard the purity of his soul and his body: and he who cannot do so, let him marry, according to the law. And it behooves painters frequently to visit their spiritual fathers, to consult them in all things, and to live after their counsel and instruction in fasting, prayer, and chastity."—*Étude d'Iconographie Chrétienne en Russie*, by J. Dumouchel, after Busláyef, Moscow, 1874.

[3] *Eïkons* cannot be *bought;* that would be desecration. They are *exchanged* for money (!).

ants, the Old-Believers of our day, was inclined to look on any deviation from the consecrated types as a sort of heresy ; in his opinion one might as well alter the text of the liturgy. A distinction is, indeed, made in Old-Russian painting between several schools ; there is, for instance, the Strògonof school : but all these schools really differ in nothing but the treatment of draperies or the clothing. This feeling of reverence was carried to such a length that scruples were felt about using material not sufficiently durable. While the use of stained glass endowed mediæval art in the West with such admirable works, an iconographic manual of the seventeenth century, ignoring the glass panels with golden background of early Christian times, forbids the use of glass to the Russians on the ground that it is too fragile a material.

Although placed under clerical supervision, religious art was not confined within the Church. Russians of all classes make a point of having at least one *eïkon* in every room ; almost all merchant families as well as most noble families in their country mansions, have collections of *eïkons*, which have been accumulating through generations and play an important part in domestic worship. Painting, from being monumental, has come down to miniature. All the buildings being of wood, there were few walls that offered sufficient space for Old-Byzantine art to array its colossal figures in, while every household was anxious to own *eïkons*, be it of wood or metal, many in the shape of triptychs or folding screens sometimes not larger than the palm of the hand. The Greeks already had introduced the use of portable *eïkons*. Russian patient industry carried them to great perfection, and reduced them in size till the figures became almost microscopic. Some very ancient paintings must be examined through a magnifying glass. A panel a few inches square will hold an entire Judgment scene. The diptychs and triptychs in metal or carved wood rival the paintings in fineness. There are brass crucifixes on which the whole life of Christ is represented in scenes grouped around the body of the crucified Saviour. Numbers of these screen pictures give all

the saints and subjects usually disposed on the *ikonostàs*. Indeed, they go among the people under the name of "churches." The Old-Believers (the sectarians in permanent opposition to the official hierarchy) were particularly fond of these tiny *eïkons*, because they were easy to carry along in times of persecution. Even textile fabrics were used now and then for these delicate paintings. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they became a sort of fad, and found their way from private places of worship into churches. These Russian artists—painters or carvers—have developed, in this branch of art, a marvellous deftness of hand. Nor is this their only merit. These Byzantine-Russian figures, in spite of their ungainliness and stiffness, are usually characterized by a simplicity, earnestness, and nobility of expression on account of which many pious souls prefer them to the masterpieces of Western art. By remaining true to the old hieratic types, Orthodox painting escaped the paganism which invaded the Renaissance and killed religious art while setting it free.

Nor can this persistence of archaïsm in art be ascribed to an ignorance of good drawing and imperfect technical training, or even to the inveterate respect for traditional types ; the cause of it lies in great part in the spirit of asceticism which is fully alive still in a great portion of the people ; this conventionalized sacred art still answers the national religious ideal. Moreover, living figures cannot be extracted out of those lanky Byzantine human sheaths, the grave Greek Virgin cannot pass to the sweetness of Luini's or Francia's Madonnas, without political or religious upheavals, moral and social revolutions, such as Italy and the West generally witnessed at the close of the Middle Ages. Where was the Russia of Ivan the Terrible or of Michael Románof to take the influences which inspired the old masters of the Tuscan and Flemish communes? What hand would have been bold enough to lift the Virgin's veils and take liberties with her waist? The very thought could not occur to Moscovite artists.

And what old Moscovia could not do, modern Russia cannot

either ; she is too old. Only in early youth can nations break so violently with their past. And now that Western art has gained a footing in Russia, religious art is powerless to create anything original. All efforts at revival only show how difficult it is to emerge out of the Byzantine style without falling into the profane style. The problem is the harder to solve that contemporary Russian art strongly leans towards realism. In the reign of Nicolas, Russia had an artist of marvellous genius, Ivánof, who devoted himself to the production of religious compositions ; but his whole life was spent in painting one picture, and he left little else besides sketches and unfinished things. The great modern churches—St. Isaac in Petersburgh, the Saviour in Moscow—betray in their finest paintings the gropings of an art which strives to find itself, and which, in its efforts to rejuvenate the traditional types, frequently falls into the same faults as modern Catholic church art, finding mannerism in place of grace, vulgarity while seeking for nature. *Eïkons* lose all their dignity when they go in for prettiness and try to smirk in their gold and silver casing. No wonder the sectarians object to them.*

Music has fared differently. Though also fenced in by Church canons, the boundaries set to this art are not so narrow—or, perhaps, the Russian musical genius refused to submit to the restraint. It would not be content with what came from Byzance, and out of church singing created a national art.

Just as, in the matter of plastic arts, the Orthodox Church tolerates only the least material painting, so, in the matter of sacred music, she will have none but the most spiritual,—the most closely allied to prayer,—singing. No soulless instruments, wood or brass, to praise God—only the one living instrument, the

* For the adornment of some of the great churches, such as St. Isaac, decorative mosaic work is much used, with the usual monumental effect. There is a mosaic factory in Petersburgh, second only to that of the Vatican, whose methods it follows, both departing from the distinctive, essentially decorative character of the ancient art, in order to reproduce the effects of oil-painting in its finest shading and minutest work.

human voice, given by the Lord to sing His praises in all eternity. No harp or psalterion, as in Hebrew temples; no viola or bassoon, such as Fra Angelico and Perugino placed in the hands of their angels; no thousand-toned organ, no many-colored orchestra; nothing to support the singing of choir or congregation; the choirs of men on earth, as those of the angels in heaven, must find their law in themselves. It is a remarkable coincidence that, although Rome has admitted instrumental music into her cathedrals and basilicas, the popes have kept out of their own chapel instruments made by the hand of man. In all the services in which the Pope takes part, no music is heard but that of the human voice; even the organ is proscribed. And this is not the only resemblance between the papal chapel in Rome and the patriarchal church in Constantinople. Many more might easily be pointed out, for the simple reason that, apart from Milan and the Ambrosian rite, it is in Rome, around the Pope himself, that the oldest Latin rite has been preserved.

But, to return to the Russian Church. She did not follow her Greek masters in church singing as faithfully as in painting. She did not attach herself to the nasal twang which mars the noblest hymns of early Christianity. The Russian Slav's ear proved more exacting than his eyes. He could not, like the Greek monks, be content with those lifeless chants, without chords or modulations, which rival the leanest Byzantine figures in dryness; he needed music that was alive. The artistic sense in this case overcame asceticism—whether because the Russian is by nature better gifted for music, or because the Church showed greater indulgence to an art regarded everywhere as a symbol and foretaste of the joys of Paradise.

Still, the Church never removed her hand from the art. Even while permitting the use of new tonalities and modern compositions of a more complicated make in addition to the modes of ancient plain-song, she always took care that religious music be kept apart from profane music, so as to make all mistake impossi-

ble. No one ever saw opera invade the sanctuary in Russia, or the faithful pray in the morning to the same tunes to which they dance at night. To this day a piece of sacred music, to be sung in a church, must receive the approval of the Ecclesiastical Board of Censors.*

Not only did the liturgical singing, originally brought from Greece, develop in accordance with Russian genius, but it is probably at this end of Christendom, beyond the boundaries of older Europe, that plain-song, inherited from classical antiquity, has best preserved its noble grandeur. The intoning of the Psalms, of the responses and the Scripture lessons, the singing of the church hymns, are matchless in their majestic simplicity. Then, the anonymous masters of the Middle-Ages have added to the old plain-song certain chants (*raspiêvy*) of original melody, often akin to the melancholy popular songs. It seems as though the invasion of Western music should have overwhelmed the Russian art; most unexpectedly, it did not, but only enriched and rejuvenated sacred song, which, at the end of the eighteenth century, under the influence of the Italians imported by Catherine the Great, developed into quite a new but equally national art. So that church singing has always been held in high honor. All classes are strongly affected by it. Nothing draws the peasant to the church like fine choirs and beautiful voices. In many a village it has been noticed that the *mujik* stopped going to church when the singing got poor. The people detest what they call "goat-chanting." In the seminaries, therefore, the greatest care is bestowed on the musical education of the future priests and deacons.

In her love for music and singing, Orthodox Russia is not unlike Protestant Germany. There as here music became pre-eminently a religious art; but, being deprived of the orchestra, could

* In fact, the approval of the director of the Imperial Chapel has also frequently to be obtained; this has alienated the great modern composers from this kind of music, and it suffers in consequence.

not, as such, soar as high. Yet, while Russia could not produce a Bach or a Haendel, her choirs and chapels gave her many a remarkable artist. It was there the musical genius first revealed itself which subsequently found expression in a fine dramatic school. Composers—mostly conductors of the Imperial Chapel—have earned renown in this particular line; let us name Bortniansky and Alexis Lvòf, the composer of the national anthem "God Save the Tsar."

There is nothing which *can* be asked of the human voice that the Russian choirs have not achieved. They attain by turns to truly angelic sweetness and delicacy and to terrifying grandeur, sweeping through all the registers of religious feeling. Some of the Russian church choirs have probably not their equal in Europe. Such, especially, are those of the Imperial Chapel and Tchùdof's. They are composed of men and boys, the female voice being banished * as too enticing and suggestive of the snares of the world, while sopranos and altos have never been provided in Russia in the same way as for the Sixtine Chapel in Rome. One is astounded at the perfection and the effects achieved by the Imperial Chapel with such simple means. The bases especially cannot be matched for depth and power. When a foreigner hears these choral masses unsupported by an orchestra, he would swear that they are accompanied by string instruments. †

* Except in nuns' convents, where the choir is composed entirely of nuns, and in girls' schools, where it is the girls who sing.

† Berlioz, in love as he was with originality in art, was a great admirer of Bortniansky's work. As to the Imperial Chapel, he wrote with his usual exuberance: "To compare the choral performances of the Sixtine Chapel in Rome to that of these marvellous singers, were the same as to place the poor little troop of fiddle-scrapers of a third-rate Italian opera by the side of the orchestra of the Paris Conservatoire."—*Soirées de l'Orchestre.*

BOOK II. CHAPTER IV.

Fast-Days and Feast-Days—The Four Lents—Attachment of the People to the Fast-Days—Why it is Difficult for the Russian Church to Make any Change in the Old Observances—The Holidays; their Great Number, the Harm they do—The Julian Calendar—Why it is Kept up—The Russian Saints; their Archaïc Character—Canonization in Russia—The Reverence for Relics—Pilgrimages; to Home Shrines and to the Holy Land.

Music, in so far as it was allowed to introduce modern tonality, is probably the only instance of the Russian Church's having infringed on the spirit of asceticism which distinguishes Eastern Orthodoxy. In all other respects, Russian worship has retained an austere immutability amounting to archaïsm; it has preserved usages and observances which seem least capable of adaptation to modern habits. So with fasting and abstinence. In no other church are the fasts so frequent and so severe. Neither the harshness of the northern climate nor the relaxing influences of the age ever mitigated these self-macerations invented in another time and for other climes.

The Russian Church has not one lent, but four: one, answering the Advent of the Latins, before Christmas; another, known as "The Great Lent," before Easter; a third before St. Peter's Day, and a fourth before Assumption Day. A third at least of the days of the year are fast-days. Besides the lents and the vigils of feast-days, there are two days of abstinence in the week —Friday and Wednesday, the day of the Saviour's death and that of Judas' treason. The Greeks, always anxious to differ from the Latins, disapprove of the latter's choosing Saturday to fast instead of Wednesday.

All through the four lents, meat is entirely forbidden; so are milk, butter, and eggs. Few things are allowed except fish and vegetables, under a sky which ripens few kinds of vegetables. Russians, therefore, are, to a great extent, an ichthyophagous people. Although the rivers and seas abound in fish, so that few countries in the world, with the exception of China, derive so great a proportion of their food from the watery element, the fisheries of the Volga and the Don, of the White and Caspian Seas are inadequate to the consumption. The herring and the cod are a large item in the diet of the people. Yet the more devout forego even fish. During the four lents the peasant lives mostly on salt and pickled stuff and on preserved cabbage; it is ship-diet and frequently brings on the same diseases, especially scurvy. The end of the "Great Lent" generally coincides with that of winter, when the system most needs substantial food; the hospitals are then crowded, the intensity of epidemics is doubled, all the more that the semi-starvation of the penitential forty days is followed abruptly by the inordinate feasting of the Easter week. The two lents of St. Peter and the Assumption, falling as they do in the midst of the hottest time and of the hardest field-labor, claim very nearly as many victims. How should mortality not be rife among laborers who feed on salt fish and cucumbers and allay their thirst with *kvàss?*[1]

Hard as these fasting times are, the people keep them most devoutly,—possibly for the very reason that they *are* hard on the flesh. They are to them essential to religion,—the token and pledge of the victory of spirit over flesh. They have a great reverence for long fasts and hard fasters. Mortification is to them, as to the saints of the East, the most meritorious of Christian practices; and the ordinary diet of the *mujik* is so poor that, to mortify himself, he has to come down to buckwheat porridge and rye-bread. Peasants of other nationalities, in the same latitude,

[1] An unfermented and very acid drink made of water in which rye has been steeped and steamed after certain peculiar popular recipes.

would find it hard to exist on such fare—only Russian endurance can stand it. Not so many years ago, under Alexander III., a high functionary who was paying a visit to some Tchekh colonists settled in Ukràïna, asked them whether they would not feel disposed, in acknowledgment of Russian hospitality, to join the Russian Church. "No, Excellency," replied the elder of the village, "your fasts are too long and too severe for us Tchekhs, used as we are to dairy fare."

Many Russians are coming round to the Tchekh's view. Indeed, no one now observes these anchorites' fasts in all their strictness, except the *mujik* and the working-man. Quite lately the merchants were the strictest in the matter of religious observances, but they have grown much laxer, the more so that ritualistic piety is in abeyance among the middle classes. As to the higher classes, they have long dispensed with these penances. Even the devoutest families practise fasting, or rather abstinence, only during the first and last weeks of Lent. Nor do the most religious always feel bound to ask the Church's leave to dispense with the strict observance of the practices she prescribes. Here again shows the difference in the spirit and habits of the two churches. With more fasts, more feast-days, more observances of all kinds than the Latin, the Greco-Russian Church really gives her children greater latitude. It is the same as with the interpretation of dogmas. The clergy does not claim such absolute submission to its authority—and therefore never gained the same practical influence. Many Catholics nowadays look on fast and abstinence as a mere matter of obedience. Nothing could be more at variance with the spirit of the Eastern Church. She regards abstinence chiefly as a means of mortification and a preparation to the feast-days. There can be no question, therefore, of dispensations or privileges such as Rome grants to certain individuals or certain countries. In the Greco-Russian Church everybody is bound to conform to the prescriptions of the Church as far as their strength will allow. Of that everybody is left to

judge for themselves, and only very timid consciences think of asking special permissions for each slight departure from the rules prescribed. "What is the use," a woman most earnest in her religious views once said to me during Lent,—"what is the use for me to ask a priest's leave when God, by giving me delicate health, forbids me to fast?" Thus the letter is not allowed to kill the spirit, and devotion, if not so frequently encountered as in Catholic countries, is generally broader and more spiritual, even among members of the sex which, as a rule and all over the world, is most slavishly given to practices and observances.

There is, in this respect, a great difference between the cultivated and ignorant classes; so great that they often seem to belong to different faiths. With the people, the letter reigns supreme. The obligation of fasting is as absolute as a law. In the remoter parts of the country they are still scandalized at any violation of it. In the reign of Nicolas, a German who was travelling from Petersburgh to Arkhangelsk had his head split open with an axe by a peasant who could not bear to stand by and see a man eat bacon in lent-time. It was a sacrilege which, he felt, no Christian could leave unpunished. Nowadays the peasants have grown too much accustomed to such scandalous doings to fall into violent fits of righteous wrath at sight of them. They even show remarkable tolerance, especially towards foreigners; but it never occurs to them that *they* might be exempted from the traditional law, and they invariably resist any attempt to argue them out of it. In order to get the people to renounce the practice, the Church would have to be prevailed upon to do so first.

But the Church—even had she the right—would hardly be free to act thus. She is a captive to tradition, to antiquity. Discipline, rite, observances, are with her almost as immutable as dogma. Once having placed her strength and pride in immutability, she cannot very well officially give up what she has held fast for ages. The simplicity of the most pious of all her children would take offence thereat, and schisms with foreign churches, or

new sects in Russia might be the result.* This is another case in which Greco-Russian Orthodoxy is at a disadvantage as compared to Latin Catholicism. The latter, owing to the uncontested supremacy of the Roman See, has more freedom in such matters, and can better adapt itself to the needs of the times or the demands of climate. Embodied in an infallible pope, the Roman Church can speak, move, bind, or loose; while the Eastern Church is like her own rigid *eïkons:* her lips, like theirs, are closed; her limbs, stiff with the immobility of centuries, cannot bend at will—they have lost the power.

In Russia Lent is not merely a time of mortification; it is also, or is supposed to be, a period of meditation and retirement from the world. The State, which makes a point of lending assistance to the Church, takes care, after a manner all its own, that it shall be so. The law, indeed, does not compel all Russians to fast, and the police no longer interferes with the fare served at restaurants and eating-houses; but the State decrees abstention from certain worldly pleasures, especially from the theatre. There is in the Penal Code, on this head, a certain art. 155, which is in force to-day. In great cities and for the non-fasting classes, this restriction is quite irksome. During Lent ("Great-Lent") and on the vigils of feast days, the theatres are closed—drama, comedy, opera, everything. True, this prohibition applies chiefly to the big theatres maintained in great part at the expense of the State, and the sacred concerts of the Imperial Chapel or Tchùdof's choirs are not the only resource even at this time. Circuses, *café-concerts*, living pictures, indeed the theatres where the plays are given in foreign languages, are generally allowed to run. Thus it came to pass, under Alexander II., that the Russian opera was forbidden—but not the French *opérette* or the German *Posse*, and Lent became the season of Offenbach and Lecocq, while the

* The Russian army, with the Holy Synod's permission, fasts only one week in Lent. But this is a special case, and more a point of administrative regulation than ecclesiastical ruling.

théâtre bouffe became the trysting-place of "society." This question of theatre in Lent has been taken up repeatedly and with great earnestness by the press and in drawing-rooms. Such subjects are generally allowed free play. Petersburgh and Moscow took opposite stands. In the first year of Alexander III. the municipal council of Moscow passed a resolution ascribing "the decadence of morality" to the fact that, for the last few years, the government had been lax in the matter of Lent theatricals. The wishes of the Moscovite *dúma* were duly considered, and the government, taking action on a report of the Holy Synod, ordered art. 155 of the Penal Code to be once more strictly enforced.

It is with feast-days as with fast-days: there are too many of them, and yet the Church would find the same difficulty in reducing their number. There are about as many holidays as Sundays, and many feast-days have both a vigil and an idle morrow. To the religious feast-days are added the civil holidays—the birthdays and saints' days of the Emperor, the Empress, the Tsesarévitch, and the anniversary of the coronation day. Formerly the saints'-days of all the Grand-Dukes were legal holidays.

As regards public health, these frequent stoppages in the regular work of life do hardly less harm than the long lenten periods. For holidays are given up to drinking and debauch. The morning may be spent in church, but the rest of the day belongs to the tap-room (*kabàk*), and, though not all villages have churches, none are without taverns. Russians are not fond of games or bodily exercise. The very word "holiday" (*pràzdnik*) means "a day of idleness"—and idleness is always demoralizing.

In Russia, just as in the West, many people fancy that the Church has increased the number of feast-days purposely, in the interest of the clergy, which reaps a certain profit from them, and used to reap more, when it was customary for the peasants to work for the parish priest on such days. There is no need of such an explanation. The natural tendency of religion, directed by a

church, is to detach men from the things of the earth and bring them to the contemplation of an invisible world—it is so everywhere. The feast-days, the days sacred to God are one of the means to this end. If there has been in this anything of purpose or calculation, the Church, in the East as in the West, probably had in view the good of the masses, the working people of cities and country, far more than the interests of the clergy ; she acted, as she has always done, for the protection of the poor and the oppressed. So long as there were slaves or serfs, the holidays which gave them a respite from servile toil were a boon to humanity. And even now, when every form of slavery is done with, do we not see workingmen and employés, in many countries, asking for legislation against Sunday labor, so as to be assured of at least one day's rest in seven?

Under different social conditions, however, holidays themselves, if numerous beyond reason, become a sort of servitude ; hampering labor, impoverishing nations and individuals. In Protestant countries the farmer has about 310 days to work in. In Catholic countries where legal holidays have not, as in France, been reduced in number, workingmen and farmers still have about 300 days, while in Russia they have hardly 250. The Orthodox labor year, therefore, is shorter by five or six weeks than that of the Catholics of Italy and Austria, and by two months than that of the Protestants of England and Germany. Here lies a patent cause of economic inferiority, all the more that to the legal holidays custom adds in every province, every village, every family, local holidays, anniversaries, birthdays and saints'-days—all occasions which every good Russian feels bound to celebrate. And the worst of it is that so many legal and local holidays come round in spring and summer, that it is no unusual thing for hay to rot on the ground or grain to sprout while the hay-makers and harvesters celebrate. It is the cry of all landowners that holidays are one of the pests of Russian farming. Pedagogues are just as bitter against them. I have seen them figure out that, to get the

same amount of work from Russian children as from French or German ones, the school term should be lengthened by a year or even two.

It was but natural that public opinion and the government should take up this question. The Holy Synod itself, the highest ecclesiastical court, is said to have placed it on file for investigation. Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether all the subjects of the tsar would admit even the Synod's right to interfere with the feast-days established by the Church from earliest times. Besides, they might be officially suppressed, but the people would keep them all the same. Even now, some of the peasant's favorite feast-days, those of St. Elijah and Our Lady of Kazàn among others, are not imposed by the Church.[2]

It is a peculiarity of the Russian peasant that he would rather work on a Sunday than on a holiday. And he does not in the least mind doing a bit of buying and selling of a Sunday as he comes out of church after mass. I have seen them finish off some job of field work on a Sunday. But they strongly object to working on a holiday for an employer; this is one of the things which set workmen in factories against their foreign masters or overseers —to such an extent that the government of Alexander III. thought best to enjoin a stricter observance of Church holidays. It is a pity that their number could not have been cut down by the same decree.

This question is closely bound up with another and no less delicate one—the reform of the calendar. It is well known that the Russian Church, and consequently the State, still keep to the Julian year; more than that, the imperial government has re-

[2] St. Elijah's Day ($\frac{\text{30th of July}}{\text{11th of August}}$) falls in the season of the thunder-storms, and has taken the place of the heathen festival of Perùn, the Slavic Thor, or Thunderer, of whom it used to be said that the thunder was the rumbling of the wheels of his fiery chariot—precisely what is now said of St. Elijah. "Elijah the Prophet is taking his drive" is a very common weather saying.

introduced it in countries which had discarded it long ago. Thus the native land of Copernicus had to come back to the "old style," and Russia, owning some of the finest observatories, puts up with this anachronism. And the reason that she persists in avowedly ignoring the natural course of the seasons is still the same: the Orthodox Church acknowledges no central authority, qualified to decree such a measure and have it universally adopted, and does not feel strong enough to carry through this reform, apparently so simple.

The State, of course, might take the initiative. But, though the Gregorian calendar bears the name of a pope, the difficulty would be, not to get the Holy Synod and the clergy to adopt it, but the people. It is possible that it could not be done short of an understanding with the Patriarchs and all the churches of the East, a sort of Council of the whole Orthodox world. In the eyes of a large portion of the nation, a change of calendar would amount to a revolution. Certain sects would not fail to see therein a sign of the coming of Antichrist. It is not only that the change would disturb the habits of the most conservative of peoples, it would play havoc with the feast-days, giving to one saint the day set apart by the calendar for another. For, to "catch up" with the new style, twelve days would have to be taken out of the year, cheating as many saints out of their dues. And what would say the men named for those saints? How get a peasant to understand why this or that saint—or even Christ and the Blessed Virgin themselves—should be defrauded of the day rightfully belonging to them, though but for one year? Why, it would be enough to frighten the people out of their senses, for what might not the defrauded ones do to them in their anger? Should the government force the measure in the face of popular displeasure, it would add another weapon to the arsenal of the Old-Believers, who already accuse it of having tampered with the liturgy. This is what accounts for the "old style" being retained: imperial absolutism does not dare touch the calendar. As soon as the

people's conscience is in question, absolutism is not absolute any more—a limit is set to it by the popular faith, though that faith be superstitious prejudice.

And what else can be expected in a country where devotion to the saints is now as much an essential of popular religion as it ever was? And in few countries of Europe have saints, ancient or modern, been so popular. Russia has her *Golden Legend*, "Lives of the Saints," which come mostly from the Greeks and Bulgars, and are greatly enriched by the national fancy. These Lives are usually anonymous and, as modern scholarship has discovered, have been worked over and added to by many different hands and at different times, and—besides being one of the most prolific branches of popular literature—they are one of the most valuable sources of national history.

There is a pretty general impression in the West that the Greco-Russian Church has only ancient saints,—ante-dating the separation between Rome and Byzance. Catholic writers are forever repeating that the East, so rich in saints, has not produced any since the schism; they even assert that the Eastern Church does not claim any at all, self-convicted of sterility. This only shows how very little that church is known to her Western sister. The East, and especially Russia, numbers hosts of saints for the last ten centuries: Saints, Blessed, and Venerables of all times, from St. Olga down to the eighteenth century. The catacombs of Kief alone contain the bodies of over a hundred, duly catalogued by the monks of the Petchersky Monastery for the edification of pilgrims. Moscow, Nòvgorod-the-Great, Pskof,—all ancient cities, and all ancient monasteries have their Saints and their Venerables, whose reputation sometimes extends from the Baltic to the Pacific. There are among them martyrs, bishops, princes, and a great many monks. There is about these Russian saints, as about their *eïkons* and their church herself, something—if we may use the word again—archaïc. They are mostly pro-

ducts of the church or cloister and have spent there the greater part of their earthly life. Many were ascetes or anchorites of a thoroughly Oriental type, like those "Blessed ones" of Kief who lived for years self-entombed in the gloom of their catacombs ("caves" they are called). A few—like Alexander Nevsky, the St. Louis of the North—are national heroes; others—like St. Sergins, St. Tryphon, St. Stephen, the apostle of Perm—preached the Gospel to heathen peoples and converted them. It is enough to compare the area of Gaul or Germany with that of Russian Scythia to guess how many missionaries were needed for those vast wildernesses, how many hardships, how much suffering the apostles of the Gospel must have undergone in the midst of all those Finns, Mongols, Tatars, those pagans and barbarians of all sorts.

The ranks of the Russian heavenly host, though they boast a few noble and sublime figures, do not present either the variety or the splendor which distinguish those of the West. The most patriotic of hagiographers will not contend that the Russian saints can vie, in originality either of character or work, or yet (and even less) in the influence they may have exercised over their country's history or culture, with the saints of the Latin Church, or even those of any one Catholic country, be it Italy, France, or Spain. We would vainly look among them for individualities to match a Gregory VII. or a St. Bernard, a Thomas Aquinas or a Francis of Assisi, a François de Sales or a Vincent de Paul. Still less would we find anything to compare with a Catherine of Sienna or a St. Theresa. Not only are women saints infinitely fewer than men, but their personality is more indistinct and blurred. It is as though *térem* life had cast its shadow even on the Russian Paradise.[3] Nor can this gray monotony of the Russian heaven be ascribed solely to the subordinate attitude of the Church or the Oriental conception of holiness in vogue in ancient

[3] *Têrem*—the women's apartments, where noble ladies lived almost as secluded as in *gynæceums* or *zenanas*.

Moscovia ; it is due quite as much to the incomplete development of public and civil life, the low grade of culture.

The Eastern Church, true to her love for antiquity in all things, has no liking for novelties in the way of miracles and saints ; she is slow to accept contemporary visions and prophecies, and is at one with the State to warn the people against excessive credulity. Not that she has pushed the supernatural element back into the misty depths of the past, as the Protestants have done, to the vague nimbus which surrounds the dawn of Christianity. She claims to be as much as ever in possession of the gift of miracles and the gift of holiness, seeing therein a token that God is with her still ; so that with all her dislike to innovation, she does not go the length of closing her doors against every new miracle-worker whatever. Indeed, she has admitted one or two new saints right in the middle of the present nineteenth century. Only she seldom does such things spontaneously : she rather suffers herself to be, in a manner, coerced by popular pressure. There is no such thing in Russia as regular canonization in the Catholic sense, with the long and costly proceedings in the Roman Congregations. It is simply : *vox populi, vox Dei.* "In our country," a church dignitary said to me, "it is not the clergy, the hierarchy, who canonize a saint, but God who reveals him." For the people and for the Church herself, the prime test of holiness is the preservation of the body from corruption after death, then—as an accessory—the miracles worked by the remains. Such is the case of many an old saint in Kief, whose desiccated but undecaying hands I have touched in those catacombs in which so many sought and found a living tomb. The same with one of the last saints admitted, Mitrophan, bishop of Vorònej, in the eighteenth century. His tomb being opened for some reason about 1830, his body was found intact ; this was accepted as confirmation of his renown for holiness, which was already established among the people. The Holy Synod instituted an investigation, the result of which was that Bishop Mitrophan ,with the Emperor's approval, was officially

proclaimed a saint. Fifty years later, I have seen pilgrims from all ends of the empire crowding to the holy bishop's silver shrine. About 1840 the claims of another bishop, Tìkhon, to saintship were preferred. But the Emperor Nicolas decided that one saint was plenty for one reign, and Tìkhon had to wait a score of years. His turn came under Alexander II., when he too was officially proclaimed.

The reverence for relics and the love of pilgrimages have always been a prominent feature in the spiritual life of the Russian people and are now. Few peasants are free from the ambition of visiting at some time the Petchersky catacombs or the tomb of St. Sergius at Tròïtsa ; nay, many, like Tolstòy's "Two Old Men," cross the seas and go all the way to Palestine or Mount Athos. Some foot it as far as Mount Sinaï. In the villages, to have visited the Holy Lands is a title to high consideration ; pilgrims are looked up to just as are the Mussulman Hadjis. They are mostly aged, men and women alike. The mujik's passion for these devotional expeditions is checked by the law which attaches him to the soil. Now, as in the times of serfdom, he hardly is allowed to go away on long leave until he has brought up a family, and is himself pretty well unfit for work. These pilgrims usually go in gangs, mostly on foot, clumsily shod with high-top boots or the homely sandal (*làpty*), plaited out of linden bast ; they travel slowly for weeks and months, often begging their way, sleeping in the open air or under vast sheds, constructed on purpose for them near the more renowned monasteries. Distance does not deter them : women and old men have been known to tramp across the whole empire, from the western frontier to the heart of Siberia, or from the banks of the Dniepr to the shores of the White Sea. Many of these old folks of both sexes, in wending their way to distant shrines, are accomplishing a vow of their youth or their mature age ; for years and years they have waited for old age to bring them the leisure to pay their debt to Christ or the saints. Sometimes, after the manner of their people, they club together,

and form an *artèl*, defraying the cost of long pilgrimages from a common fund.

The numbers of peasants who go all the way to the Holy Land to light a candle at the Holy Sepulchre, and get a bottle of water out of the Jordan, are increasing all the time. Palestine is visited by more pilgrims from Russia than from all other nations put together. In former times they mostly used to go entirely by land, leisurely tramping across the steppes of the Black and Caspian Seas, the Caucasus, Asia Minor, the Taurus Mountains, never heeding the vexatious and insulting treatment they met with from the Mussulmans. Nowadays they generally walk to Odessa, and take ship there at reduced rates to Kaïfa or Jaffa. Each spring steamers are chartered specially for them, and they are packed into them as closely as steerage emigrants shipped to America. For something like 50 roubles (about $30) they can secure a return trip from the heart of Russia to the shore of Palestine. Formerly the Russian consuls had to send home hundreds of them whom the greed of the Greek monks had robbed of their last *kopek*.

These pilgrims, like those of the Latin West in the Middle Ages, follow certain itineraries, on which are indicated the principal stations, the shrines they are to visit, and the relics which claim their homage. There is a society, which numbers among its members princes of the blood and high church dignitaries, and which, under the name of "Orthodox Society of Palestine," makes it its special mission to look after these humble worshippers at the Sepulchre of Christ, and has organized shelters and hospitals for them in Odessa, in Constantinople, in Jerusalem. As soon as they are landed on the inhospitable shore of Palestine, with no luggage but the heavy canvas sack, which the pilgrims, men and women alike, carry slung on their backs, they slowly wend their way to the Holy City, chaunting prayers as they go. I have seen them prostrate themselves and kiss the dust at the first sight of the walls of David's city, as the Crusaders did before them. In

Bethlehem, along the Jordan, on the Lake of Tiberias, I have encountered these long caravans of most sordid appearance, sometimes escorted by Turkish *zaptiehs*. The hospital wards of all the Greek monasteries are crowded with the sick who drop along the roads and paths of Judæa, and each spring many of them, still clad in their winter sheepskins, attain the joyful consummation of being buried in the soil which the Saviour's feet have trod.

These thousands of pilgrims fill Syria with the fame of Russia's piety and power. The imperial government has built for its own subjects, just outside the gates of Jerusalem, an immense monastery, which might be taken for a city. Not content with having joined France (under the Second Empire) in rebuilding the cupola which rises above the Holy Sepulchre, the Russians have restored churches in many parts of Palestine, and founded schools where both Russian and Arabic are taught.* In this land of the Crusades, where the different nations and religious denominations are perpetually clashing in rivalry, Russia, the latest come, has already secured a place all her own, as the champion of Orthodoxy. If ever the Moscovite eagle should dip its wings in the waters of the Mediterranean, these peaceful hordes may help open the way for the conquest of the new crusaders.

* In 1885 and 1886 the "Russian Orthodox Society" founded two schools at Nazareth, and, in 1887, a sort of normal school in Jerusalem.

BOOK II. CHAPTER V.

The Sacraments in the Russian Church, and the Relations between the Priest and his Flock—Baptism—At Variance with Constantinople—The Eucharist: Communion under Both Species—The Holy Chrism and Unction—Ordination—The Consequences of the Married State for Priests—The Sacrament of Marriage—Divorce—Divorce Proceedings in Russian Society—Confession: How Practised—The Custom of Confession Fees—On the Legal Obligation of Receiving the Sacraments—The Registers Kept by the Clergy, and the Statistics of Communion—How the Russians Perform their Religious Duties.

In order to account for the moral efficiency and the political value of a form of worship, it is not sufficient to make oneself familiar with its rites and practices; the relations between priest and flock should also be studied. Details of discipline or ritual which, at first sight, appear as mere liturgical variations, sometimes exert greater moral influence than divergences in dogma. In this respect, people do not always seem to realize, in the West, the chasm which the differences in their practices have placed between the two churches. Both have the same sacraments—"mysteries" the Greeks call them,—which both conceive very much in the same way, but each administers them in certain conditions or with certain rites, which frequently modify their practical workings. The sacraments are the same, but the clergy of both churches do not derive the same influence from both.

First of all, it should be noted that the attitude of both churches towards their respective liturgies and usages is not identical. The Orientals are too distrustful of any kind of religious innovation, to be as tolerant towards the rites of the Latins, as the Latins are towards theirs. Rome is assuredly more liberal in this respect, and for a simple reason: the Latin Church, which has,

more than once, deliberately corrected or simplified the ancient forms of worship, has no grounds for any feeling of repulsion against the rites preserved intact by the Greeks; there is nothing in the way of her proclaiming them holy and worthy of reverence, or admitting the practice of them among such of the Orientals as consent to recognize Roman supremacy. The Latin liturgy, in its present form, cannot, on the contrary, claim the respect of the Orthodox. To them, the rites as modified in the West in the course of the ages, must appear mutilated; and a simpler form is to them a mangled form, which disfigures the sacrament and alters its essence.

Divergences of this kind we encounter in the two chief of Christian sacraments, indeed in that which confers the quality of Christian. Constantinople and Moscow still baptize, as did the primitive Church, by immersion thrice repeated. They challenge the efficacy of baptism by aspersion, as now in use among the Latins, with the exception of Milan, where the Ambrosian rite still endures. Formerly the Russians, like the Greeks, used to re-baptize the Occidentals who entered the fold of Orthodoxy. The Church of Constantinople does so still; the Russian has desisted. The imperial brides, for whom the way to the throne lies through conversion, are not required to undergo the disagreeable ordeal. This, indeed, is the only divergence of any importance which has crept in between the two churches, as it is the main point on which certain Roman theologians have based the argument by which they claim that Russian and Greek Orthodoxy are, though they will not admit it, two separate churches, two different confessions. In reality, the communion between Russia and the Byzantine Patriarchate has never been endangered by this question. A Roman Catholic received into the Russian church is, without any demur, admitted to partake of communion by the Patriarch,—which fact gave occasion to an Englishman to remark that, to enter the Greek Church, a trip to Petersburgh was as good as being baptized in Constantinople.

Differences of greater importance, because they could be made to assume a moral and political bearing, confront us in the Eucharist. The Oriental Church understands it very much as the Catholics do and administers it much after the manner of Protestants. Like the Latin Church, she believes in the Real Presence. Only, as is her wont, she has not determined with the same accuracy the manner and precise moment of the accomplishment of the mystery, which allows her to boast of her interpretation being the more spiritual. The theologians even have occasionally borrowed from the Latins the term "transubstantiation" instead of "transmutation," more generally used in the East. It is less on the sacrament itself they disagree with Rome, than on the accompanying rites. These differences in form Greeks and Russians have dilated upon as usual, giving them the greater importance that they were thus enabled to accuse the Latins of having altered the nature of the holiest of all sacraments. So they censure them for not any longer invoking the Holy Ghost at the moment of consecration, and using, for communion, unleavened, instead of leavened, bread. This question of the unleavened breads is one of those that have aroused the most passionate feeling in the East; at one time it even drew down on the Latins the curious accusation of Judaism.

The manner of administering the sacrament presents a divergence of another order, one that more directly touches the people. With the Orthodox as with the Protestants, the layman receives the communion in the same form as the clergy; in accordance with the rite of the primitive Church, the people partake of the bread and the wine, the flesh and the blood of the Saviour, as well as the priest. This privilege has always been highly prized by the adversaries of the Roman Church. To obtain it, the Slavs of Bohemia, after the death of John Huss, sustained a terrible war. The reformers of the sixteenth century were unanimous in claiming it, because, when reserved for the clergy alone, it seemed to them to raise the latter to a pre-eminence above the

laity, especially as blood to all the ancients represented life. The Orientals looked on communion reduced to the element of bread alone as on a mutilated rite and a symbol of the abasement of the Christian people before their priests. In support of their determination to preserve the primitive Eucharistic rite in its integrity, the Russians point to one of the large mosaics, dating from the eleventh century, in the most venerable of their religious monuments, the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kief, where Christ appears presenting to his disciples the cup together with the bread.*

The other sacraments present almost as many divergences between the two churches as those of baptism and the Eucharist. Confirmation, for instance, is indeed considered a sacrament by the Orthodox—a "mystery"; but neither the name nor the rite is the same, nor the meaning quite. They call it "chrismation," or "unction," and it is administered, not by a bishop, but by a priest; not after the first communion, but, according to the usage of the primitive Church, immediately after baptism. For once, however, the Orientals have left out the apostolical rite of the laying on of hands, and have substituted for it the anointing of various parts of the body with chrism, the consecration of which no one but a bishop can accomplish. This is, in all the Orthodox Churches, a ceremony of the highest solemnity, usually performed in the religious metropolis. In Russia, the Holy Chrism is prepared, for the whole empire, in Moscow, during Lent, in the ancient patriarchal vestry in the Kremlin. All the kettles and vessels used are of solid silver. Into the composition of it enter, besides oil, wine, herbs, aromatic substances, and many other ingredients, all having a symbolical meaning.

The other chrismal sacrament, the extreme unction of the

* It should be noted, however, that the mode of communion is not absolutely the same for the laity as for the clergy. Laymen are not permitted to drink from the cup. This honor is only for the priest and the deacon. The Emperor is alone entitled to it—on his coronation day. To the general public communion is given in a golden spoon, wherein particles of the consecrated bread float in the wine.

Latins, is also slightly different with the Orthodox, in name and in practice. The Russians call it by a name (*sobórovaniyé*) which connects it, etymologically, with an assembly, a gathering.* It is usually administered, not by one priest, but by several—seven, if possible,—which the Greeks consider more in accordance with the text of the Epistle of St. James. The Greco-Russian Church looks on this "mystery" not so much as the sacrament of the dying and a preparation for death, as the sacrament of the sick and a means of healing and cure.

All these divergences, which might furnish a long list, may appear unimportant, even puerile, to the uninitiated; not so to the observant mind, any more than to the believing. It is not merely that, in religious matters, the masses become attached chiefly to externalities; under these differences in form and discipline frequently lurk differences in spirit. This is the case with the two sacraments by means of which the Church influences civil life—marriage and ordination. Regarding both, the Orthodox are, theoretically, at one with the Catholics; in practice, however, they lean towards certain Protestant sects. In the Greco-Russian Church there is no incompatibility between the two, while the Latins have grown into the habit of looking on one as essentially a lay sacrament, and on the other as essentially a sacerdotal one. More than that: not only is celibacy not a condition of ordination in Greece and Russia, but the latter is not usually conferred on any but married men, so that, actually, marriage, not celibacy, gives access to the altar.

This custom does not extend to the highest rank of the hierarchy—the episcopal,—yet its importance can hardly be overrated. The priest, being married and a *paterfamilias*, stands nearer to his flock, whose mode of life he shares, is less divided from them in thought and feeling. The Orthodox world being subdivided into

* From *sobráti*, "to gather," whence *sobrániyé*, "assembly," *sobòr*, a "Council" (ecclesiastical) then a church of the first rank; usually rendered, —not quite correctly—"cathedral."

as many churches as there are states or peoples, her clergy must needs be a purely national institution; marriage and domestic life make of them citizens whose interests are identical with those of the other classes. To this difference between the two churches another must be added, of at least equal importance. The Orthodox priest is not as irrevocably bound as the Catholic priest. He can—the Holy Synod consenting, and with the sovereign's sanction—be released from his vow, and re-enter civil life, somewhat after the manner that a soldier leaves the army.* Convicted of a crime, the priest is degraded, like an officer. In former times, a priest who had given offence could be made a soldier.

Thus it comes to pass that the clergy of both churches, while having the same origin and the same functions, differ vastly in position and influence. With the Orthodox as with the Latins, the priest is the one channel and vehicle of divine grace and the sacraments; but neither church discipline nor religious practices have dug so deep a chasm between him and his flock as they have in the West. He is not raised so high above humanity; ordination has not placed him so far out of reach of laymen as to make it impossible for him ever to be on a level with them. Communion is the same for both. Marriage is the great bond between them. Having families, and no foreign head, the priesthood cannot form a body as compact and distinct as in Catholic countries. This naturally leads the Greco-Russian Church to leave a greater influence to laymen and to the State, as their natural representative. She emphasizes less the mystical, divine character of the priest, the halo of religion surrounds him less visibly outside of the

* Here is a specimen of such an authorization, from the columns of an official church paper: "His Majesty, the Lord Emperor, on May 12th of the present year, has deigned to grant to the former priest of the diocese of Volhynia, Ivan Lvôvitch . . ., who laid down the priestly dignity in 1880, the authorization to enter the service of the State, with the rights accruing to him by birth, . . . anywhere except in the diocese of Volhynia, where he served in the capacity of priest."—*Church Messenger* (*Tserkôvnoy Viêstnik*), June 16, 1884.

temple and its sacred ceremonies. The clergy is not merged into the Church ; the people see in him not so much the representative of God, as the minister, the servitor at the altar.

As regards marriage, the difference between the two churches is not so great. Here again the Oriental Church, though in reality at one with Rome, stands, in some respects, between Rome and the Reformation. True to the repugnance of the early Christians against a renewal of the conjugal bond broken by death, she tolerates—among laymen only—a second and a third marriage, but draws the line at a fourth. Indeed, she inflicts a light penance on the widow or widower who is worldly enough to remarry. She agrees with the Catholics in making a sacrament of marriage and proclaiming its indissolubility, and with the Protestants in admitting (with Matthew, v., 32) that a breach of the plighted troth on the part of one of the consorts gives the other the right to demand a separation. In her traditions, the violation of the marriage vow annuls the sacrament. The injured consort is authorized to contract a new tie, while the delinquent spouse is forbidden the same privilege. As there is no other marriage in Russia, for the Orthodox, than the church marriage, this ecclesiastical jurisprudence takes the place of civil law. It has one great disadvantage, that of lending itself to collusion and fraudulent bargains. The unwritten worldly code has greatly modified the canonical law. This is owing mainly to manners and to the obsolete, unsatisfactory way in which divorce proceedings are conducted in the ecclesiastical courts ; and the Church is too often a willing dupe to the combined action of the ill-mated consorts.

It is not rare for a man to take the guilt on himself and thus help his wife to marry the man who, in justice, should be co-respondent with her. This is indeed considered, in the upper classes, the only thing for a decent man to do ; it has become almost a matter of propriety. The converse case—of a woman sacrificing herself and taking on herself a crime she has not committed—is much more rare. Some few do it out of devotion,

others out of cupidity. Instances are quoted in merchant circles, of wealthy widows purchasing in this way husbands who had taken their fancy. Transactions of the kind have even been shown up on the stage. There have been cases of husbands or wives divorced in this manner, wishing to recover their rights, even after the other consort's remarriage, and applying for a revision of a judgment based on fictitious facts.

The question whether the guilty consort should be forbidden for all time from remarrying, has given rise to much discussion. Several canonists have held that no council ever laid down any such law, and that it is based on nothing but the so-called *Nomokanon*, a Byzantine code which weaves into church canons the civil laws concerning the church and clergy. Certain it is that the church authorities, in Russia, incline to laxness on this point, as the severity of the regulation is generally held to be excessive. It now is only a question of time. There have already been instances of permission to marry again being given to the consort who has been declared guilty. When the exception will have become the rule, applications for divorce will greatly increase in number. The trials will be rather less scandalous in consequence; but it is doubtful whether the conjugal tie will be strengthened thereby.*

In a study devoted to the sacraments it is impossible to omit that which constitutes the moral originality of Catholicism—penance, confession. The Greek is at one with the Roman in demanding auricular confession. Theoretically, the sacrament is about the same in both, but how about the practice, which alone decides the value of such an institution? In the case of a foreigner, belonging to another church, there can, in such a matter, be no question of personal experience or of direct comparison. He must be content with more or less clear and precise information, elicited by questioning from people who are themselves not

* For the number of divorces and the manner of proceeding in divorce cases, in the ecclesiastical consistories, see Ch. VII. of this Book.

in a position to establish comparisons between their own and Catholic customs. Between Oriental and Latin confession practice appears to have dug a chasm which time may either bridge or widen. The former is briefer or more summary, less explicit, less searching ; it is also less frequent, and both its influence on the worshipper and the authority it confers on the clergy are thus materially lessened. It is generally limited to serious delinquencies, and otherwise is content with general declarations, without specifying any particular sins ; it does not delve into the secrets of individual conscience, into the intimacies of private life. The Russian Church does not place in the hands of her followers any of those manuals of minute self-examination which, at one time, were in such general use in Catholic countries ; nor does she give her priests any of those manuals of moral theology which carry the anatomy of vice to the length of a repulsive vivisection. In one word, Orthodox confession appears in every way simpler and discreeter, more symbolical, and more attached to form than Roman confession.

The Russian confessor, especially when dealing with the common people, generally proceeds by interrogation. To the peasant, I am told, he puts two leading questions : "Hast thou stolen ? Hast thou been drunk ?" to which the *mujik*, with a profound salutation : "I have sinned, father" (*Griêshen, bàtiushka*). Such an answer to two rapidly put questions generally suffices to ensure absolution. Some people object to be questioned too closely. I was told of a government employé who, on the priest's asking him point-blank whether he had accepted bribes, observed to him that he was going too far. Sometimes, after or instead of putting the usual questions, the priest asks the penitent whether he has anything on his conscience, any special offence to confess. In the capital of a government, I was told of a priest who merely asked his penitents their names, absolution being given individually by name. As a rule, confession is lumped into a general admission of sinfulness, and the vague formula, "I have sinned," is considered

sufficient; it is thought unnecessary to go into particulars. It is much the same thing in the Armenian Church, which differs very little from the Greek in rites and practices. I met in Transcaucasia an Armenian bishop, a well-informed and intelligent man, who actually erected this summary mode of confession into a theological theory: "An admission of having sinned," he used to say, "implies all manner of sin. When you have said 'I have sinned,' you have said all. Confession is the external rite of the sacrament of penance. If the priest insists on going into details, he materializes it for the benefit of the clergy." This doctrine may betray certain Protestant influences, but it is not that held by the Russian theologians. In theory, there is between them and the Catholics, with regard to this sacrament, only one notable divergence—on the question of the penance to be inflicted by the confessor. According to the Orthodox teaching, it is not an atonement, a satisfaction for sins committed, but merely a means of correction, of discipline, to aid the sinner, a remedy which is seldom prescribed unless he himself demands it. This doctrine on penance is connected with that on works; and this doctrine it is which has led Eastern Orthodoxy to reject the entire scheme of Latin indulgences,—all that the Russians ironically describe as the credit-and-debit accounts and the spiritual banking system of the Roman Church.*

If a foreigner cannot learn anything about Orthodox confession through his ears, his eyes can tell him something about it. All he has to do is to step into a church at the beginning or end of Lent. There are no confessionals. Nothing, in the Catholic churches

*The Slavophil Khomiakôf especially denounced the Church of Rome as "establishing between God and men a balance of duties and merits; measuring sins and prayers, offences and acts of expiation, encouraging one man to inform on another; in short, as introducing into the House of God the entire mechanism of a banking house." (*The Latin Church and Protestantism.*) The Greek clergy, to use another expression of Khomiakôf, "having no reserve fund of grace to draw upon and distribute," is deprived of another of the means of influence which are at the disposal of the Catholic clergy.

of Kief or Vilna, puzzles the Orthodox peasant more. The presence or absence of these special constructions—these little "sentry-boxes" (*bùdki*), as the *mujik* naïvely calls them—is alone an indication of the comparative importance of confession in the two churches. There is, as a rule, no seat for the priest, no arrangement for the penitent to kneel on. They stand behind a grating or a screen, which separates but does not conceal them from the crowd. Sometimes even this slender barrier is wanting. The priest hears confessions standing near a wall or one of the pilasters. All there is before him is a reading-desk, with a crucifix on it and a Testament, on which the penitent lays two fingers, as though to swear that he will speak the truth. On certain days of Lent, in city parishes, crowds of men and women of all classes may be seen filing into the churches, sometimes thousands, and taking their places in order, all standing and each holding a small taper. The head of the column presses against the screen which shelters the confessor. He is pressed upon so hard by the surging of the ever-renewed crowd, that he can hardly give a minute or two to each penitent. Each comes forward in turn, and after sundry salutations and signs of the cross, answers two or three questions, when he receives the absolution, which the priest gives him by laying the skirt of his stole on his head. The penitent kisses the crucifix or the Testament, and after a few more salutations and signs of the cross before some *eïkon*, walks away, and has himself inscribed on the deacon's register, then leaves the church, to return next morning in time for mass and communion.

A very Russian and most Christian custom is that of asking pardon, before going to confession, of all with whom one lives in daily contact—relatives, friends, servants. On confession days one frequently sees people, even unacquainted with one another, bow low to one another in silent token of mutual forgiveness.

All these confessions accumulate at these fixed times and are necessarily gone through in a rapid, rather perfunctory manner. But not always. There are repentant or self-doubting souls; there are zealous priests who are not content with a mere cere-

mony ; such as these are apt to need and give advice or consolation. Here and there a young girl is afraid, a mother is uneasy about the questions which may be put to her daughter. But this is rare. Indeed, in private schools, it is quite usual for the priest to hear the confession of two or three children—boys or girls—at a time, putting one question to all and receiving the same answer from all,—to get through quicker. This puts one in mind of the wholesale confession of a regiment, when the priest, standing in front of the ranks, asks at the top of his voice : "Have you stolen? Have you been drunk? Have you fornicated?" To which the men reply in chorus : "I have sinned, father!" Not a bad idea—in time of war.

One thing to be noted is that, among the Old-Believers who claim that they have, in all things, preserved the ancient customs, confession is both longer and more searching. The priest, in full canonicals, is alone with the penitent, while the others wait their turn at a distance, sometimes even outside, on the porch of the church, and not only questions him under the head of each of the Ten Commandments separately, but does not hesitate to ask the most personal and delicate questions. So, at least, I have heard from some Old-Believers. A famous sectarian of the name of Avvakùm, who lived during the minority of Peter the Great, has left a sort of autobiographical memoir, wherein he gives a sample of confession as practised in his time and among his people,—a passage which not only is of the greatest interest from the narrator's sincerity and old-fashioned quaintness, but shows that confession was not a matter of mere ceremony in the Russian Church at the time when the schism first began.*

*This is the passage in question : "When I was among the priests, a young woman came to confess, loaded down with gross sins, fornication and every nastiness ; she accused herself with tears and told me her case, standing before the Testament. Then I, thrice accursed, I healer of souls, even I caught the infection, and the consuming fire of fornication entered into my heart. That was a rough day for me. I lit three candles and stuck them on the desk, then I held my hand in the flame until this impure fire was extinguished. After which, having dismissed the woman, I folded up my vestments. . . ."

Even now, in convent churches, an observer may once in a while notice a more intimate and animated confession. But, on the whole, the institution is, we repeat, simpler and more discreet than in the West, nor is "spiritual direction," that essentially Catholic institution, so dear to the seventeenth century, at all known in the East.

There are, in the usages of the Orthodox Church—of the Russian Church in particular—several reasons why confession should be laxer than in the West. One of these causes is the married state of the priests. The East has, indeed, proved that confession does not demand that the confessor should be celibate. Rome herself recognizes the fact by sanctioning marriage among the clergy of the United Greeks, the Armenians, the Maronites. Nevertheless, it is a fact that a married priest does not inspire with as much confidence, or rather unreserve—*abandon*. Being more exposed to the suspicion of indiscretion, he will himself be more reserved. The law punishes the priest who violates a secret entrusted in confession. One sometimes hears stories to the contrary, but they should not be given credence too readily. Such occurrences are at all events too exceptional to deter a repentant sinner from revealing his guilt. It is not so much the confession of crimes or of serious offences that would be withheld on account of the priest's married state, as the delicate confidences and effusions of religiously over-sensitive souls. The husband and paterfamilias is, to the penitent, a mere mortal, unhallowed by the angelic halo with which the vow of chastity crowns the brow of the Catholic priest : he does not exercise over devout spirits, especially over women, the same mystical fascination.

One thing which detracts from the romance of confession and adds to the formalism which has invaded the Church, is the custom of paying the priest on the spot for every ministration. For in Russia, as in the East, every sacrament is paid for, confession as well as baptism and marriage. This comes from the clergy's poverty : its budget is not sufficient to allow it to dispense

with such dues. Tariff there is none: the *mujik* pays for his confession 10 or 20 *kopeks* (7 to 15 cents or thereabouts), the rich man several *roubles*. The amount depends on the person's position and liberality; vanity has also much to do with it, and the more or less repentant mood. This also may incline the priest to greater leniency and discretion; he has an interest in encouraging the penitent, who is in reality a sort of customer for the Church and her minister.

The fact that religious practices, in Russia, are so frequently purely external, ceremonial acts, must be ascribed in great part to the close connection between the two ruling powers, to the legal support which the State gives to the commandments of the Church. The law obliges every Orthodox Russian to receive the sacraments at least once every year. There is in the Code an article which enjoins on the civil and military authorities, as well as on the clergy, the duty of seeing that this law be enforced. Of course, this is scarcely feasible nowadays. Personal liberty has made too much progress, and thousands break the law without ever being interfered with. Still, it exists and *can* be used for purposes of intimidation or from excess of zeal.

The worst of it is that, thanks to this legislation, the Church has come to be considered as a sort of adjunct to the police, and religious practices as police regulations. This draws down on the government and the clergy suspicions and accusations which are mostly undeserved and always exaggerated. In some provinces you are told that the priest occasionally asks his penitent whether he loves Russia and the Tsar—a question which, naturally, admits of only one answer. More than that, confessors are commanded, on pain of death, to denounce plots against the State or the emperor. But these are relics of barbarous laws, which were always meant to intimidate rather than to be actually enforced. The most suspicious tyrants, at the worst times, rarely succeeded in wresting from members of the clergy secrets confided to them under the seal of confession. The Russian Church has had her

martyrs as well as the Latin. Only by means of torture could Peter the Great wrest a few criminating admissions from the confessor of his son Alexis. It is not the less true that political conspirators have frequently, and especially during the late nihilistic crises, shown distrust of the confessors who were sent them and affected to consider them as minions of the investigating judge.

What handicaps the Church is not so much lack of confidence in her ministers as the legal consecration awarded by the State to religious prescriptions which concern only men's consciences. There lies one of the main causes of the formalism of which the Orthodox Church is so generally accused. Material compulsion is rare, except in the case of sectarians whose worship the government refuses to sanction; but the moral pressure is heavy and almost universal. Owing to the solidarity which exists between Church and State, the attitude of the Russians towards it is not unlike that of the followers of Rome under the papal *régime*. For the sake of peace and a feeling of safety, from the hope of advancement or the fear of falling under *surveillance*, which is always uncomfortable, people will go to church who would not go out of inclination. It is a matter of worldly wisdom to take communion at Eastertide. Thus it is that the most mystical acts of the Christian religion degenerate, in so many cases, into mere formalism.

After the priest has given them absolution, government employés and soldiers receive a confession check from the sacristan, and the priest keeps a register of all who receive the sacraments. Each year the parochial lists are sent to the bishops, the diocesan lists to the Holy Synod; then a general table is set up, on which the High Procurator reports to the emperor. On the showing of these devotional statistics, about fifty millions of Orthodox Russians, besides infants, fulfil their religious duties. Those who shirk them—five or six millions in all—are divided into several categories: the sick and the infirm, the indifferent and the lukewarm, and those "suspected of a leaning towards

schism or heresy." This latter category, which comprises the adherents of unrecognized sects, should really include, at least in rural districts, the almost totality of Russians who keep away from communion, for there are few peasants who will allow themselves to be classed among the "laggards" unless out of conscientious motives. The priest, both as bread-winner for his family and as functionary responsible to his bishop, cannot afford to let his flock neglect their religious duties. But custom has brought a mitigation of the onerous obligation, as is always the case where the Church demands a certificate of accomplishment of a religious act—as for instance in France in the case of the obligatory confession previous to a church marriage. An offering in money will secure an entry on the church register, and this is a resource of which sectarians largely avail themselves, as well as unbelievers. The priest, whether his parishioners pay for receiving the sacraments or for being dispensed from receiving them, pockets his dues. All this, it will be conceded, is more conducive to formalism than to true piety.

The greatest act of a Christian's life, communion, comes under the same strictures as confession. The masses, who comply so scrupulously with the Church's ordinances, apply for the sacrament of the Eucharist only once a year, during the "Great Lent." Frequent communion, which has become so prevalent in the Catholic world, through the influence of St. Philip Neri and St. François de Sales, of Fénélon and the Jesuits, is foreign to Eastern piety. More than that, it is, to the Orthodox, an occasion of scandal rather than of edification. They are, on this point, of the same mind as our old Jansenists. Their clergy hold that communion, if frequent, loses in solemnity and consequently moral efficacy. They accuse the Catholics of wanting in respect for the Holy Eucharist in permitting worldly souls to approach without sufficient preparation and in a state unworthy of so great a boon. They insist that confession, if repeated too often, degrades the sacrament of penance to the level of mere edifying

conversation. In Russia, the most devout participate in the Lord's Supper not more than four times a year; as to monthly communion, it is a rarer thing than weekly communion among Catholics.

It is just possible that infrequent participation in the most august of church sacraments may enhance its solemnity; but the custom of bringing the whole nation to the communion table in gangs must needs diminish its efficiency in individual cases. In conformity with the ancient rite, the Orthodox Church admits to it babes and infants, who are given the wine and bread like the adults, from the gold or gilt silver spoon.* There is, therefore, properly speaking, no first communion. This solemn initiation to the mysteries of religion, which is surrounded with so much reverence and awe, which, among the Catholics and some of the Protestant denominations, exerts so great an influence on the child, is wanting in the Eastern churches. The consequence is not only that the sacrament of the Eucharist loses much of its impressiveness as regards children, who have grown used to receiving it from their earliest days, but that, preparation for this great act being deemed unnecessary, religion generally forfeits much of its importance in education, and, consequently, of its influence through life.

Not that communion is shorn in Russia of its accompaniment of spiritual preparation and solemnity; far from it: fasting, prayer, and seclusion go before. During this period of retirement the long services are to be attended two or three times a day. All through the week of Lent which they select for the purpose, the most delicate women strictly observe the severe abstinence enjoined by the Eastern Church. The most worldly retire for a few days from the world and their friends. No secret is made of the reason. The whole proceeding is both more solemn

* As a rule, children stop taking communion at three or four years of age, until they are seven, when they begin to go to confession, then take communion, the same as grown up people.

and simpler than in the West ; it is not shrouded in the same mystery as in France. After the religious exercises are ended and communion has been received, you are complimented and congratulated by family and friends, as on a birthday or other happy anniversary or festive event. When the Emperor, the Empress, or the Tsesarèvitch have received the sacrament, the fact is registered in the official journal and the public are informed of it through the press.

The account here given of the Orthodox forms of worship and the religious customs of Russia, is quite sufficient to demonstrate that, under a show of similarity, the differences between the Greco-Russian and the Latin churches are many and great, from both the moral and the political standpoint, and a comparative study will lead to conclusions far removed from the generally received opinions. It is a common saying that, having the same faith and the same tradition, the same hierarchy and the same sacraments, they differ merely in rites and forms. It were possibly nearer the truth to reverse the saying, for it is precisely in spirit that the two churches are farthest removed from one another.

Even before we have examined into the inner organization of the clergy and the mutual relations between Church and State, we already are enabled to appreciate the moral efficiency and the social value of Greco-Russian Orthodoxy. That religious forms have a secret affinity with political forms, is a fact frequently pointed out and emphasized at times to exaggeration. Catholicism, by its concentration and serried hierarchy, by its spirit of obedience and the power vested in its head, tends towards authority, centralization, and monarchy. Protestantism, by the latitude it gives to individual faith and free investigation, by its numerous and varied sects, leads rather to liberty, decentralization, representative government. The Orthodox Church, being constituted of mixed elements, is less peremptory in either direction, and her spontaneous tendencies are harder to make out. She seems to have no affinity with any political forms. She affects a

sort of indifference towards all which allows of her easily adapting herself to any form of government reconcilable with the Gospel. Orthodoxy does not carry in itself any political type or ideal towards which it might guide nations. Liberty or despotism, republic or monarchy, democracy or aristocracy, are all one to it—it does not feel fatally impelled to any one side, but bends to its surroundings. If it does not carry within itself the principle of liberty, neither does it that of servitude. It leaves free play to the people's genius and to the working out of historical causes; it exerts less influence over the world than it submits to. It lays no claim to fashioning the State after its own image, but rather allows itself to be moulded after the State. These things account for the organization and the destinies of the Russian Church.

BOOK II. CHAPTER VI.

Mutual Relations between Church and State—How the Church Constitution has been Affected by Autocracy—Main Phases of the History of the Russian Church—Successive Modes of Church Government—The Byzantine Period—The Two Metropolies—The Patriarchate—The Patriarch Nikon and the Strife between the Two Powers—Peter the Great and the Abolition of the Patriarchate—The "Ecclesiastical Code" and the Supremacy of the State—The Foundation of the "Ecclesiastical College" or Holy Synod—Synodal Administration Apparently the Final Form of Government in Orthodox Churches—The Power of the Tsar in Church Matters—Is it True that the Emperor is the Head of the Church?—Comparison with Foreign Countries.

AUTOCRACY is the clue to the history of the Russian Church. If we would arrive at a correct understanding of her destiny and her constitution, we must never lose sight of the fact that we have to do with an Established Church in an autocratic state. That alone accounts for many seeming anomalies. A church placed by the side of an omnipotent tsar, had to adapt herself to the conditions among which she grew and prospered—she had no choice. The church most jealously watchful of her liberty, the only one that ever claimed absolute independence—the Roman Church herself,—could not have breathed unharmed the dense atmosphere of autocracy. An entirely free church in a state where nothing is free, is not conceivable. How are spiritual things to be kept free from things temporal? How is the line to be drawn between what is due to God and what to Cæsar where Cæsar may claim all?

The history of the Church of Rome points this moral. The popes did not feel thoroughly independent until they had shaken off the control of both Greek Cæsars and German Kaisers. If

we examine into the relations of the Roman Pontiffs with the Byzantine Emperors in the sixth, the seventh, the eighth centuries, we will be astonished at the lowly demonstrations to which the predecessors of Gregory VII. were forced to descend. Under the last August, they have to submit, on a par with all the Imperator's subjects, to the servile formulas of Oriental court etiquette, the heathen forms of the idolatrous Roman etiquette. They are forced to give the name of "divine" to the orders which come from the "sacred" person of the *Basileus*, even when the inheritor of the Roman *princeps* is a mere usurper, with no title to the throne but what countless crimes have given him. The greatest, the most saintly of pontiffs—a Leo the Great, a Gregory the Great,—not content with flattering the emperors, are forced to pay court to the empresses and woo their favor, if they would influence the master. Yet, in the times of Gregory and his successors, the emperor is far away; he is not enthroned on the Palatine or the Cœlian hill, in the immediate neighborhood of the Lateran; he is represented in Italy by a mere foreign officer, the Exarch, who does not even reside in Rome. Catholic writers are fond of considering the neglect in which the emperors left the Eternal City and the fall of the Eastern Empire as providential dispensations: they are right. Had the emperors remained in Rome or the popes followed them to Byzance, the papacy had never been what it became. A pope face to face with an autocrat is an anomaly hardly to be conceived.

Now the Russian Church has for centuries endured this contact with absolute power. How should her entire constitution not have been affected thereby? She could not, taking example from Rome, wrap round her the mantle of Apostolic Succession and intrench herself in the supremacy of St. Peter. As a daughter of the Greek Church, she could not lay claim to greater independence than her mother, whom, moreover, she could not expect to equal either in fame or in erudition. Her first teachers inculcated submission to the powers that be; the Greek missionaries

brought the laws and regulations of the second Rome. How could the Metropolitan of Russia, long a suffragant of Byzance, claim greater franchises than those enjoyed by the Œcumenic Patriarch? For Moscow as for Kief, was not Tsargràd, the Royal City on the Bosphorus,* the sun towards which the eyes of all the Orthodox ever turned? And in Tsargràd, the Greek *autocrator*, literally adored like a god, was the traditional warder of the union between Church and State—a union which in reality was understood, both by him and his clergy, to mean subordination of the Church to the State. After the fall of the Greek Empire, the Russian tsars were to regard themselves as the heirs of the Eastern emperors, to adopt their etiquette and appropriate their claims, with a twofold difference in favor of the Russian Church: In Holy Moscow, the walls of the Kremlin never were defiled by the idolatrous rites of the Byzantine court; the tsars were not all born theologians like the Greek emperors; so none of them—neither the Rúrikovitches nor the Románoffs—meddled with questions of doctrine or discipline after the manner of the Comneni. Their attitude towards dogma was respectful, and they were content, so the ministers of the Church were kept in due subjection. The clergy, on the other hand, were content to remain in a subordinate position, so doctrine was respected. The hierarchy, always honored by the tsars, were too thankful for the protection awarded them by the throne, to resent the supremacy it arrogated to itself. Far from rebelling against the highest power in the state, the Church took pride in showing herself humble and submissive, in remaining faithful to the ancient traditions of the times of Constantine and Theodosius, and, by acting in a spirit of peace, putting in practice the sacred words, "My kingdom is not of this world."

The effects of the autocratic *régime* on church government showed themselves but gradually. The Russian Church, before she finally took the place marked out for her by Peter the Great,

* "Tsargràd" means "Royal City."

went through phases many and varied. To outsiders, her whole existence appears as a nine hundred years' sleep; yet that existence has in reality been active, stirring, often tragical. Her history, to the astonishment of Westerners, is as full of incident and interest as any. The slow diffusion of Christianity over the immense plains of the North, among tribes belonging to so many races, lends to her annals a charm equal to that which breathes from the accounts of Christian preaching in the forests of Gaul or Germany. To the political student they present a twofold interest: the progressive emancipation of the Russian Church from the mother church at Constantinople abroad, and the growing closeness of the bond between spiritual and temporal authority at home. This parallel tendency towards a twofold goal invests Russian Church history with remarkable unity.

As regards her foreign relations on one hand and her internal government on the other, the history of the Russian Church separates into four distinct phases: the period of her complete dependence on the see of Constantinople; the transition period during which she gradually achieves autonomy; that of fully declared independence; the period of the Patriarchate and, later, that of the Holy Synod, which is going on still.

During the first of these periods, the Metropolitans, who reside in Kief as well as the Grand-*Kniàzes*, are usually directly appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. They are frequently Greeks, ignorant alike of the country's language and customs. In spite of the attempts of several *Kniàzes* to break away from this bondage, the Russian Church is at this time little more than a dependency of the Byzantine Patriarchate. A time may come when the tables will be turned and Slavs will be seen seated in the chair of Photius, and the Greek Churches of Asia will become vassals of the North.

The Tatar invasion and the shifting of the political centre from the banks of the Dniepr to the basin of the Volga loosen the bond between Byzance and her daughter by separating them. The

Metropolitan, who follows the Grand-*Kniàzes* to Vladímir, then to Moscow, is still a suffragant of the Greek Patriarch, but he is a Russian by birth, and elected by his clergy or appointed by his sovereign. The intestine wars between the appanaged princes, and later the Tatar rule, secure him greater influence and independence than he could have enjoyed under a stronger power. Like the *Kniàzes* of Moscow, the Metropolitans had to receive investiture from the Mongol Khans. The policy of the foreign oppressors vied with the piety of the native princes in endowing the hierarchy with privileges. Russians and Tatars helped establish the ascendency of a clergy the heads of which frequently acted as umpires between the *Kniàzes* or as mediators between them and the foreign masters. There being only one Metropolitan and many *Kniàzes*, the former's authority extended farther than that of the latter, in whose direct interest it was not to alienate the head of the clergy, but to make of him an ally or a tool. As a matter of fact, hierarchical unity paved the way for political unity. The Metropolitans may justly be numbered among the makers of Moscovia. This age is possibly the most glorious in the history of the Russian Church—it is her heroic age, the time of her greatest national Saints : Alexander Nevsky, Alexis, Sergius ; the time when most of her great monastic institutions were founded.

While the Metropolitans of Moscow helped "gather the Russian lands," another metropoly was rising in the West, in the Orthodox lands which had passed under Lithuano-Polish domination. The Lithuanian princes, anxious to assert their independence from their Moscovite neighbor, were busily building up a rival metropoly of their own, the seat of which was Vilna or Kief alternately. The incumbent of Moscow might continue to entitle himself, "Metropolitan of all the Russias,"* but this dualism endured nevertheless until nearly the close of the

* Ivan II., surnamed *Kalità*, who was the first to assume the title of "Grand-*Kniàz* of all the Russias," may have done so, the historian Bestùjef-Riúmin suggests, in imitation of the Metropolitans.

seventeenth century. Nothing short of the annexation of Little-Russia to Great-Russia was to restore the unity of the hierarchy. The two metropolies, being subjected to different influences, showed a different spirit. Kief, vain of her culture, scorned Moscow's coarseness, taunting her with ignorance and formalism. Moscow, proud of her independence, had her suspicions of Kief's orthodoxy. In constant contact with the Latins and continuous strife against the Union, the Western metropoly suffered herself to be influenced by European ideas even while keeping the Catholic propaganda. Some of the grandest figures of the Russian Church are connected with Kief—that of the Metropolitan Peter Moghìla in the first rank. A Moldavian by descent, though doubtless of Slavic blood, Moghìla was one of the greatest bishops of the Orthodox world, not to say of all Christendom. He had studied in Paris, and to this pupil of the Sorbonne the East owes the famous Orthodox Confession, accepted by its patriarchs as binding. Although a subject of Poland, he earned the right to be considered one of the precursors of Peter the Great. Preceding him by half a century, he had prepared helpers for him in his Academy at Kief. Thanks to him, when the Metropoly of Kief was incorporated in the Patriarchate of Moscow, the first place in the reconstructed one and only Russian Church belongs to the Little-Russians, the children of the suppressed metropoly.

The effect of the rise of autocracy immediately after the breaking of the Tatar yoke was to lower the position of the Church; but the extinction of the reigning house restored to her, for a time, more than her former power. There had been method in the furious madness of Ivan the Terrible: he had always kept down the clergy as well as the *boyàrs*. The Metropolitan had paid with his see—if not with his life—for daring to remonstrate with him. To-day the silver shrine of the sainted bishop occupies one of the four angles of the cathedral in Moscow (the place of honor after the Eastern custom), and the Russian sovereigns come to kiss the relics of the old tsar's victim. The Metropoli-

tan, as the supreme head of the Moscovite Church, was a person of some account even when pitched against an autocrat. Yet a newer and higher dignity was created, with a more imposing title and more extensive prerogatives. In 1589, directly after the death of the sovereign who had so maltreated the clergy, and under the reign of the Terrible's mild son Theodor, Russia demanded a Patriarch. It was not the tsar who planned the innovation ; it was a man who, foreseeing the impending extinction of the reigning house, schemed to appropriate the sovereign power, —Boris Godunòf, Theodor's ambitious brother-in-law. The Patriarchate was instituted at the same time and under the same influences as serfdom. By the first of these measures Boris meant to propitiate the clergy, by the other the nobility. The reasons given for instituting the Patriarchate were altogether honorable for Russia : to free her entirely from foreign supremacy in religious matters ; to place the see of Moscow on the same plan as the old metropolies of the East. The pretences, too, were plausible : Moscovia, aggrandized beyond measure under the last tsars, was too vast for her church to be governed from the Bosphorus ; Constantinople had fallen under the yoke of the Turks, and her Patriarch had become dependent on the Sultan. The Russian Empire was not only the greatest in size among Orthodox states, it was the only one free from foreign rule of any kind. Was it not natural that the Church should claim the independence which the State had already attained ?

Did the creation of the Patriarchate, like the marriage of Ivan III. with the heiress of the Eastern emperors a century earlier, conceal far-reaching shemes ? Did the Russians dimly perceive the possibility of succeeding the Greeks in both their religious and political supremacy ? Who can tell ? In such cases nations, even princes, usually obey a vague instinct, no more. Certain it is that, in achieving for his church, so long a vassal of Byzance, the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Godunòf was carrying out the same policy as the Ivans, when they assumed the title of Tsar together

with the imperial eagle. This was the second act in the transfer of the Greco-Roman inheritance from Constantinople to Moscow as "the Third Rome." The secession of old Rome from Orthodoxy justified the institution of a Moscovite Patriarchate. The place vacated by the Pope was occupied by the Russian Pontiff. And, as the second Rome had succeeded the first, could not the third Rome supplant the second, desecrated by the Mussulman, and become, in her turn, the head of the Orthodox world? Such considerations were not likely to delight the Eastern hierarchs, and, had they been less feeble or less needy, they would not have lent themselves so easily to the wishes of the Tsar Theodor and his chief *boyàr* Godunòf. But the Patriarch Jeremiah had come to Russia to solicit alms, and he yielded to all that was demanded of him. Indeed, he would have been willing enough to exchange his own precarious tribute-paying see of Constantinople against the prosperous Church of Moscow. It would seem that the Russians might have found it to their advantage to place on the new church-throne the Œcumenic Patriarch, the time-honored head of the Orthodox world. But that would not have suited with Godunòf's personal designs: the usurper needed a Russian. And a Russian, Job, was consecrated as the first Patriarch.

The Moscovite Patriarchate assumed a strictly national character, its jurisdiction not extending beyond the political boundaries of the empire. It was left to the Russian bishops, assembled in council, to elect their head; they made three nominations and fate decided between the three candidates. The Patriarch's prerogatives remained, in substance, the same as those enjoyed by the Metropolitan; only he was awarded greater honors. Like his predecessor, he was the head of ecclesiastical justice, and this embraced, besides the affairs of the clergy and cases involving marriage questions, those involving questions of inheritance. So it was till the reign of Peter the Great. His support was provided for out of the revenues of the wealthy monasteries and from vast estates. His household was copied after the tsar's own: like the

tsar, he had his court, his *boyàrs*, his great-officers; he had his courts of justice, his courts of account, his administrative offices. It was really a spiritual sovereignty.

But to the Church there accrued from this innovation rather an increase of splendor than of independence. The hierarchy, being cut off entirely from Byzantine jurisdiction, was more isolated than ever, and consequently more exposed to encroachments from the secular power, with no recourse whatever against the absolutism of the tsars. It was inevitable that autocracy should sooner or later cut down the Patriarch's privileges, or even suppress him, as an uncomfortable rival. Under these conditions the new dignity could not be long-lived: it lasted barely a century (1589-1700).

At first, a grand career opened before the Patriarchate, owing to the state of affairs at the time. The strengthening of the church organization at the very moment when the civil government was growing weaker and weaker was, as it happened, a good thing for Russia—a providential thing, the church historians say. Instituted on the eve of the extinction of the reigning house of Ruric, the Patriarchate helped the country through the years of anarchy and usurpation; it presided at the election and enthronement of the Románofs. During that terrible period, it helped save Russia from dissolution and foreign rule, and when order was restored, it did much to lend to the reconstructive reign of the first Románofs that religious and paternal character which makes of that time a sort of golden age in the history of Russia.

The ten Patriarchs of Moscow form a sort of sacerdotal dynasty, which experienced many vicissitudes, alternating between greatness and abasement. Job, the first Patriarch, is the chief promoter of the election to the throne of Boris Godunòf; he is expelled by the false Dimitri. The Patriarch Hermogen, an octogenarian, incites the people to rise against the Poles encamped in Moscow, but is arrested by the partisans of the foreigners and starved to death in prison. Under Michael Románof, it is the Tsar's father,

the Patriarch Philaret, who governs ; he strengthens autocracy and is the real founder of the dynasty. His name appears on all public acts together with the Tsar's. On Palm Sundays, when the Patriarch, riding a she-ass, enacts the Saviour's entrance into Jerusalem, the Tsar in person holds the bridle. Under Alexis, it is again a Patriarch, Nìkon, who takes the lead in the management of public affairs ; it is he who plays the decisive part in bringing about the annexation of the Ukraïna and the submission of the Cosacks. His administration is the culminating point of the greatness of the Russian Church and the beginning of the crisis in her history. This son of the people, taken from a convent on the White Lake (Biêlo-òzersk), is perhaps the greatest man Russia had prior to Peter the Great. His great power, an eyesore to the *boyàrs*, led to the lowering of his see, and the wisest of his reforms, the revision and correction of the liturgical books, to a schism in his church.

Nìkon is the Thomas-à-Becket of Russian Orthodoxy. In his pontificate Russia witnesses, for the first and last time, that old, old duel between Church and State which Bismarck once traced back to Calchas and Agamemnon. In his person, Church authority, at the zenith of its power, enters for one moment into conflict with civil authority. This is the only attempt of the sort in Russian history, and it has been severely criticised by almost all national historians. Nìkon's personality and his ideas are so entirely foreign to them that they find it difficult to comprehend the man and to judge his actions. Most of them, whether laymen or churchmen, have seen in the Patriarch's claims only the pride of an individual and the domineering spirit of a prelate. They accuse him of having, as head of the Church, deliberately antagonized the head of the State, of having attempted to imitate the ways of the Roman Pontiff and aimed at becoming a Russian Pope. It is a fact that Nìkon stands entirely by himself in the Eastern world. One does not expect to encounter, in a Moscovite prelate,

such confidence in the rights of the Church, so high a standard of the Episcopal dignity.*

Nìkon was a man far above his country and ahead of his time, a foe to ignorance and superstition, nearly as remarkable by the extent of his information as by the independence of his character, and it is with amazement one beholds such a figure in Russia a quarter of a century before Peter the Great. One is inclined to take him for a Western prelate transported from some Roman convent to the patriarchal throne of Moscow. His ecclesiastical lore, the very scope of his demands, would almost lead one to suspect that the Russian convents were not so hermetically closed against ideas from Europe and against Latin influences as is generally supposed. We find him expounding the entire scholastic theory of the two powers. And in so doing, he uses the formulas and the metaphors which have become classic in mediæval polemics. He invokes by turns the two swords, of which one smites the evil-doers and the other "binds the soul," the two luminaries of which one—the greater—shines in the day, illuming the spirit, while the other—the lesser—shines in the night, giving light to the bodies.† At the same time that he proclaims, with the theologians of the West, the pre-eminence of the spiritual power, he declares that both powers have need of each other, and that, in this sense, neither is highest—that both hold their authority from God. Having made this distinction, he thunders,

* It is to an Englishman, W. Palmer, we owe the most exhaustive and most curious work on Nìkon: *The Patriarch and the Tsar* (6 vols., 1871-1876). Palmer is possibly more of a panegyrist than an historian; but he has translated, from a copy of the original MS. documents, the Patriarch's "Replies" to the *boyàrs*, his adversaries. Though of capital importance, these documents, unfortunately, are known only from this English translation; the boldness of the "Replies" is such, that the Russian text will have long to wait before it gets printed. Compare with Palmer's work those of P. Mikhaïlofsky (1863), of Hubbenet (1882-1884), vol. xi., of Soloviòf's *History of Russia*, and vol. xii., of the *History of the Russian Church* by the Metropolitan Macarius.

† See Palmer, *The Replies of the Humble Nìkon*, Question xxiv.

with the energy of a Catholic bishop, against the State's supremacy in the Church, stigmatizing it as an apostasy which vitiates the whole of Christianity, anathematizing all the prelates who would submit to it. In these replies, written in 1663, the Patriarch, (a contemporary of Bossuet), loudly protests against the idea that the management of church affairs could have been entrusted to him by the Tsar. "What you say there," he replies to the *boyàr* Streshnef, "is a horrible blasphemy. Know you not that it is not we who receive the sublime sacerdotal authority from kings or emperors, but on the contrary those who govern are anointed to rule? By that same token it is clear that priesthood is a far greater thing than royalty." And the inflexible Patriarch insists, and demands to know what power he holds from the Tsar, reminding his opponents that the wearer of the crown is himself subject to the authority of the priesthood and casting in their teeth the obsolete canon: "He who receives a church from the temporal power shall be deposed."

To such speech as that the Kremlin was not used. Nìkon paid for his audacity with his patriarchal see. "What greater iniquity can there be," he had said, "than a tsar judging bishops and arrogating to himself a power which God never conferred on him?" Tsar Alexis, a pious man of timid conscience, took great care not to pronounce judgment on the Patriarch himself. He left it to the *boyàrs*, Nìkon's enemies, to indict him before a council of bishops, who ended by condemning and deposing him. Nìkon, who had been virtually omnipotent, through his personal influence over the pious Tsar, was lost from the day that his adversaries' intrigues succeeded in preventing him from communicating with Alexis. He found out by dire experience that, in the Church as in the State, nothing holds out if deprived of the autocrat's support. Stripped of the patriarchal dignity, exiled to a convent on the White Lake, he obtained of the Tsar the single favor of being allowed to return to the Monastery of the New Jerusalem, built by him north of Moscow, and died before he could reach it. There the great

Patriarch now rests in a neglected tomb. The peasants who come on pilgrimages to the New Jerusalem to worship before the *fac-simile* of the Holy Sepulchre and the Calvary designed by Nìkon, do not kiss the slab which covers his remains. Had he been stricken down in the service of Rome, he would at least have received the honors of canonization, the Christian apotheosis. In Orthodox Russia, the unconquerable stand he made for the rights of the Church cost him not only the Patriarch's white skull-cap, but also the golden halo of the saint.

Such was the end of this unequal duel between two powers too evidently ill-matched for the fight to have been long or the issue doubtful. On autocratic soil it was impossible for the priesthood to make a stand against the State, and the champion of the Church could not but be forsaken by the clergy as well as the laity. To make the lesson complete, the abasement of the Patriarchate took place under the reign of the Patriarch's personal friend, a pious and conscientious sovereign who would have paused in his course if the Church had stood by her head. After such an example had been made no one will wonder that Nìkon found no imitators in an essentially national church, where, as he complained, "the very grace of the Holy Ghost could act only by an *ukàz* of the Tsar." *

Nikon's defeat irrevocably established the supremacy of the State in church matters, and paved the way for the abolition of the Patriarchate. The schism (*raskòl*) which was produced by opposition to his liturgical reform, robbed the official church of her influence on a large portion of the nation. The hierarchy, by having recourse to the secular power in its struggle against the sectarians, only made itself more dependent on it; but it was driven to require of the throne the support which it lost among

* See Palmer, *The Replies of the Humble Nìkon*, p. 206. Nìkon has sometimes been suspected of a leaning towards Rome. That is a mistake. Far from appealing to the Pope, he calls his adversaries papists. Nevertheless he found sympathy only outside of Russia, chiefly among Catholics.

the people. From this standpoint, the position of the Russian Church was not unlike that of the Anglican Church, about the same time, towards the Puritan sects or Dissenters, and patriarchal authority was tottering to its ruin when Peter the Great finally suppressed it.

But suppressed it had to be; only on this condition could Peter's reforms endure. For the Patriarchate represented all the old traditions, the conservatism hostile to foreigners and foreign manners. The Church was too much the natural foe of innovation to be allowed to retain so powerful an organization. Its doom was in the well-known saying of the hapless Tsarévitch Alexis: "I will whisper a word to the bishops, they will pass it on to the priests, who will repeat it to the people, and everything will be as it was before." Peter was well aware of the encouragement given by the clergy to his son's reactionary projects. Himself the great-grandson of a Patriarch, he kept in mind how his ancestor, Philaret, governed under the name of Tsar Michael; he remembered the trouble which Nîkon's deposition gave his father Alexis. And *he* was not the man to admit the scholastic theory of two independent luminaries. Such were not the lessons which he learned in the Europe of the eighteenth century.

In suppressing the Patriarchate, he was true to his tactics of imitating the West. He could not use foreigners to reform the Church as he did to reform the administration and the war department; so he employed for the purpose Little-Russians, brought up in the Academy of Kief, in touch with Europe. The ecclesiastical reform was achieved under Western, partly under Protestant inspiration. It was the time when Reformed and Lutheran sovereigns showed least regard for the Church, when the secular power almost everywhere interfered most unscrupulously with church matters. Peter's travels, the examples of England, Sweden, Holland, and of certain German states, had probably something to do with the new constitution of the Russian Church; even France, though indirectly. In the general scheme of Peter's

work, the substitution of an assembly for a single head was not an isolated act, directed specially against the Church; it was part of the scheme, of a system then in vogue in the West, especially in France, where the ministers of Louis were making way for the councils of the Regency. Peter appropriated this innovation; when he returned home from his second trip, he transferred, in all departments, the power wielded by one dignitary to so-called "colleges" composed of several members, and merely extended the innovation to the Church. The Holy Synod, indeed, was originally dubbed "Ecclesiastical College," though it bore the name only a few weeks.

Peter himself, in the preamble to his "Code of Ecclesiastical Regulations,"* assimilates this college to the other colleges, already instituted by him. They were all cut out on the same pattern, pervaded by the same spirit; the same rules, the same manner of proceeding are found in all. Like all great revolutionists, Peter, who was the most practical of reformers, showed in this his love for method and symmetry. He delighted in fashioning all things after the same principles, casting State and Church into the same mould, heedless of traditions and customs. In his "Ecclesiastical Code," written out for him by a bishop, Theophanus Prokòpovitch, he does not inquire what are the institutions most in conformity with the spirit or teachings of the Church, but, with rationalistic directness, pursues merely the best form of administration. And he proves, by long arguments, that the best is the collegiate form, an individual being liable to error, prejudice, passion. Curiously enough it does not seem to have occurred to the writer that what he said of the Church and the patriarchal authority applied just as well to the State and autocracy.

The truth of the matter, which shows here and there, is that autocracy meant to stand alone, and not to suffer by its side any authority that might invite comparison. It is a sun which cannot

*The Russian text of this "Code," with a French and an old Latin version, was published in Paris, in 1874, under the care of Father Tondini.

tolerate a rival luminary in its own heaven. On this point the Russian Tsar outdoes the Autocrator of Byzance. It is most important to extirpate the popular error concerning the co-existence of the two powers, and the "Ecclesiastical Code" proceeds to do it in so many words: "The people, in their simplicity, do not perceive in what manner the ecclesiastical power differs from the autocratic. Dazzled by the exalted dignity and the pomp of the supreme pastor of the Church, they imagine that so great a personage is another sovereign, the equal of the autocrat, if not superior to him; they look on the ecclesiastical order as on another and better state." Peter here touches on the formula so often dwelt on against the clergy: he will not have the Church form a state within the state. He asserts that the people "had come to consider, in all things, less the autocrat than the supreme pastor, even to the extent of siding with the latter against the former, in the idle fancy that they were upholding the cause of God himself." It is clear throughout that Peter is dealing with a rival power. That Russia may have but one head, he beheads the Church. He knew how much more docile a tool he would have in a synod composed of members appointed by the sovereign, divided in opinions and interests, and bearing a divided responsibility, than in a supreme pastor independently elected and head of the Church in his own right, with her entire power centred in his person.

Not content with substituting a council of prelates for the Patriarch, Peter takes good care to lower the episcopal dignity. He warns the bishops against pride, he preaches them a sermon on humility. The "Ecclesiastical Code"—which was given to all the bishops to sign—complains of the insolent ostentation affected by the bishops; it reminds them that their dignity, though an honor, is a subordinate one, not in any way comparable to that of the Tsar. The supremacy of the secular power is the reformer's one preoccupation. The memory of Nikon haunts him. He never forgets how his father Alexis heard the Patriarch exalt the sublimity of the episcopal office at the cost of the tsarian dignity,

quoting in support of his claim the prayer in which the Church calls a bishop "the image of God." This unseemly metaphor has disappeared out of the ritual, in token that Orthodox Russia could know of only one "image of God"—the Tsar.*

Though planned in the interest of the State and for the benefit of autocracy, the revolution achieved by Peter the Great could easily be colored so as to seem intended for the good of the Church. There was no lack of precedents. Was it not the councils who, in the Eastern Orthodox world, at all times exercised supreme authority? In accordance with the canons, the government of the Church was vested in an assembly of prelates during the vacancies of the patriarchal throne. There was no reason why this mode of government should not be made permanent. A change of name would do it: the "Ecclesiastical College" was definitely re-christened "Most Holy Synod," and its founders took care to represent it as a permanent council. They do not appear to have realized how widely an assembly of prelates and priests chosen by the sovereign differed from a genuine council.

In thus renovating the constitution of the Church, Peter acted after the manner of an autocrat. Yet one is struck with the cautious way in which he went to work. His manner of acting, in all this affair, contrasts strongly with his usual ways. He lets things drag, has recourse to fictions and disguises quite foreign to his nature. The reason is that he does not feel quite as free on religious as on political ground. Though he arranges matters so as to become practically the head of the Church, he does not act, and still less speak, as such. Even while arrogating to himself the power, he would fain do it as unconspicuously as possible.

* Palmer remarks that this expression, "image of God," was suppressed in the ritual of the consecration of bishops, also in modern Greek editions. The wording of the oath administered to the bishops at their consecration was also modified by Peter the Great. Before his time, the bishops swore to resist pressure from the Tsar rather than perform the duties of their ministry outside of their diocese. Such an oath could not suit an absolute monarch.

The establishment of the Holy Synod is the greatest act of interference in church matters on which the tsars ever ventured. A most arbitrary act, some will say the most arrant abuse of power. But even in the abuse of power its limits are felt. One can feel that even Peter the Great himself is not as much master of the Church as of the State. He is not generally given to procrastination and over-cautiousness, but in this case he avoids a direct attack. Before suppressing the Patriarchate, he teaches Russia to do without it. He who usually hurries through everything as though one lifetime could not suffice to carry out his designs, keeps the patriarchal throne vacant an indefinite time, with a temporary substitute in the person of Stepàn Yavòrsky, to whom he gives the title of Exarch. Only after a lapse of twenty years, when the Patriarchate has become an historical memory, when the high clergy has been almost entirely renewed and almost all the dignities have been given to Little-Russians impregnated with a different spirit, does Peter declare his intentions, and when he does decree the substitution of synodal for patriarchal church government, so excessive is his caution, that he stoops to have the bishops approve it. And even then, he gives his synod a deceptive form, to make it look as much like a council as possible, and submits the statute which determines and regulates the functions of the new governing body to the bishops and *hegumens* (abbots, heads of religious communities) for sanction.

Nor is Peter content even yet. He solicits, on behalf of the new institution, the recognition—one might almost say the sanction—of the Eastern Patriarchs. What choice had those needy and dependent hierarchs, with hands for ever outstretched towards the North, but to acquiesce in the will of the only Orthodox sovereign? They connived at the suppression of the Patriarchate as they had connived at its establishment. The Holy Synod was recognized by them as the lawful heir of the Patriarch and the legitimate heir of the Russian Church. The poverty of the great Eastern sees, their state of subjection to the infidels, did not allow them to

show much independence in their attitude towards the tsar. It is nevertheless certain that the very fact of belonging to an Œcumenic Church (to use the Greek name), even when this church affects the national form, places some restraints on State interference. For as the tsar's power extends in the Church, it still encounters a twofold limitation: in the faith of the people, and in the necessity of keeping up the communion with the Eastern Patriarchates. These barriers, while neither very high nor very forbidding, are still real ones, which imperial omnipotence could not overleap with impunity.

Peter the Great's administrative "colleges" were, under Alexander I., succeeded by ministers; the Ecclesiastical College, now the Holy Synod, alone survived. For the form of government which proved a failure in secular departments, was admirably well adapted to the Church and the times, so that the Russian institution of the Holy Synod, with all its faults, found imitators abroad. After Peter's death, two or three persons had thoughts of restoring the Patriarchate; but, had it been recalled to life, it could not have lived. There is no longer any room in Russia for a Patriarch —any more than in any other modern state. It has been the dream of a few Russian Slavophils,—Ivan Aksákof especially—to have one again; but no Russian autocrat will ever consent to it. With a constitutional Russia, it would be the same. A parliament would be found, on this question, quite as jealous and inclined to take umbrage as autocracy itself. Should Russia ever have another Patriarch, it would be the Œcumenic Patriarch of Constantinople; and even he would be tolerated only so long as he subserved the ends of Russian policy.

So it turns out that Piòtr Alexéyevitch, in this as in so many other things, only anticipated on his own times. Of all his reforms, the institution of the Holy Synod was to many the most obnoxious, yet it proved the most durable. The only cause his own church might have for cherishing a grudge against him is not so much the establishment of the synodal principle as the manner

of its application and the composition of the first synod. For, from a religious point of view, it can hardly be doubted that Peter, consciously or not, acted under Protestant influences. Himself a pupil of foreign Protestants, his orthodoxy was tainted with Calvinism. The fact that he places mere priests on an equality with bishops in his Holy Synod betrays a certain Presbyterian tendency. The spirit of the Reformation has breathed on the Ecclesiastical Regulations, the code which has remained that of the clergy. The Protestants invited to Russia were quite aware of this, and praise Peter accordingly. A dissertation written on occasion of the marriage of Peter III. to her who was to be Catherine the Great informs Germany that "the Russian religion, as established and purified by the most glorious Peter, . . . closely approaches Lutheranism." * One is almost tempted to wonder why Peter I., the admirer of Holland and Germany, so inclined to copy from them in all things, did not go the whole length and attempt to import Protestantism, so commodious an institution in other states. But he knew of course that even his onnipotence would fail there.

The synodal form of government may be regarded as the final one for all the churches of the Greek rite. The Eastern patriarchates may be spared out of respect for their antiquity; but their actual authority will dwindle down to a sort of a presidency over the council in which the church government will be vested. The Patriarch of Constantinople is even now surrounded by a synod without whose sanction he decides on no important measure. In all the Orthodox churches the old monarchical form of government, in the person of a patriarch, exarch, or metropolitan, must gradually make room for collective authority. Indeed, all the Orthodox nations whom the nineteenth century has restored to independence have followed Russia's example. Democratic

* "Religionem Ruthenorum a gloriosissimo Petro instauratam et purgatam . . . ad nostram Evangelico-Lutheranam quam proxime accedere." Wilh. Fred. Lutiens, *Dissertatio de Religione Ruthenorum hodierna* (1745); Tondini, *Réglement Ecclésiastique*, p. xxxvii.

Greece, liberal Roumania, have placed synods at the head of their churches. So has Serbia. In all these states, forms vary, but the substance is the same.

It does not follow that the churches governed by synods must necessarily be closely and perpetually dependent on the State. The synodal form does not in itself imply a church's servitude, any more than the patriarchate implies its independence. In fact neither form possesses intrinsically the virtue of ensuring the liberty of the Church. The essential feature is the mode of election out of which this or that authority proceeds, and the guaranties which hedge it in; it is, above all, the law and general custom. Under equally favorable conditions, a comparison might turn out in favor of a synod. It is a synod which is best calculated to secure the internal liberty of the Church, to protect the rights of the clergy and the faithful; to lead the religious order to self-government. There is no kind of liberal constitution but can live in harmony with a synod. Let it be composed of members by right—*ex-officio*—and unremovable, as is in part the Russian Synod, it can be made into something like an ecclesiastical senate. Let the members be elected by the bishops, it will become a sort of delegated council. Let them be elected by the different classes of the clergy, and you will have a parliament, an assembly representing all ecclesiastical interests. It is a flexible form, which lends itself to all the evolutions of political forms or of religious ideas. Therein lies the pledge for its durability; a synod fits in just as well with an absolute government as with a liberal one, with a republic as with a monarchy.

The Holy Synod of Russia keeps in touch with both government and society. Its members, like all dignities of the empire, are appointed by the sovereign. It is a side-piece to the Senate, and has the same title of "governing"—"The Most Holy Governing Synod,"—but the Ecclesiastical Code takes care to set down that it acts only as the emperor's delegate. The Civil Code says the same, repeatedly. In short, the Synod is, in church

matters, what the Senate is in civil matters: an instrument in the hand of autocracy. It would seem from this as though in Russia, where there can be no such thing as a concordate with a foreign ecclesiastical power, the State might be free to rule the Church at its pleasure. It is not so in point of fact. The power of the State is limited by the national manners and spirit, and by the customs of Orthodox countries.

And here we come to a delicate matter. Foreigners have an idea that the Tsar is the head of his church, after the manner that the Pope is of his. No Russian, no member of any Orthodox church, admits such a thing for a moment. Eastern Orthodoxy knows of only one head—Christ,—recognizes only the authority that speaks in the name of Christ—that of Œcumenic Councils. Whatever the tsar's power over the Church, it is an external power. The tsar may be, in a way, the master of the hierarchy, but never its head. If the law sometimes gives him the title, it is only the administration of church affairs which is meant. As regards dogma, the sovereign has as little to say to that as the humblest of the faithful. In this respect the Russian emperors never allow themselves to be tempted into the slippery paths down which were carried so many of the early Christian emperors. Ivan the Terrible alone prided himself on his theology, but he made use of it chiefly to entrap his enemies by captious questions. The Holy Synod is not concerned with dogma either, scarcely even with questions of discipline—or only as a special commission to which they are referred for study, the final decision resting with the councils and the whole body of the Church, when the imperial sanction is only a sort of *exequatur* or *placet*, such as the lay power has always claimed in the West.

In Russia as in the West, the right of nomination to ecclesiastical dignities is the Crown's chief prerogative in its relations towards the Church; but even that right is divided between the tsar and the Holy Synod. The intervention of the lay power in this case is easily justified from the standpoint of popular as well

as divine right. The tsar, as representative of the nation, absorbs all its powers into his own person, and it is in this capacity that he proposes or "confirms" the bishops, formerly chosen directly by the people; and besides, many ecclesiastical dignities confer temporal privileges, so that the sovereign, as the natural guardian of his people's physical and moral well-being, is entitled to a voice in the matter; for, as Peter wrote to the Patriarch of Constantinople, "God will call princes to account for the manner in which they will have taken care of His Church." What endless quarrelling has there not been in the West over the investiture question! Is it to be wondered at that it was settled in favor of temporal power in a church where there is no pope to make a stand for it?

There is a story that, at the inauguration of the Holy Synod, one of the prelates inquired of the Emperor whether there never was to be another Patriarch; to which Peter is said to have replied: "*I* shall be your Patriarch." * Even if he did say it, such a reply can no more be taken literally than Catherine's calling herself, in a letter to Voltaire, "the head of the Greek Church." Very different are the government's avowed pretensions and the theories taught in its schools. True, in church matters, as in all things Russian, practice and theory are not always one. In the Orthodox catechisms, the tsars are described merely as "the chief guardians and protectors of the Church." The famous catechisms of Plato and Philaret, the repositories of official doctrine, do not recognize in the sovereign any other capacity. It is humiliating for a Frenchman to discover that, in the way of adulation and servility, there is nothing there at all comparable to the chapter on "Duties towards the Emperor" in the catechism of Napoleon I. And if the tsar is practically the head of the Church, he is so only *de facto*, not *de jure*. It is not with the Russian as with the Anglican Church, with the Lutheran or Evangelical Churches of Germany and the Scandinavian countries. In England, the

* See Nicolas Polevòy, *History of Peter the Great;* Tondini, *The Roman Pope and the Eastern Popes.*

king—or lacking a king, the queen—is in law the head of the Church ; by right no less than in fact. It is the same in most Protestant countries. The supremacy of State over Church has been regularly established and openly proclaimed ; it exists in law, even though not always exercised any more in practice. The Church does not contest it, or has not contested it for several hundred years. On this point, Russian autocracy has never preferred the same claims or shown itself as exacting as the Crown of England under the Tudors, the Stuarts, and the Hanoverian Georges.* Neither Petersburgh nor Moscow has ever seen an assembly of laymen, such as the British Parliament legislate for the Church with sovereign power.[1] Neither Petersburgh nor Moscow ever heard jurists and theologians claim on behalf of the sovereign, in church matters, the supreme authority which both so willingly yielded up to him in Protestant Germany.

Another fact, less known, yet not less noteworthy, is that, of all Orthodox states, the Russian Empire has always shown the greatest deference to the Church. This may be one of the reasons why Russia still commands the clergy's sympathies in countries where laymen have begun to look upon her with suspicion. If the imperial government has not left to the Church more real liberty, it has taken care to disguise the want of it. The Orthodox states which resulted from the successive dismemberments of

* In England the King "declares himself supreme head of the Church, the guardian and defender of religious truth. In the midst of his council, he represents the highest jurisdiction in spiritual matters. Not even heresy escapes it. Cranmer gives as his opinion that the Crown can, all alone, make a priest, entirely dispensing with ordination. Even after this extreme opinion was abandoned, it was admitted that bishops receive their investiture from the sovereign alone, and retain their dignity only at his pleasure; their commission is renewed at the commencement of each new reign."—E. Boutmy, *Le Développement de la Constitution et de la Société Politique en Angleterre* (1887), p. 140. For Continental states see Döllinger, *Kirche und Kirchen.*

[1] The author forgets that no bill becomes law until passed upon by the House of Lords, and that the bishops and archbishops are *ex-officio* members of it, as "spiritual peers."

Turkey have all, as already mentioned, produced imitations of the constitution imposed on the Russian Church by Peter the Great, but they have, as a rule, outdone their model.

In Greece, the king has been recognized by the national synods as the administrator and "leader"—*archêgos*—of the national church. In Serbia King Milan's government showed its respect for the independence of the Church by deposing, of its own authority, like mere employés, the metropolitans who showed signs of insubordination. Autocratic Russia would, at least, have shown more regard for forms. It was in vain that the Serbian bishops took their chief's part; in vain that the deposed Metropolitan excommunicated the intruder placed in his seat at Belgrad by the ministers. The Serbian government contemptuously disregarded the bishops' protests, and they were compelled to submit.* In Roumania "regalism" wears no mask at all; so that the Synod at St. Petersburgh found occasion to join the Patriarch of Constantinople in remonstrating with the government at Bukharest and pointing out to it that the manner in which the Roumanian Church was constituted gave to the secular power a scope beyond its legal rights and was in direct violation of the canons established by the councils. Even though coming from the two most exalted authorities in the Orthodox world, these remonstrances were disregarded by the Roumanians. They persisted in enforcing the supremacy of the State. Their bishops, elected by a bipartite body, composed half of churchmen, half of laymen, publicly receive their investiture at the hands of the king, who confers it on them in his own palace, seated on his throne. When the ceremony is

* Michael, Metropolitan of Serbia, was deposed in 1881 for having protested against a tax which was to be levied from the clergy equally with all other citizens. It goes without saying that he belonged to the party hostile to that then in power at Belgrad. As he was friendly to Russian influence, he found refuge in Russia. He officiates in Petersburgh and Moscow as archbishop, while his successor rules the Serbian Church unchallenged. This is another instance of the discord which politics can introduce into the Orthodox churches.

to be performed for the Metropolitan Primate, elected by an assembly composed of the members of the Holy Synod and the two Chambers, the Minister of Cults presents the archiepiscopal crozier to the sovereign with the request that he may confer the investiture on the newly elected dignitary*: "I entrust your Holiness with the archiepiscopal staff, for the government of the Hungaro-Vallachian Metropoly," says the king, addressing the Primate. And the latter, together with the bishops, in rendering thanks to the king, express their pleasure at receiving the crozier from his hands, and promise faithfully to accomplish the mission laid on them by His Majesty. The king then descends from the throne and kisses the Metropolitan's hand, the ministers, senators, deputies following suit. In Russia, the Church is spared this humiliating ceremony, and the Emperor also kisses the hand of ecclesiastical dignitaries, and even of simple priests, to show that, within the temple, the sovereign is one of the flock, not one of the pastors.

Far from regarding himself in the light of a pope or patriarch, the Russian tsar claims no rank whatever in the hierarchy. True, there is a story that Paul I. once took it into his head to celebrate mass; but the poor man was demented. The only way he could be dissuaded from carrying out his intention was by the Metropolitan of St. Petersburgh reminding him that he had been married twice, an indulgence forbidden to Orthodox priests. He might as well have said mass in his capacity of Grand Master of the Knights of Malta as in that of head of the Russian Church. The tsar has absolutely no ecclesiastical character. His rights are those of an autocrat, and as such he interferes in the affairs of the Church, not as head of the clergy.

Here, however, a distinction—a very essential one—should be made. If the tsar has no ecclesiastical character, he has, in the

* For a mere bishop it is the Metropolitan Primate who presents the crozier to the king with the words: "I respectfully request Your Majesty to confer on . . . the investiture as Bishop of the diocese of . . ."

eyes of the masses, a very decided religious character. He is the Anointed of the Lord, appointed by God Himself, to guard and direct the Christian people. The ceremony under the narrow dome of Uspènsky (the Assumption, in the Kremlin) has invested him with sacredness. His dignity has no peer under heaven. His subjects of all classes have, collectively or individually, sworn allegiance to him on the Gospel.* Crowned by the Church after the Byzantine rite, the autocrat, in the act that the holy chrism touches him, becomes not only the Defender of the Church, but, in a certain sense, the highest representative of Orthodoxy; it is a sort of ordination, which confers on him higher lights for the accomplishment of his providential mission. The Church never can forget the seal which the holy chrism lays on the Lord's Anointed; as for the people, they see in the tsar who received his consecration in the Kremlin, the lieutenant or vice-gerent (*namiêstnik*) of God.

It may be questioned whether a change in the political *régime* would enlarge the liberties of the Church. Modern states are singularly distrustful of churches, and a constitutional government is not always more liberal than an autocrat in its dealings with the clergy. Greece and Roumania are instances in point among

* These sentiments are expressed with great force and simplicity in an address sent to Alexander III. by a commune or *stanítsa* of Cosacks of the Don, on occasion of the attempt against his life made in March, 1887: "The law of the Lord," they say, "teaches us that sovereigns are appointed and consecrated by the Lord Himself. He it is who invests them with the sceptre and supreme power; for He governs men and delegates His powers at His pleasure. As the eye was made to direct the human body, so the sovereign is given to the people to lead it in the right path. The sovereign is the image of God on earth, for there is no one above him. The prince's heart is in the hand of God. . . . Such are the teachings of Holy Writ and the ancient traditions inherited from our forefathers. . . .

"We, the Cosacks of the Don, thy children and faithful subjects, are ready, as commanded by our oath to thee, to sacrifice for thee our goods, our lives, all that we dispose of, in accordance with the example set us by our forefathers." (Address of the *Stanítsa* of Ust-Biêlokalívensk, March, 1887.)

Orthodox countries. In a free Russia the members of the clergy might claim their share of the public franchise ; as a constituted body, the Church would probably be kept under control.*

The Russian Church, it should not be forgotten, is an Established Church, and the union of Church and State always brings about the dependence of the Church. The closer the union, the stricter the dependence. The Latin Church is the only one that could enjoy the privileges belonging to a State religion without yielding up her liberty, because the Vatican is in a position to make itself heard and treat on equal terms with the State. Orthodox communities are differently situated. The Russian Church can never free herself from State control ; everything is against her ; her history, her habits, her very greatness ; besides, the State never would allow it. Whatever of liberty she can look forward to, she can hope for only from the general progress of ideas and manners.

In the meantime the State, even while treating the Church as a minor ward, is bound to show her respect and homage. The State is no more free to separate from the Church than the Church from the State. The State's supremacy extends over persons, over the clergy, over church dignities ; it has no jurisdiction over dogma, nor even over church usages. Religion remains outside of the tsars' power, and even church matters are a province in which the autocrat's sovereignty can assert itself only with much

* The official representatives of the Russian government are fond of demonstrating that the Church is better off under an autocracy than in the constitutional states of the East. So Mr. Pobiêdonôstsef, the High Procurator of the Holy Synod, in his report for 1884, published in December, 1886, accused Greece, Serbia, Roumania, of making a political tool of the Church, of keeping her entirely dependent on fickle majorities "of alleged representatives of the popular will," of placing her at the mercy of parties and personal interests, without any possibility for her of enjoying anything like liberty. The Church, he would have us believe, can be free only under the ægis of autocracy. Without wholly subscribing to this extreme view, we cannot deny that there is some truth in the rebuke addressed by Mr. Pobiêdonôstsef to the Orthodox governments of the East.

discretion, for fear of shocking popular feeling ; so that absolutism is tempered by the people's faith, or, let us say, superstition. The same remark, however, might be applied to other states and other religions, whether Christian or not. Religion, even where it teaches despotism, is a check on the despot.

BOOK II. CHAPTER VII.

Internal Constitution of the Church—The Holy Synod: how Composed, and how it Works—Active and Assistant Members—The High Procurator and his Chancellery—Orthodox Clericalism—Spiritual Censorship—Bishops and Episcopal Grades—Extent of the Dioceses—Diocesan Consistories—Influence of the Consistory Secretaries—Managers of Divorces—Provincial Councils—Centralization and Bureaucratical Character of the Russian Church.

LET us now examine into the internal mechanism of church administration. Let us enter the palace of the Holy Synod which, on the vast square where towers the equestrian statue of Peter the Great on its granite rock, faces the palace of the Senate. From the lay standpoint, the Synod is the first of the constituted bodies in the State. From the religious standpoint, it takes the place and exercises the rights of the former Patriarchate. Peter the Great, while reserving to himself the selection of its members, appears to have contemplated a sort of representative body including all classes of the clergy. The bishops composed the minority at that time; below them sat the archimandrites (heads of monasteries or abbots) and members of the secular clergy. The assembly which is at the helm of the Russian Church is now composed after a manner more in harmony with the hierarchy and the orthodox canons, according to which church government is vested in the bishops. They now form the majority in the Holy Synod. The number of members is not limited. All are appointed by the emperor, but not on the same grounds nor for the same term. There are two kinds of members—active, and assistant, the former unremovable, the latter temporary. The former

are headed by the three Metropolitans, of the cities which successively became the capitals of the empire : Kief, Moscow, and Petersburgh. To the "Metropolitan of Nòvgorod and St. Petersburgh" belongs the title of "first member," and, as a rule, the presidency. Custom assigns a seat in the Synod to the Exarch of Grúzia (Georgia). The other members are appointed for a specified term ; there are four or five archbishops, bishops, and archimandrites. Lastly come two members of the lower, married clergy, archpriests, one of whom generally is the emperor's own confessor and almoner, the other the grand almoner of the army.

The presence of married priests in the supreme council of the Church is imperatively called for, the ecclesiastical body being divided into two classes, with widely different tendencies and interests. Indeed two members of the secular clergy would scarcely be enough to balance seven or eight representatives of the celibate monastic clergy,—were it not that their inferiority in numbers is often made good by the support they receive from public opinion and the government itself.

The Synod resides in Petersburgh ; in Moscow, as in Grúzia, it has only delegations or local commissions. The incumbents of bishoprics have to divide their time and attention between their dioceses and their synodal duties. They take turns at the latter, after a strictly determined order of rotation. In this manner the members who always reside in the capital—the Metropolitan and the emperor's confessor,—take a larger part in the direction of affairs than their colleagues from the provinces. When economic or civil reforms bearing on the clergy are discussed, the Synod is invited to sit in the commissions where these difficult problems are studied ; in other words, some high civil functionaries are appointed to assist it. Such was the great commission "on the affairs of the Orthodox clergy" which Alexander II. appointed to investigate ways and means for improving the material condition and social position of the clergy. In other cases, the Synod itself calls for information and advice from all the bishops.

A permanent adjunct to the Synod is a delegate of the emperor, who bears the title of High Procurator. This functionary, who represents the secular power, is always a layman. He is "the eye of the tsar"—so the "instructions" of Peter the Great define him. His duty is to see that the affairs of the Church are treated conformably to the imperial *ukàzes*. In Russia there is no Minister of Cults; there never was but once, for a very short time, under Alexander I. The High Procurator takes his place; he has a seat in the committee of ministers and is responsible directly to the sovereign. The non-Orthodox denominations are under the control of the Minister of the Interior; the Orthodox Church is governed by the Synod under control of the High Procurator, who, acting for the sovereign, asserts and exercises the sovereign's rights and prerogatives. He is the intermediary between the emperor and the Holy Synod; all communications which pass between them are made through him; he submits to the Synod the laws projected by the government, and to the emperor, for sanction, the rulings of the Synod. Nothing is done in church matters without his participation; it is he who proposes and expedites current business, who sees that the measures decided on are carried out. No act of the Synod is valid without his endorsement; he has a *veto* for cases when its decisions should be contrary to the laws. Each year he presents to the emperor a report on the general situation of the Church, on the condition of the clergy and of Orthodoxy generally within the empire—and sometimes abroad also.*

Peter the Great, desirous of having the clergy drilled after the manner of an army, was of opinion that this important post should be confided to a military man, of bold and decided character.

* It is a matter of some wonderment to foreigners when the High Procurator of the Holy Synod officially addresses to the emperor a report on the relations between other governments and their subjects of the Greek rite, as though the tsar were the recognized patron of all Orthodox peoples and he, the High Procurator, the recognized guardian of all Eastern churches. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef especially, in his report dated December, 1886, took up

Under Nicolas, it was occupied for a long time by an *aide-de-camp* of the emperor, a cavalry officer, Count Protàssof. Such a choice was in no way surprising in Russia, at a time when the most exalted civil offices used to be filled by army generals. But to the West the idea of a hussar in a red dolman and spurred top-boots presiding over an assembly of bishops and priests was rather startling. However, those times have gone by, and there is nothing now in the person of the High Procurator calculated to reflect on the dignity of the Church or to call forth the raillery of foreigners. But then, under Nicolas, when the Church was ruled by Protàssof's sabre, what was first of all demanded of the High Procurator was that he should keep Orthodoxy's rusted armory bright and furbished, in good condition for fighting the heterodox religions in the border lands. Reforming the clergy, improving the condition, moral and material, of the priests, the administration of ecclesiastical justice, the teaching in the seminaries,—all these, in the eyes of the Church's imperial guardian and his lieutenant in the Synod, were matters of secondary interest. Their one absorbing care was—State Church propaganda.

Proselytism was the watchword of Protàssof, the bureaucratic apostle of Orthodoxy in Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces. So it was with his successors, men like Tolstòy and Pobiêdonòstsef. If it was no longer their only object, it was their main object still. Instead of soothing religious passions and inculcating a spirit of tolerance, they made it their mission to rouse the Church out of her apathy and to stimulate the zeal of the clergy, who were, to their minds, indifferent or lukewarm. Instead of teaching the priests to place their reliance, in the struggle against rival confessions, on the light of science or the power of faith, they taught

the cudgels openly against the governments of Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, reproving and lecturing them—Austria for her Latin hankerings, Roumania for her negotiations with the Vatican, the others for their interference in church matters, and all of them for the obstacles they put in the way of the intercourse between the local churches and the Holy Synod of Russia.

them to call on the State for aid on every occasion. Instead of maintaining the Church within the circle of her purely religious task, they have been striving to extend the sphere of her activity, and to transform her into an instrument in the hand of the government, and the clergy into a body of political agents.

National passions and revolutionary agitation have contributed in equal parts to bring about this sort of Orthodox clericalism, helped on at times by the personal inclination of the sovereign or his consort's devoutness ; for female influence has not always been foreign to the management of the Church any more in Petersburgh than in Byzance.* Things could not be different under existing conditions, and this official pietism has always made itself felt most at times of revolutionary unrest,—under Nicolas, under Alexander II., under Alexander III. The same spirit inspired the administration of Count Dmitri Tolstòy, whom Alexander II. had invested simultaneously with the onerous duties of High Procurator and Minister of Public Instruction.† It asserted itself with violence under the rule of Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, formerly the tutor of Alexander III., whose confidential friend he always remained. He is a sort of lay monk, who has fed his spirit on Scripture and the Mystics, translated the *Imitation* into Russian, and looks askant, from temperament as well as on principle, at anything like political or religious liberty. He has more of the Spaniard of the sixteenth century than of the contemporary Russian. He has been called an Orthodox Philip II. But his integrity, his austerity, his utter want of personal ambition, place him assuredly far above the Catholic King. He can, however, vie with Philip II. and the Grand Inquisitors of Spain in faith, in cold and patient fanaticism, in hatred of heterodoxy, in the passion for unity as well as in the habit of identifying the interests of the State with those of the Church, and in unscrupulousness where either are concerned.

* So the Emperor Alexander II. often yielded, in religious matters, to the influence of his wife, the Empress Maria Alexàndrovna.

† He was later called to the Ministry of the Interior by Alexander III.

Such a man could not but prefer the post he occupied to all others, though he had his choice of portfolios. From the Holy Synod he could extend his watchfulness over both Church and State, and, without sharing in the responsibility of power, be the inspirer of his imperial pupil's policy.

The affairs which come within the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod are divided into several branches, some of which, like censorship and the administration of justice, are more particularly the province of the Synod, while others, like schools and financial matters, are managed more by the Procurator. Ecclesiastical affairs are treated in writing and by correspondence; hence a complicated clerical organization, departments, bureaus, and files without end. This is a distinctive feature of the Russian Church and her besetting plague. Of all Western institutions, bureaucracy has become most thoroughly acclimated in Russia. Nothing can be decided without reports and vouchers either in Church or State. The Synod and the Procurator have their separate chancelleries. These lay offices, filled with priests' sons who could not or would not enter the priesthood, are strongholds of red tape, and their power is all the greater from the fact that the persons who compose the Synod are never long the same, and therefore few of the members are posted on the details of ecclesiastical jurisprudence and procedure.

It is impossible for the Synod to transact all its business in its regular sittings, for it sits only once or twice a week, and an average of 10,000 cases come before it through the year. Of these not more than one thousand can be disposed of in the sittings. All the rest, under the head of "current affairs," are left to the different bureaus to report on and decide; and it is the Procurator or the director of his own chancellery who decides what cases are to come under this head. The members have only to sign. To expedite matters, the papers, it is said, are often taken home to them for their signature. Hence many stories and anecdotes of a more or less edifying nature. So there is the story of a

member who, catching one of his colleagues in the act of perusing a report, observes: "We are not here to read; only to sign; quicker work." And that of the bishop who is entrapped into giving his signature in a case in which it is directly in his interest to refuse it. There are instances, it is asserted, of decisions taken at a sitting being altered in one or other of the bureaus and then presented for the members' signature. However, popular malice revels in such stories all the world over and too much faith should not be placed in them. The government has already done away with many an abuse by dealing severely with dishonest employés. Still, it is certain that bureaucracy takes much room in the Church where it would seem to be most out of place. From the Holy Synod it descends, through the consistories, into the dioceses and parishes, cumbering the entire Church with the wheels within wheels of its ponderous machinery.

The affairs which the Synod reserves more especially for its own decision, leaving the others to the High Procurator and his chancellery, are principally those which bear most directly on church discipline or church tradition: the instruction at the seminaries, the investigation of popular superstitions, religious observances, and spiritual censure. This latter institution is now peculiar to Russia alone. The only analogous one known is the ecclesiastical censure which has its seat in Rome, with the difference that the papal censure covers the entire range of the human mind, while in Russia it is limited to religious matters. Secular sciences are under the control of secular censorship, naturally less narrow-minded and not so suspicious.* Thus works on science, philosophy, and political economy see the light, which the synodal commission might have scrupled to pass.† For this censure is

* See Vol. II. Book VII. Chaps. I. and II.

† There is in Petersburgh an official *Press Indicator*, a paper which comes out twice a month and gives the list of the books forbidden or passed by either censure. From its columns one can gather the exact extent of the jurisdiction of either as well as form an idea of their strictness. In a few numbers taken at random I noted among the forbidden books works of

preventive, the Church having retained the privilege which the State gave up: the *ukàz* of Alexander II., which, in 1865, freed the press from this bondage, particularly set forth that the new franchise was not to be extended to original works, translations, new editions, or even "extracts" treating of religious matters. In this domain the *ukàz* of 1828, with the draconian regulations issued by Nicolas, remain in full force. Political periodicals, if they wish to touch on any matter which in any way concerns religion, must obtain the sanction of the spiritual censure: they generally prefer to abstain from such questions. The clergy thus finds itself more protected than the administration, the Church than the government. This partly accounts for the scant room allowed in the Russian press and literature to religion, church history, theology, even philosophy, and for the seemingly indifferent attitude of Russian writers towards religious questions, so often animadverted on.

The synodal censure-commission and its provincial committees being composed of monks, the monastic spirit prevails in them, and the married parish clergy are hindered even more than laymen from stating their grievances and wishes. On this ground the Church, far from being always subservient to the State, has sometimes publicly asserted her authority in favor of views not agreeable to the nation, nor, frequently, to the secular power. With public opinion and even the sympathies of the government spheres on their side, the lower clergy and their advocates have sometimes been compelled to resort to indirect ways, such as giving their views in the form of novels and stories, or else in books printed abroad. The same experience awaited the most religious of laymen—Khomiakòf, Samárin, Vladímir Soloviòf. Thus the privileged Church censure has proved an obstacle in the way of reform. It was instituted by Peter the Great, in 1740, for the ex-

Strauss, Athanase Coquerel, Renan, Herbert Spencer. Many translations could appear only with cuttings demanded by the censors or suggested by the publishers' own prudence.

press purpose of combating the Schism (*raskòl*), but has signally failed to arrest the growth and propagation of sects. As things stand now in Russia, its suppression is hardly to be hoped for; but it were greatly to be wished that the institution should at least be limited to a disciplinarian control over the Orthodox clergy.

Thanks to the Holy Synod, the Russian Church is probably the most centralized in the world. Being placed in constant relations with the central power, the bishops have become a sort of ecclesiastical prefects. Each bishop is appointed by the emperor out of three candidates nominated by the Synod; as a rule, the first on the list is chosen. It is thought to conciliate in this way the interests of the Church and those of the State. The dioceses usually cover the civil provinces or governments. There are sixty in the empire, divided into three classes; of these, not quite fifty belong to European Russia.* Some of these dioceses are more extensive than France or Italy. They are, on an average, fifteen or twenty times the size of French dioceses. In this respect the Russian Church contrasts strongly with Greece, where every big hamlet has its bishop. Of these dioceses three are metropolies and nineteen are archbishoprics. These titles no longer correspond to any difference in jurisdiction; they imply a difference in rank only. There are no suffragants any more; the archbishops are assisted by one or two vicar-bishops or coadjutors. There is only one independent ecclesiastical province left in the empire—the dioceses which form the exarchate of Grúzia; everywhere else the bishops depend solely on the Synod.

The titles of archbishop and metropolitan are not always borne by those who occupy the respective sees. It frequently happens that an incumbent has filled the office several years before he is awarded the title by the government. A bishop, is "promoted" to the dignity of archbishop, the archbishop to that of metro-

* In 1887, there were forty-eight dioceses in European Russia, four in Transcaucasia, six in Siberia, only one in Turkestan; the Aleutian Islands and Alaska formed another.

politan, as a recompense for his services, so that these titles, like the grades in the *tchin*-hierarchy, become a personal distinction. Sometimes the sovereign awards to a metropolitan the honors formerly enjoyed by the patriarchs. This was the case with Philaret, the Metropolitan of Moscow, and with his disciple, Isidor, Metropolitan of Nòvgorod and St. Petersburgh.

With the salary, it is much the same thing as with the title; this makes the bond of the bishops' dependence on the central power doubly strong. There is no fixed appropriation from the treasury,—or, more correctly, that appropriation forms but a small portion of the episcopal revenues. Besides the regular salary, there are the "subsidies" from the Holy Synod, then the ecclesiastical lands and buildings, or the indemnities paid for them, not to speak of fees and donations. All these items sum up to a respectable income, by no means an excessive one. The bishops, especially those of the higher grades, hold an exalted rank in society, and are usually entitled to it by their personal merit. The choice of the Synod and government almost always falls on enlightened men, of well-informed mind and pure life. As regards virtue, erudition, eloquence, the Metropolitans of Moscow—such men as Philaret, Plato, Macarius—would not have been out of place in the most eminent sees of the West. Not one of these—not Paris, Vienna, or Canterbury—can boast a more illustrious line of incumbents. The same judgment applies, in almost the same degree, to those of Petersburgh. In this respect, devout souls have no reason to regret that Russia did not revert to the election of bishops by the mixed suffrage of clergy and laymen. Nor does intrigue open the way to the episcopal chair, as is the case in Turkey, where every step on the hierarchic ladder costs money. Under the rule of the Orthodox tsars the Russian Church has been kept unsullied by the inveterate taint of her Byzantine sister—simony.

Russian bishops are, externally, surrounded with a certain pomp and show of luxury: but their home life is austere. They

must reside at their see, bound thereto by canonical law, unless the sovereign does them the honor of calling them to the Synod. They hardly ever absent themselves except on long and tedious pastoral tours through their immense dioceses. They mostly reside in convents, having been monks before they were made bishops. While occupying the highest church dignities and surrounded by the most exalted honors, they practise the same rigorous abstinence. At official banquets, at the tsar's own table, they touch no food but fish and vegetables. True, it is reported that on their pastoral travels, the laymen who entertain them, in their hospitable worldliness, not content with placing before them the fat sterlets of the Volga and the Dvinà, do not scruple to have their lenten fish soup (*ukhà*) prepared with beef broth.

Not only are the bishops subject to the authority of the Holy Synod, but each of them is assisted by an ecclesiastical council which, under the name of "Diocesan Consistory," occupies in the diocese much the same position that the Synod does in the Empire. The members are nominated by the bishop, but appointed by the Synod, and their decisions become valid only with the bishop's sanction. These consistories attend to the business of the diocese. They try in the first instance such cases as are still referred to ecclesiastical courts. In most cases, especially those with which justice is concerned, the Holy Synod is the highest court of appeal and cassation.

The cases subject to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts come under two principal heads: matters of clerical discipline and matters pertaining to marriage and divorce. The Russian Church has, almost alone of all the Christian world, retained this right of jurisdiction, and would be very loth to give it up. This jurisdiction, already reduced by Peter the Great, was to have been still more curtailed. The question was considered of taking divorce cases away from the Church, only leaving to the bishop the right of confirming or vetoing the judgments pronounced by the ordinary courts. This very ticklish reform has been indefinitely ad-

journed. The government stopped short before the forbidding attitude of the Church and the objections raised by the Holy Synod, giving thereby one more evidence that on one domain—the ecclesiastical—the supreme power of the State does not feel absolutely free.*

And yet, consistorial justice is one of the most defective portions of ecclesiastical administration. The old modes of procedure having been retained there, the diocesan courts are tainted with all the vices of the old courts generally—extreme tardiness, formalism, venality. These faults are especially glaring in marriage and divorce cases. Notwithstanding the efforts of the clergy and the severity shown by the bishops, the rouble still reigns paramount in the lay bureaus of the ecclesiastical consistories. "I know from personal experience," a woman said to me, who had been divorced and remarried, "what the cost is of preparing a divorce case; I know what the color is of the bank-notes which it is wise to mislay on the desks of the different officials." As a matter of fact, legal divorce is a luxury for the wealthy. Which accounts for the exceedingly small number of marriages annulled by diocesan consistories.† The peasants, who are, in many ways, outside of the law, dispense with these costly formalities: unhappy couples get the assembly of the *mir* or the cantonal courts to break the bond.‡

Each consistory is assisted by a lay secretary, whose local duties are much like those of the High Procurator in the Holy

* On the organization of the ecclesiastical courts and the projected reforms, see Vol. II., Book IV., Ch. II.

† For the year 1880 the High Procurator reported 920 divorces, on the following grounds: 32—bigamy, committed by one or other of the consorts; 17—impotency; 121—adultery; 482—prolonged absence without tidings of the missing person [1]; 259—sentence of imprisonment with hard labor or transportation against one of the consorts; 9—marriages contracted between persons related within forbidden degrees. It will be seen that adultery is not the only ground for divorce admitted by the Russian Church.

‡ See Vol. II., Book IV., Ch. II.

[1] Practically—desertion; seven years is the term required.

Synod. He is in charge of the diocesan chancellery, conducts the correspondence, and attends to the composition of all necessary papers. He is appointed by the Synod but nominated by the High Procurator, who remains his immediate chief. It is to the Procurator he addresses his reports, while the bishop and consistory send theirs to the Synod. Like most of the employés in these ecclesiastical chancelleries, the secretary, though a layman, usually belongs to a priestly family. In all this vast administrative machinery, the High Procurator and his principal assistants are almost the only functionaries who are not connected with the clergy by birth. The influence which the secretaries and the diocesan chancelleries exert over the presentation of cases, the appointments to places, the decision of suits, has thrown open the doors of the Church to administrative corruption. Abuses are mostly traceable to these secretaries. They have been known to turn themselves into regular divorce brokers, to give ill-matched couples the benefit of their experience, even going the length of providing witnesses if they wish to establish a sham case of adultery. Russian literature sometimes presents types of these ecclesiastical bureaucrats in the pursuit of their lucrative specialty. Attempts have been made to suppress such practices by subjecting the secretaries to a stricter supervision and at the same time raising their salaries. But no radical changes have been made in the diocesan administration, for it is bound up with the entire church constitution.

The Holy Synod stands to each diocese much in the same relation that a Minister of the Interior stands to a provincial district. Hence an enormous expenditure of paper and red tape. The bishop and his consistory have to refer every single thing to the Synod: nothing of any importance—be it the erection or suppression of a church, the use of funds or alms, the deposition of a priest or the annulment of his vows—can be done without the Synod's express sanction. To absent himself from his diocese for more than eight days, a bishop must ask leave of the Synod. He

is expected to send in each year a report on the general condition of his diocese, on the ecclesiastical schools, on the number of persons who have received the sacraments, on the conversions accomplished amongst the followers of alien religions.

Conditions peculiar to Russia and the Russian Church account for this administrative guardianship. The immense distances have always made it so difficult to seek redress against the abuses of local authority, that the government had hardly any choice, in any department, but strict centralization. Then the division of the clergy into two classes, mutually jealous, made such central control doubly necessary. The wider the separation between the bishop and high celibate clergy on one side, and the married clergy on the other, as regards the mode of life of each and their respective interests, the greater the need for the interposition of a moderating and impartial power. This is one of the causes of the influence which the secular power wields over the Russian Church, though it is generally overlooked. In the Latin Church, where no such division exists, the priest is too directly exposed to the arbitrariness of an almost omnipotent bishop not to seek protection against it. This protection which, since the Revolution, the lower clergy could not claim at the hands of the State, it asked of Rome, while the Orthodox priest finds it in the tsar and his government. For, if the authority of the State weighs heavily on the high clergy, it is to the lower clergy not so much a yoke as a safeguard.

To find means for raising the Church's spiritual authority has been a frequent preoccupation of earnest men in Russia. The imperial government, acting on the advice of such men as Aksàkof and Katkòf, determined to restore to the hierarchy a right which has always been an object of suspicion to most governments. The bishops, whom Peter's "Regulations" were specially intended to keep apart and isolated, were authorized—it might be more correct to say invited—to come together and form regional assemblies. This is equivalent to provincial councils, a privilege which

the French Church has been long debarred from, except for a short time under the second Republic. True, these Russian councils can neither sit, nor deliberate, nor publish anything, except by permission of the Synod—or, in other words, the government. Such assemblies have been held in several large church centres: Kief, Kazàn, Vilna, even Irkutsk. True, again, these episcopal assizes, obedient to the impulse given by the hand of the High Procurators, have probably taken more thought of proselytism than of the clergy's interests and internal church reforms. Under Alexander III., a few zealous Orthodox Slavophils ventilated the question of convoking in Moscow a national council of all the Russias, or indeed, an Œcumenic Council of the entire Eastern Church, with a view to a closer union between the churches of the Greek rite and a closer solidarity of the entire Orthodox world. There would be no lack of questions for such a council to discuss, but it is doubtful whether the Russian tsars would be anxious to promote one, or foreign governments to send their bishops to it.

But even without renewing the institution of provincial councils, many reforms might be introduced in the Church were but the public morals ripe for them. Many things might be done, did the public spirit and habits lend themselves to it. But they don't. At all events, if there is one country where the religious community cannot be isolated from the rest of society, that country is Russia. The transformation must begin at the political end of public life.

What must seem desirable to the friends of the Church is not the abrogation of existing institutions, but their progressive enlargement, so that they should remain in harmony, as well with the spiritual needs of the people, as with the civil government. While retaining the right of supervision over church administration, the government should abstain from making use of the clergy to further temporal interests. It is for the good of religion that the State's intervention in church matters should be discreet and well regulated; it is for the good of both Church and country

that the State should not entirely abdicate its influence in the Church, as such a course would give her up to ignorance and routine. For she is of her nature essentially conservative and stationary, and only external influences can bring her to accept reforms. Besides, the initiative, in Russia, has always come from above, from the throne, because the governing element, being constantly in contact with the West, has always been more enlightened than the bulk of the nation.

Having to deal with such an essentially religious people, the Church has a perfect right to claim her share in the great work of national regeneration; if she has not done more towards it, if many projects have borne no fruit, many measures have been carried out wrongly, the blame does not always lie with the State, but quite as often with the sullen resistance encountered in the Church herself. For, docile and dependent as she apparently is in her relations with the secular power, she has more means of defence at her disposal than anybody knows of; and if all else fails, she still has the power of inertia. The government is not overfond of arousing the Holy Synod's displeasure or sowing discontent among the clergy; it is especially afraid of hurting the feelings of the ignorant masses. This is why so many useful reforms have been adjourned, such as the emancipation of the Dissenters (*raskòlniks*), the secularization of justice and of the registers of births, marriages, and deaths, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the suppression of spiritual censure. In all these matters,—we cannot repeat it often enough,—autocracy is not omnipotent. Let us say the emperor has the right of government in the Church: he can exercise it only if he respects her traditions, and at times her prejudices.

BOOK II. CHAPTER VIII.

The Black Clergy—Convents and Monks—The Clergy Divided into Two Classes—Supremacy of the Monastic Clergy—Character of Russian Monarchism—Its Lack of Variety—Its Historical Importance—The Great National Monasteries—Comparatively Small Number of Monks and Nuns—How Monks are Recruited—Their Mode of Life—How Monasteries Became State Institutions—Their Classification—Their Possessions and Resources—Their Work—Nunneries—The Nuns—The Sisters of Charity.

In Russia, the clergy is not only a body, but a class; until quite lately it was virtually a caste. It is even now hereditary, and counted as one of the four or five estates or classes (*sosl'oviya*), of which the nation is composed. It is itself subdivided into two groups, two different and often rival classes: the priests and the monks; the lay, parochial, clergy and the regular, monastic, clergy; or, to use the current designations, the White Clergy and the Black Clergy. This designation is not suggested by costume. The monks, indeed, are garbed in black, but the priests are not robed in white. They wear dark colors mixed with black. Both wear long beards and long hair; the distinctive feature of the former's costume is the long black veil which hangs down their backs from their tall headgear.

The black clergy is celibate, the white clergy is married; therein lies the fundamental distinction between the two. This sacerdotal dualism is found in all the Eastern churches, not excepting those which are said to be "united" to Rome. The only exception known to me is that of the Melchite Greeks in Syria, where the spirit of Rome prevailed and the celibate clergy ended by ousting and suppressing the married clergy. It is not impossi-

ble that we may, some day or other, witness the converse event in this or that Orthodox country.

In all these Eastern churches, the episcopal dignity is reserved by traditional custom to the celibate clergy ; hence its preponderance and the married clergy's subjection and jealousy. The antagonism between the two is the more natural, that the contrast is very great and the passage from one to the other very difficult, marriage being as much an obligation for the priest as celibacy is for the monk. This is a barrier which can be annulled only by death, or—but this is rare—by the voluntary separation of two consorts.

The interests of the two clergies are entirely different, and, as a consequence, so are their tendencies. The black clergy is bent on asserting its domination, the white strives to escape from it : there is a constant clashing, a constant undeclared, sometimes unconscious, competition, which, however, never flares up into open hostility. From the ground of material interests and power, this rivalry sometimes passes into the spiritual domain, the religious sphere proper. For these two clergies are, by their very position, fatally drawn towards the two opposite poles of Christianity : one gravitates towards tradition and authority, the other towards innovation and liberty. As we have pointed out already, there is here a hint at the high church and low church of the Anglicans Not that the Russian Church is as yet in any danger of such conflicts. Tradition is too powerful and the need of union too great for anything like open strife or dissension to be possible. The two clergies will go on living side by side, and neither will achieve a triumph so complete as to annihilate the other. One has the pre-eminence of power, erudition, and historical tradition ; the other that of numbers and social position ; one has a greater past, the other possibly a greater future. Let us begin with the black clergy, as that which occupies the higher position at present.

Monasteries and monks have always held a large place in Russia's life ; to this day her vast convents are her most remark-

able historical monuments. In no country have the monks played a more prominent part ; but that part was not always the same as in the West. Eastern Orthodox monachism did not grow such a multitude of branches or break into such complex efflorescence as Latin Catholic monachism. Instead of ramifying into such a variety of orders and communities, it retained all through the ages an archaïc simplicity. The Russians and the Greeks have known only the initial phases of monachism, the mediæval stages anterior to St. Bernard, or at least to St. Dominic and St. Francis. Of the two main phases of monastic life—the active, militant, and the contemplative, ascetic, the Eastern monks have invariably preferred the latter, doubtless that which is best suited to the Oriental spirit. Martha, with them, has always been sacrificed to Mary.

It was distinctly with the object of cultivating penance and asceticism, prayer and meditation, that most Orthodox monasteries were founded. It was neither the need of organizing for the struggles of life nor zeal for the saving of souls,—it was the love of seclusion, renunciation of the world and its strife, which filled the Russian monasteries in olden times. The foes who were to be fought were the same that the mighty spiritual athletes of Thebaïs had combated, with no weapons but prayer and fasting : their own rebellious flesh and the Serpent-tempter. It was by dint of self-maceration that the recluses of Petchèrsk earned the name of "terrestrial angels and celestial men." The Russian monk's object was neither intellectual work nor manual labor, neither charity nor proselytism, but merely personal salvation and atonement for the sins of the world.

"The mission of monks," those of Tròytsa said to Palmer as late as in the reign of Nicolas, "is not study nor labor of any kind ; it is to chant the services, to live for the good of their souls and do penance for the world." * They added that asceticism was the sinew of Christianity, and boasted that they had been truer to it than the Latins, seeing therein a token of their own Church's

* Palmer, *Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church*, pp. 200, 201.

superiority. Some monks at St. Sergius seemed to consider the two besetting vices of all Eastern convents—ignorance and uncleanliness—as almost an essential virtue of monastic life. When Palmer, after spending a few days in their cells, complained of insects and vermin, they replied that, in a convent, these creatures had their use, as instruments of mortification and a means of exercising patience. For the common monk the monastic ideal will always be the anchorite in the desert, the stylite on his pillar,* the Christian gymnosophist, clothed only in his long beard, who figures on many convent paintings, or the holy men self-buried in the catacombs of Kief. The names of the monasteries recall the deserts of Thebaïs ; the large ones are called *làvra*, the small ones *skit* or *pustỳniya* (deserts, hermitages). Their crypts and catacombs are not so much the sepulchres of the dead as the dwellings of those old anchorites who retired into caves in imitation of the Fathers of the desert. Caves—such as the *sacro-speco* of St. Benedict at Subiaco or the *cueva* of St. Ignatius at Manresa—seem never to have lost their attraction for the imaginatively religious among the uneducated. In the neighborhood of the Gethsemane *skit* near Tròytsa, the visitor finds catacombs where modern competitors of the old Kief saints have been living for years in subterranean cells, away from men and the light of day. In Crimea, in the monastery of the Assumption, near Bakhtchi-Saràï, monks have hollowed out for themselves in the side of a rock a number of aërial grottos which they have connected by means of frail wooden galleries. This troglodyte convent is not a century old. The inclination for hermit life is not extinct among the people. The State no longer directly countenances it ; but dissident sectarians still frequently erect hermitages for themselves in the remoter parts of the empire.

With such tendencies, one monastic order was amply sufficient, as that of St. Benedict was for a long time sufficient for the needs

* The Russian Church boasts two holy stylites, St. Cyril of Tùrof and a certain St. Nikíta, both of the twelfth century.

of the West. In Russia, as in all the East, the prevailing monastic statute is that of St. Basil, not to be compared for precision and system with the complicated statutes of Catholic orders or communities, so admirably adapted for their respective special objects. This statute, written out in the form of questions and answers, does little more than lay down the bases of monastic life, without hedging it in with a narrow code of observances. Here again, as in matters of faith, Russia has added nothing to what the Greeks brought her. Russian convents, at various times, underwent divers reforms, but nothing original ever came out of them. The Russian church militia never presented that marvellous variety of troops, arms, uniforms, which lent such splendor and so much power to the monastic armies of the West. Accordingly, Russian convent life has never known anything to be compared to those grand monks, men of peace or of battle, men of action or of the pen, statesmen at a pinch, who have so deeply stirred the Latin world. Russia has had monks, but no religious orders ; she has had monasteries, but nothing like those monastic federations or republics which formed, as one might say, spiritual states within nations and political states. Russian monasteries, like those of the French Benedictines, have sometimes taken the form of colonies, but no powerful organization resulted therefrom. Thus monastic life has always been wanting both in variety and cohesion, in diversity and unity. Hence monks could be neither the same help nor the same disturbance to society and civilization that they were in the West.

Not that their influence went less deep. They played, in the formation of the Russian nation and culture, about the same part that the monks of St. Colombanus and St. Benedict did in Catholic Europe. They were the pioneers of both civilization and Christianity, as the others were in Gaul and Germany. While converting barbarous tribes, they opened forests, ploughed up wilds, and drew Russian colonists after them into the wildernesses of the North and East. Many a city grew up around a monastery.

Many a fair of widespread and enduring renown was first held in front of convent gates—the fair of St. Macarius for one, now transferred to Nijni-Nòvgorod. In Russia as well as elsewhere, convents have been the one shelter of letters, these being brought over from Byzance by Greek monks. In this respect, few of our Western abbeys could vie with Petchèrsk, the *Làvra* of Kief, where Nestor and the first chroniclers wrote.* If ever country was made by monks, that country was Russia.

The convents there have a more national character than anywhere else. In monastic life as in all other things, religion has identified itself more with the people. During the conflicts with the Tatars, the Lithuanians, and the Poles, monasteries were the main bulwarks of the nationality of which, through the diffusion of Christianity, they had been one of the principal factors.† Almost the entire history of Russia confronts us in her two great *làvras:* Petchèrsk, with its catacombs lining the Dniepr, symbolizes and sums up the first period of national life; Tròytsa the second. Petchèrsk embodies the Kief epoch, Tròytsa that of Moscow. The old convents were citadels; many still show battlemented walls; they are the castles, the strongholds of the Russian Middle Ages. The larger ones are real cities, containing numerous churches and chapels: Petchèrsk numbers sixteen, Tròytsa fourteen, Solovètsk seven. But they can show nothing to be compared to those architectural marvels, the Gothic abbeys of France, England, and Portugal.

In default of artistic beauty, many of these monuments are invested with the charm of picturesqueness. In Russia as everywhere, the monks have selected the finest sites. Hermitages

* Although the monks of Kief never fail to point out in their catacombs the tomb of the sainted chronicler Nestor, his authorship of the Chronicle known under his name remains a matter for doubt; not so its being written by monks.—See L. Léger, *Chronique Dite de Nestor.*

† The same with most Orthodox peoples—the Greeks, the Serbs, and notably the Bulgars. Convents, like that of Rilo, have been the refuge of Slavism in the Balkans.

sometimes are poised on a lake or river bank, sometimes nestle on an island ; cenobites have taken possession of forest clearings or of wooded oases in the midst of steppes. Tròytsa's thickset red brick towers, which have stemmed the advance of the Poles, then masters of Moscow, and sheltered Peter the Great from the mutinous *streltsŷ*, rise from the edge of a ravine. On one of our visits to this national sanctuary, the monk who was taking us round the walls showed us through the embrasures the site of the Polish tents and the Polish ordnance, which was answered by the convent cannon (1608-1609). At Petchèrsk, Kief,* the site is grander, the associations are more legendary. This monastery, the cradle of Russian monachism, and the shelter of saints unnumbered, sends up its rose-colored steeplès, and its cupolas of gold or starred azure from the bluffs on the right bank of the Dniepr. Below, on the other side of the great river, a vast green expanse meets the eye, flat and immense as a becalmed sea, while under the convent burrow the dark catacombs wherein the old anchorites dwelt, and their bodies repose in standing posture. Into these sepulchral galleries, as narrow as those of the Roman catacombs, crowds of pilgrims press from early morning. Led by monks, the long files are engulphed in the mysterious labyrinth, each man and woman carrying a small taper, to the echoes of the Old-Slavic plain-chant which accompanies the mass service in the subterranean churches. From out the niches which they occupy in death as they did in life, the holy ascetics, now walled up, hold out rigid and desiccated hands to the kisses of the faithful.

Other monasteries, of hardly less renown : Simeònof, Donskòy, and Novospàssky, the walls of which arrested the Tatars and kept them from the gates of Moscow,—St. George at Nòvgorod, the Assumption at Tver, Solovètsk on the White Sea,—also recall glorious memories and attract hosts of pilgrims. These sanctuaries hallow a district or city in the eyes of the people. Peter the Great, little as he loved monks, could not afford to leave his

* From *pesh-tchèra, petchèra*—cavity, cavern, grotto.

new capital unconsecrated. In order to incorporate to Holy Russia the semi-Finnic soil on which he built his city with the German name, he had the remains of the princely Saint, the Russian St. Louis, Alexander Nevsky, transferred from Vladímir to Petersburgh : the warrior *kniàz*, the victor over the Swedes in the battles by the Neva, could easily be presented as the precursor of him who vanquished Charles XII. Around the shrine of the national hero-saint, at the gates of the new capital, a vast monastery was erected, and endowed with such wealth and privileges as entitled it to rank with the *làvras* of Petchèrsk and of Tròytsa.

With the exception of the great *làvras*, the convent population is not what it used to be. The crowds of pilgrims are as great, but the resident monks are comparatively few ; in some places they almost look like the custodians of these religious fortresses, formerly inhabited by thousands of men. The gradual decadence of monachism is indicated by the geographical distribution of the monasteries. It were instructive to draw up a monastic map of Russia, if only to follow out on it the various stations of Slavo-Russian colonization. The number of convents is in proportion not to the density, but to the date of the population. The greater portion cluster round the old capitals or the old republican cities—Kief, Moscow, Tver, Vladímir, Pskof, the two Nòvgorods. In the recently colonized regions—the Black Mould zone or the southern steppes—the convents are few and far between. Still Russians always erect some in newly colonized countries. In Crimea, also in the Caucasus, Russian monks have settled down in monasteries which had stood empty hundred of years. And some have been built in Siberia and Central Asia. In such remote regions they are usually founded and endowed by the State, being considered in the light of institutions for the public good, besides serving as centres of colonization and russification.*

In every bishopric there is at least one monastery, the father

* The convent of Issik-Kul, in Turkestan, was built at the cost of the Treasury and endowed, under Alexander III., with fertile lands and fisheries.

superior of which is, *ex-officio*, a member of the diocesan consistory. There are, at the present writing, in the whole empire, 550 convents, or thereabouts, containing about 11,000 monks and about 18,000 nuns, making altogether not quite 29,000 persons.* This, for such an empire, is not an alarming figure, the less so that the number of monks does not increase, though that of nuns does, slightly. It is nothing compared to what we saw but very lately in Spain and Italy. In the face of the many obstacles we put in the way of religious communities, when it comes to their making new recruits, Orthodox Russia, with double the number of followers of the established faith, has only one fifth or one sixth as many monks and sisters of all sorts as Catholic France; possibly she has actually not as many as microscopic Belgium. But nowhere except in Russia, are found vast convent cities like those of Tròytsa or Petchèrsk, to this day peopled with hundreds of monks, bringing before our eyes a counterpart of the legendary colonies of ascetics in the East. The *làvra* of Petchèrsk in Kief contains six hundred monks and novices. In the same province the female convent of Flòrovo holds about five hundred nuns. It will be seen that in Russia, as used to be the case in France before the Revolution, there are more men's than women's convents, but more nuns than monks.

To the monks officially registered as belonging to monasteries within the empire should be added the irregulars, the Russians who have enlisted in foreign convents, especially those on Mount Athos. One of the chief monasteries on the Holy Mountain, the Panteléymon, or Rossikôn, shelters four or five hundred of them. Others live in the monasteries of St. Andrew and Elijah the Prophet, or by themselves, as hermits.† These Russian monks,

* On the showing of the reports rendered by the Procurator of the Holy Synod, in December, 1886, there were then in Russia 380 men's convents, with a population of 6,772 monks and 4,107 novices, 10,879 altogether; and 171 women's convents, with 4,941 nuns and 12,966 novices and lay sisters, 17,907 altogether—or 28,786 of both sexes.

† Besides the Panteléymon, there are two other large monasteries, the

whether anchorites or cenobites, have generally come to the Hagion Oros as plain pilgrims, some of them as boys. The beautiful scenery, the lovely climate, the easy life, the contagion of pious idleness, have kept them there. They live there free, in dreamy contemplation, between the azure sky and the deep blue Ægean Sea, away from the regulations and control of the Holy Synod. The Russian government, while it supports them in their differences with the Greek *kaloyers*, does not recognize them as regular monks, for the law forbids taking the veil unauthorized. The government distrusts these free colonists of the old monastic republic. It not only does not encourage them to emigrate, but occasionally treats them as deserters; more than once they have been refused the permission to return to Russia and collect alms for their convents. They contrive to do it all the same, disguised as laymen if need be, and collect large sums too. It is also a well-known dodge of adventurers who speculate on popular credulity.

In spite of the favor with which the people still regard monachism, it is declining in Russia as in the East, though not as much as in Greece and the other Orthodox states, where the convents, already much reduced in numbers, are likely soon to disappear entirely. This is not only because our civilization is mortal to monastic asceticism, and because the activity and safety of modern life keep away from cloistered life many who formerly would have sought shelter there. It is because religious life in the East has not, as in the West, successively adapted itself to all the evolutions of society, to second or moderate them, has not been renovated by labor or charitable works.

Moreover, the two dominant facts of modern Russia's church history—the Schism (*raskòl*) and the institution of the holy Synod, have reacted unfavorably on the monasteries almost in an equal degree. The *raskòl* has alienated from them the more fervent portion of the people; the Synod has held them in a subjection rather un-

Zôgraphos and the Chilantari, which, being occupied by Serbs and Bulgars, form a sort of Slavic forepost on the Greek peninsula.

propitious to monastic life. Some convents having, at the outset, shown themselves favorable to the Schism—Solovètsk was one of these—Church and State were induced to place all under strict discipline. The underhanded resistance which they opposed to the reforms of Peter the Great was another cause of their decline. The secular power made it a special object to reduce the number, wealth, and influence of these strongholds of the old ideas. Every restriction was imposed on them by Peter and his successors that could be imposed without actually abolishing the convents. The laws still show traces of this hostility. A man cannot take the vows before the age of thirty, nor a woman before that of forty, in order that no one may retire from the world before having discharged his or her obligations towards the State, the commune, or society generally. The monk must renounce all the privileges belonging to his class or rank in life, the right of owning land or real estate of any kind, of receiving any inheritance. At one time, Biron, Anna Ivànovna's Protestant favorite, allowed nobody to take the veil except widowed priests and discharged soldiers, and those only with the sanction of the Holy Synod. About 1750 there still were 732 men's convents ; the number was reduced to less than 200.

Nor were the monks attacked only in their numbers and property, but also in their spiritual influence. The Code of Ecclesiastical Regulations did indeed recommend them to study the Scriptures, but forbade them, on pain of corporal chastisement, to write books or to make extracts out of books. They could not have ink or paper in their cells without a special permission from the father superior, because, Peter's Ecclesiastical Code condescends to explain, nothing is more disturbing to the tranquillity of monastic life than senseless and unnecessary scribbling. Each communitywas to have only one common inkstand, and that was to be chained to one of the tables in the refectory, and used only by permission. Curious reforms to proceed from an apostle of enlightenment. In that as in sundry other matters, Peter was in danger of defeating

his own ends. Such measures could scarcely be expected to elevate the monks, but they certainly deprived them of all influence.

It seems an incongruity that all the high ecclesiastical dignities should have been reserved for these monks, who have been kept in such abasement; that these convents, looked upon with such suspicion, should have the monopoly of supplying the Church with bishops. The privilege would, indeed, be an absurdity bordering on aberration if it really extended to the monastic plebs. What accounts for it is that the bulk of the monks have no part in it, as it is reserved for a chosen few, who often have of the monk only the name and garb.

Under the external uniformity of monastic life, there are vocations and individual existences many and various. Of the two or three hundred men who take the veil every year, a good half come from priestly families; the rest belong to the merchant class, to town crafts, to the peasantry. The contingent from the governing classes—the nobility and the liberal professions—is very small indeed. The formalism of a monk's existence, almost entirely absorbed in routine observances, is not attractive to cultivated natures. Yet the black robe conceals a few men of the world, especially former officers. I have been told of *hegumens* who had commanded regiments before they came to command a convent community. Like Father Zossìm in Dostoyèfsky's novel, *The Karamàzof Brothers*, they had sought peace and oblivion in convent cells. There are not a few old soldiers among the monks. When the term of military service was abnormally long, it came natural to an old trooper to exchange one uniform for another, one barrack for another. How many there are who, if questioned, might give the same answer that a monk in Vòlogda gave to Fletcher, Queen Elizabeth's envoy:—"What did you enter a convent for?" the Englishman asked him.—"To eat in peace" replied the monk.

The two extremes of the clergy meet in the monasteries—the

most intelligent men and the most ignorant, the most cultivated and the most uncouth. All sorts of men come there: mature men; aged priests who seek a haven of rest for their latter days; young men, whose only object is to qualify for an ecclesiastical career. Among the recruits furnished by the clergy can be met most brilliant subjects and also the dead fruit of the monasteries. The latter are doomed to a long novitiate, and they may never become priests or even deacons at all (for in Russia, as in the primitive Christian Church, there are many monks who are not priests); while for the others the convent is only a brief stage on the road to a bishopric or to other church dignities. While in the West it is usual for monks to forswear the honors of episcopacy and prelacy, with the exception of countries where missions are established, in Russia men enter convents with the special object of making "a career."

Seminary students, after choosing between the world and the Church, have another choice to make between the two clergies: between the priest's life, with the joys and cares of the family, and that of the monk, with its ambitious hopes. Until quite lately, the ecclesiastical academies were controlled exclusively by monks, who spared no pains to attract and keep promising young men. Even craft was sometimes used for the purpose, and stories are told of stratagems which would have done credit to the recruiting sergeants of olden times. But such things belong to an order of things which has passed away. As a rule, there is no need of fraud or finessing; self-conceit and dread of the well-known hardships of a priest's existence are sufficient inducements, where true piety is lacking, for most young men who have been singled out by their superiors.

Once the seminarist has taken the vows, nothing can run more smoothly, more rapidly, than his advancement. The law does not allow a man to take the irrevocable step before the age of thirty; but for the academy student the legal term is set down to twenty-five; he is, besides, exempted from the test of the

novitiate. As soon as his term of study is completed, he is appointed inspector or professor at some seminary [1]; after that he is made rector, or father superior of a convent, and by the time he is thirty he may be a bishop. These privileged few sometimes even arrive at the highest dignities without having led the cloister life at all or scarcely resided in a monastery. They are, in a word, not so much monks as celibate priests; they are accounted monks merely because in Russia celibacy goes only with monachism. Between these young scholars, whom their brother students nickname "the academicians," and the general crowd of monks, there is very little intercourse or sympathy. The bishops themselves, although nominally convent-bred, show, as a rule, no great fondness or respect for monastic life. In these mitred monks the black clergy, no less than the white, finds not so much brothers as masters.

As to the monkish *plebs*—no career lies before them; nothing but a monotonous existence, filled out with minutest observances. Keeping their respective convents in good condition, attending on their churches, chanting the long services of the Greek rite—such are their main occupations; labor, whether of body or brain, holds an exceedingly small place in it. As is customary in Greek convents, the time of novitiate is spent principally in serving and waiting on the older monks. The novice, as the Russian name implies (*pòslushnik*), is a kind of servitor—one might almost say servant. In fact there is only one word for "novice" and "lay-brother." There is nothing at all like the slow and laborious initiation which the future monks undergo in Catholic convents. The Russian novice learns of monastic life little besides the routine; he is thus trained for the almost machine-like existence which most monks lead.

Until quite lately few Russian convents formed communities in the word's proper sense, in spite of the efforts made by several

[1] "Seminary" in Russia always means an ecclesiastical school or college, never any kind of secular educational institution, with the exception of the Normal Schools, which are called "Teachers' Seminaries."

patriarchs and metropolitans to promote the system. The monks of a convent used to live under the same roof, but by no means in common. They prayed and had their meals together, but each monk had his own money, his share of the revenues of the house, and used it as he pleased. The Holy Synod intends to introduce in all the convents the community system together with a stricter discipline. Monastic reform is the business of the central ecclesiastical authority, and, through that, of the government. For convents, in Russia, are a national institution, not in any way private establishments. And such associations under an autocratic form of government can exist but on condition that they shall accept to stand under government control.

Bureaucracy has of course invaded the monasteries not less than the entire body of the Church. Not only are they not, as in the West, free and more or less independent corporations, but the right of electing their own *hegumens* has long ago been taken from them. They are placed under the absolute control of the Holy Synod; without its sanction, no new convent can be founded; without its permission, no novice can be admitted to take the vows. Up to a reform of recent date, it was the Synod who appointed all the convent dignitaries. The posts of *hegumen* and *archimandrite* (answering to our abbots and priors) had become mere stepping-stones in an ecclesiastical career; they were often given to bishops or to episcopal candidates; a state of affairs which gave rise to something very like the "benefices" and *commendes* of old times in France. The archimandrites of convents of the first class were real prelates who took in large revenues, kept horses and carriages, hardly sharing in the life of their monks at all, even while residing in their midst.

The Holy Synod has addressed itself to the correction of these abuses. While subjecting the monasteries to stricter rules, and converting most of them into regular communities, it promised to give them a more liberal administration and restore to them the right of electing their own superiors. Such a measure would be in

harmony with the great civil reforms. It would place the monks on a level with the other classes, and give them a share in the self-government which is the very soul of monastic institutions. It remains to be seen whether such an innovation would be sufficiently consistent with the actual constitution of Church and State, to be put in practice with sincerity and to be really profitable to the convents and the clergy.

The Russian convents are officially divided into two categories: those which are subsidized by the State, and the so-called "supernumerary" ones. The former are the more important and the more numerous*: the number of monks who compose them is limited by the law. They are again divided into three classes, the highest of which contains the most illustrious convents in the empire. Four have received the ancient title of *làvra*: they are the three great sanctuaries which represent the three great epochs of Russian history: Petchèrsk in Kief, Tròytsa north of Moscow, St. Alexander Nevsky near Petersburgh; to these was added under Nicolas, the convent of Potchàyef in Volhynia, taken from the Ruthenian Uniates. Next to the *làvras*, where the metropolitans of their respective sees usually reside, holding them in their personal dependence, come seven or eight convents with the title of *stavropigias*: these are the only ones the father superiors of which are to be still appointed by the Holy Synod, heir to the Patriarchs.† After the *stavropigias*, which comprise the most extensive monasteries in the environs of Moscow, come the convents of the first class, among which there are some famous sanctuaries, like St. George of Nòvgorod. The number of monks is generally in proportion to the rank of the monastery. In the *làvras* the legal number is

* The reports of the High Procurator give the number of the subsidized men's convents as 207, and that of the "supernumerary" ones as 173; of the women's convents 106 were subsidized and 65 were not.

† This name of *stavropigia* (Greek *stauropêgion*) given to the monasteries placed under the direct jurisdiction of the patriarchs, alludes to the rite by which the patriarch took possession of the place—by planting his cross into the ground.

fixed at about a hundred, not including novices and lay brothers, which makes it virtually twice and even three times as many. In the *stavropigias* and the convents of the first class, the legal maximum has been lowered to 33. In accordance with recent reforms, the idea of limiting the number of monks was given up for country convents and large city monasteries. For the smaller ones it was proposed to keep only as many monks as were required for the services. In this way it was hoped to remove monks from the turmoil of cities and to bring them nearer to the spirit of the institution, by taking them back to the quiet of country life. The maximum was brought down to 18, 13, and 10 for convents of the first, the second, and the third class, respectively. The object was to lighten the budget of convents, and, the property being held in common, whatever was left over of the revenues was to be used to increase the stipend of the bishops, to assist poor members of the clergy, to endow schools and hospitals.

One still hears a good deal in Russia about the wealth of monasteries: it should be understood what it is composed of. They have lost most of their lands, but still retain the valuable objects—gifts, *exvotos*, etc., which have accumulated in their treasuries through centuries. Nothing in Italy or Spain can give an idea of such gorgeousness. The shrines of saints and the *ikonostàs*-screens are cased in gold and silver; the *eïkons*, the vestments, and the sacred vessels are resplendent with pearls and precious stones. At Tròytsa, a museum has been formed in the convent vestry (*rîznitsa*) of all these magnificent gifts, which are never used—jewels, precious vessels, textiles woven of gold and pearls, art treasures of all kinds—a museum unrivalled by any in Europe, except that in the patriarchal vestry in Moscow; not to speak of unmounted pearls and gems, heaps of which are said to be kept in the cellars of Tròytsa. These treasures belong to *eïkons* and the saints. The monks are only the keepers and live poor in the midst of them.

In former times the convents used to own vast estates. Land

and villages had accumulated in their hands no less than precious metals and stones. In Holy Russia, as everywhere else, it soon became incumbent on the State to curb the tendency of the Church in that direction. The Tatar domination had favored it and the monasteries' landed property had reached such abnormal proportions as to cause serious uneasiness to the Moscovite princes as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In spite of their piety bordering on bigotry, the last rulers of the house of Rùrik did not hesitate to put a stop to this aggrandizement. Ivan III. already had confiscated the lands of the churches and convents in the territory of Nòvgorod, and Ivan IV., in the midst of his *opritchniks* (body guard) and his harem at the Alexander Suburb (*slobodà*), even while going the length of mimicking monastic life in his devotional zeal, delighted in rebuking the monks, sarcastically upbraiding them for their slothfulness, their unmanly, ill-regulated life, ascribing their vices to excessive wealth. Under his reign, the Council of 1573 forbade the richer monasteries from acquiring more lands; that of 1580 extended the prohibition to all without exception. Threatened in their possessions, the clergy, both regular and secular, naturally had recourse to spiritual weapons. Anathemas against spoliators of the Church were introduced into the liturgy. In a missal used in the diocese of Rostòf in 1642, there is a marginal note facing these anathemas, which reads: *To be chanted loud.*

These solemn imprecations, thundered forth by deep-voiced deacons, could do little to conjure the storm. Tsar Alexis took from the monks the management of their own lands; Peter the Great took to himself the better part of their revenues; Peter III. undertook to confiscate all the Church lands; Catherine II. gave them back, but managed to have the ecclesiastical authorities confer them on herself. The domains thus added to the Crown Demesnes by Voltaire's pupil and friend in 1764 included a million "souls" (not counting the women, after the manner of the Russian census). Two thirds of them belonged to monasteries. Tròytsa alone owned 120,000 "souls," *i. e.*, male peasants.

Solovètsk owned nearly the whole western shore of the White Sea, with salines, fisheries, and a fleet of fifty sailing vessels. Only a few lands without serfs were left to the convents, flour mills, meadows and pastures, ponds to fish in, woods for fuel.

The State, while taking into its own hands the greater portion of convent lands, undertook to provide for the monks. Hence the "appropriation for the *làvras* and monasteries" which still figures in the budget. This subvention mounted up to 440,000 roubles in 1875; in 1882 it had been reduced to 402,000, which sum was unevenly distributed among over 300 monasteries, tenanted by 5,500 monks and lay brothers and at least as many nuns.* On an average, each of the subsidized convents received hardly more than 1,000 roubles, *i. e.*, scarcely enough to keep one of its churches. In fact some thirty of these convents did not draw more than 500 roubles apiece, and a few drew as little as 20 roubles. Counting per head, the annual subsidy gives an average of only 4 roubles, about $2.00 at the present rate of exchange. However poor the convent fare, it is evident that monks and monasteries cannot exist on such an endowment. The suppression of these subsidies is therefore frequently advocated, the more reasonably that the subsidized convents are often the richest. To this the defenders of the convents reply that these appropriations are but a meagre indemnity for what was taken from them.

This landed wealth, confiscated in the eighteenth century, the

* Besides the appropriations served to convents at home, the Russian government frequently pays out, through the Holy Synod or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, subsidies or occasional sums to Orthodox convents abroad. There still are, in recently annexed provinces, especially in Bessarabia, vast estates which were dedicated, before the provinces came under Russian rule, to the use of certain convents situated in particularly holy places—on Mount Athos, on Mount Sinai, in Roumania. These lands, mostly bequeathed by Moldo-Vallachian Hospodars, have been turned over to the Ministry of Crown Demesnes. They have given rise to difficulties between the Roumanian and the Russian governments, because the latter, in disposing of the revenues, did not always comply with the testators' wishes.

Russian monasteries have succeeded in partly rebuilding in the nineteenth. There is nothing wonderful in that. The same thing has happened everywhere to everybody's ken,—the lavishness of piety and the saving spareness of monastic life sufficiently account for it. The Russian government, while taking their lands from the convents, left or restored to them the right of acquiring others. The State was the more disposed to be lax in this matter, as the Church is organized in such a way that the use of this wealth does not altogether escape the government's control.

As parts of a State institution, the monasteries are legal persons, and cannot acquire land, either by gift or purchase, without the State's sanction. And not only has the State permitted them to accept donations from private individuals, but it has sometimes made them such donations itself out of the Crown Demesne lands. It has been estimated that, between 1836 and 1861, the imperial government has distributed, among 180 convents, 9,000 *dessiatínas* (about 25,000 acres) of arable and meadow land, and 16,000 *dessiatínas* (about 44,000 acres) of forest land. Towards the close of the reign of Alexander II., the landed property of the black clergy was estimated at about 156,000 *dessiatínas* (about 430,000 acres), and it must have increased since then. The monasteries of the government of Nòvgorod then owned between them about 10,000 *dessiatínas* (about 27,500 acres), of which St. Sergius alone claimed 7,000 (about 20,000 acres). In order to estimate correctly the value of this amount of landed property, we should remember that in Russia, especially in the north, where the greater number of convents are situated, there are a great many estates of 100,000 acres, nay, of 200,000 and more, and the income from such immense domains is often less than that from a farm not one twentieth that extent in the west. Still, it is certain that some convents have once again become great landed proprietors, so that the question could arise whether they should not by rights be represented in the provincial assemblies (*zemstvo*).

Anyhow, these lands are only the smaller portion of the property owned by convents or the revenues enjoyed by them. Many own capital besides, which the father superiors invest so as to get the highest possible interest. It was said, some years ago, that Solovètsk, on the White Sea, that *Ultima Thule* of the monastic world, that classical refuge of asceticism, had lost 600,000 roubles in the failure of the Skòpin Bank.* Several convents of both sexes were victims of the same financial catastrophe. Abbots and abbesses, with a guileless faith in high interest not uncommon among church people, had entrusted their savings to this municipal bank, which paid six and a half per cent. The management of money matters and investments is always one of the principal cares laid on the chiefs of religious communities. Although abuses, and indeed complaints, are rare, certain facts, such as the trial of the Abbess Metrophania, under Alexander II., have shown that even saintly souls may sometimes be drawn into very worldly tricks by the wish to enrich their communities. The Abbess Metrophania, a scion of an aristocratic family in great favor at court, and once a *demoiselle d'honneur* of the empress, was indicted on the charge of having had recourse, for the greater good of her convent and its charities, to such irregular means as undue influence, fraud, even forgery. The jury was composed of tradesmen, burghers of the poorer class, peasants—that is to say, it was taken from the classes most respectfully inclined towards religion and the religious habit, and it was feared that a Moscow jury might be influenced by awe of the dignity of the defendant. Nevertheless, the abbess was convicted. It so happened that the presiding judge was a Protestant, while the counsel for the defence was a Jew, so that all things combined to make of this trial a test case illustrating the newly recognized principle of equality before the law. Had the occasion arisen a few years later, under Alexander III. and Pobiêdonòstsef, it is very doubtful whether the

* A *krach* which caused a great commotion in the reign of Alexander III. See Vol. II., Book III., Ch. IV.

abbess would have been placed at the bar before a jury at all ; certain it is that, in accordance with the new regulations, the case would have been tried *in camera*. And though she was found guilty by a secular tribunal, the abbess retained many devout admirers ; many hold that excess of charity was her only crime, and that her condemnation was nothing short of martyrdom.

Some Russian convents have been accused—as were the Jesuits in the last century and certain communities in our own time—of carrying on commercial or industrial operations without paying for licenses. The Englishman Fletcher said in the sixteenth century that the monks were the largest merchants of Russia. At the present time convents, men's or women's, cannot be said to do much in the way of commerce ; they merely sell the products of their lands or labor. True, several of them own, in cities, houses and shops which they let to tradesmen, and which yield a good rental. So Alexander-Nevsky owned grain storehouses and buildings on the Neva which brought in nearly 130,000 roubles a year ; the monks refused an offer of one million roubles for them. The offer was made by the municipality. St. Sergius has a yearly income of 100,000 roubles from houses and shops in Moscow and Petersburgh. In addition to this, certain Moscow merchants give the convent a percentage on the income from their houses and other buildings, or on the net profit from their business.

Although the convents own lands and houses, it is no easy task to estimate their wealth : the sources of it are too manifold and too recondite. The entire sum of their revenues has been estimated at about 10 million roubles—which, for over 500 convents, would not make 20,000 roubles apiece. Again, their movable possessions have been estimated at 20 or 25 million roubles, not including the precious things of all sorts—gold, silver, gems, vessels, reliquaries—in their possession. In Russia, as elsewhere, barbarians have been found who advised that these venerable national art treasures should be put up for

sale, for the better endowment of public charities and instruction. Other friends of progress would be content, on the principle that wealth ill beseems monks, with confiscating the convents' revenues and lands to swell the budget of public instruction. The question has been repeatedly discussed. Some few reformers would even go the length of suppressing the convents entirely, in the interest of religion itself, in order to transfer their revenues to the white or secular clergy. Such projects are seldom free from delusion. The framers forget that Russia's great historical *làvras* cannot subsist without revenues; that the people are not prepared to see them closed, or to see married priests supplant the monks. They forget, above all, that alms are the main source of their income, and that the suppression of the convents would in almost every case entail that of their revenues.

And this source, ancient, profound, which, through all these centuries, has sprung spontaneously from all layers of the Russian soil, not only is not drying up, but flows more bountifully than ever. The convents own most of the renowned relics and *eïkons;* to the convents goes the bulk of pilgrims and alms. The railroads and the emancipation, the moral and material facilities enjoyed at present by the *mujik*, have increased prodigiously the rate of pilgrimages. Some twenty years ago Kief prided herself on 200,000 pilgrims who yearly visited her sanctuaries. Scientists were horrified, on sanitary grounds, at these periodical human agglomerations at certain festivals. They pointed out that, when cholera devastated Europe, it often seemed to get started at Kief, among the pilgrims, just as is still the case in the great pilgrim crowds of India, Persia, Arabia. Since then the number of devotees who visit the Petchèrsk catacombs has increased fourfold or fivefold. Kief, as a place of pilgrimage, ranks first in the Christian world, if not on the entire globe. Some years—especially in 1886,—the holy city on the Dniepr is asserted to have received almost a million pilgrims, each of whom bought at least one candle and left at least one coin.

At St. Sergius, as at Petchèrsk, the crowd is so great at certain times, that the candles give out. The monks at Tròytsa have been known to sell the same candle five times over to the pilgrims who come to kneel at the shrine of St. Sergius. The sale of small crosses and of *eïkons* made at the *làvra* is another source of income. These sacred souvenirs are sold at a profit of 100 to 200 per cent. The offerings collected for holy-bread (the bread of communion, *prosforà*) bring in to Tròytsa from 80,000 to 100,000 roubles a year. About 1870 the same convent drew some 30,000 a year from the same source, and about 1830 not more than 1,000 roubles. Then there are the fees for masses said in the twelve churches of the *làvra* at once for several consecutive hours, for the *Te-Deums* and the funeral services held before the shrine of St. Sergius. One third of these is the Metropolitan's perquisite; the rest goes to the convent. The monks take in all that is paid for *Te-Deums* chanted by them before other shrines and other *eïkons*, and the piety of the Moscow merchants keeps them busy.

The great monasteries have still another source of income: the inns and eating-houses constructed before their gates and leased out to enterprising managers. At Tròytsa the convent inns shelter thousands of pilgrims. True, there, as at Petchèrsk and at numbers of convents, poor pilgrims are hospitably entertained and no payment asked, or—as at the *Grande Chartreuse*—guests, when they depart, leave whatever they can spare. But pilgrims are not always content with a short visit. They will sometimes stay quite a while, in accomplishment of some vow or penance. At Solovètsk especially, out of the ten or fifteen thousand pilgrims who take advantage of the brief polar summer to row or sail across to the convent citadel of the White Sea, more than one stays for months, sometimes years, in voluntary bondage, working for the monks.

Aside from the great pilgrimages, there are few convents but possess an attraction for worshippers in the shape of some venerated *eïkon*. And when worshippers cannot come, the *eïkon* goes to the worshippers. The miracle-working Virgins, of which there

is one in every convent, go forth each year on progresses through the surrounding country. The monks take them in solemn procession from village to village. The people meet them in crowds, vying for the honor of carrying them, saluting them, giving them hospitable shelter for the night. These are harvest times for the monks. Such is the Russian people's passion for *eïkons* that one is enough to enrich a convent. No traveller but has noticed, in Moscow, a small chapel built against the main gate of the Red Square, which separates the Kremlin from the bazar. This chapel, which few Russians pass without crossing themselves, is the home of the "Iberian Virgin" (*Iverskaya*), the most highly venerated *eïkon* of Moscow. The emperor never enters the ancient capital without going to pay it reverence. This Virgin, like the *Bambino* of Ara-Cœli in Rome, frequently goes to visit the sick at their homes; she has carriages and horses for the purpose. During such absences, a substitute takes her place in her niche. She brings in from 400,000 to 500,000 roubles a year. Part of this sum is claimed by the Metropolitan; the rest belongs to the convent which owns the *eïkon*.

Relics and miracle-working *eïkons* are a sort of monopoly in the hands of the black clergy, which suffers with a very ill grace any attempt at competition in such matters from the white clergy. This monopoly has given rise to another, almost equally lucrative. Russians are fond of having their tombs near those of saints; it became a matter of fashion as much as of piety, and monasteries with their adjacent graveyards became the most aristocratic, most select places of burial. In Russia as in the West, it was long customary for princes and *boyàrs* to don the monastic garb at the approach of death and have their bodies buried in convents. To this day the wealthy inhabitants of Petersburgh pay fabulous prices for a lot in the cemetery of Alexander-Nevsky or, if not there, in that of St. Sergius, near Strelna on the Gulf of Finland.

Of these convent revenues, derived from such different sources, a portion goes, as we have seen, to the metropolitans and the

bishops of great sees. The rest is not always a dead loss to the country : public charities and instruction receive their share of it. The black clergy saw that the best way of defending their revenues would be to make a noble use of them, and concluded to do voluntarily what their adversaries would have liked to coerce them into doing. Many convents have founded schools, homes, hospitals. Nor was this in every case an innovation. Many had opened refuges for the poor and destitute as early as the Middle Ages. At the present time a considerable portion of the sums bequeathed to convents is apportioned by the testators themselves to the endowment of charitable or educational establishments. Besides schools and an orphanage for children of both sexes, St. Sergius has quite lately founded an hospital for women. Others have built homes for the aged or infirm. There are at the present day over sixty hospitals attached to or defrayed by convents.

There is one great difference between these monastic foundations and similar ones in the West, which is that they are established with the money of convents, but not maintained by the personal labor of the monks. The schools, the homes, the hospitals founded by them, are usually managed by laymen. Sometimes—as is the case with the women's hospital established by St. Sergius—convents even leave to the white clergy of the diocese the government of these establishments, nay, the religious services to be performed therein. This shows how persistent is the secular character of Russian monachism and how disinclined both Church and State are to make any changes in this direction. They would be afraid, by so doing, of violating the ancient spirit of the institution and of leading the monks into the temptation of taking too great and independent a part in the struggles and affairs of secular life, like their Western brethren. Ascetics vowed to contemplation or to the routine of traditional rites are, on the whole, considered preferable to the militant orders, the active and stirring congregations of the Roman Church. The reason why the entire suppression of monasteries is advocated by so few Rus-

sians is, as I was told by one, that the spirit of asceticism is still too much alive among the lower classes for the people to do without any monks at all. "If we closed our monasteries," my informant said to me, "it would be at the risk of giving rise to numbers of clandestine *skits* [hermit communities]. Now, convents controlled by the State are a degree better than occult monachism."

Hence, in many convents, the monks' only office appears to be that of keepers of relics, *eïkons*, and treasures, and of collectors of alms. Their principal business is to enhance in every way the majesty of the divine service. This they sometimes do with consummate skill. Some convents, like St. Sergius of Strelna, are famous for their choirs,—no small attraction in a country where sacred music is in such high honor. Others have kept up schools of painting, after the old Byzantine traditions, by the side of singing-schools. Still others ply the old convent art of copying sacred writings; only printing has supplanted writing. From the presses of Petchèrsk in Kief comes a vast number of those liturgical books in Old-Slavic, which have so long supplied the demands of the Slavic countries subject to Turkey and Austria. To some convents special occupations are indicated by their geographical position: Solovètsk, on its island in the White Sea, has sailor brethren, and carries pilgrims forth and back on its own steamers. The great *làvras* are, moreover, the seats of the ecclesiastical academies. So that the Russian monks, it will be seen, are not altogether idle or useless, even if they do not always render society direct services, even if they still persist in holding prayer and holiness superior to labor and works. Public opinion will compel the Church to treat them more and more harshly—if indeed enough monks are allowed to subsist for them to find any leisure outside of their religious duties and ministrations.

Women's convents are less numerous than men's, but the communities are generally larger. On the showing of official statis-

tics, there seem, at first sight, to be fewer nuns than monks; but a closer investigation shows the contrary to be really the case. As the law does not allow women to take vows before the age of forty, statistical tables do not include any but women who have passed that age. But these regulations, dating from Peter the Great, do not forbid younger women and girls to enter convents. They live there as novices, free to return into the world and to marry. Many value this freedom so much that they grow old within the convent walls without ever taking vows. These novices or lay sisters—(the two are generally synonyms in Russian convents)—are two or three times as numerous as the regular nuns, whose life they share. By fixing the minimum age at forty for women, while it is only thirty for men, the legislator intended to leave family life open to young girls, who are permitted to take the vow of chastity only after they have passed, or nearly passed, the age of maternity. This is a wise precaution against feminine impulsiveness, infatuation, and variability.

The number of women who take the veil has been steadily on the increase for the last century. In 1815 there were only 91 women's convents in the empire, with not quite 1,700 regular nuns. Towards 1870 Russia numbered about 11,000 nuns and novices, distributed among 148 convents. Some fifteen years later, in 1886, the number of women vowed to a religious life had increased to nearly 17,000, and that of their convents to 171. Although these figures fall far short of the 120,000 to 130,000 sisters of all garbs which France alone can show, it will be seen that in Russia, as everywhere else in our days, the attraction exercised by the cloister is greatest for women.

Besides the novices and regular nuns who wear the long-trained black robe, there are several thousands of so-called *tchernítsy*, *i. e.*, women who dress in black, a sort of plebeian canonesses, who live in communities, observing celibacy and fasting, without binding themselves by any vows, and keeping their separate purses. These women are much respected of the

people; it is thought that many of them take up this semi-monastic mode of life only to be independent from their families. When the daughter of a peasant or artisan declares her intention to "don black," it is customary to hand over to her the share of the family's common property which would be hers on her parents' death. It is these free nuns whom one sees begging for alms on the streets or at the doors of churches, in a thickly quilted conical cap with large earflaps. The regular nun stays in her convent. Though she is not exactly cloistered, she cannot go out without a permission from the abbess.

Alike as the convents of both sexes are in other respects, there is one great difference between them: while the clergy furnishes more than one half of the monks, scarcely an eighth of the nuns is recruited from its ranks. There are almost as many nuns from the nobility and the professions as from priestly families. The reason is simple. For the daughters of the clergy the convent is only what it is for any other women—a retreat; for the sons of priests it is a career. The nuns mostly belong to the merchant class or to that of the poorer townspeople (*miêsh-tshánié*). But there is among them a considerable number of society women. though not as many as in the Catholic West. Not a few come there to seek shelter against some great sorrow or passion, like the pale nun whom Théophile Gautier saw at Tròytsa, or Turguénief's Lisa, who places between herself and the man she loves the impassable barrier of her black veil.

Women's convents generally depend for their support on the inmates' labor and on alms. Some sisters are sent out into the world to collect them. As the nuns have no churches in their charge, their devotional exercises leave them more time for work than the monks can dispose of. Accordingly, they lead a busier life. They do all sorts of fine work, generally for sale. Some convents are renowned for the fabrication of rich stuffs or of church vestments, for their embroideries in gold and silver. Others ply various industries; thus, for instance, the convent of

Alexéyefsk at Arzamàs, government of Nijni Nòvgorod, has workrooms as well-famed now as when Haxthausen first described them.

Works of charity and self-devotion, however, do not, it must be admitted, hold as great a place in Russian communities of either sex, as in Catholic convent life. Few of them are wholly dedicated to the care of children, of the poor, the sick, and the aged. Still, the spirit of the age is beginning to make itself felt even in the Orthodox Church of Russia. Nuns have always done much charitable work within their own walls, and now they do it on a larger scale. Some abbesses have founded hospitals where the sick are tended entirely by nuns. Communities have been formed specially for the care of the poor and infirm, and Russia is proud of her Sisters of Charity. There is a tendency in Petersburgh and Moscow to use their services in hospitals in the place of paid nurses—just the reverse of Paris. The only fault which is found with them is that they are too few.

These sisters are not generally regarded as nuns. They take no vows, they have no statute or regulations specially sanctioned by the Church authorities. They are mostly pious women, who have formed associations for the purpose of taking care of the sick. As everything in Russia has to be started with a patriotic object under high protection, these sisters were placed under the patronage of the Empress Maria Alexàndrovna and instituted for the purpose of nursing wounded soldiers. The Turco-Russian war of 1877-78 suddenly opened an immense field to their activity. Society women enlisted among them ; the *salons* of both capitals supplied the ambulances with a contingent of delicate-handed nurses. Many overrated their physical strength and now lie with those they tended in Bulgarian cemeteries. At a time when Russian women were possessed with a vague and restless longing for self-sacrifice and devotion, could they be deaf to the call of patriotism and human pity? As the fumes of passion and vanity, the frivolity of fashion and fads, and the spirit of adventure will add their dross

to the gold of the noblest impulses, so they may not have been quite foreign to this general rising of public charity, and of course these lay sisters did not all turn out saints. The war ended, but the women who had worn the Red Cross badge were not all dismissed. If there were no wounded any more for them to tend, there was enough for them to do in the hospitals. So they became an institution.

Although it would seem that religion could alone be capable of calling forth and supporting such self-sacrifice, these volunteers of charity were by no means all animated with the spirit and example of the Christ. Many there were who, in the work they undertook, saw only another way of "going among the people"—a way just a little less deceptive than the so-called "revolutionary apostolate." Among the young girls with closely cropped locks who hastened to the pallets of the wounded at Plevna, not a few took pride in having substituted the love of humanity for that of God, the virile doctrines of solidarity and altruism for the antiquated teachings of Christian charity. The sincerity of the Russian soul in matters of faith enables it to perform such feats. The religion which these modern sisters preached to the dying was not always that of the Gospel. Young socialists have been known to don this garb of charity, in order to ply their propaganda in the very heart of hospitals and ambulances. Some of these sisters (I have my information from an eye-witness) made it their mission in the camps in Bulgaria to keep the wounded from thoughts of God. Eager to wrest souls from the fetters of priestly superstition, they would harass with their sarcasms those who, at the approach of death, were weak enough to accept the consolations offered by the ministers of what they called a superannuated faith. It will be seen that, for all they bore the name of Sisters of Charity, these nurses were not exactly all nuns.

Nor was it these sectarians, who, moreover, never were but a small minority, whose services were secured for the hospitals. An institution of this sort hardly can become lasting and widespread

unless it will submit to some sort of discipline like that of the Daughters of St. Vincent de Paul or our Little Sisters of the Poor. However strong and tenacious the roots of charity may be in woman's heart, the plant, to yield all the fruit it is capable of, needs the even warmth of faith and the shelter of religious life; it needs chastity, voluntary poverty, filial obedience. The truth of this is shown by the fact that the English Protestants have seen the necessity of instituting regular sisterhoods for the relief of human infirmities.

The laws, the habits, the bureaucratic organization of the Russian Church do not, unfortunately, leave to Christian charity the same latitude and spontaneity, nor, consequently the same variety and fruitfulness, as in the West. It seems as though, in this as in all other matters, nothing can be done but by the initiative of the authorities, temporal or spiritual. Otherwise, no people is more naturally inclined than the Russian to pity and works of mercy; indeed none is more inclined to make the love of one's neighbor alone stand for religion. We should not wonder, therefore, if the spirit of charity should gradually renovate convent life, at least for women.

As regards the educational work which convents do in other countries, it may be doubted whether the Jesuits' colleges and convent schools, male and female, will soon find imitators in Russia. The government encourages the founding of schools in connection with monasteries, but is hardly prepared to leave education in the hands of men and women bound by certain vows, and who might bias the popular mind in a given direction. Free instruction is not suited to an autocratic country. In any case, wherever the State wishes to enlist the clergy in the work of education, it prefers the white (or secular) clergy.

BOOK II. CHAPTER IX.

The "White" or Secular Clergy—How the Clergy Became a Caste—Hereditary Priesthood—Churches as Dowries—Subdivisions of the Sacerdotal Caste—Education of the Clergy—Seminaries and Theological Academies—Characteristics of these Institutions: the Faculty; the Spirit which Pervades Them; Instruction Given There—How the Clergy is Situated Materially—The Majority of Priests Receive No Salary—Tendency in Favor of Salaries—Budget of the Orthodox Worship, its Items and Increase—Church Property—Sources of Income—Fees—Difficulty of Collecting Them.

WHAT may properly be called the sacerdotal class is the "white" or secular clergy, the married clergy, which has long formed an hereditary corporation, a sort of tribe consecrated to the ministry before the altar. This peculiar system was established gradually; it was an outcome of serfdom and the social order generally. The peasant, being tied to the soil, could not enter the ranks of the clergy without defrauding his lord; the noble holder of serfs could not do so unless he renounced his serfs and his class privileges.* Under such conditions the clergy could be recruited only out of itself. There had to be a class attached to the altar as there was one attached to the glebe. So the sons of priests were brought up in seminaries and church positions were

* In the Middle Ages scions of great families are sometimes met with in the clergy—such as the Metropolitan Alexis—but such cases grew more and more rare. This separation between nobility and clergy served to weaken both. The *kniàzes*, jealously bent on keeping all their *druʃìnniks* about them, grudged them to the Church. As early as the fourteenth century, Vassíli Dmítrievitch entered into an arrangement with the Metropolitan by which no retainer of the Grand-*kniàz* was admitted to ordination (Soloviòf, *Russian History*, vol. xiii., p. 36). The dearth of men under which Moscovia suffered so long thus became one of the causes which produced hereditary priesthood.

reserved for the graduates of seminaries ("seminarists"). Custom having made marriage compulsory for priests, wives had to be provided for them, and their daughters had to be looked after. So the daughters of priests were set apart for the young clerics and the young clerics for the daughters of priests, and it became necessary for both to secure a special permission if they wished to step out of the sacerdotal class and marry into another.

In this way the Russian clergy was forced, by the existing state of things, to become virtually a caste. As a compensation for this curtailment of personal liberty, it was ranked among the privileged classes*; it was exempted from military service, from personal taxes, from corporal punishment. These were precious prerogatives—if only they had always been respected, if the church dignitaries or the lay functionaries had more often deigned to conform to the laws.

This condition of the clergy being an outcome of serfdom, it was natural that it should cease with it. In 1864, three years after the emancipation, Alexander II. released the clergy from its long caste bondage. The Church was thrown open to all classes, and all careers were thrown open to the children of the clergy. It will be some time before the fruits of this radical reform become apparent, for what the law allows, custom still forbids. So long as the other classes—nobles, merchants, peasants—are kept from the Church by their bringing up or by secular ties, so long will the clergy remain a separate body within the nation.

The levitical constitution of the clergy induced habits of life which cannot disappear in a few years. The priestly dignity being hereditary, the functions and places attached thereto tended to become hereditary too. It would naturally be the priest's ambition to transmit his parish to one of his children; the father's parish was the son's inheritance. The clergy all but succeeded at one time in having this right of succession legally recognized, and several of Russia's most eminent prelates vainly combated it in the

* See Vol. I., Book V., Chap. I.

eighteenth century. Custom was in the clergy's favor. It became customary for a candidate to marry a daughter of his predecessor, after the latter had died or retired; the bishop, most of the time, would not appoint him but on this condition. There were two reasons for this. The first was that the dead or retired priest's family fell to the charge of the Church or the State, either of which was glad to pass it on to the new priest. The second was that the parish house or presbytery rarely was the property of the commune or the Church; there was an arable lot set aside for the use of the priest, but the house which he built on it was his own, was part of his inheritance; to take possession of it, the new-comer had to arrange with his predecessor's family and give them a compensation. The simplest way was to enter the family at the same time as the house. Priests' wives being forbidden to marry again as well as the priests themselves, there could be no question of his marrying the late incumbent's widow. The matter, therefore, was usually settled by his marrying one of the daughters, while the widow and other children received a pension. Quarrels and lawsuits were averted in this manner, and the authorities for this reason encouraged such a solution. As a seminary graduate could not be ordained until he was married, he had to find a wife as well as a parish before he went up for ordination; so his great object was to secure an heiress, who would bring him a church as dowry, and he generally showed himself less particular about his future wife's beauty or qualities than about the furniture and about the income which the parish could yield.

The custom in question became so general that a law was needed to prevent its becoming obligatory. This law, issued as late as 1867, was excellent in itself, but could not do away with a habit of several centuries' standing. If the appointment of parish priests is to be no longer complicated with questions of marriage and inheritance, the widows and orphans of the clergy must be sheltered from want, and a presbytery must be provided for every priest.

Heredity did not stop at the priestly office; it descended to the lowest grades in the Church, the sacerdotal class comprising not only the ordained priests and deacons, but also the choristers, the sacristans, the beadles, the bell-ringers.* The Russian clergy numbers about 500,000 persons. This figure strikes one at first sight as considerable, but of the number comparatively few occupy a position involving regular duties, especially as priests. There is even less homogeneity in the white than in the black clergy. It is divided into two or three groups, each of which forms a class within the class, separated from the rest by differences in education or mode of life, and marrying, as a rule, only within its own circle. There is, in the first place, the priest, familiarly called "pope." † Ordinary parishes have one, the larger ones two. In 1887 there were not more than 35,000, about 1,500 of whom had the title of arch-priests (*proto-ierêy* or *protopòp*). Then comes the deacon, who assists the priest in the ceremonies and can perform some in his stead—as, for instance, burials. The most highly priced quality in a deacon is a fine bass voice. Deacons not being essential to the services, not all churches have them, and in the parishes where they do have them, they are generally fewer than the priests. There are not more than 7,000 in all. There were about double as many twenty-five years ago. This shows a tendency not so much to simplify public worship as to save on it. Lastly there are the sacristan, the psalm-singer, the bell-ringer, and the various "church servitors." These answer to those members of the lower clergy in the Latin Church who have received the "minor orders," and perform the same duties. Most parishes have one or two such acolytes or assistants. Like the

* We mean here the class as it is preserved to this day. From the point of view of ordination, the Orthodox Church recognizes only three degrees in the hierarchy: deacon, priest, bishop.

† The word "pope," the equivalent of the Greek *papâs*, is not only used familiarly, but implies a certain slight. It is more respectful and customary to use the word *sviash-tchènnik* ("priest," literally "a consecrated person").

deacons, they have greatly decreased in numbers in the last quarter of a century; there are now hardly 40,000. There is the same tendency as in the West to substitute hired laymen in their place.

The two or three categories into which the sacerdotal class is divided have remained separate up to the present time. They did not represent the stages of one career, successively won by one man, but different and isolated grades, each respectively occupied for life. The reader or psalm-singer remained such, the deacon died a deacon,[1] especially if he had a fine voice, as the priest was priest from first to last. Owing to the principle of heredity, families stayed in the same grades immovably for generations. Nor did such families, though living side by side in the same parish, intermarry much. Each class married within itself; psalm-singer, deacon, and priest each married the daughter of a colleague. It did not even always suffice that the two families should stand on the same degree of the hierarchy ladder; a certain similarity in their respective positions was considered desirable.

As regards both education and pecuniary means, the city priest is generally much above the country priest; accordingly the rural and the city clergy seldom intermarry. The *élite* of the white clergy consists of the arch-priests (*protopòps*), the head priests of parishes which have several. They frequently act as a sort of deans or inspectors of the parish clergy, with the title of *blago-tchìnnyié* (literally "guardians of good order"). A married *protopòp* can rise to the highest post to which a priest can be called—a seat in the Holy Synod. Between these beacon lights of the white clergy and the humble village priest or deacon, the distance is nearly as great as that which, in the black clergy, divides the monk who wears the bishop's robes from the novice who performs the lowliest convent drudgery.

In both the celibate and married clergy, intelligence and industry go for much in shaping the individual's destiny. Even in the worst days of heredity and routine, ecclesiastical preferment went

[1] Still, deacons are not unfrequently ordained priests.

greatly by merit. There were graded examinations for both deacons and priests. Priesthood was reached only after two or three successive ordeals. The candidate who stopped short at the first remained a deacon for life, while he who could not achieve even one graduating certificate, had no other way of securing the privileges belonging to the cloth and escaping conscription than to take the position of chorister or sacristan.

The special schools for the clergy are divided into three categories: parish and district schools, seminaries, and academies, answering pretty nearly to our three grades of education, primary secondary, and higher. The lower clerics come out of the elementary schools, the priests mostly graduate from diocesan seminaries, and the cream of both clergies from the four academies which answer to the Western theological faculty. Of these the three oldest are under the direct control of the Metropolitans of St. Petersburgh, Moscow, and Kief; the fourth is at Kazàn, on the border of the Mussulman world. In this latter academy the Oriental languages hold a great place; it is a sort of Orthodox Propaganda, which supplies the missions of Asia and Europe. In all these academies instruction, until about 1840, was carried on in Latin. Formerly they were entirely in the hands of monks. To this day the first three academies are annexed to the three *làvras:* Alexander Nevsky, Tròytsa, Petchèrsk; but they occupy separate quarters, and there, as well as in the seminaries, the monks have been supplanted by secular priests, and even by laymen; true, the latter usually belong to the clergy by birth and education. At least three quarters of the students at these high schools of theology hold free scholarships defrayed by the State, by dioceses, or by convents. A greater number of them prepare themselves for the career of teachers than for the priesthood. The academies are really normal colleges for seminary teachers rather than seminaries on a large scale. This is a calling for which young men who are of the clergy by birth have a preference, because it allows of their living in the world.

Academies and seminaries, indeed all ecclesiastical schools, are, like the Church itself, vigorously centralized. They are under the direct control of the Holy Synod and the High Procurator. In the diocesan seminaries, as well as in the diocesan consistory, the episcopal authority is subject to that of the Synod, and the clergy is controlled by the State. Quite lately still, it was the Holy Synod which, on the bishop's nominations, appointed or confirmed the rectors and professors of both seminaries and academies. It was only in the latter days of Alexander II. that, with a view to raising the clergy in the public estimation, they were, in their respective localities, invited to elect their own rectors jointly with the seminary professors. Moreover, it is the clergy which, in periodically convoked assemblies, elects the committees entrusted with the overseership over its schools.

Rectors, professors, students, *i.e.*, the entire staff of ecclesiastical schools of all grades, is recruited almost exclusively from among the sons and daughters of priests, for there are educational institutions for the latter also. The seminaries and theological academies exist not so much for the benefit of young men who wish to enter the clergy as for those who are born in its ranks, for in spite of the laws which throw the Church open to all classes indiscriminately, the sons of priests are so far almost alone to ask for admittance. Many, indeed, just pass through the seminary and out again, to enter a civil career. The seminaries have nevertheless preserved distinctive caste characteristics ; they are in many respects the very stronghold, as they are the property, of the caste. By giving the children of the clergy a special education in establishments practically closed against other families, they confirm it in its isolation. It has accordingly more than once been suggested to suppress the seminary as a step toward suppressing the caste itself, and to bring up the children of the clergy together with those of the other classes. This would probably be the best way to ensure a really secular clergy. But then the Church intends that her priests shall be brought up on other food than profane

knowledge ; the ministry demands a long training, difficult to obtain in public colleges, in the midst of young people absorbed by very different cares. So that the clergy could hardly shut up her seminaries and give her future priests a purely secular education —though on the other hand, there is really nothing to prevent her sending her sons and daughters to the same primary schools as other children.

Not that Russian seminaries and ecclesiastical schools of all grades differ greatly from secular establishments in feeling and ideas. The spirit which pervades them is not always higher in tone. Indeed it may be said that religion is far from establishing that ascendancy over the students' souls which, it would seem, a clerical education ought to ensure. Numbers of unbelievers have, at all times, issued from these church nurseries. The fact is not limited to Russia, but nowhere is it of more frequent occurrence. This seeming anomaly is partly to be accounted for by the system long pursued in the seminaries, and partly by the physical hardships inflicted on the students. In the teeth of the law and the immunities officially enjoyed by the clergy, no other discipline was known there until lately than the rod and corporal punishments generally. It is said that they have not been given up everywhere even yet. Ill-fed, insufficiently clothed, embittered by precocious suffering, knowing little of religion beyond wearisome observances, no wonder if seminarists nursed a grudge against their instructors and their calling, against society and the Church. The theological academies were not much better, and the students did not scruple to haunt taverns and public houses (*traktìrs* and *kabàks*), whence it was not unusual for them to be taken home dead drunk. A priest's son, who died at the age of twenty-nine from want and debauch, Pomialòfsky, made a name for himself by depicting, in a series of short stories, life in the old *Bùrsas* (the name given to the seminaries by the people), he having been brought up in one himself. At one time these establishments were so extremely unpopular that children of the clergy had to be

pressed into them with the help of the police.* The professors, ill-paid and badly treated by the monks who were their superiors, were as wretched and as discontented as their pupils. Is it to be wondered at, under the circumstances, that the seminaries should have been, at a certain period, a hotbed of radicalism?

And even at the present writing, when so many reforms have been accomplished by Count Tolstòy and Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, the spirit is not greatly improved in the seminaries. Under Alexander III. the ecclesiastical schools were not less undisciplined in their manifestations than the gymnasiums and universities. Even mutinies have occurred. There was one in a Moscow seminary in 1885, when the Metropolitan was compelled to require the police's assistance. It is said that the rioters were severely flogged, *manu militari*, in the presence of the Metropolitan, who, evil-minded gossips add, kept exhorting them to repentance, after having blessed the rods with his own pontifical hands. Two or three years before that, the seminarists of Vorònej, being dissatisfied with their rector, proceeded to serve him as the political conspirators did the late Tsar: they simply attempted to blow him up by placing explosives in a hot-air pipe opening into his study. Nor was this a new invention of these embryo ministers of the altar: two years before, in 1879, they had done their best to get rid of their inspector after the same manner. And when, in March, 1887, strychnine bombs were manufactured, to kill Alexander III. with, there turned up amongst the conspirators a "candidate" of a theological academy (a degree something like "Magister").

Until nearly the end of the reign of Alexander II. graduates of seminaries were admitted into the universities on the same footing as those of classical colleges or gymnasiums. This privilege

* See the Memoirs of D. Rostislàvof, in the *Rùsskaya Starinà* (*Russian Antiquities*) for January, 1880. Also an anonymous work by the same author, *The Ecclesiastical Schools of Russia.* This Rostislàvof, himself a professor at one of the theological academies, later wrote, still anonymously, a book on the white clergy and the black clergy. He was saved from persecution at the hand of his superiors only by protection in high quarters.

was abruptly withdrawn at the height of the nihilistic crisis. Whatever the real reasons, one of which might well have been the wish to arrest the growth of revolutionary "groups" by limiting the numbers of lettered proletarians, or whether it was done, as alleged, simply in view of the inferiority of the seminaries to the classical gymnasiums, it is certain that this measure raised one more barrier between the clergy and the other cultivated classes.*

Yet, the instruction imparted in these ecclesiastical schools is singularly like that given in the secular schools. The seminaries have very much the same programmes as the gymnasiums; with this difference, that, during the last years of the course, theological studies are added to the classical *curriculum*. In fact the seminary course is not at all what foreigners imagine it to be. In no other country is the clergy expected to take up such a variety of topics. In the matter of languages, Latin is obligatory as well as Church-Slavic, and some Greek (not so much of the latter as one would expect in a country following the Greek rite); but this is not all, the student must take at least one living tongue besides his own—either French or German, at his choice—so as to keep in touch with the modern world and have free access to the sources in dealing with other creeds. The programme is most promising: letters do not crowd out sciences, nor are theoretical studies pursued at the expense of practical ones. Geometry, algebra, physics are supplemented with a smattering of botany, farming, and even a little medicine. This fair structure is crowned with history, philosophy, and theology, the last taught specially in its different branches. It were difficult to lay out a broader plan of instruction for churchmen. The trouble is that, as in all modern schools, the quantity of matter to be got through with is compressed into too short a time, the ground to be covered is too extensive for deep ploughing. Another great fault of Russian seminaries lay, until

* On the other hand, seminarists who do not take orders are subject to military service like other young men, with whom they share the privileges accorded to graduates of primary and secondary schools.

very lately, in the imperfection of the methods used, the dulness of the routine, the choice of obsolete books and authors, the absence of all critical and scientific spirit. Having been established, in the course of the last two or three centuries, in imitation of Western seminaries, these ecclesiastical schools, while enlarging their programmes, retained many of their models' faults, to which the country added some of its own : the scarcity and scant learning of the teachers, and the precariousness of the teacher's career. At the present time, the faculties of the seminaries and academies are no longer incompetent ; their standard has risen immensely since secular priests were substituted for monks. The latter, especially the more eminent, mostly regarded teaching as the first step towards another career, not as a life-long profession. Young men, immediately after taking the vows, are often seen to step from the student's form straight to the master's desk, only to leave the latter very soon on the road to higher dignities.

With all its faults, the instruction imparted in the seminaries and theological academies has this advantage (some people may call it a drawback)—that it is less exclusive, not so specially clerical, as in other countries. Were the programmes acted up to, the Russian clergy would be the best informed and most enlightened in the world. As it is, if not quite that, it is scarcely inferior to that of sundry Western countries, and decidedly superior to that of most Eastern countries, whether or no " united " to Rome. In intellectual culture, the majority of priests stand far above the sphere in which their lot is cast, and if few of them take advantage of this superiority the fault lies not so much with the instruction they received at the seminary, as with the depressing conditions of their daily lives. The deacons and lower clergy generally cannot boast as high an educational standard ; the oldest among them can only just read Church-Slavic, and go through the service by rote. But the times are far behind when the Patriarch Níkon was taxed with excessive exactingness because he demanded that all churchmen should be able to read. How about the West ? Can *all* Catholic sextons and bell-ringers read at the present day ?

It is not ignorance which is the main plague of the Russian clergy, but poverty, or, more correctly, the lack of independent means. The parochial clergy receives no stipend, or, if any, it is insufficient. Only one third of the priests have any stipend from the State; but even these privileged ones could not live on what the State gives them. The provinces where other creeds have numerous adherents are the only ones where the Orthodox priests receive a stipend worth speaking of. There political interests combine with national pride, and will not allow the State to leave the priest a burden to his flock. But even in such exceptional cases, a Russian parish priest hardly gets more than 300 roubles, which, with a family to support, leaves him far worse off than the ministers of rival creeds, who are also paid by the State, which, from the very distrust with which it regards strange creeds, prefers to keep their ministers well in hand by paying them. This it generally does by means of a special tax levied from the members of each confession, thus acting merely as a self-imposed intermediary between the different churches and their pastors. With the Orthodox clergy it has no need of such diplomacy, holding it as it does by so many other bonds.

From this one instance it will be seen how mistaken are those who would have us think that, in order to separate Church and State, all that is needed is to strike the Church off the State budget. That is a crude view, which only ignorance can endorse. Few churches have been so intimately associated with the State as the Russian, yet, till quite lately, it was not on the budget at all; never was clergy more dependent on a government,—yet the majority of its members receive nothing from the treasury even now.

In a country where the people are wealthy, where individual initiative has been matured by the enjoyment of public liberties, especially in a country where the nation is divided amongst several religious creeds, and where religious feeling is stimulated by competition between rival cults, it may be better for the clergy's

independence, for their dignity, that they should receive their support exclusively at the hands of their flocks. It is different in a country where the bulk of the people are poor and accustomed to look to the State for everything. There the priest, if his support is derived wholly from private piety, forfeits his independence and the regard of his parishioners, and is even likely to deteriorate morally : in fact, he is at their mercy. This is what we too often see in Russia—at any rate in the rural parishes. Out of the former serfs he can hardly get enough to keep his children from starving. There seldom is more than one well-to-do family in a parish—generally that of the former lord of the manor,—so that liberality lacks the incentive of emulation, and gratitude, being undivided, becomes dependence and servility. In the times of serfdom the priest lived chiefly on the bounty of the local magnate ; to him he was under so many obligations, that he became his dependant, his creature ; a sort of private almoner or chaplain. The emancipation could not do away with this state of things all in a day.

While other countries discuss the expediency of suppressing the church budget, Russia inclines to the opposite opinion. And indeed, where Church and State are bound up in each other, it is to the advantage of both, with very few drawbacks, that the State should pay a stipend to the clergy. The priest can find it profitable to dispense with aid from the government only if he is free from its control. To be dependent on the State through the discipline of church government, and on the faithful through its own material needs, that places the clergy in a condition amounting to twofold servitude. Not to be crushed, it must be freed from one or the other. In a country whose resources are as yet so little developed, the best way of raising the priest in the eyes of the people is to pay him a salary. The difficulty is of a financial nature. Each new reform is a drain on the treasury, at least temporarily, and that is why so many projected reforms are put off. As it is, the Orthodox clergy item has increased more than most. The appropriation now made by the Holy Synod is more than ten times

what it was sixty years ago: in 1833 it was not quite one million roubles; it was nearly eleven millions in 1887. Of this sum, it is true, less than half went to the urban and rural clergy.* Out of 35,000 parishes, or thereabout, not more than 18,000 had any share in the State's liberality. Church bureaucracy naturally takes money. The chancelleries and their staff of clerks absorb a considerable portion of the sums set aside for the Church. Fortunately, she finds private piety more liberal than the Treasury. Her income from the State is more than doubled by free gifts. Collections during the service, church boxes, alms and offerings of all kinds, average about twelve millions a year. Over and above this, the Holy Synod owns capital, a sort of reserve fund saved up gradually and amounting to some thirty million roubles, the income from which is added to the budget of the Orthodox Church.

In Russia, as in France, this budget might be regarded as a national debt. The stipend paid to the Church is, in both countries, but an inadequate indemnity for the property taken from her. For the Church owned immense estates in old-time Moscovia. Land and the peasants upon it were the current coin of the country, and in this coin the princes and the *boyàrs*, poor in

* We copy from the budget of 1887 the column showing the distribution of the sums appropriated to the support of the Holy Synod and the Orthodox Church:

	Roubles.
Central administration	246,789
Chapters of cathedrals, consistories, archbishoprics, and bishoprics	1,437,493
Monasteries	402,472
Urban and rural clergy	6,392,022
Subsidies to ecclesiastical schools	1,748,060
Orthodox establishments in foreign countries	188,122
Labor on buildings	265,541
Sundries	307,643
Total	10,988,142

It should be noted that, in this same budget of 1887, the sums allotted to the support of other creeds were entered as a separate item charged to the Ministry of the Interior, and amounted to 1,758,000 roubles.

cash, paid the clergy for their prayers. Thus it came to pass that the Church became the largest landholder in Russia. But her possessions were curtailed already by the old tsars, and she lost almost all of them in the eighteenth century. In 1764 the process of secularization reached the white clergy as well as the black. Catherine II., in putting out her hand for the possessions of the Church, pretended, as did the French Assembly some thirty years later, that her only object was to make a better use of them "for the glory of God and the good of the country." More fortunate or cleverer than the French Revolution, she got the clergy to endorse the act which stripped the Church of her property. Only one prelate, Arséni Matvéyevitch, Archbishop of Rostòf, protested in the name of the canons of the Church. This imitator of Níkon on a small scale was deposed, pronounced to be demented and raving, and imprisoned for life in Revel. There he died twenty years later, and his death was kept secret, lest some devout persons might take it into their heads to pay honor to him as to a martyr and confessor.

The clergy, however, both white and black, retained or recovered some of their lands. In each parish the priest usually has the use of a lot. Most communes allow him about 30 *dessiatínas* (about 82 acres). And it is sometimes those who draw a salary from the State treasury who are best provided with land. This is mostly the case in localities where other religions are represented; for, where the Orthodox priest is the rival of the Catholic priest, the Protestant minister, or the Mussulman mollah, he is supported by the State as an agent of russification. Statistical reports of the *zemstvo* of Podolia show that 80,000 *dessiatínas* (about 220,000 acres) of cultivated lands, yielding a yearly income of about 600,000 roubles, were divided among the 1,350 parishes of that one diocese, and to these lands should be added vegetable gardens, meadows, and some woods.

The dioceses of central Russia do not, as a rule, fare as well. In Kurlàk, on the Bitiuk, a village of the government of Vorònej

where I stayed for some time,* the church owned 12 *dessiatínas* (about 30 acres), only half of which was left to the priest, one quarter (3 *dessiatínas* or a little over 8 acres) to the deacon, and the rest, about 4 acres apiece, was thought sufficient for the psalm-singer and the sexton. This fact will receive its full significance when I add that in all that region the peasants' allotment was generally more than 30 acres per head. As to the lord of the manor, whose hospitality I was enjoying, his estate covered over 40,000 *dessiatínas* (110,000 acres); he had to have relays of horses to drive from one end of it to the other.

But no matter how many acres priests and deacons may call their own, it is mostly but a meagre resource in a thinly peopled country, where land is generally valuable only in proportion as the owner can work it himself. The peasants usually help the priest with their labor free of charge, but the help is insufficient, and it ends with his taking hold of the work himself. So at Kurlàk the priest tilled half of his six *dessiatínas* and leased out the other half. The clergy's main resource lies not in the land, but in the fees. There are in each parish two, three, four families—as many as twenty or twenty-five persons—who live on the church. There might be enough for all, were the revenue of every church given up entirely to its own clergy. But this is far from being the case: certain alms, certain church taxes are reserved for the treasury of the diocese or of the Synod.

In all Orthodox churches, both Greek and Russian, one of the most regular sources of income is the sale of wax candles; it is something like the letting of pews in Protestant churches and of chairs in France. The Orthodox do not sit in church, but they seldom enter it without buying at the door a little taper which they leave to the church or light before one of the *eïkons*. The more devout light several, before different saints. The pale glim-

* This village was comparatively poor in land, the peasants having received at the time of the emancipation the "free quarter lot." See Vol. I., Book VII., Ch. III.

mer of the flame is a symbol of prayer. The church is very particular about the purity of the wax, the sweet odor of which blends well with the fragrance of the incense: it must be wholly manufactured by the winged workers to whom the Lord seems to have deputed this duty. In Russia, where the people still drink mead, and where so many lands have never yet borne anything but wild flowers, the hive colonies are many. In many regions, for instance towards the extreme north, the Ural and the Caucasus, the honeycombs deposited in the forest by wild swarms yield a sufficient supply. But wild or tame, the innumerable bees which roam the mighty empire labor in the first place for Christ and His saints. Of the fifty million kilograms (over one hundred million pounds) of wax which Russia collects every year, by far the greater portion is consumed in her churches. In former times the making of candles was left to private industry. Nowadays the Church thriftily sees to it herself. A number of bishops have their diocesan candle factory; so has many a convent. I could not tell exactly how many millions the making and selling of candles brings in to the Church; so much is certain, that this is one of her chief revenues, and the question of how it should be used and distributed is naturally much discussed. Most of it, I believe, goes to the Holy Synod and the ecclesiastical schools.

The Catholic priest has a source of income in the fees he receives for masses. The Orthodox priest has no such resource. Masses, indeed, are said for the dead, but only on death anniversaries; it is unusual to have them at other times. Then again, the Orthodox Church does not deal out dispensations in the matter of lents and fasts; she leaves the observance to everybody's conscience, and does not substitute alms for fasting; but she exacts payment for all her ministrations.* That the practice is injurious to the clergy's dignity, church authorities admit and would fain abolish it, at least for those two sacraments which the Latin Church never has taxed—confession and communion. In

* See above, Ch. V.

1887 the Synod resolved to forbid penitents from slipping money into the priest's hand or leaving any on a table or stand by his side after confession. It also resolved to abolish the peculiar practice of placing money on a plate while drinking the warm wine after communion. As a substitute, the Holy Synod ordered slot boxes to be placed in the churches for voluntary offerings. This was done in Moscow, in 1887, during the Holy Week. As might have been expected, there was a notable falling off in the receipts. There were even found buttons and slips of paper instead of silver coins and bills. The new system may be more conducive to the priest's dignity, but it is decidedly detrimental to his interests, and it is doubtful whether it will be found practicable to keep it up or extend it to all parishes. As to the sacraments, it will hardly be attempted to exempt them from the tax of fees.

Now these fees are very small. Poor people cannot afford to pay more than a rouble or two for the more important functions; a few *kopeks* must do for those less important and of more frequent occurrence. Since Peter the Great several attempts have been made to establish a tariff, but popular feeling has always been opposed to such a course. The result is too often unseemly bargaining and haggling. Couples have been known to come to church, to be married, and go away again because they and the priest could not agree about the price. Peasants have been known to bury their dead clandestinely, in order to escape the priest's demands. He is poor, so are his parishioners, so they are forever pitted against each other.

Hence numbers of stories, legends, anecdotes. One tells of a priest, who, to get even with a particularly stingy peasant, gives the child he baptizes some ridiculous name. Another tells how a peasant asks leave of his village priest to get married in another parish :—"Very well," replies the priest; "but have you counted up all I lose by that? In the first place, I should have married you—so many roubles; then you will have children; say seven—that 's seven christenings. Then some of your children must die;

say three—that 's three burials. The others will have to get married—four weddings."—"But, father (*bàtiushka*)," objects the bewildered peasant, "you are quite old ; you may die long before all these things come to pass."—"True, friend," replies the priest, "we are all mortal. Therefore I will let you off for only ten roubles."

Clerical greed has supplied the subject-matter of sundry popular tales. Not that a people's relations to their clergy should be entirely judged by their folk-tales or proverbs. Monks and priests have always and in all countries been the butt of popular satire. Yet the Russian popular banter is noticeable for its exceeding bitterness. Here a specimen, from Afanàsief's collection. A priest refuses—no unusual thing—to officiate at a poor woman's funeral. The husband digs the grave himself and, in so doing, discovers a treasure. He takes one gold piece to the priest, who thereupon is all willingness—performs the ceremony and comes to the funeral feast, where he eats and drinks as much as three ordinary men. That so poor a man should serve such a banquet, however, astonishes the worthy pastor, who questions him and adjures him to confess his sin :—"Hast thou killed some wealthy merchant?" he asks him.—"No ; I have discovered a treasure." The priest resolves to get possession of the treasure by giving the poor fellow a scare. He consults with his wife, and dresses up as the devil, a disguise which he accomplishes by means of a goatskin. The *ruse* is a success ; the peasant gives up the treasure ; but the priest, in taking it home, perceives that the goatskin has grown on to his body and he cannot get rid of it. * This simple story might be turned into an allegory : the evil name for cupidity has fastened on to the priest like that symbolical goatskin. To say of a man that he "has a priest's eyes" is to intimate, proverbially, that he covets everything he sees.

The bishops do their best to restrain their clergy from this sin of covetousness, and, on occasions, give them a sharp lesson.

* Ralston, *Russian Folk-Tales*, ch. i.

Here is a case in point which I have every reason to believe really occurred. A poor woman came to Dmitri, then Archbishop of Tùla, and besought him to lend her two roubles. The prelate, whose charity was notorious, could not find the money about his person.—"What do you want two roubles for?" he asked the woman.—"My husband is dead," she replied; "I want the prayers of the church recited for him, and the priest won't bury him under two roubles."—"I cannot lend you the money to-day," Dmitri then said, "but to-morrow I shall attend myself to your husband's funeral." He kept his words, to the dismay of the priest, who saw himself disgraced. When the service was over, however, the bishop relented, and instead of rebuking the priest, tendered him two roubles, with these words:—"Take this. It is not with you as with me: you have only your fees to live on." Which, in most cases, is literally true, and accounts for the unfortuate priests' seeming rapacity.

A priest's first care, when he takes possession of a parish, is to find out what it brings in fees. A few years ago a young priest of the diocese of Volhynia was appointed to a parish in the district of Rovno. Having learned that it was a poor one, he wrote to the archbishop's office, asking for a better appointment. The archbishop, Palladius, granted the young man's request, but wrote the following note on the margin of the petition: "The petitioner asks for a lucrative parish. To obtain one, he must work and show himself worthy. An absorbing care of material things ill suits with a churchman's mission. It might be well if the petitioner would seek to better himself in some other career than the priesthood, for which he does not seem to have much vocation." * It is hardly probable that the pastoral advice was taken. The majority of priests look on the church as a career, which they do not scruple to work for profit. There be those who will not even

* The archbishop's marginal note, published by the Consistory, for the admonishment of the diocesan clergy, was reproduced in several papers (1885).

shrink from violating the laws of the State or the canons of the Church for lucre. Thus priests have been found who consented to bless secret marriages or, worse still, to join in holy matrimony couples who could not legally be so joined. In remote regions, especially in Siberia, there are priests who, not content with oppressing native converts, carry on all sorts of trade.*

The pecuniary straits under which the clergy labor are so notorious that, in many a country, the fact is an obstacle to the progress of Orthodoxy. "The Russian faith comes too high," objects the Siberian native to those who would convert him. "The priests are too grasping," say the dissenters (*raskòlniks*), "the sacraments cost too much." This wholly practical consideration has had something to do with the success of some of the later sects, such as the Stundists. Many a *mujik*, after an animated discussion with the priest on the price of a ceremony, has come to the conclusion that the sacraments might be dispensed with. This was precisely the starting-point from which one of the most conspicuous sectarians of these latter years, Sutàyef, began his career.

These practices have caused the Orthodox Church to be accused of simony. The accusation may apply in Turkey, where the high church dignities are sold by the Porte or the pashas: the clergy has no choice but to extort from the faithful the money which is to be paid to the Mussulman masters. In Russia the wool that is taken from the sheep at least goes to clothe the shepherd; he could not, if he would, remit the dues which buy the bread his children eat. Nor can the indifferent or the dissenters be allowed the liberty of eluding the church tax; this would mean defrauding her ministers or increasing the burden of the faithful. The *raskòlnik*, therefore, ransoms himself from attending the worship of the established church. Hence pecuni-

* The traveller Maksìmof quotes numerous instances of the kind. [1]

[1] See also extracts from the diary of Nicolas, present Bishop of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

ary transactions between priests and sectarians. So, in other countries, the clergy has long collected its tithe indiscriminately from all, and the State still makes everybody contribute towards the support of the different creeds, their followers as well as their opponents. The Russian priest gets too little to be able to give up anything. He has his wife and children, a great incentive to insist on his rights; he has his brother clerics—the deacon and the lower clerks, who live on their share of the same fees, and therefore would be the victims of his disinterestedness. To avoid quarrels, it was found necessary to set down official rules for the division of the fees: the priest takes half; of the other half the deacon gets two thirds, and the psalm-singer one.

At the best these dues would be insufficient, did not the people's piety or superstition open to the clergy other sources of income, aside from the sacraments and habitual church ceremonies. In the country, the different seasons and crops claim the priest's intervention, and he is paid for his services sometimes in cash, sometimes in produce. Natural visitations, such as drought and epidemics, are another source of profit to the rural priest. I have myself, in the south, seen the priests bless each peasant's growing melons, successively. Now and then, when the desired result fails to appear, the Church's prayers turn against her ministers. The peasant accuses them of having said the wrong prayers or of not having performed the rites in the proper way. In a commune of the government of Vorònej, on one occasion when the drought *would* not end, the peasants concluded to duck the priest in the river. This *argumentum ad hominem* is usually reserved for witches; but then, the *mujik's* befogged intelligence does not always discriminate very clearly between the wizard and the priest, between the incantations of the one and the invocations of the other,—the less that both give him much the same kind of assistance, on very similar conditions. Out of sheer neediness, the clergy is often compelled to lend itself to practices derogatory to the Church's dignity, and becomes the accomplice of popular

superstition. We see an instance of this in the long-preserved custom of carrying prayers in a cap to women in childbed. The peasant held out his fur cap (*shàpka*), upside down, for the priest to recite certain prayers into it, after which he closed it up tight, so the blessing should not escape from it, and, hastening to the woman, shook out the cap over her head. This custom was condemned in the "Ecclesiastical Code" of Peter the Great; yet it survived, in certain parts, down to our day. We can easily understand the priest's reluctance to deal summarily with superstitions on which he makes part of his living.

But, even leaving the *mujik* and his *izbà* out of the question, religion—or, more correctly, religious ceremonial—still holds a large place in Russian life, in the family, in business. On every important occasion—an anniversary, an arrival or departure, a change of residence or a journey, the beginning or conclusion of any undertaking—a blessing is asked of the Church. The parish clergy is invited into the houses, to sing *Te Deums*, and bless family festivals; these are for them occasions of rejoicing and feasting as well as of extra earnings. But the priest does not always wait for an invitation. At certain times—Christmas, Twelfth Night, Easter—it is usual for the clergy to go the round of their parishioners, to bless their dwellings. A similar custom still exists in some Catholic countries. In Russia, in cities and in country, the priest and deacon, in their vestments, go from house to house to sing an "Allelujah." The moment they enter, they turn to the *eïkons* in the corner, rapidly recite the prayers for the occasion, give the inmate the crucifix to kiss, pocket their money, and go to the next house. In some houses they are received in the anteroom by the servants; in others, the money is handed them and the prayers are dispensed with. In the villages these periodical visitations are at times the occasion of the queerest scenes; some peasants will shut up their huts and run, at the risk of being pursued by the clergy's women and children. In order to put a stop to such demonstrations, the Synod had to

forbid the latter to follow their husbands and fathers on these expeditions. Then again, the peasant may refuse point-blank to comply with the custom, when a bout at bargaining and chaffering ensues, which would better become a fair than the Church. I was told a story of a priest who, disgusted at not being able to get a fee out of a peasant for the prayers he had recited, had the bright thought to take back the blessing the man would not pay for, and substitute imprecations instead. Superstitious fear overcame stinginess, and the priest got his fee.

These parochial visitations, which are repeated several times through the year, greatly detract from the respect due to the clergy, not so much because of this solemn sort of begging as on account of the scenes to which it gives rise. The clergy, on such occasions, frequently become the victim of a fine national quality—hospitality, which still has a certain primitiveness about it. No peasant is so poor but will offer a glass of *vòdka* to his priest on such festive days, and the meanest boor's feelings are hurt by a refusal, as, in the peasant's code of manners, it is tantamount to an insult; the priest who refused would be forever branded as proud and "stuck up," and the peasants would take their revenge by refusing to help him with his field labor. It is wisest to submit. But, then, the honor done to one cannot be denied another. So the parish clergy travel from *izbà* to *izbà*, in full canonicals, dispensing blessings, and everywhere receiving in exchange a "drink" and a few *kopeks*. The consequences are easily divined. By nightfall there is little left of the priest. But the peasants don't mind, in consideration of the occasion, and if he is not very solid on his legs, there are plenty of kind souls ready to support him and tenderly help him from door to door till his day's work is done. Such scenes are naturally not calculated to bring the dissenters back to the bosom of the Church. I once saw, in Moscow, in a picture gallery belonging to a wealthy *raskòlnik*, a canvas by Peròf representing just such a scene. The priest, crucifix in hand, totters along, while the drunken deacon soils

the sacred vestments.* Such accidents cannot inspire the peasant with respect, even though he himself occasions them. With the inconsistency characteristic of the uneducated, he scoffs one day at what he encouraged the day before. The best thing for a priest is to have a good strong head, able to stand liquor and make no sign. There is no lack of opportunities for him to display his prowess ; at wedding feasts, for instance, he has to drink with every man who proposes his health. Such being the general custom, it will be seen in what way the rural clergy came by their reputation for drunkenness and gluttony.

It were a great mistake, however, to imagine that this humble clergy lose all sense of their lofty mission under the stress of their many foibles and faults. The priestly functions are too often lowered to a mechanical routine of rites and ceremonies ; but these rites the priest performs with a full sense of their religious and moral significance. He is usually faithful to what might be termed his professional duty. Coarse-mannered, narrow-minded he may be ; yet, in the hour of need, he can find words of comfort for the sick and of hope for the dying. He knows how the simple and ignorant should be spoken to. The nearer to the people he stands by his mode of life, by his very faults, the better he is understood of them. It is not the priests of the new generation, better informed as they are, more reserved in manner, and soberer, who inspire the *mujik* with the greatest confidence. He is inclined to prefer the old-fashioned *pope*, with his good nature, his uncouth manners, and his petty vices, all things common to both. "I know he gets drunk once in a while," said a peasant, speaking of his parish priest ; "but he is a good Christian, and he is never drunk on Saturday nights or Sunday mornings." The poor *pope*, half peasant all through the week, becomes the priest once more when he dons the sacred robes ; religion, by its mysterious virtue, exalts him above his petty surroundings and

*This is not the only picture of the kind from the brush of Perôf, which does not spare the clergy, black or white.

cares, and, for one hour at least, to the lofty plane of his sublime functions. And very hard they are, these priestly functions, under such a sky, with such winters, and the huge distances of a Russian parish. It takes nothing short of heroism, at certain seasons, and in certain parts, to travel over those shelterless plains, bearing the sacraments to a sick man, or going to hear a dying man's confession. And if the priest expects to be paid for administering the sacraments, he was never known to refuse to administer them. More than one has met death in a snowstorm while carrying the viaticum on a winter's night. To give himself the necessary strength, he may have swallowed down a large glass of *vòdka* as he left the house—and next day his wife and children dug his body out of a snow-drift. I have heard of several such cases. We hear more rarely of a priest so renowned for holiness as to attract the masses to his particular church; yet there are several such. Foremost in the number, of late years, ranks Father Ivan Ilìtch Sèrgief, arch-priest (*proto-ierév*) of the church of St. Andrew in Kronstadt. He is credited with miraculous cures; the people have absolute faith in his prayers, and come to him in a stream to ask for them or confess to him, so that his church is, at all times, as crowded as others are only on Good Fridays.

BOOK II. CHAPTER X.

The White Clergy (*continued*)—Their Social Position ; their Isolation ; their Dependence—How Treated by their Superiors—The Priest's Family : his Wife ; his Children ; his Sons—Caste Spirit and Tendencies of the Men Born in it—Efforts to Improve the Clergy's Moral and Material Condition—Attempt to Reduce the Number of Parishes and Priests—Drawbacks of the Measure—Parish Priests Elected—Parochial Trustees—The Clergy's Place in Public Instruction—Why it is Thought Desirable to Put Primary Instruction in their Hands—Parish Schools—Preaching not much in Use till lately Quickened by the Political Disturbances—Characteristics of the Russian Pulpit—Can the Barrier between the Black Clergy and the White ever be Removed, and can the Episcopate be Opened to the Latter?

THE position occupied by the clergy fully accounts for the generally not very respectful attitude towards them of the people and the little influence they have. For the Russian's reverence for his religion does not always include that religion's ministers. The peasant or merchant does not scruple to make fun of the priest whom he greets as "father" and whose hand he devoutly kisses. This distinction made between the Church and the priest, in its very exaggeration, does credit to the people's spiritual sense : they are not so benighted as to confound the two, to hold Christ responsible for the evil manners of his ministers. The peasant sees in the priest a sort of spiritual *tchinôvnik*, who, like other functionaries, collects dues from poor people, and does not look on him with much more favor than on the minions of secular bureaucracy. His filial devotion to the master, earthly or heavenly, does not extend to the master's servants. A country priest in France has little enough influence as a rule ; in Russia he has rather less. But there is nothing to hinder his acquiring some in the future,

for he is, after all, the only person who has a real hold on the peasant—through religion.

If we turn to the higher classes, we find that the clergy has not over them the influence which, in other countries, it wields through women or politics, being qualified thereto by education. Nowhere else have the Church and her ministers occupied so small a place in what is known as "the world." The priest is kept at a distance from the manor house and excluded from polite society. If, in the country, the noble landholder does once in a while open his house to the priest of his parish, it is only on occasion of some festivity, or when some ceremony is to be performed, and there is hardly ever any cordiality or personal friendliness about the act. No one would think of reserving for him the seat of honor. Thus it is that the priest,—especially the rural priest,—while kept at arm's length by the cultured classes who differ from him in bringing up, manners, ideas, is yet too much above the peasants not to feel the degradation of being lowered to their level, and so stands practically isolated between two worlds, and feels almost equally a stranger to both. Such an anomalous position narrows his horizon. He can learn only from books, and the only books within his reach are theological treatises or superannuated works. So that science and the modern world are hardly more accessible to him than society.*

One of the causes and, at the same time, one of the effects of this social ostracism is that, as a rule, there are no family ties or bonds of common ancestry between the clergy and the other classes. In this respect, no celibate clergy could be more utterly cut off from the rest of society. Indeed marriage has, if anything, helped to keep it so, for the reason that, through so many centuries, it has married almost entirely within itself. As for laymen, especially of the cultivated classes, scarcely any ever think of entering the Church, and the very few that do almost invariably become

* It should be mentioned that there are now several church periodicals, some of which are very good.

monks. There have been no exceptions to this rule, till within the last few years. In the reign of Alexander III., I have been told of a few noble landholders and a few students, also nobles, who had been ordained priests; such instances have occurred, among others, in the diocese of Khàrkof. This was a bold innovation, truly; but it may have been only another way of "going forth among the people," of ministering to the peasant at a time when there was a general rush of self-devotion seeking for an object.

It stands to reason that the priest, morally separated from all other classes, cannot feel at ease in associating with them; hence his manner is mostly awkward and lends itself to ridicule, or provokes a sort of contemptuous pity. This people, so reverent of their saints, make a butt of their clergy. In the popular saws, as well as in art and literature, the priest and all that belongs to him—his wife, his children, his house, his farm—are perpetually railed and gibed at. "Am I a *pope* to eat two dinners?" says the *mujik*, and this taunt is not the worst. There is another, saying "the *pope* is a drunkard and the cross is of wood," which seems to sum up all the people's spiritual disappointments. Even superstition, which, it would seem, should favor the priest, turns against him. He is credited with the evil eye; to meet a priest the first thing on leaving home is as bad an omen as meeting a funeral, and many a good Russian will turn back or leave undone the errand on which he was starting.

Looked down upon by some, isolated from all, the rural priest is dependent on everybody: on the peasant, who pays him and helps till his land; on the noble landholder, the local magnate, who often got him his appointment and can have him removed; on the bishop; on the consistory; on the dean or superintendent (*blagotchínny*); on the entire bureaucracy, civil and ecclesiastical. The bishop, who is spoken of and addressed as *vladÿka*, "master, ruler," * is not so much his priests' father and protector as their

* Answering the Greek *despótes*, which is used in the same way.

head and judge. The high church dignitaries, taken from the ranks of the black clergy, often treat the rural clergy with a want of respect not calculated to raise them in the opinion of their parishioners. The country priest is seldom admitted to his bishop's presence, and dreads his pastoral visits. The prospect alone of entertaining him at luncheon sends him into fits of nervous terror. Not so very long ago, certain bishops were accused of keeping their priests waiting in the servants' anteroom and of receiving them only to rebuke and threaten. Now at least they no longer call them drunkards and thieves in public.

The emancipation and the abolition of corporal punishment have indirectly raised the condition of the rural clergy, whom their superiors had long been in the habit of looking on as a kind of serfs. We in the West can hardly realize how these poor priests used to be treated at a time anything but remote. The ecclesiastical no less than the secular courts had freely recourse to corporal punishments, and so did the diocesan consistories in dealing with members of the clergy. Even after Catherine II. had introduced a milder spirit into the legislation and the clergy was officially ranked as one of the privileged classes, exempted as such from corporal punishment, the practice was not at once desisted from in rural districts. The tradition is still green in priestly families; stories are handed down from father to son of how certain prelates respected their clergy's legal prerogatives. Here is one instance, from the memoirs of an academy professor, who had it from his grandfather.* It was towards the end of the eighteenth century, and the see of Vladímir was occupied, not by one of those mitred tyrants who have achieved a legendary fame in many a diocese, but by a bishop reputed as kindly and humane, who received his priests and clerics paternally, and on occasion dealt out to them paternal correction. "Oh, you scamp!" he would call out from the divan on which he remained stretched at full length;—"I 'm

* Rostislâvof's Memoirs, *Rùsskaya Starinà* (*Russian Antiquities*) for January, 1880.

going to give you a lesson. Bring the rods. Now undress!" And then and there, the priest or deacon thus addressed, had to take off his loose robe and outer garments. He was laid on the floor, half naked. Four men held down his arms and legs and kept him stretched out at his eminence's feet so that the pastoral eye could superintend the operation. Sometimes priests were commanded to perform this office, while the bishop's men laid on the rods, before any and everybody who happened to be present. The law exempting the clergy from military service was no better respected by the princes of the Church; all they had to do was to depose a priest, when there was nothing in the way of his being made a soldier. As lately as the reign of Nicolas, a certain Eugene, Bishop of Tambòf, used to send to the ranks priests and seminarists in batches. True, such abuses are now impossible; but a priest can still be imprisoned in force of a sentence passed by his bishop. He may also be sentenced (and so may laymen for that matter) to "church penance," in which case a convent becomes his jail. The fortress of Sùzdal has been turned into a house of detention for members of the clergy. The commandant, in 1887, was still a monk, the Archimandrite Dositheus.

It is to the dependent and miserable condition of the clergy that Russian Orthodoxy is indebted for some of its formalism. The priest's ministrations were naturally lowered to mere ceremonial, to an externality. Science and study were superfluities in such a life; the rural priest had not the hope of rising, or of qualifying himself for more valuable service to stimulate him to effort. Patience, resignation, humility, were his cardinal virtues. If anything is to be wondered at, it is that the Russian clergy, under such a combination of demoralizing conditions, should not have become utterly degraded.

The weight which has dragged down the Russian secular clergy is—marriage; family. The wedded state for priests may have its good sides from the point of view of politics and religion;

economically, it comes high, seeing that a priest's duties are really of a very special nature and demand a man's whole time and all the work he is capable of. The married priest is suited to one of two orders or stages of society: the patriarchal, in which, the various functions not being yet strictly differentiated, he need not belong exclusively to the altar; or the advanced, highly cultured stage, with a wealthy community, able to remunerate services amply. Situated as Russia is at present, in a state of transition, the clergy may not support their families by manual labor, and the country is not rich enough to endow the priesthood in a manner to provide not only for the priests but for their families. The priest is no longer, like his Maronite brother, a peasant who devotes the week to field labor and Sunday to the church; he is not yet, like the English or American minister, a man of the world honorably supported on a sufficient stipend paid by a prosperous and cultured congregation. If we analyze the budget of a country priest, we shall be astounded, and wonder how he contrives to exist. We have such a budget, drawn up by a Russian priest under Alexander II. *: the various items of food, clothing, dress for the wife and daughters, board and tuition for the sons at the seminary, mounted up to about 600 roubles, for a family of seven or eight persons. Even at the present day, the receipts frequently fall much short of this sum. To balance this poor little budget, our anonymous informant did away, one after another, with every "luxury," such as sugar, tea, coffee, then butcher's meat and wheat flour; lastly with the cow, to save her keep. After "retrenching" on the children's food and schooling, there still remained a minimum of 407 roubles—for an entire family, bound to live decently. Life has grown more costly since, yet there still are numbers of priests whose yearly receipts hardly reach 400 roubles. Our poor French parish priests live on as little, but they have no wives to support and no children to bring up.

* Anonymous revelations ascribed to a priest of the diocese of Tver and published in Paris and Leipzig (by Franck). Compare Father Gagârin's *Le Clergé Russe.*

The material and moral discomfort of such a condition reacted on the priest's family and lowered their sacerdotal dignity. Let us glance at the members of such a family. There is, first, the wife, the *popadià*. She often is a very important person in the presbytery, for it is frequently through her that her husband has got his living. A priest who loses his wife cannot marry again. Therefore priests' wives are supposed to be taken very good care of, and there even is a saying: "Happy as a *popadià*." * Poor sort of happiness at best. The priest may once in a while spend a pleasant day, be an honored guest at a feast, have some amusement—his wife rarely has a share of these good things. Still less do her education and the domestic cares which weigh on her allow of her seconding her husband in his work, sharing in acts of piety and charity. Between them there seldom is that sort of co-operation which is so habitual a feature of Protestant parsonages, where the wife, by becoming her husband's helpmate, doubles his strength and power for good.

The first time I heard mass in a Russian village church, I noticed in the front rank a woman in a round hat and differing in her attire from the peasant women around her. It was the priest's wife. She stood alone, in the midst of the village *bàbas*, in her city clothes. For the *popadià* follows European fashion, though at a respectful distance and only on Sundays. I have seen one or two wear a hat with upturned brim. Their apparel is a visible sign of their isolation—it symbolizes their social position. The priest's wife has no equal in the village, no companion; she can associate only with those of her own class, such as live in neighboring parishes. In the cities it is not so bad. The canons or church regulations are said to forbid priests' wives from wearing gay colors or taking part in worldly amusements; but in city life, where the priest feels at ease and his wife finds congenial intercourse, these rules mostly fall into disuse.

* Another saying is: "Nothing is the last except a priest's wife," *i. e.*, "nothing is *sure* to be the last"—in allusion to a priest's disability to remarry.

One of the causes of the clergy's isolation lies in their women's inferior education. Many a family would be glad enough to receive the well-informed and cultivated priest on terms of intimacy, but cannot do so on account of his wife's ignorance and want of manners. In a country like France, even though the clergy usually is recruited from the lower classes, the dignity of the priestly calling frequently supplies the place of birth and learning, atones for defects in the bringing up; it is quite different with a married clergy. Between the priest and society, his wife becomes not a bond but a barrier. To raise the clergy's position the standard of their women must be raised. In what class does the married state make higher demands on women, for high-mindedness, nobility of character and all the loftiest virtues? It really seems as though a special vocation were needed. We have seen that there are special schools for the daughters of the clergy, just as there are such for noble maidens. A great deal of fun is made of these institutions for "the young ladies of the clergy," but really one hardly sees how they could be dispensed with. As things are now, it will be years before a country priest can find a bride, outside his own class, anywhere but among the ignorant daughters of peasants or working men. In England itself, the country where the clergy are best situated, there was a time when country clergymen found nobody to marry but waiting-maids.*

Next come the priest's children. They cannot all, boys and girls, remain in the sacerdotal class. Now that the way out of it has been made so much easier for them, many of the young people who have been born and bred in the shade of the sanctuary are unwilling to enter a career the hardships of which they know only too well. On leaving the seminary or academy, many turn away from the Church. Yet to these also life holds out but sombre prospects. Their bringing up places them outside the world of the peasant or the artisan, while in the liberal professions poverty stands in their way, and lack of connections, and social prejudice.

* See Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. i., pp. 323, 324 (Tauchnitz).

This threefold obstacle keeps most of them in the lower ranks of bureaucracy. Yet a good many of these "seminarists," as they are called, manage, by sheer persistence, to attain an honorable position. They are to be met with in all careers—in the teaching and the medical faculties, in the press, in the bar, not unfrequently even in the army, and in "business." They have, to stimulate their ambition, such examples as that of Count Speransky, the trusted counsellor of Alexander I. and of Nicolas I., who, from the forms of a theological academy, rose to the highest dignities of the empire.

In Protestant countries, it is notorious that from no class of society spring so many eminent men, especially scholars and scientists, as from clergymen's families. No wonder; these sons of ministers derive from their bringing up two great elements of superiority: scholarship and morality. Under like conditions the youth of the Russian clergy would give as valuable a set of men to their country. And even as it is, in spite of the many difficulties under which they labor, they form an important element in Russian society. Among the scientists, scholars, and literary men of Petersburgh and Moscow, many illustrious names belong to sons of the clergy, thus—to mention only the dead—that of S. Soloviòf, the historian.

In entering this or that profession, these children of the Church are officially enrolled in one of the various classes into which the nation is divided. It does not always follow that they amalgamate with their new surroundings. No matter in what career, no matter on what grade of the *tchin* ladder, they generally retain certain tricks of manner and looks peculiarly their own. A "seminarist" is known anywhere; he is stamped indelibly. If by nothing else, they are known by their names. Many have names made up out of those of church festivals or sacraments, something after the manner of certain Spanish given names, such as Concepcion, Annunciacion, Dolores, etc.: Preobrajénsky (from Transfiguration); Voskressènsky (from Resurrection); Voznes-

sènsky (from Ascension); Blagoviêsh-tchensky (from Annunciation); Rojdêstvensky (from Nativity); Tròytsky (from Trinity); Spàssky (from Saviour); Krestovozdvíjensky (from Elevation of the Cross); I have even heard the most peculiar name Allelùyef (from Allelujah). Others retain, as their name, from generation to generation, some church title, such as Protopòpof (from *protopòp*, arch-priest).

The spirit which the seminary graduates bring into the world is not what one would expect from children of the Church. It is an ultra liberal, mostly even revolutionary spirit, a spirit of envious disparagement towards all established positions and towards the higher classes. These propensities, seemingly incompatible with their birth and bringing up, are on the contrary the result thereof; the consequence of all the accumulated sufferings, hardships, snubs, which their class has endured for ages. The white clergy, as a body, have no well-defined opinions; how should they, weighed down as they are by the twofold burden of material cares and religious authority? Consciously or not, their tendencies are not those of the clergy in most other European countries. Far from being firmly attached to the aristocratic and conservative interests, they have popular, democratic instincts. Many a priest is taxed with nihilism. It is true, however, that this is a singularly misused word. In this respect as in so many others, there is between the married priesthood and the high monastic clergy, a natural antagonism. The former are not so delighted with things as they are that they should have the dread of innovations which troubles the princes of the Church. Now what, in the priest, is only an instinct, becomes in his sons a conviction, reasoned out and hardened into a doctrine.

The contrast between the priest's lofty calling and lowly position early shocks the young seminary student; the hindrances which he encounters at the outset of his career wound his pride; the prejudice which pursues him through life irritates him. Hence the democratic, innovating, often radical and revolutionary

spirit which animates the sons of priests. As a rule they do not retain any more liking or respect for the religious than for the social existing order. The moment they step out of the schools provided for them by the Church, they openly rebel against that church, which, to them and their fathers, has been a hard step-mother; their whole being rises up in reaction against the moral compression inflicted by their education; and in these souls, sore and sullen in their grudge against authority, reaction against old-established tradition sometimes goes the extremest lengths. In the Western world it has been noted that, in the eighteenth century, the most reckless philosophers and the most violent revolutionists came from the clergy's schools. Out of Russian presbyteries go forth legions of atheists and socialists. In the ranks of the apostles of nihilism and the fabricators of bombs, the sons and daughters of the Church hold a distinguished place. They form a large part of that class of born malcontents, of predestined revolutionists, which is fatally drawn to dream of the destruction of the existing order. In this country, where the labor proletarians are not yet numerous, they form a sort of intellectual proletariat. Among them are found both drifting waifs and *parvenus*, animated with like hatred of all who enjoy a well-established superiority, through birth or wealth. The lower government spheres teem with these sons of priests, and to them, in great part, is traceable that radical, levelling spirit with which the bureaucracy is often taxed as well as the press.

It is manifestly in the interest of both Church and State to improve the condition of the clergy. The imperial government has long realized this. From Alexander I. to Alexander III., not one emperor but has given the subject earnest attention. It is one of the questions which come up anew at each new reign. Alexander showed how much importance he attached to it, by following with regard to it a system not unlike that which he adopted with regard to the emancipation of the serfs. As early

as 1862, he appointed, for the purpose, a commission composed of members of the Holy Synod and high functionaries. The better to help the work on, a special committee was appointed in each diocese. These studies were proceeded with throughout the Liberator's reign and taken up again under his successor. They did not do all that was expected of them; still they were not without results.

A way was proposed, seemingly most simple, of increasing the resources of the clergy without adding to the burdens on the State or the people: to reduce their numbers. Up to the first years of Alexander III., the Holy Synod was busy reducing the number both of parishes and churchmen. In doing so, the Synod was merely, though perhaps unconsciously, imitating the Lutherans of the Scandinavian countries, where, for similar reasons, the same retrenchment was operated.* But this reform was ill-suited to the Orthodox cult and to the Russian Empire. An insurmountable obstacle lay in the immensity of the territory. At the moment when, under Alexander II., it was decided to reduce the number of parishes, Orthodox Russia had not quite 39,000 churches (not counting a few thousands of small chapels), and of these many were grouped within or around cities. When Alexander III. came to the throne, over 3,000 had been suppressed. Although a good many have been rebuilt or reopened since, the number cannot be pronounced excessive for so vast an empire. In 1887 there were not 33,000 parishes in all Russia. A bit of comparative statistics will show that, European Russia, with a territory eleven times the size of France, has not nearly as many churches, as many parishes.

This comparison will give an idea of the vastness of some of the Russian parishes. If their number could be reduced at all, it could only be in the more densely populated regions and especially in the cities—those old Moscovite cities where, as was often the case in the West, prior to the Revolution, the number of churches

* See Döllinger, *Kirche und Kirchen* (*Church and Churches*).

and convents was in proportion rather to ancestral piety than to modern needs. The principle was laid down, that there should be about 1,000 "souls" to each parish (not counting the women), and it was calculated that each "soul" (male) could be assessed at one rouble, which would have given each parish church a revenue of 1,000 roubles. In a country where tracts of land numbering 60 inhabitants to the square mile are counted among the most populous, a parish of 2,000 persons will always be very large indeed. And what of the provinces of the north and east, where certain parishes exceed in extent whole dioceses in Italy and the Orient! As it is, Russian parishes generally consist of several villages, sometimes of a dozen small hamlets, often very distant from one another. And it should be noted that it is not in the interest of either Church or State to have the peasant too far away from his parish church. The vast extent of rural parishes even now places official worship out of the reach of a large portion of the people, thereby favoring the dissenting sects (*raskòl*), especially those which do without any priests at all (*Bezpopòftsy*). We cannot wonder, therefore, if the government and the Holy Synod gave up the idea of reducing the number of parishes and priests. We foresaw it would not work at the time when the system was in favor.* It created much discontent. Nor did the clergy reap the material profit which was expected from the measure. The church being too far away, fewer people went to it, and the receipts decreased by just so much. It was found that removing the priest from his parishioners meant alienating the people.

As for reducing the number of priests, the idea is fully as unpractical,—the more so that an Orthodox priest, unlike a Catholic one, can never, under any circumstances, perform more than one mass on one day. There are not quite 35,000 Orthodox priests in the empire—surely no excessive number for so vast a country or even for such a population. Some twenty years ago there were

* See *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 15, 1874.

more, by several thousands. It was the deacons, and especially the singers and sacristans, whose numbers it was principally proposed to reduce. These latter, the so-called "church-servitors" (*tserkòvno-slujìteli*), formed the bulk of the sacerdotal class,—not only the largest, but the most ignorant and immoral part of it. By their vices and abject poverty, they lowered the standing of the entire clergy. The worst of it is that, while individually so miserably poor, they are, collectively, a heavy burden on the Church and country. The simplest way would be to dispense with them altogether, and employ in their stead laymen, who would be paid for their services, but who would depend for their living on some other occupation. This is what the Latin Church has done and what the Russian Church is gradually coming to. Where these "church-servitors" have not been discharged, the attempt has been made to lift them to a higher plane, by utilizing them for instruction in the popular schools.

As it proved impossible to improve the clergy's material condition by reducing the number of its members, other ways had to be thought of. The question was proposed whether the priests might not be supported by the provincial assemblies (*zemstvos*) or by the communes, in this manner—that a fixed salary should be paid them, in consideration of which they should claim no dues for their ministrations from the individual parishioners. Unfortunately, the *zemstvos* and communes are always in financial straits, so that it would hardly be wise for them to add to their burdens. They could not, in fact, without imposing a new tax, which would bring things round to the starting-point, and at all events would make the reform anything but popular.

Some few communes are said to have voted salaries to their priests; but these are exceptional cases; and besides, such resolutions can be recalled. To encourage this movement, it was proposed to allow each parish to choose its own priest, and the idea found favor in certain circles, especially in Moscow; the late Aksàkof was one of its supporters. Writers of Slavophil ten-

dencies took to task to demonstrate that this was in accordance with national customs and church canons, and would really, far from being an innovation, constitute a return to ancient usages. True, such elections frequently gave rise to scandals, as the Moscovite councils of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries bear witness. Candidates sometimes bought votes. The custom is said to have survived longest in Little-Russia, and traces of it are, it is asserted, found in the diocese of Kief as late as 1840. In Bessarabia, as late as 1820, the bishop ordained only such candidates as brought him the written "approval" of their parishes. And in the heart of Great Russia, the famous Metropolitan Plato, under Alexander I., is said to have recognized the right of the parishes to nominate candidates for the vacant parishes.

In 1880 and 1884, the *zemstvo* of Moscow requested that the right of election, or at least of nomination, should be restored to the parishes. Other provincial assemblies made the same request. But the Holy Synod, through the High Procurator, censured this interference of the *zemstvos*, denouncing it as an encroachment of the secular authorities on church ground, and added that if, in former times, the Church suffered the parishes to nominate their pastors, she did so only because so few qualified men were personally known to the bishops, and that the case was different now when the seminaries are the natural nursery of the clergy, so that the election of parish priests by laymen would really amount to a return to the dark ages. This objection has left the partisans of lay election unconvinced. They reply that the choice of the parishes might be limited to graduates of theological schools. As a matter of fact, village assemblies or cantonal assemblies (*vôlost*), holding it their right to speak out on any matter of interest to the commune, occasionally do take the liberty to request the appointment or removal of this or that priest. The Ministry of the Interior, with the High Procurator's sanction, forbade peasant assemblies, in 1887, from meddling with such questions.

The lay election of priests would have, among others, this ad-

vantage—that the people would take a direct interest in the choice of their pastors, and the bond between them would become closer. This result is being striven for by other means also, conspicuous among which is the institution of parochial boards of trustees. One of the chief attractions of dissident sects is that their followers are members of a closely united community, sharing in its administration as well as its expenses; that the chapel belongs to them all, so they feel at home there. It was proposed that the parish boards of trustees, instituted in 1887, should give laymen a chance to share in the management of parochial affairs. These boards, acting now as general advisory council, now as bureau of charities, then again as school committee, were intended to raise at once the material condition and the moral authority of the clergy. They do not seem to have done much for either. There was a lack of spontaneity and independence about these creations of a higher power. A great many churches are still unprovided with such boards, and where they do exist, they often exist only in name. The trustees must be appointed by a general parish meeting, and it is not always easy to bring one about. When it is called together, the object is generally to ask for a money contribution; this accounts for the reluctant and incomplete attendance. The contributions should be voluntary, but as they are usually slow in coming in, it often becomes necessary to impose on the parishioners a sort of tax, which the board has great difficulty in collecting, even for the most urgent needs. The peasant gives little, and one of the chief resources of churches and clergy in other countries—private endowments, are almost entirely wanting. Funds are bequeathed to support schools, hospitals, convents, but very rarely for rural churches. No class seems greatly interested in them. This seems strange in view of the active spirit of enterprise manifested by dissenters of all denominations. This contrast between the dissident and the orthodox sections of the same people can hardly be ascribed to anything but the official character of the clergy and the bureaucratic ways of the Church.

The imperial government has sought in the schools still another instrument to operate a closer union between people and clergy and to improve the priest's condition. A new sphere of work has thus been opened to the Church. The parish schools entrusted to her care developed rapidly under Alexander III. While in France the State strove to exclude religion and the clergy from public instruction, in Russia it called in the Church to direct it. Not that it was a novel idea. In old Moscovia all knowledge was confined within the Church. Under Peter the Great and his immediate successors, the Holy Synod was in charge of public instruction. Alexander has partly revived the old order of things.

Count Dmitri Tolstòy, already at the time when he filled the two posts of High Procurator and Minister of the Interior, made it his object to multiply the parish schools, which were placed under the direction of the local clergy. At one moment, towards the middle of the reign of Alexander II., these schools reached the number of 20,000—at least on paper. But, as often happens in Russia, where discouragement and carelessness follow so closely on excessive enthusiasm, the popularity of these parish schools fell almost as quickly as it had risen. Most of them disappeared before the lay schools inaugurated by the *zemstvos*.* Their restoration is the task undertaken by Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, and, under the impulse given by him, parish schools are again springing up on all sides. No Minister of the Interior ever accomplished so much in this respect. The imperial government finds this collaboration of the Church in school work doubly advantageous, from a moral and a material point of view. It hopes by employing men ordained by the Church and placed under the bishop's authority, to teach the people both at less cost and with greater safety. The first results achieved by the primary schools have not, it must be confessed, turned out very satisfactory. They have yielded an additional proof of the fallacy of the popular

* See Vol. II., Book III., Ch. II.

prejudice which sees in the diffusion of primary instruction a pledge of morality. The mere fact of knowing how to read and write has not by any means improved the morals of those peasants who had the good fortune of having a school in their village. And it was soon found out that such peasants are less deaf than others to revolutionary appeals. In placing the problem before the Church and requiring her assistance in solving it, the Russian government is doing only what has, at various times, been done by other governments, who, while recognizing the utility of primary instruction, had become distrustful of some of its effects. By placing the clergy at the head of the school, it was intended, not only to raise its moral level, but to improve its material condition by adding to its usual resources a certain remuneration for school work.

In accordance with the new statute elaborated by the Holy Synod and issued in 1884, the parish schools opened by the Orthodox clergy are expressly intended to strengthen in the people the foundations of faith and Christian morality, while imparting the first elements of useful knowledge. It cannot be denied that such a scheme of instruction, based on religion, is best adapted to the peasant's tastes and moral habits, and when Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef asserted in his reports that instruction, to win the people's confidence, should be based on religious teaching, he merely set forth the results of experience. The Russian peasant wants to hear his boy sing at church and read aloud to him some devotional book on the long winter evenings. That 's what he should like to send him to school for. In making him learn to read, he possibly has in view the good of his soul more than the temporal goods of this life. With him, as with us in the Middle Ages, knowledge should be the handmaiden of faith, and only in so far has he any regard for it, as it lends itself to this humble office. With such views, with the universally prevailing superstitions, there is little doubt but that a school conducted on religious principles is the best calculated to free the *mujik* from the " Powers of Darkness."

The difficulties (apart from financial questions) do not come from the people, but rather from the clergy. The Orthodox Church has never refused to lend her ministers for such work; but—are they equal to it? have they the leisure? This is what many impartial persons doubted. One portion of the clergy seemed too ignorant. This objection, it is true, might not apply to the quite elementary grades, and it lies with the clergy itself and with the ecclesiastical schools to remove it entirely. In several seminaries a beginning has already been made with courses of pedagogy, and model primary schools have been instituted in connection with some. In some places—so in the diocese of Nijni-Nòvgorod—ecclesiastical normal colleges have recently been established (1887). As regards the demand on the priest's time, he is not so much the actual teacher as the director or superintendent of the new parish schools. The bishop can, if he sees fit, appoint another person for the office. Or the priest can have the deacon to assist him or take his place in the school; or else the minor clerics, the so-called "church-servitors." It has been proposed to employ specially the deacons or the psalm-singers in this capacity; they could teach school through the week and sing in church on Sundays. And at a pinch, the priest might be assisted by his own family—his wife, his sons and daughers. The small salary would thus remain in the family.

School-teaching, says the statute of 1884, is incumbent on the priests and other members of the clergy. It may be entrusted to other teachers, male or female, but always under the supervision of the priest and with the sanction of the diocesan authorities; such teachers to be taken preferably from among graduates of ecclesiastical schools and seminaries. The principle of the subordination of the school to the Church could not be more broadly asserted, and we would vainly look, in any country of Europe, for so deliberately "clerical" a scolar system. These parish schools stand directly under episcopal control. Each diocese has its scolar council, composed mostly of churchmen; lay "benefactors" are

given a seat in it, with the title of honorary trustees. Each bishop appoints diocesan inspectors, priests ; the schools, however, are also subject to lay inspection.

The parish school being a dependence of the Church, the general direction is reserved to the Holy Synod. It is the Holy Synod which sets up the programmes, where the first place is given to Bible history, catechism, prayers, Church singing. Reading, writing, the elements of arithmetic come second, and therewith closes the humble *curriculum*. In two-class schools (which are the exception), are added elementary notions of national and Church history. Attendance at church, at the different services, on Sundays and holidays, is obligatory. To the schools for children may be added, by episcopal permission (not otherwise), courses for adults, technical sections for the teaching of trades, Sunday courses. Popular libraries can also be annexed ; the choice of the books is left to the Holy Synod.

These parish schools are of too recent creation to allow of appraising their influence on the people and the clergy. Although their means of subsistence are precarious, being dependent on the parishes and on private benevolence, their development has been rapid. Thousands have sprung up in a few years. Semi-religious, semi-patriotic brotherhoods, such as the brotherhood of the Virgin in Petersburgh and that of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in Moscow, have made it their mission to further the good work. They are extolled as a preservative against sectarianism. Katkòf commended them as agents of russification in those parts of the empire which have mixed populations and religions ; for instance along the Volga, among the Tchuvàshes or Tcheremìss ; nor only in semi-Asiatic regions, where alien races dwell who are three quarters heathen, but also along the European border-land, in the Western provinces of Lithuania, White-Russia, and Little-Russia. There are localities where, among the children who attend the parish schools, the Catholics are more numerous than the Orthodox. The Catholic clergy would not be allowed to open counter schools.

At the time when the *ukàz* of June, 1884, was promulgated, there were only 3,000 parish schools left in the whole empire; six months later, nearly 2,000 new ones had been started by the clergy, and the movement has been increasing ever since. At a word from the bishops, at a sign from the High Procurator of the Holy Synod, the schools have sprung up in hundreds, in all the fifty-four dioceses of the empire, and, if we may judge by the last few years, there will soon be not many parishes unprovided with them. Sceptics, indeed, wonder whether they really all exist anywhere except on the consistory registers, such mystifications not being altogether impossible in Russia: the age of Potemkin's famous improvised villages is not quite a thing of the past even yet. It is quite possible that, out of the thousands of schools inaugurated with such flourish of trumpets, a few hundreds may have everything except teachers and students. Such things have been seen, in this very matter of parish schools, under Alexander II., when it had just been suggested to place popular instruction in the hands of the clergy. Thus about the year 1865, official statistics reported as many as 18,000 such schools; yet, when it came to the number of students, what was the general surprise to find that they could not show 100,000 children between them (all the 18,000),* giving an average of five or six per school,—which is as much as saying that many of them existed only in name.

Things, it appears, are very different now. If we believe official reports, the average attendance at these new parish schools, is, in several dioceses, as high as from twenty to thirty students, making a total of many hundred thousands of children of both sexes.† There was, at one time, some talk of entrusting the

* These figures were given by the High Procurator, Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef himself, in his report for 1883, published in 1886.

† The parish schools are meant principally for boys. Thus, in the diocese of Podolia, of the 20,000 students distributed, in 1885, among 854 parish schools, only 1,000 were girls. In some dioceses it was proposed, in 1887, to open model girls' schools in connection with the diocesan educational establishments for the "young ladies of the clergy."

clergy with the free schools founded by the *zemstvos*, but such a complete absorption by them of the entire forces of primary instruction would be repugnant to the vast majority of Russians, who are very much alive to the advantages of variety and competition. Among the professed friends of the Church there have been some sufficiently clear-sighted to deprecate for her a monopoly so manifestly beyond her power to manage. The late Aksàkof was afraid that the exclusion of the secular element might lead to pronounced antagonism between society, as represented by the *zemstvos*, and Church influences. Yet the question has been agitated in the very midst of provincial assemblies. In some districts the confidence in the clergy proved so great that the *zemstvos* turned over their schools to them of their own accord, even while supporting them with their own money. As a rule, however, the *zemstvos* have kept their schools to themselves, only making more room for religious subjects, especially for the study of Church Slavic and the liturgical books : this was the best way to inspire the people with confidence in secular teaching.

On the whole, then, the *zemstvo's* schools remained independent of the clergy. Not so the little village schools, where only reading and writing were taught, generally by peasants, old soldiers, or retired small employés, whom the parents "found" in food, and that was about all the pay they got. All these poor "peasant schools" Alexander III. placed under the direction of the Church authorities. We shall not wonder at that when we remember that in France, immediately after the revolution of 1848, Mr. Thiers was for leaving primary instruction entirely to the monks and parish priests. True, the Russian Church is far from having the same passion and the same capabilities for teaching as the Catholic Church ; and if the new start taken by the parish schools is to be kept up, and the work of Alexander III. is to turn out less disappointing than his father's, great changes must take place in the clergy's habits. Quite lately still, priests cared

so little, that they did not always go to the trouble of teaching the people their catechism, even though the *zemstvos* paid them to do so in the schools. After that it will not be wondered at if sceptics are found who doubt the clergy's aptitude for teaching.

But school teaching is not to detract from the clergy's own proper mode of instructing the people—preaching. Here a wide field opens in Orthodox countries. In all of them the priest had almost given up one of his most important functions—he preached little or not at all. The institution by which Christianity has perhaps best served the cause of morality—the parish priest's humble homily—that institution the Greek Church, who, in her early age, gave birth to so many and great orators, has allowed, in the course of these last centuries, almost to lapse into desuetude.* This is not imputable solely to the ignorance of the clergy or to the spirit of autocracy, but in part to that which pervades the Church herself. While the Reformation, based on the principle of free investigation and individual interpretation, made preaching the mainspring of church work, Eastern Orthodoxy, bound up in tradition, allowed her ministers to neglect the duty of expounding the faith, as though fearing that they might disfigure it by their commentaries. The East, worn out with innumerable heresies, at length became suspicious of the spoken word generally, and anything like individuality, free inspiration, extempore expression, aroused distrust, as well in oratory as in art, in the oral as in the plastic presentment of subjects pertaining to faith. Reproduction, servile copying of consecrated models, was considered preferable to invention or even imitation. Nor can the

* The absence of any kind of preaching in the Moscovite churches used to astonish foreigners :—"They never have any preaching. All they have is certain lessons which are read on certain holy-days from some chapter of the Old or New Testament." Thus wrote one, Captain Margeret, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in his book : *Estat del'Empire de Russie ou Grande-Duché de Moscovie.* (*State of the Russian Empire or Grand-Duchy of Moscovia.*)

Church be wholly blamed for mistrusting the oratorical effusions of an ignorant clergy. "The Russians," the Moscovite envoy explained to the Italian historian Paolo Giovio, "do not tolerate sermons in their churches because they wish to listen only to the word of God, free from all human subtilty." And so for preaching was substituted the reading of the Fathers and of authorized books.

Not until the influence of the West and of Kief made itself felt, in the time of Peter the Great, did the living word resume its place in the Church, and even then enough people were found who were scandalized or disturbed in their minds at such an outlandish innovation. The Ecclesiastical Code of Theophanus Prokòpovitch freely admits that the priests capable of teaching from memory the dogmas and precepts of the Church were few. Not to leave the people entirely without any notions of religion, the Code recommended the reading of select works between the services. Treatises were written especially for this purpose, subject to the Synod's approval. But these books, plentifully sprinkled with quotations in Old-Slavic, and miserably read, mostly remained utterly unintelligible to the masses. Yet, to this day, they have hardly received any other spiritual food. The catechism, which could be taught the unlettered only orally, was almost as badly neglected. In short, the Orthodox Russian has, for several centuries, done without any religious instruction at all. We ask ourselves how and in what manner faith could be transmitted. It is true that numbers of peasants are, to this day, ignorant of the most essential dogmas; that very many do not even know their prayers. When the Lord's vineyard is thus left untended by those to whose care it is committed, can we wonder if it should be overrun with the weeds of heresy and the riotous creepers of sectarianism?

From the time of Peter the Great down to that of Alexander III., preaching has been entirely confined to the higher church spheres. Among the black clergy—bishops and archimandrites—

eloquence has always been a distinction and a means of promotion. Accordingly, the finest orators of the Russian Church have been prelates. A few have left an illustrious name. Philaret of Moscow, Innocent of Kherson, have, in their time, been compared to such men as Lacordaire and Ravignan. This episcopal oratory chiefly excelled in panegyrics. Such is the national bias, owing to the national institutions. The Christian pulpit seemed to be inspired as much with the spirit of the younger Pliny speaking to Trajan as with that of St. Ambrosius or St. John Chrysostome speaking before the Greek emperors. The solemnity of its utterances had an official flavor. Eulogies of the reigning sovereign held a large place in them. Flattery mixed Oriental hyperbole and Byzantine rhetoric with the patriarchal and Biblical style so dear to the Russian heart. Adulation at times went to such extravagant lengths that Alexander I. found himself compelled to issue an *ukàz*, forbidding to refer to His Majesty, in sermons, "in a strain of praise beseeming God alone." * Some sacred orators, however,—Philaret, for instance—have shown, in speaking before the tsar, the same kind of courage as Bossuet or Massillon before Louis XIV.

Bishops and archbishops have an immense advantage over preachers belonging to the lower clergy: they need not trouble their heads about the "censure." It is but yesterday, so to speak, that, in accordance with regulations issued by Nicolas I., the sermons composed by mere priests had to be submitted for approval to their immediate superiors or to the ecclesiastical censors. It will be seen how terrifying such an obligation would be to poor village priests, little versed in the art of writing. Moreover, they would find it difficult to address the peasant in the simple language suited to him while burning the midnight oil over their composition. Accordingly, although the Metropolitan Philaret decreed that every priest who had regularly graduated, should, at

* *Ukàz* of October, 1817. See Tondini, *Le Règlement Spirituel de Pierre le Grand*, p. 199.

least once a month, preach a sermon composed by himself, the practice never obtained. Now the dread of the ecclesiastical censure has been removed and the priest's tongue is untied. Pessimists contend that it is not all gain. And there are priests who do not always know how to regulate their speech. So in 1884 the priest of a village in the diocese of Tver laid himself open to the accusation of having, in a sermon, incited the peasantry against the noble landholders.

If preaching has, within the last few years, taken an unexpected flight, it is due to events in the temporal world. Here again the clergy has yielded to external influences, and has undertaken to interpret the Gospel's teachings for the people as much from political as from religious motives. The pulpit seemed as good an instrument as the school to act on the people with. Christian eloquence was enlisted in the war against subversive doctrines, the word of God proclaimed in opposition to the insinuations of the secret revolutionary propaganda.

The main preoccupation of Russian pastors, especially the bearers of the episcopal staff, is how to guard their flock against the wiles of the prowling wolf—nihilism. This is the more natural that, in combating the enemies of the State, they are conscious of fighting the Church's battles also. The government has no occasion to find fault with the clergy—the higher at all events—on the score of indifference. The High Procurator has every reason to be satisfied with the bishops' zeal. The majority of them have personally led their priests in the defence of autocracy. The Bishop of Viatka was not the only one who urged his clergy to inculcate on their congregations "sound religious and political principles." The episcopal mandates and discourses have been filled with politico-social dissertations, and the plain priests have followed suit as best they could. Loyalty to the tsar and throne has furnished the text for numbers of homilies. Imperial anniversaries, birthdays, and "saints' days" supply constantly recurring occasions for solemn panegyrics and instructions on the

duties of subjects, quite in accordance with the course recommended already by Peter the Great, in his Ecclesiastical Code.

A renewal of the custom of preaching will be in every way beneficial to both Church and clergy. For the Russian people, sedate and guileless, are very fond of this solemn entertainment, and certainly no audience could be more eager for the word of God or listen to it more respectfully. And good preachers find not only hearers, but readers as well, so that collections of sermons are not wanting. The eminent Church historian Macarius, Metropolitan of Moscow, at one time undertook to publish a periodical intended to acquaint the people with the finest preachers of the ancient capital. In Petersburgh, a collection of sermons preached at St. Isaac's was bought up in a few weeks—several hundred thousand copies. In the large cities the clergy has begun, besides, to give lectures and public disputations on religious subjects —a thing which always draws large audiences. In short, the clergy is emerging from its long torpor and begins to take part in the struggles of national life. It has at last found the weapon which properly belongs to the priest : it may aid him to recover the dignity and authority which are what he is lacking.

On the whole, the clergy's material condition has been ameliorated ; their social position elevated ; new branches of activity have been opened to them in connection with public instruction. Can anything more be done ? Can the church dignities, hitherto reserved for the monk only, be made accessible to the priest also ? Some Russians say "Yes." Yet it were possible only by throwing down the barrier which separates the priesthood from the episcopate, and this can be done only in one of two ways : by allowing priests to remain unmarried or bishops to marry. There are serious difficulties in the way of both innovations. It seems an easy thing to declare marriage optional and not obligatory for the white clergy—but, constituted as the Eastern Church is, it only *seems* easy. The unwritten law established by tradition is that

a married man shall be admitted to ordination, but an ordained one shall not be married. As ordination can follow but not precede the marriage sacrament, the churchman who does not wish to take the vow of celibacy must receive the nuptial benediction first. So long as the discipline now in force in all Orthodox countries will not have been abrogated, optional celibacy will not annul the distance which now separates the two clergies ; it would, at best, create a third, intermediary clergy. The secular clergy would then be divided into two categories, almost as effectively separated, by their respective mode of life, as the black and white clergies are now. Not that the Orthodox priest is always forced to choose between married life and the convent. There have been cases, in Russia, of men being admitted to ordination who were not married and did not wish to become monks. There might be more such instances ; but such priests, being placed apart from the others, would not do much to elevate or in any way improve the condition of the married clergy.

Optional celibacy would never be anything but an exception, unless it were to pave the way for obligatory celibacy,—a contingency of which no Russian would ever hear. The abrogation of the custom which admits to ordination none but married men would be a step towards Catholicism, while that of the discipline which precludes the ordained priest from subsequently marrying would be one towards Protestantism. This latter concession, though possibly more consonant to the tendencies of public opinion, would encounter two obstacles : abroad, the desirability of keeping united with the other Orthodox countries ; at home, the dread of strengthening dissent and the national attachment to traditions. The same reasons militate against still another innovation desired by some—the second marriage of priests. For the priest who has become a widower to be allowed to marry again would be contrary to the canons and even to certain scriptural texts. The time may come when the current of public opinion may carry the Russian Church beyond all such

traditional rules, but it is far away still; and—such reforms rarely coming in isolated, we may predict that, when it does come, Orthodoxy will have slipped off the track it has followed all these centuries. But there is nothing to prevent a widowed priest continuing in his office, and the practice is beginning to gain ground. Yet even this was not permitted in old times. After long disputes on the subject, the council held in Moscow in 1503 decreed that widowed priests and deacons should not be allowed to officiate. All that they were to be permitted to do, was to stand in the choir in their vestments and to sing at vespers and matins. Quite lately still, a priest lost his living in losing his wife; so he generally retired into a convent. The white clergy are now freed at last from one of the restraints imposed on them; their living is insured against the tricks of chance and made contingent on their own merit only, no longer on another person's life.

The same obstacles which tradition opposes to granting priests full freedom in the matter of marriage, it opposes to the choice of bishops from among the married clergy. Were it only a question of national habit, it would by this time have given way to the democratic instincts of the modern Slavs, who are apt to find fault with the black clergy for being a sort of aristocracy as well as a relic of the Middle Ages. But we have to do with a custom as old as the Greek Church itself and common to all countries of the Greek rite. Its apologists defend it on the ground of a text, which, however, really is in direct contradiction with the law in favor of which it is invoked, or, at least, can be reconciled to it only by a subtle trick of interpretation. "The bishop must be without reproach, the husband of one wife," says Paul (I. Timothy, iii., 2). The same thing is said in nearly the same words in the Epistle to Titus (i., 6), of the priest ("presbyter" or "elder"): "He must be blameless, the husband of one wife." In the case of bishops, the interpreters contend that a bishop being wedded to the Church, he can have no other wife. Were there no other barrier between the priest and the episcopate, the white clergy

would soon dispose of that; but there are the canons, the traditions, the universal practice of all Orthodox churches, and these have hitherto been respected. This rule assuredly leads to strange confusions: by compelling the Church to take her high dignitaries from the ranks of the monks, it forces monachism into a course directly opposed to the spirit of the institution. Out of a life of renunciation and humility has been made an ambitious career; the vow of poverty has become the door to fortune. On the other hand it cannot be denied that, ever since the introduction of Christianity in Kief, it was the black clergy which embodied Orthodox tradition and has best represented the œcumenic, catholic aspect of Russian Orthodoxy as distinguished from the other Eastern churches. Had the Russian Church been left entirely to the white clergy, which is more exclusively national, more accessible to secular influences, she would be more open to innovations, more in danger of allowing the unity of faith to slacken,—in short of swerving into the paths which led to the Reformation. The one fact of having married bishops would be a decided step towards Anglicanism.*

If church tradition does not allow a married priest to be consecrated as bishop, it does not debar widowed priests from the episcopal dignity. Though even then it has been customary, till quite recently, to make them first pronounce the monastic vows. It is now admitted, however, that a bishop need not necessarily

* The question is one of those which the Russian clergy, being subject to ecclesiastical censure, hardly can discuss with entire freedom. Thus it is that a professor of the theological academy of Kief advised those of his students who were Southern Slavs to take advantage of their freedom from censure in order to undertake researches into church antiquity and see whether arguments could not be found there against the obligatory celibacy of bishops. This hint was taken by the Serb M. N. Milach, who published (in 1879) a dissertation on the condition of the Orthodox Church, from documents, down to the fourteenth century—in which he strives to prove that the bishops have not always been compelled to celibacy. Still, if a few married bishops can be brought forward, the fact was never, in the Greek Church, anything but an exception. (See among others W. Gass, *Symbolik der Griechischen Kirche*, p. 282.)

be a monk, and some few bishops have been consecrated without having to pass through the convent, even nominally. But so startling was even this innovation, that when, in 1875, the archpriest Popiel, a former Galician Uniate, was to be consecrated, they did not quite know how to robe him for the ceremony, until, from lack of precedents, it was decided that he should wear, like his colleagues, the monastic habit.

The episcopal dignity is the only one of which church discipline still persists in making an absolute monopoly of the black clergy. There is nothing to prevent all the other dignities being conferred on members of the white clergy, which, accordingly, has already invaded most of the provinces formerly guarded by the monks for their own benefit. Its most signal conquest was that of the higher department of ecclesiastical instruction, which the monks had long kept jealously to themselves. That alone was a sort of revolution, which can, in the course of time, lead to important results, since on the direction imparted to the teaching at academies and seminaries depends the very spirit of the Church. If married priests are not admissible to the episcopate, certain arch-priests, on the other hand, are given the privilege of wearing the mitre, which makes them look like bishops. In addition to this, the white clergy as well as the black, are allowed to accept decorations of various kinds, a distinction of which they are so fond that an ordinance had to be made, forbidding them from wearing the insignia on their church vestments. An exception is made, however, in favor of the cross of St. George. For such priests as cannot raise their aspirations as high as the imperial orders, there are more modest rewards: the purple berretta which is the prelude to the pastoral cross and the title of archpriest (*protopòp*). When to all these we add the professorships, the chaplaincies, the various honorary distinctions and the possibility of a seat in the Holy Synod itself, it will be seen that the white clergy can no longer be said to be debarred from a career and a future. The episcopate and the monastic dignities are

about all that is left exclusively to the monks. It would be difficult to still further restrict their chances without shutting them up for good within their convent walls and cutting them off entirely from the nation and the world.

But, even should the secular clergy be wholly delivered from the pressure of want and from dependence on their parishioners, which weighs on it more heavily than the domination of the high monastic clergy, nothing but an extension of the liberties of the Church and of the people at large can finally lift it out of its lowly condition to the level of the high mission which devolves on it. Like all other classes, it is only in moral emancipation, in the right and practice of participation in its own country's government, that it will find the source of strength and dignity. This enfranchisement has partly been accomplished already. Under Alexander II. the parish priests were granted the right of electing the dean or district inspector (*blagotchìnny*),—one of their own number entrusted with the supervision of his brethren within a certain radius. Although, this franchise has been rescinded since —the election being now valid only when sanctioned by the bishop, —the clergy at least have recovered the right of meeting periodically to discuss together matters affecting their common interests. Such measures would be praiseworthy in any country. But in Russia, the church reform will be complete only on the day when the State Church will have sufficient confidence in her clergy to defy the free competition of other creeds and of her own dissenters.

BOOK III.

THE RASKÒL (SCHISM) AND THE SECTS.

CHAPTER I.

Origin and character of the *Raskòl* or Schism ; its Religious causes—Importance Attached to Rites and Formulas—Revolution called forth by the Correction of the Liturgical Books—Chief Points of Litigation—The Old-Ritualists or Old-Believers (*Staroviêry*)—How they Exaggerated the Principles on which Eastern Christianity is Based ; Immobility ; Nationalism—In what Manner the *Raskòl* Sprang from the Old-Slavic Liturgy—How in Rebelling against the Official Church, the Old-Believers Rebelled against Foreign Influences.

RUSSIAN Orthodoxy has been, for the last two hundred years and more, slowly undermined by divers obscure sects, unknown to foreigners, imperfectly known to the Russians themselves. Beneath the imposing structure of the official Church there spreads a subterraneous network of dark galleries, a very labyrinth of crypts and caverns, the shelter of popular beliefs and superstitions. Into these catacombs of ignorance and fanaticism we will now descend. Nothing could better help us to a full comprehension of the national character, better lay bare before us the very essence of the Russian soul. The *raskòl*, with its thousand and one sects, is perhaps the most original feature of Russian life, that which most clearly defines the difference between the Moscovite East and the West.

Let the reader not wonder if we claim his attention for a set of queer and rustic heresies. We do not in the least mean to ascribe to these unlettered sects an importance, whether in the present or

future, out of proportion with their moral or numerical value. If we insist on this obscure phase of the national life, it is because, in our eyes, this is the side from which it is easiest to get at the real stock-Russian, so different from the Russian whom Europe knows. The latter invariably judges by externalities—laws and institutions, book literature and drawing-room "society." Whereas in studying the sects, we get at the people's innermost self, not from above, but, so to speak, from below, from the depths up.

As the waters of a river are tinted by the soil through which it courses, so a religion assumes a different shade from each population through which it passes. The *raskòl* is simply Byzantine Christianity colored by the lower layers of the Russian people. In the turbid and muddy waters of the Moscovite sects, it is easy to distinguish alien infiltrations, sometimes Protestant and sometimes Jewish, oftener Gnostic or heathen. The *raskòl*, nevertheless, differs from all foreign creeds and confessions, both in its principles and tendencies; it remains an essentially original, uncompromisingly national thing. It is so thoroughly Russian, that it made no converts outside of Russia, and even at home numbers its adepts almost exclusively among the Moscovites, the Great-Russians, the most Russian of Russians. It is so spontaneous that, through all its phases, it explains itself out of itself; nothing could have stemmed or altered its course. It is the most national of all religious movements sprung out of Christianity, and at the same time the most exclusively popular. It grew up neither in schools, nor amid the clergy, but in the peasant's *izbà*, in the merchant's counting house—and there it stays. This is why such ignorant heresies have, for the philosopher and politician, an interest far beyond that of mere doctrines. It is certainly not their theology which makes these sects of peasants, serfs but yesterday, so worthy of the student's attention—they claim it as symptoms of a peculiar mental state, of a social order of which nothing in the West can give an idea.

The *raskòl* (the word means *schism*) is not a sect, nor even a group of sects; it is an agglomeration of doctrines or heresies, frequently differing from, or indeed opposed to, one another, having only two things in common: their starting-point and their antagonism to the official Orthodox Church. In this one respect "*raskòl*" answers to "Protestantism." Far inferior to the latter in the number and culture average of its adepts, it nearly equals it in the abundance and originality of its forms. Here, however, the resemblance stops. In their rebellion against their respective mother-churches, both Teutonic Protestantism and Russian *raskòl* still retain each the stamp of its origin, the impress of the church from which it seceded, of the world from which it sprang. In Europe the greater number of modern sects are born of the love of speculation and criticism, of a free and investigating spirit. In Russia, on the contrary, they are begotten by ignorance and the spirit of reverence. In the West, the source of religious perturbations is the predominance of feeling over forms and externalities; in Russia it is the excessive attachment precisely to forms and externalities, to ceremonial and ritual. So that the two movements run inversely to each other, in opposite directions—which does not hinder them from sometimes getting to the same point. The reason is that, once having cast off the traditional authority which kept intact the unity of doctrine, the *raskòl* could not, any more than could Protestantism, build up within itself a new authority. Hence it was fatally drawn into free criticism, into individual fancies, consequently into diversity and anarchy.

Few religious revolutions have produced such complex results, yet not one was simpler in its primary cause. The innumerable sects which, for the last two centuries, have been stirring up the Russian masses have almost all had the same starting-point: the correction of the liturgical books. All these branches have sprung from one trunk. Only a few sects—not the least remarkable, by the way—were anterior or foreign to this reform. In Russia, as everywhere else, the Middle Ages were prolific of heresies. The

oldest could easily be bred of the contact between Greek and Slav, or of that between the Slavs and the ancestors or eastern brethren of our Albigenses, the Bulgar *Bogumils*. Other heresies sprang up later, in the north, on the territory of Nòvgorod, from contact with European and Jewish merchants. Of most of these little more is left than the names: the *Martỳnoftsy*, the *Strigòlniki*, the *Judaïsts*, etc. They were all seeing their last day when the *raskòl* broke out and gathered into its bosom all the formless embryonic beliefs, which the people enfolded. Some of these old sects, for instance the *Strigòlniki* and the *Judaists*, after disappearing out of history, even seem to have made an effort to reappear in certain modern sects, as though they had flowed on their course underground in the meantime.

In these obscure mediæval squabbles we can already detect the fundamental principle underlying the *raskòl*: the excessive reverence, even to the pettiest minutiæ, for letter-formalism. "In such and such a year," records a Nòvgorod annalist of the fifteenth century, "certain wiseacres commenced to sing '*O Lord*, have mercy on us!' instead of '*Lord*, have mercy on us!"* The whole *raskòl* is contained in this remark as in a nutshell. It is from such flimsy controversies the great schism was born which gnaws at the vitals of the Russian Church. We must remember that the people were half pagan still under their Christian veneering, and so the prayers—especially the short invocations—were to them something like magic formulas, the efficiency of which would be impaired by the least alteration. It almost seems as though the priest, to them, were still a sort of *shaman*, the ceremonies incantations, and the whole of religion a system of sorcery.† The attachment to rite—*obriàd*—is, as already noted,

* Schédo-Ferotti, *La Tolérance et le Schisme Religieux*, p. 33. This alludes to the response *Gòspodi pomìluÿ*, the equivalent of *Kyrie eleïson*, which recurs incessantly in the Slavic liturgy. Similar discussions on the *Allelujah* or other prayer formulas likewise occur long before the breaking out of the great schism.

† See the present volume, Book I., Ch. III., pp. 36 ff.

one of the Great-Russian's chief characteristics. The manner of Russia's conversion had something to do with that. The bulk of the people became Christian "by order," without having been prepared to receive the new faith,[1] without even having finally accomplished the polytheistic evolution which, with most other peoples of Europe, preceded the adoption of Christianity. Other nations slowly assimilated the spirit of Christianity after adopting, at first, its outer forms. Russia's geographical and historical isolation made this assimilation more difficult to her. Immense distances and the Tatar domination separated her from the centres of the Christian world; through ignorance and misery of all kinds, religion deteriorated like the rest. Theology was neglected;

[1] This is one of those sweeping mis-statements for which compendiums and handbooks are responsible, which serious historical research has long ago disproved, and which such eminent scholars as our author and A. Rambaud should not repeat unqualified. In consequence of the long and intimate commercial intercourse between the Russian Slavs and the Greeks of Byzance, greatly antedating the coming of Rùrik, Christianity had been slowly spreading precisely among the people, the masses, and gaining rapidly for the hundred years before Vladímir officially adopted it. It was the military nobility—the *drujìna*—who resisted the influence, and Vladímir, on taking possession of Kief, even attempted a pagan revival. But the human sacrifice which was perpetrated on this occasion brought matters to a crisis, almost causing a rising. Then he yielded to the spirit of the times, assisted by certain strong feminine influences in his own family: his grandmother Olga, "wisest of mortals," was a most zealous Christian and she had had the entire care of her grandchildren, their father Sviatoslàv (her son) being always absent making war. She was naturally most anxious to convert him. He resisted all her pleadings, but merely on the ground that his *drujìna* would laugh at him—and left her to the end to manage his house and govern his country. Then, too, one of Vladímir's wives was a Christian, his elder brother's widow, a Bulgarian nun, whom Sviatoslàv had taken out of a pillaged convent as his own personal booty, on account of her beauty, and brought home to his oldest son for his bride. Again, the reason why the general baptism had to take place in the Dniepr was that the numbers of neophytes desiring to be baptized was so great, out of all proportion to the very few churches then existing in Kief, and the small number of priests brought from Byzance. After that, it is quite possible that what was done spontaneously in Kief, was done not so willingly in Nòvgorod, where, owing to its remoteness from Greek centres, Christianity had as yet gained comparatively little ground.

nothing remained but worship—cult. In the midst of the general lowering of the intellectual standard, the knowledge of the rites and words which make up divine service was all that could be asked of a clergy, not all the members of which could read.

The Moscovite people's excessive attachment to their rites and texts was the more unfortunate that it was in great part misplaced: they had undergone many corruptions,—even to those of the liturgy itself, the object of the most superstitious reverence. Into all the books wrong readings had crept; local customs into the ceremonies. Copyists had introduced into the missals the grossest absurdities, preposterous interpolations; and these new readings were regarded by the people with the respect due to age. The corrupt and sometimes unintelligible passages were held all the more sacred for their obscurity. They were supposed to contain mysteries, recondite meanings were sought therein; on these adulterated texts theories were based, systems which sometimes became the themes of apocryphal books which impostors palmed off on the Fathers of the Church. Yet the alterations were so plainly visible that, as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Grand-*Kniaz* Vassíli IV. of Moscow sent for a Greek monk to revise the liturgical books. The blind reverence of clergy and people made a failure of the attempt. The corrector, Maxim the Greek, was pronounced a heretic by a council and shut up in a remote monastery.[2] It was the introduction of printing which brought about the final crisis.

[2] This most learned and virtuous Greek would hardly have been dealt with so severely, in the teeth, too, of all the dictates of international law and courtesy, had he not made himself personally obnoxious to the sovereign, the nobility, and the Church. He had spent ten years of his youth studying in Italy. In Venice he was assiduous at the lectures of his famous fellow-countryman Lascaris, and enjoyed the companionship of the illustrious Renaissance scholars who formed a sort of court around Aldo Manucci, the great printer and editor of the classics. But it was in Florence he met his fate in the person of Savonarola, whose preaching and personality struck the one live chord in his soul. He suddenly saw the world, its vanities and iniquities, with the prophet's eyes, and after Savonarola's tragic end, sorrow

The new discovery, as everywhere, caused the texts to be studied, and resulted in theological disputes. The missals issued from the Russian printing-presses of the sixteenth century at first made matters worse: by reproducing all the blunders and errors of the manuscripts from which they were set, they lent them authority and a wide publicity, substituting a seeming and most convincing unity and unanimity for the divergences and variations caused by the errors of individual copyists.

There seemed no remedy to the corruptness of the Slavic liturgy when, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Patriarch Nìkon determined to accomplish the much-needed revision. With his highly cultivated mind, his enterprising and inflexible character, Nìkon possessed all that was requisite to carry out such a resolve—knowledge and power, for his influence over Tsar Alexis was such that he could be said to rule the State almost as much as the Church. All the same it was a bold thing to undertake in Moscovia before Peter the Great. By the Patriarch's order ancient Greek and Slavic manuscripts were collected from all parts; monks from Byzance and Mount Athos were summoned and called upon to compare the Slavic versions with the Greek manuscripts, and the interpolations due to ignorance or fancy were expunged from the liturgical books. New missals were

and indignation drove him to Mount Athos, where he lived the life of a recluse and scholar. The call to Moscow was to him a sign from Heaven that he should not only pray and think, but do some active good. He followed in his beloved master's footsteps, and made it his mission to denounce every abuse or evil way he came across in the Moscovite Court or Church, with true Savonarolean vim. He filled the measure of his host's patience, when he, alone of statesmen and churchmen, protested against Vassíli's determination to repudiate his guiltless and inoffensive wife on the plea of barrenness and force her to take the veil, that he might marry Helena Glinsky, a noble Lithuanian lady (eventually the mother of Ivan the Terrible). Vassíli, who had so far protected Maxim out of respect for his virtue and learning, now thoroughly enraged, delivered him into his enemies' hands. He was a prisoner from 1525 until his death in 1556. His one prayer was to be sent back to the peace and seclusion, the blue skies and seas, of Mount Athos. But *he knew too much* to be allowed to recross the Russian frontier.

printed, and these Nìkon caused to be adopted by a council, which made the use of them obligatory for all Moscovite lands.*

"I was seized with a great trembling," writes a copyist of the sixteenth century, "and a great fear came upon me, when the reverend Maxim the Greek commanded me to erase several lines from one of our church books." The scandal was not less great under the father of Peter the Great: the hand which dared to touch the sacred books was, on all sides, denounced as sacrilegious. Yet the high clergy, whether from better knowledge or from a spirit of solidarity—*esprit de corps*—supported the Patriarch. But the lower clergy and the people everywhere strenuously resisted him. And now, after more than two centuries, numbers of the faithful persistently adhere to the old books and the old rites, consecrated by national councils and the sanction of patriarchs. This was the starting-point of the schism—the *raskòl*. Looking at it from the highest standpoint, the contest hinges on the vexed question of the transmission and translation of the sacred texts—a question which has more than once caused dissensions amidst the Western churches. In Moscovia, there were not ten men competent to pronounce an intelligent judgment on the substance of it; the quarrel was all the longer and more violent. Monks, deacons, even mere sacristans, denounced Nìkon's corrections as concessions to Rome or to Protestantism, indeed as a new religion. Against these mutineers the Church made use of the means employed against heretics all over the world: with no other success than to give an impetus to the schism by giving it martyrs. Ten years after the proclamation of the liturgical revision, a council solemnly deposed its bold promoter, who fell a victim to the jealousy of the *boyàrs*. Nìkon's disgrace appeared to justify the schism, for the condemnation of the reformer must, so they reasoned, involve that of the reform he

* Nìkon's corrections were not always sufficiently thorough to restore the purity of the texts. A new revision, therefore, has sometimes been proposed. But the success of Nìkon's undertaking is not exactly encouraging to would-be imitators.

advocated. Great, therefore, was the general stupefaction when the very same council hurled the Church's anathema against the opponents of the revision. The sanction given to this excommunication by the Eastern patriarchs weakened instead of strengthening its authority, because the dissenters argued that as the Greek and Syrian bishops did not know one Slavic letter, they had no right to pronounce any judgment upon Slavic books.

Used as the theological world is to subtilities, it never, perhaps, saw such interminable quarrels spin themselves out of such futile points. The shape of the crucifix and the manner of crossing oneself,—the direction of processions westward or eastward,—the reading of one of the articles of the creed,—the spelling of the name "Jesus,"—the inscription on the crucifix,—the repetition of the word "allelujah" two or three times,—the number of *prosforàs* or holy-breads to be consecrated;—such are the main points of the controversy which, since Nìkon, divides the Russian Church. To be honest, the points on which bore the first disputes between the Greeks and Latins were not of a much more serious nature. They were also alterations in the rite, which the Latins deemed permissible but which the Greeks denounced as heresies. In attaching so much importance to the ritual, the Moscovite schismatics (*raskòlniki*) merely walked in the footsteps of their Greek masters. In this sense the Russian *raskòl* is only a logical sequel—an exaggeration, let us say—of Byzantine formalism.

The Orthodox Russians make the sign of the cross with three fingers, the dissenters with two, like the Armenians. The former accept, as we do, the crucifix with four branches; the latter tolerate only that with eight branches—a cross-piece above the Saviour's head and one under his feet. The Church, since Nìkon, sings the "Allelujah" twice, the *raskòlniki* three times. The latter justify their stubborness on the ground of symbolical interpretations, of a simple rite they contrive to make a whole profession of faith. Thus they give the following explanation of the

sign of the cross as they make it : the three fingers bent down signify the Trinity, while the two raised ones allude to the dual nature of Christ, so that, without a word, the sign of the cross proclaims the three fundamental dogmas of Christianity : Trinity, incarnation, redemption.[3] They interpret in the same manner the two "Allelujahs" coming after the three "Glorias," and accuse their opponents of neglecting one of the great Christian dogmas. These interpretations, based on corrupt texts or alleged visions, show what singular mixture of dross and subtility the *raskòl* is made of.

Judging by the origin of the quarrel, the cult of the letter, the servile respect of form, is the essence of the Schism. To the Moscovite who rebels against Nìkon's reforms, Christianity consists entirely of ceremonies, and the liturgy is the whole of Orthodoxy. This confusion between the forms and the substance of faith is expressed in the names by which the dissenters call themselves : not merely "Old-Ritualists" (*staro-obriàd-tsy*), but "Old-Believers" (*staroviêry*), by which they mean "true believers," truly Orthodox,— for in religious matters, contrary to human sciences, it is always antiquity which makes the law ; even innovations are made in the name of the past. This is, in a way, true of the Greek Church in general, as she always gloried in her immobility and made loyalty to tradition the only criterion of truth. So that the Old-Believers, in refusing to submit to anything that even seemed like an innovation, only carried the principle on which their church is based to extreme lengths. They would not believe that their claim was unfounded and unjustifiable, that what they advocated as antiquity was really nothing of the kind, quite the contrary ; they were ready to suffer martyrdom for the sake of the old books, blind victims of Byzance's systematic immobility.

[3] It never seems to have occurred to them that their argument works both ways : why could not the three raised fingers signify the Trinity and the two bent ones the dual nature of Christ?

The principle of the Schism is essentially realistic. Yet, under this rank materialism in the forms a sort of crude idealism can be detected. Religious aberrations always have some nobility about them, even in their total unreason. The *staroviêr's* overscrupulous attachment to his traditional ceremonies is not all ignorant superstition. His low-bred heresy is, after all, only an excessive ritualism, logically carried *ad absurdum*. His great reverence for the letter comes from the deep-rooted conviction that letter and spirit are indissolubly one, that, in religious matters, substance and forms are equally divine. Christianity, to him, is something absolute : worship and dogma ; it is one complete whole, of which all parts are linked together ; no human hand can touch it, Providence's masterpiece, without disfiguring it. The *staroviêr* looks for a hidden reason to each word, each rite. He refuses to believe that any of the Church's ceremonies or formulas can be void of sense or virtue. He cannot admit that anything should be accessory, indifferent, or insignificant in the act of divine service. In holy things, all is holy ; in the worship of the Lord all is profound and mystical, uncommutable and adorable. Though unable to formulate his doctrine, the *staroviêr* has in his mind an ideal of religion as a sort of finished whole, an adequate scheme of the supernatural world. So that, once we really understand him, the Old-Believer who went to the stake for his way of crossing himself and let his tongue be torn out by the roots for a "double Allelujah," appears before us in his true light as an admirably religious man, led astray by what might be called excess of religion. His formalism is based on symbolism, or, more correctly, the *raskòl* is but symbolism run to heresy. Therein lies its originality, its value in the history of Christian sects. To these ultra-ritualists, ceremonies are not merely the outer garment of religion, they are its very flesh and blood ; without them, dogma is but an inanimate skeleton. It is, therefore, the direct contrary of Protestantism, which attaches little value to forms and externalities, looking on them as a frivolous adornment if not

a dangerous superfetation. Whereas to the *staroviêr* the ritual is as much an integral part of the sacred tradition as the dogma; as much the bequest of Christ and the apostles: the Church's mission is to preserve both equally intact.

Combined with the love of symbolism, this scrupulous fidelity to the external forms of worship does not always imply a servile spirit. Far from that, the propensity to allegorism, while guarding the letter so closely, sometimes takes singular liberties with the spirit of the texts and ceremonies. This is always the way with excessive symbolism. It makes of the ritual and the sacred books a sort of celestial riddle, to which imagination finds the key. In searching facts as well as words for a hidden sense, certain dissenters have gone so far as to allegorize the stories of the Old and New Testaments and transform all scriptural narratives into parables. A few have gone the length of seeing only rhetorical figures in the greatest miracles recorded in the Gospels.* Such a method of exegesis can lead to a sort of mystical rationalism; the forms of religion are in danger of becoming more solid than the substance, and the ritual of worship more sacred than the dogma. This is precisely what some of the extremists among the dissenters have arrived at. These ignorant people revelled in a perfect orgy of interpretation, which culminated in the most fantastical teachings and the most preposterous beliefs.

The Old-Believer is attached to his rites not only for the sake of the meaning he sees in them, but also for that of those from whom he received them. Men and nations have always gloried in keeping "the faith of their fathers." The very abuse which rhetoric has made of the phrase shows what a hold the thing has

* Dmitri, Bishop of Rostòf, who lived in the eighteenth century, tells us that certain sectarians even then taught that the resurrection of Lazarus was not a fact, but a parable. "Lazarus," they said, "is the human soul, and his death is sin. His sisters, Martha and Maria, are the body and the soul. His grave represents the cares of life; his resurrection is conversion. Again, Christ's entrance into Jerusalem riding a she-ass is nothing but a simile."

over the human heart. A people's religion is to them a sacred heirloom received from their ancestors and native land, and the feeling has nowhere been more strongly alive than in Russia, where it was further strengthened by an almost superstitious reverence for antiquity. Many sectarians, when asked what binds them to their creed, can give no other reason. Not later than the other day, some peasants, who were prosecuted for indulging in clandestine religious practices, replied to a judge of my acquaintance who was exhorting them :—"These rites were observed by our fathers. Let them transport us anywhere they will, so they let us worship as our fathers did." It is said that a similar answer was made to the Tsesarévitch Nicolas (the elder brother of Alexander III.) when he visited the dissenters' famous cemetery of Rogòj :—"Why do you repudiate our church?" asked the prince.—"Because we were taught so by our fathers and forefathers."

Nìkon's reform entailed a revolution in the most elementary devotional practices : the son had to unlearn the sign of the cross as taught him by his mother. In any country, such a change would have caused great perturbation—but in none so great as in Russia, where prayer, being accompanied by inclinations of the body and multitudinous signs of the cross, constitutes a sort of material rite. The people would have none of the new sign of the cross and the entire new liturgy. Little they cared that Nìkon's rites should be older than theirs. The ignorant know of no antiquity but that of fathers and forefathers; and these had taught them minute observances for every hour and every act of their lives. A book of the sixteenth century, the *Domostròy* or *Manual of House-Rule* shows to what extent formalism reigned in old Moscovia. The religion recommended by the author, who was no other than the virtuous priest Sylvester, the preceptor of Ivan IV., consists first and foremost in the scrupulous accomplishment of external practices. The model Christian of this code of Moscovite piety and decorum is he who stands straight

and stiff during divine service ; who kisses the crucifix, the *eïkons*, the relics, keeping in his breath, without parting his lips ; who, morning and evening, performs three salutations before the home *eïkons*, each time touching the floor with his forehead, or at least bowing as low as the girdle.* To all these ancestral usages the *raskòlnik* makes it his boast to adhere faithfully, not only in religious matters, but in all things. In certain localities he has preserved with almost equal care the old domestic customs, the rites observed on civil holidays, the legends of the past, including songs and traditions of heathen origin. So it was that Hilferding could collect his finest *bylìnas* or epic ballads among the *raskòlniks* of Onéga, † and that A. Petchersky, in the semi-pagan spring festival, detected what he felt sure was an echo of Slavic poetry of remotest times, antedating the introduction of Christianity. In the *izbà* of the Old-Believers the ancient customs were found intact, as though embalmed in superstitions.

One of the characteristics of Eastern Orthodoxy is, as already mentioned, its propensity to assume national forms, and break itself up into local churches, with each its own liturgic language.‡ Nowhere is this tendency more marked than among the Russian Slavs. The *raskòl* is, in a way, only the consequence or culmination of this nationalism. It is born of the national liturgy, of Slavic missals. Church Slavic became to the Russian the veritable sacred tongue. He identified Orthodoxy with his old books and his apocrypha, and would not believe either the Greeks or the texts, even though their testimony was appealed to by his own patriarchs. His Slavic missals were to him as Holy Writ. He saw in the Church only a local, national institution, and entirely lost sight of her catholic, œcumenic qualities. He would hear of nothing but his own church, his own liturgy, traditions, and obstinately intrenched himself in them, as though revelation had been

* See, in the *Bibliothèque Universelle*, Lausanne, May, 1887, Mr. Léger's study on domestic life in Russia.

† See A. Rambaud, *La Russie Épique.*

‡ See the present volume, Book II., Ch. II.

conveyed to man in Old Slavic, or Russia had been the one and only fold of Christ. This led to the saying that the *raskòl* was not only the Russian's old creed, but his own distinctive creed.

The Moscovite of the seventeenth century was all the more tenaciously attached to the external forms of worship, that Moscow was ever on the watch against the Pope's and the Jesuits' efforts to convert her, or, at least, bring her to terms. The Russian had every reason to fear that, if he allowed his traditional ceremonies to be tampered with, he might be *romanized*, and, like the Uniates of Poland, be unwittingly incorporated in the spiritual empire of the popes. It was out of blind fidelity to Orthodoxy, that the Old-Believer rebelled against the Orthodox hierarchy. In their dread of any taint of corruption touching the Church, the people and clergy looked with suspicion on all foreigners, even on their own brethren in the faith, whom the tsars or patriarchs called in from Byzance or Kief. Having remained, alone of all Orthodox peoples, independent of both Catholics and infidels, the Russians looked on themselves as the people chosen of God to preserve the true faith. In their animosity against the West, its churches and civilization, some Old-Believers anathematized the West's scholarly, theological language. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, one of their writers indignantly denounced the Orthodox priests of Little-Russia, many of whom, he said, "studied the thrice-accursed Latin tongue." He accused them of not regarding as guilty of mortal sin whoever called God *Deus* and the Father *pater*. The outcry made by the *staroviêrs* at the correction of the name of Jesus reveals the same spirit. They persist in spelling and pronouncing it *Issùs*, repudiating as diabolical the correct Greek form *Iissùs*.[4]

It was against the foreigner, against Western influence, that the people rose when they rebelled against Nìkon. When they

[4] *Ιησους*—the long *η* (*ê*) being pronounced short in modern Greek—exactly like the initial *I*, which it thus repeats or doubles, giving "I-issùs," instead of "I-essùs."

accused the Patriarch of leaning towards Latinism or Lutheranism, the Old-Believers did not call their feeling by the right name. It was not Western theology, it was Western culture and the Western spirit which Nìkon and Tsar Alexis were borrowing, perhaps unconsciously. The beginning of the schism coincides with the inauguration of foreign influences in Russia. Not accidentally ; but because the schism was the countershock of the Romànofs' European reforms. Nìkon's work, which has sometimes been ascribed to the Patriarch's vanity, his wish to show off his literary culture, was really the forerunner of the great coming revolution, a symptom of the new-born interest in the West, where, about the same time—for instance in England,—similar reforms were giving rise to similar quarrels. When he called in criticism and erudition to regulate devotional practices, the whilom hermit of the White Lake (*Biêlo-òzersk*) was yielding to the influence which, under Alexis' immediate successor, the elder brother of Peter the Great, was to bring about the institution of a theological academy in Moscow, a sort of ecclesiastical university, on the model of that of Kief. A wind from the West was beginning to blow across the Russian plains, touching with its breath the Church as well as the State. It was in the religious domain that European imitation first made itself felt, and it was there it encountered the most tremendous obstacles. From the historical point of view, the schism is the resistance opposed by the people to the ideas imported from the West. This characteristic, Peter the Great brought out fully into light ; of a theological revolt he made a social and civil revolt.

BOOK III. CHAPTER II.

Origin and Character of the Schism; its Political Causes—It is a Reaction against the Reforms of Peter the Great and his Successors—It is the Protest of the Old-Russians; Personifies Resistance to Modern State Forms—Peter's Innovations Denounced as a Sign of the End of the World; himself Looked upon as Antichrist—The Era of Satan—Condemnation of all Usages Posterior to Nìkon and Peter the Great—Struggle for the Beard—The *raskòl* and the Popular Grievances against Serfdom and Bureaucratic Despotism.

ALTHOUGH originating merely from a revolt of Moscovite formalism against the correction of the church books, the Schism received, from the European reform of Peter the Great, renewed vigor and higher aims. The opponents of the liturgical alterations introduced by the Patriarch Nìkon were joined by the adversaries of the political changes introduced by Peter and his successors. The Schism took the proportions of a national protest against the imitation of foreign things, a popular protest against the transformation of Russia into a modern state. The *staroviêr*—the Old-Believer—embodied the opposition of Byzantine Russia to new-fangled ways and Western importations.

Peter the Great was, not by any wish of his own, the second promoter of the Schism. It is difficult in these days to imagine anything like the impression which this sovereign made on his subjects. It was not merely amazement, stupefaction,—it amounted to scandal. The country's customs, traditions, prejudices, were by him attacked openly, systematically, at times with something

very like brutality. And it was not secular institutions alone with which he dealt thus summarily—he handled the Church, invaded the home, regulating private life to suit his whim, as he did public affairs. In the Russia made over new by Peter, the Old-Moscovite hardly knew his own country ; he felt out of place in his native land. Foreign garbs shocked his eye, a foreign administrative nomenclature was discord in his ear. Perturbation was everywhere, in things and names, in the calendar as in the laws, in the alphabet as in the fashions and costume. It was decreed that the first of January should be New Year's day instead of the first of September ; that time should be dated not, as heretofore, from the beginning of the world, but, after the manner of the Latins, from the birth of Christ. The old Slavic script, consecrated by the old missals, changed its shape ; several letters were cast out by the sovereign's express order. The men's garb was altered, their chins were shaved, the veil was torn from the brow of the women. What feelings could such a succession of shocks arouse in the breast of a people passionately devoted to ancestral custom? It was nothing less than an earthquake, which shook Old-Russia to her bases.

Of these innovations, all borrowed from the West, in other words from the Latins or the Protestants, a great many had, for the people, a religious bearing. By meddling with the old calendar, the Slavic script, the national garb, Peter made himself in his subjects' eyes the continuator of the revolution initiated by Nìkon. The similarity was so obvious, that the Old-Believers saw in his acts nothing but a sequel and consequence of the Patriarch's acts. This idea took shape in a seditious legend which made of Peter Nìkon's illegitimate son, the child of adultery. The repulsion felt against the Patriarch's innovations was superadded to that inspired by the Emperor's ; opposition to civic reforms was strengthened by resistance to the liturgical reform. Rebellion took the cloak of religion, because it had been provoked in the first instance by an ecclesiastical measure, and still

more because Moscovia had not yet outgrown the stage of culture where every great popular movement assumes a religious form. By appealing to the people's consciences the Schism lent popular prejudice a vigor and enduringness which two centuries could not wholly overcome, and gave it the prestige of nationality.

It was not merely against Peter's foreign innovations, it was against the very principle which underlay his reforms, against the abstract idea and the practical proceedings of the modern State, that the *raskòl* rose up in arms. What the Moscovite,—like the Moslem of the present day, like all peoples who have not yet reached a very advanced stage of culture—what the Moscovite chiefly saw in government practices imitated from Europe, was—extra burdens and vexations of all sorts. In this respect, the *raskòl* embodied the resistance of an immature society, half patriarchal as yet, against the regular, scientific, and impersonal forms of European states. It has an instinctive repugnance against centralization and bureaucracy, against the State's encroachments on private life, the family, and the commune ; it strives to struggle itself free from the ruthless machinery which grinds everybody's life in its iron wheels. As the Cosack, with his fierce love of freedom, sought the steppe, so the Old-Believer refused to submit to all that complicated organization : census, passports, government stamped paper—all these novel forms of taxation and military service he would not hear of. To this day there are *raskòlniks* who live in a state of systematic rebellion against the most elementary proceedings of state life. As usual, they contrived to justify their dislikes on religious grounds. They have theological objections against the census and the registering of births and deaths. The strict *staroviêr* holds that God alone has a right to keep such a register,—witness the Bible and the punishment inflicted on David. The mere administrative nomenclature frequently adds to the conscientious scruples of these simple men, inclined as they always are to exaggerate the value of words and

names. Hence, in part at least, the people's repugnance against capitation— the "soul-tax," as they call it.*

In their blind struggle against State overseership and interference, certain sects have gone so far as to refuse to submit to such obligations as every civilized country imposes on its inhabitants. The "Wanderers"—*Stràvniki*—in particular openly declare themselves at war with the secular authorities, and erect rebellion into a moral principle and religious duty. The State, condemned at first as the auxiliary of the Church, subsequently was denounced for its own tendencies, its own claims. Strange to say, the extreme dissident sects came to look on their native country's government much with the same eyes as the early Christians looked on the Roman Empire, while it was still pagan. To these fanatics the government of the Orthodox tsars became the rule of Satan —not in the way of metaphor, but as a settled belief, a dogma.

For the total upsetting of public and private manners under Peter I., for all that they looked upon as the triumph of godlessness (*bez-bòjiyé*), the dissenters could account in one way only: the coming of the end of the world, of Antichrist. So great had been the general upheaval in the Russian lands, that it seemed as though all things were to be engulphed: the Church, society, nay, all mankind. "The end of the world!" this has, for centuries, been the cry in which culminated the anguish and dread of Christian people. After resolutions or disastrous wars, we have seen, in the most enlightened countries of Europe, devout souls, seized with panic, account thus for the sufferings of the Church or their native land, and, like the prophets of the *raskòl*, announce that the end was near. What must it have been in Russia, when everything seemed about to be crushed under Peter's ruthless hand! Already at the time of Nìkon's reform, fanatics had declared that

* The opposition of certain *raskòlniks* to the poll-tax or capitation was the more strenuous from the fact that, in the intervals between one census ("revision") and the next "dead souls" were paid for: this is the subject of Gògol's great novel. To tax the dead seemed to these pious hearts the height of sacrilege.

the Patriarch's fall was the forerunner of the end of the world. "The days of man are numbered," they said; "the time of anguish depicted in the Revelation has arrived; Antichrist is about to appear." And when Peter came, upsetting all things before the eyes of a people incapable of understanding him,—cynically treading under foot the old customs and the old morality, the *raskòlniks* had no difficulty in recognizing in him the Antichrist whose coming had been predicted. Such is the obtuseness of popular vision: the maker of modern Russia was regarded by a notable portion of his own people as an envoy from hell, and the Russian Empire has ever since been anathematized, as the kingdom of Antichrist, by a portion of its own subjects.*

The reformer's own personality did lend itself in certain ways to this satanical apotheosis. He was a stumbling-block. Not only his civic and church reforms, not only the abrogation of the patriarchate which seemed like beheading the Church for the benefit of the throne—but his personal conduct and that of his associates were, to the masses, a riddle, and not an edifying one. His repudiation of his legitimate wife Eudoxia,—his connection with a foreign woman of doubtful character,—the death of his son Alexis, whose blood was said to be upon his hands,—even to his peculiar state of health and the nervous twitchings of his face, even to his prodigious victories after as many astounding defeats, —everything contributed to cast a sort of diabolical glamour around the reformer's fierce and gigantic figure. Ivan the Terrible's vices had been many, but even in his crimes Ivan had been a genuine Moscovite, devout and superstitious as the last of his subjects.

The general terror and stupefaction were all the greater for the profound reverence which the Russians bore their princes. Could such a man—such a "vessel of iniquity," such a "ferocious

* Whether he knew or not that people saw in him an incarnation of the Evil One, Peter the Great had the foresight to get Stepàn Iavòrsky to publish a treatise on *The Signs of the Coming of Antichrist* (1703).

wolf,"—be the *real* tsar, the "White Tsar"? Had he not himself cast off the national and biblical title of "tsar" in use among Slavs, to assume the outlandish and pagan one of "imperator"? The memory of the usurpers and the false Dmitris was still fresh. The unhinged fancy of an unlettered people forthwith created legends which made their faith in the reign of Antichrist consistent with their loyalty. Thus the *raskòlniks* circulated fanciful stories which have been secretly transmitted down to our own day. Some would have it that Peter was the sacrilegious bastard of Nìkon, the Patriarch—and what could the issue of such stock be but a limb of Satan? According to others, Piòtr Alexéyevitch was a pious prince like his fathers; but he was lost at sea and a Jew had been substituted for him. When he took possession of the throne, the false tsar shut up the tsarìtsa in a convent, killed the tsarévitch, married a German adventuress, and deluged Russia with foreigners. Such fables perfectly accounted to a *staroviêr's* mind for this monstrosity: a Russian tsar playing havoc with all the old customs of Holy Russia. In the course of this very nineteenth century, the most trifling as well as the greatest incidents of Peter's life, his vices as well as his glory, have been put forward as proofs of his nefarious mission. If, after terrible disasters, he gained brilliant victories, he was working miracles by the aid of the devil and freemasonry *(farmazia)*. If he surpassed in might all the Russian sovereigns and all the epic heroes *(bogatỳrs)*, it was because Satan rules the world and his minister was sure to be worshipped in it as a god. The simplest facts are twisted in this manner. If Peter assumed the title of "most august" and took to celebrating the new year on the 1st of January, with festivals and allegorical pageantry, it was because he intended to restore the cult of the false gods and "the ancient Roman idol Janus." * In these laughable inventions, in this in-

* All these allegations are found in a work written about 1820 and published in London in 1861, under the title of *Collection of Texts from the Scripture about Antichrist*, in the second vol. of Kelsief's *Collection of Government Information on the Schism*, vol. ii., pp. 254, 260.

capacity to comprehend that a heathen name or emblem may be used without for that returning to paganism, we recognize one of the *raskòl's* fundamental traits—its realistic symbolism, its material literalness in dealing with images, words, allegories.

The presence of Antichrist being once ascertained, the sinister predictions of the prophets were easily enough applied to Russia and her government. With their passion for seeking mysterious riddles in names and numbers, the fanatics found no difficulty in discovering the entire Revelation in modern Russia. They sought for the number of the Beast in the very names of Peter and his successors. As each letter has, in Slavic as in Greek, a numerical value, all that was needed was to add up the letters of a name until the total gave the apocalyptic number 666. (Revelation xiii., 18.) By intercalating or suppressing a letter here and there, and putting up with approximate figures, the sectarians have discovered the diabolical figure in the names of most Russian sovereigns, from Peter the Great down to Nicolas. They contend that such alterations are permissible, because the Beast falsifies the figure in order to escape notice, so that it really can be identified under 662 or 664 just as well as under 666. From each individual sovereign they pass on to the imperial title in which they have triumphantly hunted out the Beast. As ill luck would have it, the word *imperator* does give the desired number, *if* the one letter *m* is thrown out; hence they say that Antichrist hides his accursed name in the letter *m*.* By a no less peculiar and unfortunate coincidence, the council of Moscow which, after Nìkon's deposition, finally excommunicated the Schism, took place in 1666. The date contained the fatal figure bodily; it was revealed to the *raskòlniks* through the calendar reform, when Peter substituted the era dating from Christ's birth for that dating from the creation of the world. They were greatly struck by this discovery; it was an arrow out of their adversaries' own quiver. From this year they dated Satan's accession. Not content with

* Kelsief's *Collection*, vol. ii., p. 257; also vol. i., p. 179.

having thus made of their sovereigns a line of ministers of the demon, some of these defenders of Old-Russia made of their own native land, by means of an anagram, the mysterious accursed country of Holy Writ: by spelling Russia *Russa* (instead of *Rossía*) they identified her as the *Assur* of the Bible, and applied to her all the maledictions hurled by the prophets against Nineveh and Babylon.

But it was not only in the names and title of their sovereigns that the *raskòlniks* found the countersign of hell; they found it in all their innovations, all their importations from abroad. Russia being under the rule of "the devil, son of the demon," the true believers were bound to reject everything that had stolen into their country "in the years of Satan." Firmly anchored to this idea about Antichrist, the *raskòl* declared war against European reforms, and the modern state, and any and everything that came from the West, everything that was new, including articles of material use and scientific discoveries. While Europe was enriching herself with the products of the two Indies, the Old-Believer obstinately shut his door against them. He condemned the use of tobacco, of tea, coffee, and sugar; in fact he denounced colonial produce generally as "heretical and diabolical." Everything that was posterior to Nìkon and Peter the Great was proscribed. Did not one sectarian warn his people against travelling on paved roads, because they were inventions of Antichrist! Another, more recently, taught that the potato was the apple with which the Serpent had tempted Eve.

Thus the Old-Believer raised around himself a high wall of prejudice and religious scruples, and excommunicated civilization wholesale. To Peter's ordinances enjoining his subjects to change their way of dressing, to use the new calendar and the new alphabet, the *raskòl* replied by issuing a new decalogue: "Thou shalt not shave. Thou shalt not smoke. Thou shalt not eat sugar," etc. In the North, where they are more numerous and strict, many dissenters would not to this day touch to-

bacco, "the thrice-accursed herb," or sweeten their tea with sugar. For all this they bring Scripture authority, and their arguments are generally grossly materialistic. For not smoking they refer to the text: "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him; but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man." (Mark vii., 15.) They add that the man who smokes makes himself like unto the devil, whose mouth exhales a pestilential smoke. Sugar is condemned on the ground that blood is used in refining it, while Scripture forbids man to feed on the blood of animals—a prohibition which appears to have been respected in Russia longer than in any Christian country. The *staroviêrs* have a saying, that "he who smokes tobacco drives away the Holy Ghost; he who takes coffee will be struck by lightning; he who takes tea will not be saved."

Apart from all theological arguments, the real reason of the *staroviêr's* objection to this or that ware, this or that usage, is its novelty, its recent introduction in Russia. In his manner of living no less than in matters of faith, in the food on his table no less than in the forms of his worship, his one idea is to do just as his fathers did. One day two friends—one Orthodox, the other a dissenter—were drinking together. The former took a cigar. "Out on the diabolical poison!" cried the dissenter.—"And how about wine?" said his friend.—"Wine? why, wine was prized by our forebear Noah," replied the other.—"Well," his friend caught him up, "prove to me that Noah did not smoke!" To these people, who are still patriarchal in their ways and views, antiquity is the law from which there is no appeal. "Mock not at the old," is one of the dissenters' aphorisms; "for they know about old things and teach righteousness."

In every conflict, whether political or religious, parties need a banner, an outer sign visible to all, easily understood of all. In the same way that, by several modern countries, political or social questions are symbolized in the color of a flag, so in Russia, in the struggle between popular stubbornness and the European

propaganda, the beard became the rallying sign of the Old-Russians, the emblem of nationality and ancestral custom. The war about beards was not so puerile as is usually given out. Long before Peter the Great, the imitators of the West had begun to shave, contrary to the Oriental practice in vogue among all classes of the Russian people. Already under the reformer's father, Alexis, one of the leaders of the *raskòl*, the *protopòp* Avvakùm, denounced men with "libertine faces," *i. e.*, with smooth-shaven faces. As usual, religious scruples were put forward: in the first place the prohibitions in Leviticus,* then the old missals, and the ordinances of the *Stoglàf* ("Hundred Chapters"), a sort of ecclesiastical code ascribed to a national council. At first only the clergy had been forbidden to cut off their beards, but the prohibition gradually extended to all Orthodox Christians. One of Ivan the Terrible's objections in his discussions with the Jesuit Possevin was that the Latins shaved and allowed their priests to shave.† The patriarchs, who up to Nìkon were hardly less devoted to formalism or less opposed to any kind of foreign importation than their future adversaries, the dissenters, had condemned beard-cutting as "an heretical custom which disfigures man created in God's likeness and likens him even unto cats and dogs."‡ This is the main theological argument against the barber; this the way in which they interpret the words of Genesis "in the likeness of God made he him." To combat this singular piece of exegesis, one of Peter the Great's bishops, Dmitri of Rostòf, composed—but in vain—a *Treatise on the Image and Likeness of God in Man.*‖ "The image of God is the beard,

* "Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard." (Leviticus xix., 27; comp. xxi.,). From this passage the Jews also derive their great reverence for beards.

† Possevin was happy to be able to inform Ivan that Pope Gregory XIII. wore a full beard. See Lerpigny, *Un arbitrage Pontifical au Seizième Siècle*, p. 120.

‡ Soloviòf, *History of Russia*, vol. XIV., pp. 277-278.

‖ Certain dissenters declared to this same prelate: "We had as lief have our heads cut off as our beards."— "But will the head grow again?" retorted the bishop.

and his likeness the whiskers" (moustache), wrote a dissenter as late as 1830. "Look at Christ and the saints on the ancient *eïkons*," further argued the Old-Believers; "they all have beards." In order to refute them, the Orthodox theologians had to hunt for the very few beardless saints to be found in Byzantine iconography. At bottom, it is still the same attachment to forms, the same symbolism under the guise of realism. As these simple men will not allow any alteration in the text of the divine word, so they will not have God's living work touched. As they insist that each word, each letter of the service, must have its own proper value, so they do not admit that the hair with which the Creator has furnished the human countenance should have no special significance. It is in their eyes the distinctive mark of the masculine face, the natural sign of man's superiority over woman; to shear it off means to disfigure the work of God; it is a sort of mutilation and emasculation.*

Like the "double Allelujah" and the cross of eight branches, the beard has had its martyrs. In Petersburgh itself, in the reign of Alexander II., in 1874, a naval recruit obstinately refused to let the razor approach his face, and rather than go against his religion he suffered himself to be sentenced to several years of prison, for mutiny. Such incidents induced the government to allow certain army corps to wear beards—for instance the Cosacks—and those corps are mainly composed of Old-Believers. There was nothing Peter the Great did not try, to overcome this repugnance. He failed signally—the beard was too much for him. At last, finding he could not shave all the rebels by force, Peter

*The following anecdote will show the line of argument followed by the Old-Believers and their opponents. On certain holidays the Dissenters and the Orthodox of Moscow used to hold public disputations in the Kremlin: "Man," once said the champion of the former, "was created with a beard; consequently, to shave is to disfigure the likeness of God."—"Not at all," replied the Orthodox champion; "man was created beardless; his beard grew after the fall. See the age of innocence—see the children: they are born without a beard; they get one only at the age when they begin to sin. Consequently, by shaving man returns to his original condition."

bethought him of creating a tax on long beards; and the most ardent defenders of old customs, the *raskòlniks*, were to pay a double tax: it was no use. When he forbade them from residing in cities, when he deprived them of their civil rights and made them wear a badge of red cloth on one shoulder, he only pointed them out to the people's veneration as the most courageous representatives of the national traditions. In the course of time the numerous laws anent beards and beard-wearers entered in the Code were perforce allowed to fall into disuse.

In view of this attitude towards such a matter of form, the social character of the Schism can hardly be mistaken. It is a popular protest against the invasion of foreign manners, a reaction against Peter's reforms, somewhat after the same manner that modern ultramontanism is a reaction against the Revolution. The *staroviêrs* are the champions of ancient custom as well on social as on religious ground. The Old-Believer is the unmitigated Old-Russian, the Slavophil of the people, consistent *usque ad absurdum*. In his revolt against authority he is not so much like the Jacobin as he is like the man of the Vendée. He represents the refractory Muscovite element which refuses to be amalgamated through all the transformations of modern Russia. It is the Russian who repulses Europe and holds to Asia. In this sense, the Schism is the most Oriental thing there is about Russia.

Like the East, it is wedded to outer forms, it glorifies immobility and persists in casting modern society into the old traditional mould, though it should petrify therein. Like the Oriental—or like a child—the *raskòlnik* places wisdom and knowledge at the dawn of culture; holds that the fathers were better than their sons, that the old way of living was preferable to the modern. He carries his respect of the past, his passion for antiquity into domains which have nothing to do with religion; or, more correctly, this feeling for the past lies at the bottom of his religion.

Looked at from this point of view, the Old-Believer is decidedly retrogressive, opposed to progress on principle; he is the hero of

routine, the martyr of prejudice. His eyes are habitually turned backwards; if he dreams of reform, he means a return to the good old times. He has not changed one jot in his conception of sovereignty. "A tsar, not an emperor," such is the political watchword of a majority of the dissenters—as of the people generally. Alexander II. was pointed out to a recruit—a *raskòlnik*: "That is no tsar," he declared; "he has whiskers, a uniform, a sword, like all our officers; he is just a general like the rest."—To these worshippers of the past, these devotees of ceremonial, a tsar is a man with a long beard, long robes, as in the ancient pictures. The Old-Believers are the incarnation of that stationary spirit which the Russian government must perforce take into account. The blind resistance opposed to the liturgical reform shows what obstacles may even yet be encountered in the nation by measures which, anywhere else, would be the simplest thing in the world.*

In its principle the *raskòl* is conservative, indeed reactionary; in its attitude towards Church and State, in the habits it has contracted through two centuries of opposition and persecution, it is revolutionary, at times to the verge of anarchism. There is a connecting bond between all authorities; reject one, and you will reject the others. Once a man has set aside one authority, says the historian Soloviòf, † he feels inclined to cast off all control, to break free from all bonds, social and moral. Thus the Hussites, rebelling against Rome, quickly end in the Taborites rebelling against society; thus Luther leads to the Anabaptists. The same phenomenon is enacted in Russia, as it was in England and Scotland. Once carried away by the spirit of revolt, the Schism ran wild and some of its sects arrived, in fact as well as theory, to the most unbridled licentiousness. Here we meet with another of those contrasts so frequent in Russia, a seeming anomaly, which has caused the *raskòl* to be judged in so many different ways in

* See present volume, Book II., Ch. IV.

† *History of Russia*, vol. xiii., p. 143.

its own native land. In all these views, even the most opposed, there is some portion of truth. This movement, reactionary at the start, could very well come to be regarded as a vindication of individual liberty and national life as against autocracy and the government. And in fact it was precisely that, after the manner of smugglers and mutineers, in defence of abuses and prejudice. What the *staroviêrs* claimed was indeed liberty as the uncultured understand it—liberty to act and live as they pleased, liberty to treasure their superstition and ignorance—a liberty that has nothing to do with political liberties. While rejecting all that comes from abroad, the Old-Believer can advocate reform in what he thinks conducive to the people's interests—those of the peasant and artisan, in conformity with national tradition. Like every popular movement, the *raskòl* is essentially democratic; in some of its sects it has even reached socialism and communism.

Two things especially contributed to give it this democratic character, which, in a sense, can even be termed liberal: the enslavement of the peasants and bureaucratic despotism. The Schism broke out about half a century after serfdom was established: it was no mere coincidence. It owed much of its popularity, of its vitality, to this wholesale enslavement of the nation. The serf took comfort in having a different creed from the masters', and slavery is, all over the world, a soil in which sects grow rank. It was an unconscious protest of the bondsman's free soul, his human dignity, against the master, the State, the Church. It was this dignity, this freedom, which the Old-Believer defended in his beard and his manner of crossing himself. To all the oppressed the *raskòl* opened a moral haven, sometimes even a material shelter, free to all the contemners of masters and laws, to the runaway serf as well as to the deserting soldier, to public debtors, in short to all who were proscribed for some reason or other. From this point of view, it was an unconscious form of opposition to the bondage of the soil and an all-powerful bureaucracy. Hence it is that the Old-Believers are most numerous

wherever abide the most unruly elements of the Russian people: in the North among the free peasants, the old colonists of Nòvgorod; in the South among the free Cosacks of the steppes. Religious and civic opposition joined forces and mutually strengthened each other. In this union lay the might of the great popular movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the mutinies of the *Streltsŷ* to the rising of Stenka Ràzin and Pugatchòf. In its causes and its excesses, the rising of Pugatchòf is singularly like those of the Western "Pastoureaux" and Anabaptists, at a time when serfdom prevailed in all Europe. In the great Russian *jacquerie* and in all the insurrections which promised deliverance to the people, the Old-Believers always played as prominent a part as the Cosacks, who for the most part shared their creed. Between these two forms of national resistance there is a natural affinity: both equally embody the genius and prejudice of Old Russia; both were, first and foremost, a popular protest, so that the Old-Believer might be said to be a religious Cosack, who carries into the spiritual sphere the instincts of the wild horsemen of the Don.*

* The *skits* or anchorites' settlements of the Old-Believers have frequently served as centres to the most ardent defenders of Cosack autonomy. See Vitefsky, *The Schism in the Army of the Uràl (Raskòl v Uràlskom Vòyskié).*

BOOK III. CHAPTER III.

Evolution of the Schism—General View of its Progress—Its Strictly Logical Development—The Old-Ritualists Have No Clergy—How can Worship be Kept up and the Sacraments Administered without a Hierarchy?—The *Raskòl* Separates into Two Groups: the *Popòftsy* and the *Bezpopòftsy*, Those that Have Priests and Those that Have not—Starting-Point of the Two Parties—What can be Substituted for the Priesthood and the Sacraments?—Results at which Extremists Arrive: No Priests, No Marriage—How Account for the Disparition of the Sacraments?—By the Coming of the End of the World; The Reign of Antichrist—To Escape from it Certain Sectarians Have Recourse to Violent Death—Redemption by Suicide and "Fiery Baptism"—The Millennium and the Coming of a New Messiah—How Napoleon was Sometimes Taken for that Messiah—Hopes of a Millennium and the Emancipation of the Serfs—Comparison between Russian and American Sects.

NOTHING is more strictly logical than are religions, nothing so consistent in making deductions as the theological mind. Religious thought moves in an ethereal vacuum, in a mystical obscurity, where no obstacle hinders its flight; material facts are powerless to stay it; nothing can turn it from its course. In the *raskòlnik*, the logic peculiar to the theological mind is strengthened by the innate logic of the Russian mind. For one of the distinctive traits of the Great-Russian character is a love of close reasoning. The Russian delights in getting out of a principle everything it can be made to yield; he does not shrink from going the whole length of his ideas, from carrying an argument to its extremest deductions. This is one of the causes of sectarianism, of the manifoldness and spontaneity of the singular doctrines which agitate the people. If this logical bent often leads to absurdity and grotesqueness, it gives a curious regularity to the

progress of the Schism, even in its deviations. For in its very diversity it maintains a remarkable unity. It is with this spiritual movement as with a physical phenomenon : disorder, accident, are only seeming ; the point of departure being known, the point of arrival and all the complications along the way might have been foretold. The sects issued out of the main trunk of the *raskòl* may look like a veritable chaos ; yet, to grasp the mysterious bond of co-ordination between them, it is sufficient to look down on them from the vantage-ground of the historical point of view.

The Moscovite Schism was, from the beginning, confronted by a dilemma which might have nonplussed men of a less robust faith. The Old-Ritualists rose in defence of ceremonial and ritual, yet they found themselves forced to dispense with both, from a lack of priests to carry them on in the proper way. At the very outset the defenders of the old creed were disabled from practising it. When Nìkon carried out his reform, only one bishop, Paul of Kolòmna, stood up for the old books. He was imprisoned and died—possibly not a natural death—without having consecrated any bishop. By this one fact the Schism found itself without episcopate and, consequently, without a priesthood. The chain which reached down from the Saviour was broken, the Schism was forever cut off from the power which Christ bequeathed to His apostles, which can be transmitted only by uninterrupted imposition of hands, and without which there can be neither priest nor church.

The *raskòl* seemed lost from its first steps, so to speak stillborn. It was cornered and, as it would not retrace its steps, it had only one alternative to choose from : either admit priests ordained by a church which it disapproved of, or do without priests, although in that case it could not celebrate the very acts of worship on account of which the secession had taken place. Both solutions were almost equally contradictory, yet both had their partisans. At this first stumbling-block, the Schism sepa-

rated into two groups which, for two hundred years, have remained hostile. "There is no Christianity without a priesthood," said one group; the Russian Church, "for having followed Nìkon's heresy, has not forfeited the apostolic power, *cheirotony*, the right of consecrating bishops and ordaining priests by the imposition of hands. Their ordinations being valid, all we have to do in order to have a clergy is to bring back to us and the ancient rites the priests of the official church." "Not so," reply the others; "by giving up the ancient books, by anathematizing the ancient traditions, the Nikonians have forfeited all right to the apostolic succession. The official clergy is no longer a church, it is Satan's synagogue. All communion with these ministers of hell is sin, consecration at the hands of these apostate bishops pollution. By sanctioning the anathemas hurled by the Russian prelates against the ancient rites, the Eastern patriarchs have become participators in their heresy. With the fall of the episcopate, Orthodoxy has perished. There is no longer any apostolic succession, any lawful priesthood."

In its very first generation the *raskòl* thus found itself divided into two parties: the *Popòftsy* or "Hierarchists," who persist in having priests, and the *Bez-popòftsy* or "No-priests," who repudiate all priesthood. In order to have *some* kind of a clergy, the *Popòftsy* were compelled to take deserters from the official church and thus remained to a certain extent dependent on that church. We shall see how, about the middle of the present century, they succeeded in procuring an episcopate of their own and an entire independent hierarchy. By keeping a priesthood, however ignorant and scant in numbers, they preserved intact the sacraments and the whole economy of Orthodox Christianity. In spite of the inconsistency of admitting the priests of a church which they rejected, they could keep to the starting-point of the Schism and need not depart from the ground taken by the original Old-Believers.

As to the *Bez-popòftsy*, it is almost impossible to find a halting

point on the declivity down which they speed, carried away by an inexorable logic. In renouncing the priesthood, they renounce Orthodoxy, or at least its worship and forms. The loss of the sacrament of ordination involves that of all the sacraments which must be administered by priests. Of the seven traditional channels of divine grace, only one—baptism—remains open to men ; the other six are choked and dried up to all eternity. Thus the *Bezpopòftsy* arrived at one stroke at the annihilation of the very principle of Christian worship. To save all the rights, they sacrificed the most essential ; for the sake of the sign of the cross with two fingers and the "double Allelujah," they rejected the sacraments, without which there is no Christian life, no visible bond between God and man. By way of protest against some slight alterations in their devotional practices, they abolished the sacred ministry and divine service, and opened wide the door to all the vagaries of sectarianism. By their stubborn attachment to antiquity they laid themselves open to indiscriminate innovation.

The miserable solution at which the "No-priests" arrived could not satisfy the love of ceremonial and tradition which had given rise to the Schism. How were they to fill the void left by the disparition of the sacraments and priesthood? The ancient Orthodox law, though not abrogated, had become impracticable. The abyss down which they had allowed themselves to be precipitated was deep and dark enough to daunt the most resolute sectarians. And now, among these rebels who were agreed on one point, there soon sprang up discord and dissensions,—hesitation and compromises in one quarter, in another wild dreams and extravagant, sometimes savage, doctrines.

The more timid would not believe that a Christian could live and be saved without the means of salvation instituted by Christ ; they tried to find substitutes for the lost sacraments. In their forlornness they sought comfort and self-delusion in all sorts of inventions and contrivances, even to sham sacraments. Having no ordained priest to give them absolution, certain sectarians confess

to their elders, even to women, and the confessor, not being competent to remit the sin, promises forgiveness in the name of God. Deprived of the eucharist, these souls, hungering for the flesh and blood of Christ, had recourse to rites of their own invention, which were to serve as reminders of the divine sacrament. Some clothed this pseudo-communion in graceful forms, others instituted terrible and bloody ceremonies. One sect partook of raisins distributed by a young maiden ; with another (connected, it is true, only indirectly with the *raskòl*), it is said that a young virgin's breast supplied the elements of the eucharistic food. One group of *Bez-popòftsy*, known under the name of "Gapers," contends that Christ cannot deny to the faithful the flesh and blood He gave for men. At their Holy Thursday service, they stand with mouth agape, expecting that angels, the only ministers left to God, will come and allay their spiritual hunger and thirst from an invisible chalice.

Such were the various ways by which the more tender or exalted souls strove to escape from the spiritual abyss into which the Schism had precipitated them. Very differently acted the more resolute ones, the stricter theologians, who drew after them the majority ; for in religion, logic takes the lead of feeling, the head silences the heart. They shrink from no consequence of their doctrine, and reject all pious stratagems. There is no priesthood any more, nor are there any sacraments, except the one and only one which laymen can administer—baptism. Sham sacraments are no good. These holy bonds by which the Church bound earth to heaven are broken ; nothing short of a miracle can restore them. In the meantime, all true Christians are like wrecked mariners cast on a desert isle, without a priest among them. There is no eucharist any more, no penance, no holy chrism ; and—worse still—there is no marriage. For the priest can alone give the nuptial benediction : no priests—no matrimony !

Such is the Schism's last consequence, such the cliff on which the "No-priests" come to grief : no marriage ; consequently there

is an end of family, of society. How reconcile the human heart with such a doctrine? what becomes of the social order, of morality itself? Marriage is the stumbling-block of the *Bez-popòftsy*, the central tangle of all their disputes and disagreements; on this one point they break into the wildest aberrations, here and there corrected by the queerest compromises. The more practical retain the conjugal relation as a social convention; the more logical erect celibacy into a universal obligation. Asceticism is not always the gainer thereby. As has frequently happened in the history of religions, lust and mysticism sometimes contract a monstrous alliance. Some have practised and preached free love, the free union of the sexes, the community of women. Some of the grossest heresies of antiquity and agnosticism have been known, in these depths of the Russian people, to get mixed up with modern utopias. The majority of the "No-priest" theologians do not indeed fall into such excesses, but they uphold the prohibition of marriage, and in so doing put forth the wildest maxims. Debauch, in their eyes, is but a momentary weakness, a lesser sin than marriage, which, being forbidden by their creed, is a sort of apostasy. They reverse the moral code, preferring concubinage to marriage, and libertinism to both. "Better"—one of their sternest doctors* cynically declares—"better live with a beast than with a pretty girl; better have secret commerce with many women than cohabit with one openly. "This is where the most scrupulous defenders of the old rites have arrived. For the sake of a few ancient ceremonies, they stepped out of the pale not only of Christian, but of natural morality. These sects, from being at war with the State and modern culture, end by denying *in toto* the very principle of society.

The most fanatical of men cannot arrive at such conclusions without a feeling of terror, and the *Bez-popòftsy* feel impelled to

* Kovỳlin, quoted by N. Popòf, in his book: *What is Contemporary Russian Old-Ritualism?* (*Shtò takòyé sovremènnoyé staro-obriàd-tchestvo v Rossii,*) p. 34.

justify their actions to themselves: Christ, they argue, has forsaken the Church and mankind. How could He rob them of the sacraments and the means of salvation which He Himself had bequeathed to them? How allow the hand of the godless to break the bond with which He Himself had bound man to God? This terrible riddle admits of but one solution. This downfall of the priesthood and the Church, this triumph of iniquity and untruth, have been predicted by the prophets. The hour foretold in the Scriptures has struck, when the saints themselves shall be shaken, when God shall seem to deliver up His children to the Enemy. A priestless church is the widowed church announced by Daniel for the latter days of the world. Thus the Schism arrived by a new road, that of theology, at the conclusion which we showed it to have reached through its aversion to the reforms of Church and State—the belief in the reign of Antichrist. It has begun—such is the fundamental doctrine of the *raskòl* and especially of the "No-priest" section of it. By the light of this new dogma all contradictions are explained and solved. We clearly see why there can no longer be either priesthood or family. What is the good of uniting oneself to a woman? Why help propagate the human race, when the trumpet of the angel may at any moment proclaim the end of all flesh?

That the end of the world was near, had been announced even before Peter the Great's time, and now, nearly two centuries after him, the descendants of the Old-Ritualists who had made the announcement are not yet weary of looking for it. The *raskòlniks* are like the Western Christians of other times in that they are cunning at finding reasons for the delay and do not waver in their belief. Many have come to regard the reign of Antichrist as a sort of era or period which may last for ages. It is to them one of the three great epochs of mankind's religious existence and, like the two others—that of the old law and that of the new law, (the old and new dispensations)—it has its own law, which abrogates the preceding ones. It should be noted, however, that the

deserters—even the "No-priests"—are far from being agreed on this question of Antichrist. Most of them admit his reign, but, as far as we can judge, they understand it in different ways. The Old-Believers who still recognize a priesthood and the more moderate of the others picture the reign of Antichrist as a spiritual, invisible one: it is unwittingly and against their will that the State and the Established Church act as the ministers of hell. The extreme sects, on the contrary, hold that Antichrist is ruling the world materially, in a corporal and palpable manner. It is he, as already mentioned, who, since Peter the Great, sits in the throne of the tsars, and it is his sanhedrin which holds its sessions under the name of Holy Synod. From a theological point of view, the difference is trifling; it is most important politically. With the sects which consider it as merely blind and led astray, the State can, after all, agree on some basis of mutual understanding, hit on a *modus vivendi* of some sort; with those which look on it as a diabolical incarnation, no peace or truce is possible on any terms.

The belief in the reign of Antichrist could not but lead ignorant peasants into the most frantic freaks of thought. The world being ruled by "Satan the son of Beelzebub" (*Satanà Veelzevùlovitch*), all contact with it is a defilement, all submission to its laws a cowardly concession, an apostasy. To escape the diabolical contagion, the best means is isolation, seclusion in closed retreats, flight into desert wildernesses. So great was the horror which took possession of these perturbed souls that many could see no refuge but death. To abridge the time of trial, to make a way out of this condemned world, killing and self-destruction were systematically resorted to. Fanatics, under the name of "child-killers" (*diêtoubìitsy*), made it their task to send to heaven the innocent souls of new-born babes, and thus spare them the anguish of living under infernal rule. Others, called "chokers" or "clubbers" (*dushìlsh-tchiki*, *tiukàlsh-tchiki*), believe they are doing their parents, relatives, and friends a service by saving them

from dying a natural death, and hastening the end when they are dangerously ill. Interpreting literally, in a spirit of fiercest realism, the text, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and men of violence take it by force" (Matthew xi., 12), they assert that heaven is only for those who die a violent death.

These Russian fanatics little knew that, at the distance of some fifteen centuries, they were reproducing African horrors. There were those in Africa then, who burned themselves to death or sprang into the sea from high cliffs, to die the death of martyrs —sectarians who, like the *Philippoftsy*, preached redemption through suicide. Some of these chose steel, some starvation, but the greater number fire. Voluntary death in common was considered the most meritorious act. Whole families, sometimes whole villages assembled together to offer themselves to God as a burnt-offering. The voluntary victims constructed a barricaded enclosure, within which they could perform the ghastly rite undisturbed. Frequently the prophet, the apostle who had recruited them, was present and saw that there was no weakening among them, keeping away the profane and preventing the flight of such as might yield to the faint-hearted temptation of escaping and returning to this sinful world. In the reign of Alexander II., a peasant of the name of Khòdkin is recorded as having prevailed on some twenty persons to retire with him into the forests of Perm and there starve themselves to death. He directed them to construct a grotto in which he shut them up, after they had all donned white shirts, the emblem of purity. The weaklings, the children, who had not the moral energy to stand the tortures of hunger, he kept in the grotto by force. At length two women managed to escape, when the fanatics, fearing they might be denounced and brought back under the rule of Satan, slaughtered one another, sons killing their mothers and fathers their children.

Death by starvation being slow and the victims liable to recant, the *Philippoftsy* usually preferred the "fiery baptism." Besides, fire alone seemed to them capable of purifying from the stains

contracted in this world since it had fallen under the domination of the Evil One. The head of a family would take his wife, his children, his friends, and shut himself up with them in his cabin after heaping straw and dry brushwood all round it. A preacher would set fire to the pile, talking loudly to encourage the victims, and, if necessary, pushing them back into the blazing pyre. At the time of the great persecutions in the eighteenth century, these human sacrifices used to be performed wholesale. The sectarians sought in the flames a refuge from the pursuit of soldiers, the temptations of the trial and of torture. There has been more than one such *auto-da-fé*—veritable "acts of faith," —in which as many as a hundred and two hundred persons perished at once. The number of Christians who died in this manner in the Urâl and on the confines of Siberia, is estimated at several thousands. The "self-cremators" (*samo-sojigàteli*) would huddle together on large piles of wood surrounded with deep ditches and stockades, to make desertion impossible.

Such doings are not unknown to the nineteenth century. Instances are mentioned as late as the reign of Alexander III. In 1883, a peasant, Jùkof by name, burned himself, singing hymns to the last. The "bloody baptism" or "red death," considered no less efficient than the "fiery baptism," is even less rare. It is the favorite way for parents desirous to save their children from the snares of the Prince of Darkness. In 1847, a peasant of the government of Perm determined to send his whole family to heaven at one stroke; but the axe dropped from his hand before it had done the dire work, and he gave himself up to justice. Another peasant of the government of Vladímir, indicted for killing his two sons, explained that he wanted to save them from sin, then starved himself to death in prison, in order to join them.

There is a symbolical legend, told in verse by a *raskòlnik* poet, the legend of "the woman Allelujah," composed to vindicate these ferocious proofs of parental affection. "The woman Allelujah," on a winter day, is sitting before the blazing oven, with

her son in her arms, when lo ! the infant Jesus steps into the *izbà*, begging to be sheltered from the enemies that pursue him. The woman vainly looks for a hiding-place. "Cast thy son into the oven" says Jesus; "and take me in thy arms in his stead." She obeys, and when the "enemies" arrive, she shows them the oven in which her child is being consumed; but when they are gone, she begins to weep and wail, mourning for him. "Look into the oven," says Jesus, to comfort her. She looks and beholds a cool garden, wherein her son disports himself, singing, with the angels. Jesus leaves her, after commanding her to teach the faithful to pass through the fire the innocent flesh of their infant children. And many are found, who are willing to act on this Moloch-like command. A peasant woman, after thus offering to God her little girl, openly declared: "I have followed in the footsteps of the woman Allelujah. Let us rejoice—the child has ascended into the kingdom of heaven." In 1870, a peasant attempted to reproduce the sacrifice of Abraham: he tied down his seven-year-old son on a bench and cut him open, then kneeling before the holy *eïkons*—"Dost thou forgive me?" he asked the child, who was still breathing.—"I forgive thee, and God forgives thee," replied the victim, who had been prepared and had consented to the sacrifice.*

One kind of folly breeds another. The belief in the actual presence on earth of Antichrist leads to that in the approaching renewal of the earth—the second coming of Christ and the Millennium. Thus it is, that Millennianism and Messianism have invaded the extreme sects of the "No-priest" section, which, through this belief, joins hands with Gnostic sects, although these are of very different origin. Russian realism, like many early Christian heresies, puts an entirely material interpretation

* See especially the studies of Mr. Prugàvin (*Rùsskaya Mỳsl*, January.—July, 1885). Similar cases sometimes come before the courts. Thus in Odessa, in the one year of 1879, were tried: a case of "self-scourging" or flagellation (*samo-bitchevàniyé*) and "crucifixion" (*razpiàtiyé*); a case of suicide by fire, and one of mutilation "out of piety."

on the prophets and on the Book of Revelation. The *mujik* looks forward to the establishment of a temporal kingdom of Christ, and discounts in advance the power promised to His saints. Such a creed opens the door to prophetism with all its accompanying frauds and crazes. In the face of the Code which condemns false prophets and false miracles, the country is travelled right and left by alleged seers, who proclaim the second coming of the Lord, or, indeed, give themselves out for the expected and announced Messiah. Or else, simple souls wander forth to look for the Redeemer. Under Nicolas, certain Siberian sectarians who called themselves "Christ-seekers" (*Iskàteli Khristà*) contended that the Saviour had surely reappeared on earth, and were roaming through forests and wilds in search of Him. In other parts, peasants have been known to refuse to pay the taxes, on the ground that Christ had come, and all taxes were abrogated by His coming. In many villages, the peasants have spent nights in prayer, in expectation of the Judgment-Day trumpet's blast.

It is now a mere peasant, now a prince, foreign or national, whom the Russian sectarians take for their Messiah. Some greeted the announced liberator in Napoleon I. Regarding the Russian Empire as the kingdom of Antichrist, there was no reason why they should not hail as a saviour, him who came to chastise the pride of *Assur*. In the invaders of incinerated Moscow, in the great promoter of the liberation of serfs all over the world, many then thought they recognized the lion of the valley of Josaphat, the conquering Messiah of the prophets. This singular sect, it is said, pay secret homage to images of Napoleon, whose busts are nowhere in such demand as in Russia. Equally with these plaster casts, they honor engravings representing the emperor in the midst of his marshals, all hovering above the clouds in a sort of apotheosis, which, with their usual realism, the Russian Napoleonists take literally. This is what they call "his ascension to heaven." It is asserted that this engraving was made especially for them, and that it is to them a rallying token. They

are convinced that Napoleon is not dead. He escaped from St. Helena, and found a refuge in Siberia, by Lake Baïkal, whence he is to return one day, to overthrow the throne of Satan and establish the reign of justice and of peace.

At the bottom of all these millennial dreams was the hope of the suppression of labor-tasks and tribute (*obròk*), of the enfranchisement of the peasants and an equitable division of lands and the good things of this world generally. Such an evangel, in which promises of freedom combined with dreams of a vague sort of communism, could not but appeal strongly to crowds of serfs. Similar dreams have caused, in the West, the risings of the French *Pastoureaux* or "Shepherds" in the Middle Ages and of the Anabaptists in Germany in the sixteenth century: they must vanish gradually along with the bondage which begot them. This age of liberty, this kingdom of God, dimly perceived by the *mujik* in the promises of his prophets, has arrived at last; the Messiah, the liberator of the people, has appeared and his reign has begun. The actual enfranchisement of the serfs has struck a heavy blow at these millennial and messianic fancies; it is now for the progress of learning and prosperity to finish them.

The sects of which we have just sketched the evolution appear to us often ridiculous and always childish. We are tempted to look with contempt on a people who can be the dupe of such aberrations. This would be a mistake. Feeble human reason has everywhere readily accepted extravagance if it came under the cover of religion. There are countries that have culture older and more general than Russia, yet are hardly wiser in this respect. The Russian *raskòl* has its counterpart in the sects of England and the United States. Many are the analogies between the Puritans and the Old-Believers. For religious eccentricity, the Anglo-Saxon can compare with the Great-Russian. Russians are fond of discovering resemblances between their own country and the great American republic: this is not one of the least of them. Like the serfs of old Moscovia, the citizens of the Union have their

seers and seeresses. There is no such absurdity, no such immorality that does not find preachers and proselytes among them. To what is attributable this singular similarity between the two greatest states of the two continents? to the genius of the people and a mixture of races not yet well amalgamated? to peculiarities of soil and excessive climatic contrasts? or to the very vastness of the territory and the diffusion of men over immense areas? or yet to the too rapid growth, the ill-balanced temperament of the two colossi, the insufficiency of primary instruction in the one and the mediocrity of higher education in the other?

In certain respects, it is true, the principle of sectarianism appears different, almost contrary, in the democratic republic and the autocratic empire. In the United States, this exuberance of religious thought, these theological debauches, come from an excessive individualism, from a spirit of initiative and innovation, from habits of independence and recklessness, transferred from the province of politics or industrial enterprise into that of religion. In Russia, on the contrary, if the popular mind has run riot in the sphere of religion, it is because that sphere was so long the only one open to it, the only field on which it could disport itself with any freedom. The theological fancies and vagaries which, in the one country, appear to be a consequence of the social status, are rather a reaction against it in the other. In this respect Russia has an advantage over America, which is that her people is more primitive, nearer to nature, and on the whole more childlike. Now there are diseases which it is better to go through with before the body is finally formed, which come easier in childhood or adolescence than at a maturer age. The Russian people has not yet passed the age at which religious fevers and mystical attacks are habitual visitations. It will come out of it some day: the precocious scepticism of so great a portion of the educated classes sufficiently shows that the Russian genius is far from being fatally condemned to credulity and superstition.

The *raskól* is not merely a morbid symptom, nor is it a sign

of intellectual debility. If it does no great credit to the mind of the people, it does, immensely, to their conscience and will power. The Old-Believers show the vigor of character and the sense of duty which, no less than intellectual power, constitute the force of nations. And this is the nation which has so often been accused of servility and lack of personality ! Under the dull and flat surface of the political community, the sects take us down to the resisting hard-pan bottom of this seemingly inert people ; they show its originality, its individuality, its independence where things are concerned which it really has at heart. This firm and patient energy, the initiative occasionally displayed in these religious conflicts, all this is a native fund on which the Great-Russian will draw some time for other purposes, in other spheres. The revolt of so great a portion of the nation against the liturgical reform is alone sufficient to prove that this people is not the stolid and indifferent herd as which Europe has so long been pleased to regard it. Here is at least one ground on which its conscience has cast off the bondage of temporal authority, on which autocracy is not all-powerful. If mere alterations in rites have raised such a storm, what would happen should more deep-reaching alterations be attempted? Far from being an ever docile mass, devoid of will and spontaneity, this people has shown, even in its religious aberrations, a singular capacity for organization, a remarkable faculty of free association. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to examine into the constitution and resources of the principal dissident sects.

BOOK III. CHAPTER IV.

Number of the *Raskòlniks;* Difficulty of Finding it out—Little Value of Official Statistics—Disguised *Raskòlniks*—Prestige of the Schism for the Uneducated—Geographical Distribution of the *Raskòl*—Recruited mainly among the Great-Russians—The Old-Believers as Agents of Colonization—Their Colonies outside of the Empire—The Strength of the Schism does not Lie Entirely in the Number of its Adherents—Moral Superiority of the Old-Believers; it does not Come from Religious Causes Only—Their Material Prosperity—The Causes thereof—Their Importance in Commerce—Part Played by Money in their Communities—Culture of the Old-Ritualists—In what Manner the Necessities of Religious Polemics have Given them a Taste for Learning—Characteristics of their Erudition—How Primary Instruction is Insufficient to Effect their Intellectual Enfranchisement.

How many *raskòlniks* are there? This is the first question that suggests itself and the most difficult to answer. Official statistics, indeed, give the census of all the religions professed in the empire; the *raskòlniks* have their column, but the figure given for them is not even approximative; it is not quite 1,500,000.* Competent men,—statisticians first among them—are unanimous in rejecting this statement, in declaring it notoriously short of the truth; but they disagree about the figure to be substituted for the official one. Some think the latter should be doubled or trebled, but the majority assert that to multiply it fivefold, sixfold, would hardly bring it near the real number. Many are of opinion that we should make it twelve million souls and more—possibly more than fifteen millions. The absence of anything like positive data accounts for these divergences. One of the most eminent Russian statisticians told me he had consulted on this subject dissident leaders

* About 1835, the synodal reports showed not quite 480,000 dissenters of all sects; and they pretended that thousands were converted each year.

who had come to Petersburgh on business relating to their religious affairs. "There are many of us," was their reply; "*how* many, we do not know." Nobody knows, and in this obscurity lies not only one of the *raskòl's* chief peculiarities, but one of the sources of its strength.

Government statistics give as dissenters only such as have for several generations contrived to elude the parish registers of the Orthodox clergy. That, naturally, is but a small number. In addition to these declared *raskòlniks*, there are those whom public documents continue to number among the Orthodox; there are all those who are dissenters in secret, and keep quiet from fear of pursuit; there are, lastly, all the secret and forbidden sects which hide persistently from the light. In the absence of a reliable census, there is a class of documents from which some approximate data on the number of the dissenters can be extracted: they are the reports of the High Procurators of the Holy Synod on the use of the sacraments in the official churches. Already Peter the Great's Ecclesiastical Code taught that the surest sign to know a *raskòlnik* by, was his staying away from communion. Now, on the official lists, among the persons registered as not having approached the eucharist, there have these many years been certain categories, which looked as though they might belong to the Schism. A searching investigation of the lists of confessions and communions led to the estimate of nine or ten millions as the probable number of dissenters (about the year 1860).* At the present day, this figure would doubtless be behind the truth. The number of Old-Believers increases with every year, if from no other cause than the natural one of excess of births over deaths; it has been noticed that the Dissenters have, in this respect, the advantage of the Orthodox. Then, to the self-confessed Old-Ritualists, who refuse to attend the services and to receive the sacraments of

* Schédo-Ferroti, *La Tolérance et le Schisme Religieux en Russie*, pp. 153, 154. Count Perôfsky, Minister of the Interior, in a secret report to Nicolas I., had already arrived at the same figure.

the Established Church, should be added the timid or shame-faced ones, who, to escape vexations, continue to receive the eucharist from the priest, saving their consciences by taking communion according to their own rites later, in secret. To this day there are many of these "non-resistants," as they have been named by their co-religionists. It follows from all this that the number of dissenters of all kinds can scarcely be estimated at less than twelve or fifteen millions. Half of these may be credited to the *Popòftsy* or Hierarchists—the section which retains a clergy; the other half would be divided between the *Bez-popòftsy* or "No-priests," and the mystic and rationalistic sects. If, however, it is difficult to determine the entire number of dissenters, it is still more so to fix that of the various sects.

But numbers alone cannot give an adequate idea of the importance of the Schism. It is not with the Russian *raskòl* as with most established religions: its influence could never be gauged by figures. The *raskòl* is not always plainly a church, a confession adopted by so or so many million souls; it frequently is merely a tendency, something like a declivity down which slide many who have not forsaken official Orthodoxy. The *raskòl's* strength lies possibly not so much in the adepts who openly profess it, as in the masses who covertly sympathize with it. This sympathy is easily accounted for by the fact that old-ritualism sprang spontaneously from the depths of the people, that it is the product as well as the glorification of popular manners and notions. Instead of a feeling of repulsion, such as rebels and heretics should inspire, the peasant, the workingman, who has never left the pale of the Church, mostly has one of respect towards the Old-Believers, whom he regards as better Christians, more pious and more fervent, similar to those of the early ages and, like them, persecuted for their faith. In certain localities we are confronted by the singular opinion that official Orthodoxy is good for the lukewarm, that it is a worldly religion in which it is difficult to attain salvation, that the holy and true Christian religion is that of the *staro-*

viêrs. "Who fears God does not go to church," is an Old-Ritualist saying; many so-called Orthodox seem to be of the same opinion. A high functionary who was sent, towards the end of the reign of Nicolas I. to make a secret investigation concerning the *raskòl*, tells an instructive story to the point: "When I entered a peasant's *izbà*," he says, "I frequently was met with these words: 'We are not Christians.'—'What are you then? infidels?'—'No,' they would answer, 'we believe in Christ, but we follow the Church. We are of the world, given to vanities.'—'How then are you not Christians since you believe in Christ?'—'Those are Christians who have kept the old faith. They do not pray in the same manner that we do; but we have not the time to pray like them.'" This *naïve* self-accusation of men who avow their respect for the Schism even while they protest that they do not belong to it, shows what deep roots it has in the popular mind. Right or wrong, a large portion of the nation is supposed to be inclined that way. That is a serious thing, and therein, perhaps, lies the main obstacle to the complete emancipation of the Old-Believers. There is the secret fear that, on the day when every one will be free to openly become one of them, the Established Church may lose one quarter, possibly one half, of her children. The government appears to delay the experiment until the bulk of the nation has become more firmly anchored to the Church, either through greater enlightenment or through indifference.

The Schism is far from being evenly distributed among the different provinces and the different races. It is most widespread among the more energetic and more genuinely Russian populations—the peasants of the north, the old colonists of Nòvgorod, and the miners of the Uràl, the pioneers of Siberia and the Cossacks of the southeast. It belongs essentially to Great-Russia, the Moscovia of the first Romànofs. Of all the races—Slavs, Finns, Tatars—which people the vast empire, the Old-Russian alone is a born sectarian. There are Old-Believers of various

denominations in Little-Russia, in White-Russia, in Poland, in Livonia, in the midst of Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant populations, but they are always colonies of Great-Russians, who live by themselves, apart from the natives. In all these countries, as well as in Siberia and the Caucasus, it has been remarked, that the Dissenters do not proselytize, or, if they do, it is generally only among Great-Russians—soldiers, for instance. This characteristic is so pronounced that it amounts to an ethnical distinction, a sign of race. The question suggests itself whether this queer sect growth is really a product of the Slavic soil, or whether it has its roots in the Finnic subsoil of Great-Russia. The fact remains that this proneness to sectarianism is pretty strictly confined to the least Slavic limb of the Slav trunk. Yet one dares not pronounce it a Finnic or Turanian trait, because both the pure and the russified Finns appear to be free from it. Some few sects have indeed been unearthed in Finland, but there is nothing there to compare, in spontaneity and importance, with the Russian *raskòl*. Quite recently some sects have sprung up also in Little-Russia—the *Stundists*, for instance—but they are sects with rationalistic tendencies, born under Protestant influences, and it has been repeatedly observed that the Little-Russian has not the same liking as his brother of the North for dogmatical argufying.

Cultured and sceptical Russians are fond of saying that the Great-Russian, with his inveterate sectarianism, is the least religious of the Russian Slavs. There is here a curious contrast, but hardly an absolute contradiction. The principle of the *raskòl* is not exclusively religious ; it is first of all formalistic, realistic, and realism, of its nature, is not particularly religious. Indeed, in this excessive devotion to the forms of worship, one might perhaps see a sort of infirmity, of religious incapacity.

Among the Great-Russians themselves, each of the two branches of the Schism has its own region, its own preferred domain. Both prevail especially in those parts of the empire where the population is least dense, the parts farther away from the cen-

tres—the forests of the north, the steppes of the south. We do not mention Moscow, which has once more become the centre of the *raskòl*, as of Russian life generally. The hierarchical sects—the *Popòftsy*—are more numerous in the centre and the southeast; the "No-priests"—*Bez-popòftsy*—in the north. The latter are dominant among the peasants of the basin of the White Sea, in Siberia and the Uràl, the former among the Cosacks, along the Don, the Lower Volga, and the river Uràl. Soil and climate, history and manners, account for this distribution. If the Old-Believers are more numerous in the remoter regions, it is because the ancient manners and customs have been better preserved there; because, away from the state centre, the sects had a better chance to get organized and be propagated. As to the predominance of the "No-priests" in the northern governments, we must remember that Christian churches have, almost everywhere, shown more secular tendencies under the ruder northern skies than under the milder southern climes.

In the Russian north, the anti-sacerdotal sects were more especially favored by the extent of the territory, by the poor quality of the soil, and by the extreme thinness of the population. In those huge northern governments, one of which, Arkhangel, is equal in size to France and Italy put together, while several others, like Vòlogda and Perm, are equal to England or Hungary, the number of parishes and priests has always been insufficient. Sacerdotal influence suffered in consequence and religion became, in a way, secularized. To this day the extent of the parishes is such, that in several it takes a day's journey to go from any point of the circumference to the centre. With a population thus dispersed, with roads impracticable for several months, church is virtually out of reach of the majority. The people seldom do go to church, and the priest's assistance cannot always be obtained even for the most solemn acts and occasions of life. In the gallery of a wealthy *staròviêr* of Moscow, I was much struck with a picture representing a funeral in those regions of the far north. In the midst of

an immense snow-clad plain, a woman is taking a wooden coffin to some remote cemetery on a low peasant's sleigh. It is a scene which aptly embodies the desolate life of those vast regions where the priest was made inaccessible by distance even before he was rejected by heresy. Lost in these wilds, men huddled together in small groups and were compelled to find all their resources in themselves, to provide for all their own needs, spiritual as well as material. Even before the Schism broke out, the peasants used to build chapels, where they would read and chant the prayers together, the more learned teaching the others. They thus learned to dispense with priests practically, before they were taught to do so as a matter of doctrine.* Russian writers belonging to different schools, Khomiakòf and Kelsief among others, attributed this predominance of the "No-priest" persuasion in the north of Russia, to the influence of the Protestants of northern Europe. This is a far-fetched hypothesis.† The *raskòl*, in its most radical branch as in its point of departure, is essentially indigenous, autochthonous; it is the unadulterated product of local habits and manners. In Nòvgorod the *Strigòlniki* professed, as early as the fourteenth century, doctrines very similar to those of the modern *Bez-popòftsy*; they repudiated the clergy's authority long before the apostles of the Reformation were born.

* To this day such involuntary "No-priests" are sometimes met with, especially in Siberia. An Orthodox priest, Father Gùrief, told in 1881, in the *Rùsskiy Viêstnik* (*Russian Messenger*), how the Bishop of Tomsk once deputed him to examine some dangerous sectarians, who had been arrested by the police and sent up to the episcopal city to be "exhorted." Father Gùrief reports that these good people, carried away from their homes, turned out to be harmless Orthodox peasants who, living in a remote hamlet, out of reach of any church, had concluded, rather than do entirely without divine service, to have some of their own number officiate. In Siberia, adds Father Gùrief, many such unwitting sectarians might be found.

† With certain Russians, especially Khomiakòf, these assertions are part of a system. Khomiakòf, one of the leaders of Slavophilism, looked on Protestantism and the spirit of heresy as the logical product of "Romanism." According to him, nothing analogous could come out of Orthodoxy; therefore he was driven to ascribe the origin of the Russian sects to foreign influences.—See Khomiakòf, *The Latin Church and Protestantism from the Point of View of the Eastern Church.*

It were of the greatest interest to have a graphic presentation —a map—of the Schism. The atlases which give the different creeds, usually mix up Orthodox Russians and Russian sectarians. The Bureau of Statistics did lately plan a special map of the *raskòl*, and I have held the rough draft in my hands ; I don't know whether it ever was published. On this map Moscow figures as the religious centre, the ecclesiastical metropolis of the Moscovite Schism. Around the ancient capital the schismatic mass describes a sort of circle, darker and closer towards the north, the east and the south, narrower and lighter, almost open towards the west, the recently annexed provinces. From the heart of old Moscovia, we see the *raskòl* reaching out to Europe in long, thin threads, which connect it on one side with the Baltic lands and Prussia, on other sides with Austria and Turkey as it used to be. A glance at such a map might make one think that the Schism has its roots in Europe : no such thing. These long threads are not roots ; they are shoots from the Moscovite trunk. Within the first century of the Schism many of its adherents sought peace abroad, on Swedish and Polish soil, in Austrian and Turkish lands. These colonies have kept their ground on these different points, without mixing with the local elements, and the sectarians at home never severed their relations with their brethren abroad. Hence these lines, which, running more or less continuous, connect the Moscovite Schism with Europe. They indicate the various stages of emigration among the schismatics ; they mark the habitual route of the emissaries who keep up the communications between these foreign colonies and the dissident centres of Great-Russia and, incidentally, the Old-Believers' strongholds and the lines along which their propaganda is carried on.

Here the Schism appears under a new aspect—as an agent of emigration, of colonization. From this point of view as from several others, the Old-Believers have played a part not unlike that of the English Nonconformists, the Puritans. They could not, it is true, sail across the seas, and found on another continent

an empire to suit their ideals; but they had, within their own country, an almost indefinite field for emigration. By seeking, in the solitudes of forest and steppe, a refuge against vexations and persecutions, the Dissenters have notably contributed to spread the Russian nationality over regions which, until lately, were almost exclusively Asiatic. Now as voluntary emigrants, now as exiles transported by decree of the authorities, they are settled in the remotest provinces, in the Uràl and the Caucasus, among Catholics in Poland, among Protestants in the Baltic Provinces, and among Mussulmans in the East. The foreign colonies afford shelter and safety in cases of extreme distress. The principal stronghold of the *Popòftsy* section was for many years situated in Poland, at Vetka (present government of Mohilef). To destroy it, the troops of Anna Ivànovna and Catherine II. twice violated the Polish frontier (1735 and 1764). In a small town of Bukovina, under the Austrian flag, the *staroviêrs* succeeded, under Nicolas' very eyes, in constituting an episcopal hierarchy of their own. In the Baltic Provinces and in Lithuania, that vast belt of lands annexed in the eighteenth century, the *raskòlniks*, formerly established under the sceptre of Sweden or Poland, are even yet almost the only settlers of Great-Russian stock. These have been brought back by political vicissitudes under the talons of the imperial eagle; but some of them were recalled by Catherine II., and settled, under certain pledges of partial tolerance, in the region of the Lower Volga and in New-Russia. There still are, however, outside of the empire, several colonies of Dissenters, which, uninfluenced by the surrounding populations, lead a thoroughly Russian, indeed Moscovite, mode of life. There is such a colony in Prussia, near Gumbinnen; there are several in the Austrian province of Bukovina; in Roumania—both Vallachia and Moldavia—on different points of the Turkish territory, both in Europe and in Asia Minor.

The strength of the Schism does not lie entirely in the number or the diffusion of its adherents, but also, and more, in the classes

which hold and propagate the "old faith." It is an object of contempt to the "civilized" Russian, and its followers are recruited entirely among the lower classes—the peasantry, the working-class, and among the merchant-class, the bulk of which is still very near the others. It has no access at all to the nobility.* In other countries, such a localization in the lower layers of the nation might have been a source of weakness; in Russia it is a condition of vitality. The Schism is a sequel of that cleaving of Russian society into two different worlds, two nations with no bond of mutual sympathy between them, which was one of the first consequences of Peter the Great's violent reforms. The thick wall which the eighteenth century built up between the people and the lettered classes has served as a bulwark to the popular sects and superstitions. The *raskòl* grew and throve behind the nobility's supercilious contempt as behind a rampart protected by that very contempt against the attacks of the civilized classes; so efficiently protected, that for more than a century and a half it remained almost entirely unknown to the men who might have combated it. Only quite recently have well informed Russians begun to feel any curiosity to venture into the obscure labyrinth of beliefs wherein the dissident *plebs* has its being. This impulse of mere curiosity should be greeted as a symptom of a coming better understanding between the classes, and it lies with this above all things, with the mutual sympathy between the two halves of the nation, to correct or suppress the religious aberrations of the lower classes.

Despised as it was, the *raskòl* possessed two elements of power, which are frequently found combined: morality and wealth. "These *raskòlniks*," one hears on every side, "are the soberest men, the most honest, the most saving." When a landlord ushers you into a cleanly and well-kept peasant's cabin, if you ask

* There are hardly any exceptions to this except among the Cosacks, especially those of the Don, who have several families of Old-Believers officially belonging to the nobility.

him what sort of people are the owners, he is almost sure to answer you : " They are *raskôlniks*, Old-Believers." If you inquire of a manufacturer who are his best workmen, of a merchant who are his best clerks, you will most likely hear the same reply. At the great fair at Nijni-Nôvgorod, which is to many Russian merchants merely a trysting-place for having a good time together, the Old-Ritualists can always be known by their quiet, dignified demeanor and their respect for the proprieties. They leave to the followers of the official Church the disgraceful orgies which are cynically indulged in every night. These orderly and thrifty qualities they display just as well in their dealings with the State, though it persecutes them. " The Old-Believers," a governor said to me, " are, of all tax-payers, the most regular and reliable." It is notorious that dissident villages are rarely in arrear, and the *staroviêrs* are accordingly held in high esteem by tax-collectors from end to end of the empire. The Orthodox peasants, as they compare the prosperity of their non-conforming brethren with their own penury, are naturally tempted to see therein a token of the superiority of the " old faith."

These moral advantages are partly due to the dissenters' prejudice against certain things, and are on the wane in proportion as this prejudice is gradually giving way. The repugnance which many of them entertain against certain amusements, certain articles of food, keeps them safe from certain vices, certain faults, just as the dictates of the Koran preserve the Moslem from drunkenness. Yet the principle of the dissenters' higher standard of morality is not to be sought there, nor, still less, in their forms of worship. Morality is not always a direct outcome of dogma : it is sometimes better than the doctrine, and sometimes falls short of it. So for the *raskôlniks*' honesty and virtuous life there are two causes outside of religion : one national, peculiar to the Russian people and the origin of the Schism ; the other universal, which, given a similar case, produces the same effects in all countries. The national cause is that, the Schism being the outcome

of a revolt of the popular conscience, it was the most conscientious who remained faithful to it, and therefore it is in harmony with the people's social, moral, even domestic ideals. The universal cause is that wherever there are privileged churches, and, by their side, less favored confessions, the latter make up for their inferior situation by a higher relative standard of zeal and virtue which they derive from that very inferiority. When an opposing party, whether religious or political, from a minority becomes a majority, it fatally tends to relax the moral strain which upheld it. The moral efficiency of one and the same religion in different countries is often in inverse ratio to its political power. As a spring, when it expands, loses some of its limpidity, so a religious doctrine, as it spreads, is apt to lose much of its purity, its austerity.

With the Old-Believers—as is generally the case with religious minorities—the qualities inherent to their numerical inferiority and oppressed condition, were further enhanced and intensified by remembered or expected persecution, which ennobled their souls and gave the temper of steel to the iron of their characters. There are countries where, after a long period of abasement, public morals have been uplifted by religious minorities which had been looked down upon. But the Old-Believers were lacking in something the want of which prevented them from exercising over Russia the influence which the Puritans exercised over the England of the Stuarts. Confined within itself, absorbed in the contemplation of the past, isolated from a civilization which, whether it would or not, was spreading over the country, the *raskòl* never became more than a barren protest ; it was and remained powerless to endow Russia with, at any rate, a political ideal, whatever we may think of a moral one.

To the power which a high standard of morality imparts, the Old Believers add that of money. Here again there are special causes, peculiar to the *raskòl*, and general ones, connected with the position occupied by the *raskòlniks*. Their aptitude for mak-

ing money is partly a consequence of their moral superiority, and can likewise be due to certain beliefs, certain prejudices of theirs. The *staroviêr*, who does not smoke and drinks little, finds in temperance and economy a short cut to competence. Yet this is only a partial explanation. There is a reason of a higher order, one which we encounter in most religions, in almost all races which have been long downtrodden. Persecution, disqualifying laws, by debarring oppressed sects from taking any interest in public affairs, turn them perforce into the channel of private enterprise—into commerce. Their financial capabilities, strengthened by practice and accumulated by heredity, end by becoming a sort of natural gift or inborn faculty. The Jews all over the world, the Armenians in the East, the Parsis in India, the Copts in Egypt, are, in their different ways, living illustrations of this one law. The *raskòl* is too recent a creation, too many of its followers belong to the rural classes, for the application of the law to be as marked and general. So much we may venture to affirm, that with them as with the others the positive bent and the mercantile qualities of the Great-Russian mind have been doubly sharpened by the knowledge that only wealth could secure them any degree of freedom; they had need to hold always in their hand the golden key which opens all doors. The *staroviêrs* were perhaps the first in Russia to grasp the fact that money could, on occasion, be a safeguard, and that wealth was a power.

The mercantile prosperity of the Old-Believers compares favorably with that of sundry Protestant sects in England and the United States. There are certain religious forms laid out on simple lines, inculcating severe, even morose, moral principles, which are suited to certain social classes and to a certain mediocre average of culture, doctrines of what might be called a *bourgeois*,—some would say "philistine"—standard, which easily fit the mind of the merchant or business man and lead to fortune by a surer and more regular road. In the *raskòlnik* as in the Puritan, the Quaker or the Methodist,—in the Great Russian as in the

Anglo-Saxon, practical sense goes very well with the theological mind, and a turn for business is not incompatible with religious delusions. In the cities, which were not officially re-opened to them until the reign of Catherine II., the dissenters count among the wealthiest of those Russian merchants whose colossal fortunes ofttimes rival those of American merchant princes. In Moscow, the commercial and financial capital, many of the finest houses, of the largest factories, belong to *raskòlniks*. In Perm and the Uràl, the region of mines and smelting works, the Old-Believers have come to control a large proportion of the different transactions. Wealth accumulated so rapidly with them, that a semi-official writer, under the Emperor Nicolas I., asserted that a considerable portion of Russian capital was in the Dissenters' hands.* There was even, among the more timid, a sort of scare, lest the *raskòl* should accomplish something like a financial boycott or monopoly, such as is so often looked for at the hands of the Jews. Needless to say that such panics were, to say the least, exaggerated. The sober truth is that, in the nineteenth century, the *raskòl's* main strength will have lain in its purse. Money is indeed its *nervus rerum;* the rouble has all along been its great weapon, for self-defence and conversion.

There are whole regions entirely controlled by the Old-Ritualists. Such is, to quote only one, the district of Semiònof in the government of Nijni-Nòvgorod. They monopolize certain branches of industry, to such an extent that working men and peasants are seen to adopt the Schism, just to make sure of work. In this manner the fabrication of those wooden spoons which find their way into every part of Europe has passed almost entirely into the hands of the *raskòlniks*.† The spirit of solidarity has been entertained among them by long years of persecution, and their system of mutual assistance makes them very strong against

* Memoir of Mèlnikof, written for the Grand-Duke Constantine.

† Bezobràzof, *Études sur l'Économie Nationale de la Rusie*, vol. ii., p. 75.

competition. As has been so often said of the Jews, this solidarity amounts to something like freemasonry. It sometimes extends even to members of different sects. In spite of their intestine quarrels, of the everlasting internecine war carried on within the Schism, they coalesce on occasion against the common foe. They have signs and tokens by which they know one another, such as rings, chaplets, or else wooden spoons, painted and decorated specially for them with certain conventional emblems. Their chaplets are made after an ancient type common to both sections; they vary in value and material, from plain wood to precious stones. Semiònof is the centre of this pious industry and sends out its chaplets over all the schismatic world, to the farthest boundaries of the empire—and beyond.

Thanks to the bond which a common creed establishes between all dissenters, the Schism has come to be considered by many as the royal road to success and wealth. Certain business men, certain rich traders, have found in it a powerful means of influence, some even of unrighteous money-making. In these religious sects, just as in political parties, the earnest and the guileless are too often preyed upon by jobbers and schemers, for whom the Schism is nothing but a tool and a ladder, as revolution is to the others. It has been said that "the *raskòl* is now nothing more than the milch-cow of rascally millionaires."* Such an assertion, if taken literally and extended to all Old-Believers would be an arrant slander. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that money plays a great part in all the affairs of the Schism, both sections of it. A writer who has depicted the life and manners of the *raskòlniks* of the Volga, A. Petchersky,† has shown what a large place material preoccupations take in the thoughts of both the leaders

* J. V. Livànof, *Schismatics and Jailbirds (Raskòlniki i Ostrò)jniki)*, vol. ii., p. 6.

† His real name was Mèlnikof. Having been for many years employed by the Ministry of the Interior in matters pertaining to the Schism, he depicted the *raskòlniks* in a grand trilogy of unique novels: *In the Woods*, *In the Mountains*, and *On the Volga*.

and the masses. The heroic age of the "old faith" has passed away, that of mercantilism has taken its place. Numbers of merchants remain true to the old rites not so much in view of eternal blessedness as of temporal advantages.

"What makes them hold on to the old faith?" exclaims one of Petchersky's personages, Mother Manèpha, the abbess of one of their *skits* (free communities); "Is it the hope of salvation? No—it is lucre." And truly, there be those among their managers who get credulous brethren to pay their debts or taxes for them. Their very donations to their chapels and *skits* are ofttimes suggested by a calculating spirit of lucre, in the hope to bribe Heaven to prosper them. "Thanks to thy holy prayers," a merchant writes to mother Manèpha, "I have this day made fifty per cent. on my fish." And, in acknowledgment of the blessing, he sends one hundred roubles, to be distributed among the good souls who have "prayed well," recommending at the same time not to give any of the money to so-and-so and so-and-so who pray for his competitors; "but their prayers," he adds, "are less efficient than yours; therefore we beg you will not stop praying well, so the Lord may grant us greater profits in our trading." If such be habitually the gist of the Old-Believers' devotion, it must be admitted that it does not greatly differ from that of numbers of Orthodox worshippers.

If the *raskòlniks* know how to amass wealth, many of them also know how to use it nobly. They vie with the Orthodox merchants in endowing schools and charitable establishments. And—what is more curious still—these inheritors of the Old-Russians who rebelled against Western importations of any description, sometimes become the most liberal patrons of the arts which Russia has borrowed from that same West. These men, but yesterday clad in the old Moscovite costume, to-day surround themselves with all the luxury of modern civilization. We visited in Moscow a mansion belonging to one of those rich *staroviêr* merchants. To beautify this vast dwelling, the architects had pilfered

from all known styles ; there was a lavish profusion of marbles, paintings, flowers ; the only thing a Parisian eye could find fault with was the excess of decoration. In one wing of the building was the chapel ; there the walls and *iconostàs* were covered with those ancient paintings of "Greek style" for which Old-Believers give their weight in gold.* The master of the house showed us with infinite pride a panel by Andrèy Rubliòf, that artist of the fifteenth century whose works have been erected into models by the iconographic manuals of the Moscovite Church. Then there was a long gallery of profane paintings. There were landscapes and marine views, historical canvases and *genre* pictures. Everything was there that charms modern art,—not excluding mythological subjects and heathen nudities—there, in that museum collected by a disciple of the fanatical haters of Europe and Peter the Great. Only one trait betrayed the Old-Russian, ever alive in the Old-Believer : all these canvases, otherwise so varied, were signed with Russian names. It was a national gallery, and nowhere,—possibly not in the public collections of Petersburgh and Moscow, could one study more thoroughly the contemporary Russian school.

Such are these wealthy Old-Believers at the present day, not unlike in this respect from many a rich merchant of Moscow : they have all the superfluities of our civilization, while the essential, the substance, frequently escapes them. For such families to remain impervious to progress, steeled against it by their "old faith," they would have to go on living isolated, in a fenced-off world. But these men, whom fortune has brought to the threshold of culture, how long will it be before they cross it? Perhaps the sons, who at each generation drop some of their fathers' preju-

* It should be noted that it was the *raskòlniks* who revived in Russia the taste for national antiquity together with the comprehension of Old-Russian art. Out of their great love for the past, they started collecting not only old books and old *eïkons*, but old furniture, old jewelry, old bric-a-brac of every description. It was superstition made antiquarians of them ; all the same they became the masters or precursors of the modern archæologists.

dices, will step out of the *raskòl*, being already taken out of the narrow circle of ideas in which it was born. There have been already instances of such conversions. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Old-Ritualists will find a way out of the *raskòl*'s antiquated ways and narrow prejudice without for that renouncing the worship bequeathed them by their ancestors. It would not be the first time that the followers of a religion would change their views and manners without changing their religion. To the great scandal of good provincial souls, young Old-Believers are already seen in Moscow smoking, shaving, dancing, frequenting the theatres. Wealth, which has begun the *raskòl*'s social emancipation, will end by accomplishing its intellectual emancipation also. So that, after having been, temporarily, a source of strength, money and the conditions it creates will become a cause of weakness and undermine the *raskòl*'s doctrines and principles. Men cannot grow rich with impunity, and through wealth the Schism will have to mitigate its rigor or—to perish.

This result is still in the remote future ; for with these schismatic nabobs, as with most Russian merchants, wealth has preceded education by a long stride. Not that the Dissenters are more ignorant than their Orthodox brethren. Indeed they frequently are ahead of other Russians of the same class in education as well as in material prosperity. Among these fanatics of the ritual, the man who cannot read is far more of an exception than in the bulk of the people. The Old-Ritualists believe in primary instruction. In order to spread it among their co-religionists, they have been nobly generous. A few isolated sectarians may have made a virtue of ignorance ; for the greater number reading and writing were indispensable weapons against the attacks of the Established Church. Like the Protestant, the *raskòlnik* was, by his rebellion, placed in the necessity to create his own faith and to demonstrate it to his own satisfaction. On this point as on several others, the men who founded religion wholly on tradition were led to the same results as those who founded

it on the Book—the Bible. The bond with authority, the ancient keeper of holy usage, once broken, nothing remained but to seek in old missals, old manuscripts, for traces of those traditions which the Church was accused of forsaking. The lack of a regular hierarchy or of any at all drove both sections of the *raskòl* with almost equal urgency to a study of the Scriptures. And we should take into account the fact that sectarianism stirs up thought and, by developing a love of discussion, develops also a taste for free research and a habit of investigation. The Schism could not escape these influences. In murky *izbàs*, by the flickering flame of the *lutchína*, poor peasants may be seen searching certain pages of the Scripture for the revelation which they no longer received unquestioningly from the Church. Here it is that the Russian is at so great a disadvantage alongside Western Protestantism. Instead of the Fathers and the great writers of antiquity, its only food consisted in a few uncouth Byzantine compilations, a few misty apocrypha.

To this inferiority, which is that of ancient Russia generally, the *raskòl* adds another, due entirely to itself. The Old-Believers can read, but they read only devotional books, very old books. Herein especially do they show their blind reverence for antiquity, and, of all the forms which this particular infatuation can assume, the exclusive study of old books, old authors, is not the least fatal to anything like progress. The *raskòlniks* are very partial to works in Old Slavic, printed in Slavic script with red rubrics ; they love to read them and to write them. At the fair of Nijni-Nòvgorod, where the book-trade always occupies a very modest place, I have seen such old books and old music, with the notation in "crotchets" (*kriukì*) of the ancient missals. They sell sò well, that both Russians and foreigners have been guilty of forging such "pre-nikonian" editions. In order to gain an easier access among the Dissenters, their adversaries have frequently resorted to these archaic forms ; they have used Old Slavic to fight the sects born of the Old Slavic liturgy. This predilection for a dead hieratic

language as opposed to the live language is at the root of the original opposition between *raskòl* and Protestantism. The Old-Believers carry their love of everything antiquated to the length of preferring handwritten books to printed ones—such are still sold at Nijni. In their *skits* or eremitic colonies men and women go on reverently copying the faulty manuscripts of old times, and, like the monks of the Middle Ages, glory in their caligraphy. What they call the "seashore writing" (*pismo pomorskoyé*) *i. e.* the work of the copyists of the region by the White Sea, still enjoys a great reputation.

The *raskòlniks* have books, they have men of vast reading—they have no scholarship, Endless fine-drawn subtilties and criticless compilations only foster what might be called erudite ignorance. This pseudo-scholarship, bristling with unverified facts and misinterpreted words, does possibly more harm than plain illiterate ignorance. The Schism has its own prose and its own poetry, both interesting at times, as all popular literature is, but mostly heavy, flat, devoid of ideas. With its barren disputations and primitive methods of controversy it has created for itself a sort of crude scholasticism, thus threatening modern Russia with a plague which had been spared her through the Middle Ages, owing to entire ignorance.

In the religious, as in the political domain, school-learning,—at least primary instruction, which is alone universally accessible,—is far from being the infallible safeguard and panacea that it has long been believed to be. Such instruction is necessarily superficial and therefore likely to propagate error—theological, political, economical—instead of immediately eradicating it. In Russia, primary instruction no more corrects mystical dreams and religious fancies than, in other countries, it corrects socialistic utopias and revolutionary schisms.* The man who just can read is every-

* The provinces where the sects show most vitality are frequently those which have the greatest numbers of lettered men—men that can read and write—*alfabeti*, as the Italians call them. Such is, for instance, the government of Yaroslàvl, where, out of 100 recruits, 61 could read.

where prone to make up his own creed—here after the Bible, there after the daily paper. It has been noticed that the peasant who can read is more apt to fall into sectarianism. The *Official Messenger* (*Pravìtelstvennoy Viêstnik*) showed one day, with help of judiciary statistics, that school learning, while it diminished the number of offences against persons and morality, increased the propensity to offences against religion and the established order. Between instruction and science there lies an abyss ; yet the latter can be reached by no other road. Unfortunately the dissenters' prejudices keep them from the very studies which would be best calculated to deliver them from those prejudices. So these men, while they are in love with Old-Slavic, have an inveterate repugnance against Latin and classical studies. They usually keep away from the gymnasiums, the universities, and, in consequence, remain outside the pale of true culture and of true knowledge.*

* In 1887, in the university of St. Petersburgh, of 2523 students only 4 were dissenters.

BOOK III. CHAPTER V.

Constitution and Organization of the Principal Sects: the "Hierarchists" (*Popòftsy*)—How the Different Groups of the *Raskòl* at First Organized in the *Skits* or Eremitic Colonies—Importance of these Communities—In what Manner the Leadership later on Passed to the Moscow Cemeteries—Efforts to Give the Old-Ritualists Greater Cohesion—Attempts of the Revolutionary Emigration to Enter into Relations with Them—How the Old-Believers Contrived to Secure an Independent Priesthood—The Hierarchy of Biêlokrìnitsa. *Starovièr* Bishops; their Position; their Dissensions—Separation of their Adherents into Two Factions—Efforts of the Government to Bring together the Hierarchists and the Established Church—The Use of the Ancient Rites is Conceded to Them—The *Yedinovièrtsy* or Old-Ritualists Reunited to the Church—Obstacles to the Union.

After the period of propaganda, of individual and undisciplined sedition, there comes, for every new sect, the period of organization, when it constitutes itself into a well-defined body, a church. The sects of the *raskòl* could not escape this universal law; nevertheless, most of them remained in a sort of inchoate, incoherent state. Whether from its members' lack of culture or from something defective in the very principle of the Schism, it had more difficulty than even Protestantism to solidify into anything like churches. It has remained, so to speak, in a fluid state.

Most Russian sects display a singular faculty for association, for practical organization, joined to a certain difficulty in determining doctrines, formulating a theology. Theology is, perhaps, what many of them are most lacking in. On the other hand they abound in what strikes us so much in the rural commune and the industrial *artél*—in the spirit of association and disciplined self-government, under elected chiefs, who are obeyed. It is owing to

that spirit that sects, having no legal existence, could form and subsist in an autocratic state, in the face of an Established Church. The heads of the principal schismatic communities, with the exception, possibly, of Andréï Deníssof, were neither theologians, scholars, nor controversialists; they were mostly men of action, skilful organizers, one might almost say smart business men. The dreamers and fanatics, solely occupied in preaching incongruous doctrines, were succeeded by practical men, who gave to the Schism the firm standing, the material consistency, which it never could have derived from its beliefs.

The sects of the *raskòl* are many; a bishop of the last century, Dmitri of Rostòf, already counted two hundred of them. Many have vanished, many new ones have sprung up. Contemporary specialists can match the bishop's figure. On the ever shifting surface of the Schism, sects form and vanish like rippling waves at a breath, jostling one another, mixing, breaking. But we must not allow ourselves to be misled by appearances, by words. It is with the *raskòl* as with Protestantism. All these sects, these "denominations," to use a felicitous English word, do not always represent separate confessions, different cults. They are often nothing more than factions, schools. So that the term "sect," although we are compelled to use it, is frequently a misnomer. The Russian words used to designate the different groups of Dissenters do not express the idea of separation, but rather that of union, association, community (*soglàssié*—literally, "harmony"—*òbsh-tchina*, *òbsh-tchestvo*), or, as the word *tolk*, that of interpretation, doctrine.[1] It is not rare for *raskòlniks* to form a sort of spiritual *artél* or brotherhood, having each its own head, its own rallying centre, its own statutes and customs. Indeed, it has been repeatedly shown that herein lies, for the people, one of the chief attractions of sects.

[1] *Tolkovàt(i)*—to talk, to talk over, to interpret. It will be remembered that *òbsh-tchina* (and, more seldom, *òbsh-tchestvo*) is the Russian name of the peasant commune (see vols. i. and ii.).

Of the Schism's two great divisions, that of the "Hierarchists" (*Popòfsh-tchina*) could most easily be constituted into a church. Their recognition of the priesthood kept them within the pale of Orthodox dogma, and left little room for a multiplicity of sects. The question of the conditions on which priests were to be admitted was the main, almost the only, occasion of dissension among the "Hierarchists." With no bishop to ordain priests for them, the Old-Believers were in the same predicament in which the Old-Catholics would have found themselves but for the little Jansenist church at Utrecht. Their entire clergy was necessarily composed of deserters from the official Church, which drew down on them the insulting nickname of *biêglo-popòfsh-tchina*, *i. e.*, "community of runaway priests." Before receiving them as their pastors, the Old-Believers forced Orthodox priests to go through a humiliating form of abjuration, to undergo a sort of purification or penance. At first, they used to be re-baptized, and, as it was feared that they might forfeit some of the powers conferred by ordination if they were stripped of the priestly insignia, certain communities immersed them in full canonicals. Whatever conditions they imposed on the reception of their *popes*, it is certain that the Old-Believers could have no great respect for priests who had been, as was frequently the case, expelled from the official Church or drawn to the ranks of the Schism by cupidity. As a rule, such priests were well paid, but held in little esteem.

The priest's position, therefore, among the "Hierarchists" was that of a hireling, who was made to perform divine service as a mere trade of which ordination had conferred on him the monopoly. Far from directing and mastering their flock, the schismatic priests are entirely dependent on the communities who pay their salaries, appointing and deposing them at will. They frequently are nothing more than domestic chaplains in the households of wealthy merchants. The priesthood has lost much of its authority even among the sects which proclaim the necessity of maintaining it; some Old-Believers went so far as to receive mere

deacons as priests, if they did not greet as such, by acclamation, the first-comer who took their fancy. As to the directing authority, it is in the hands of laymen, of the elders. Herein "Hierarchists" and "No-priests" are alike—at least, they were until lately, when the *Popòftsy*, having secured an episcopate of their own, became possessed of an independent priesthood.

With both branches of the Schism, the first religious centres were the *skits* or eremitic colonies, which drew around them a certain number of adherents, and were in constant communication with similar associations in the various provinces. These communities used to hide in the thickest of the forests, or else sought shelter under foreign rule on the other side of the Russian frontier. The principal stronghold of the *Popòftsy* was for many years at Vetka (government of Mohilef), on Polish territory. The convents there, it is said, held over 3,000 monks; Russian troops twice crossed the frontier to disperse them and bring back to Russia by force the peasants who had settled around them. The *skits* of Starodùb inherited the influence which Vetka had wielded. There, as at Vetka, as at all schismatic centres, villages had sprung up around the dwellings of the anchorites. These *skits* became the nucleus of industrious colonies. To this fact and their quiet and orderly mode of life these communities, to whichever section of the Schism they belonged, owed it that they were tolerated, sometimes even protected, by the authorities. The nineteenth century has been harder on them than the eighteenth. The most renowned *skits* were closed or destroyed under Nicolas I. Their dismantled walls are to this day a shrine which pilgrims (Schismatics of course) visit in great numbers. Such are, in the government of Sarátof, the famous monasteries of Irghiz; in that of Nijni-Nòvgorod the curious *skits* on the river Kerjenèts, one of the oldest refuges of the Old-Believers, who thence easily could, by means of the Volga, hold communication with Moscow, Nijni, the whole empire. Some of these convents—Komaròf, for instance—were real towns, consisting of large, roomy log-huts

(*izbàs*), connected between themselves by covered passages. It is said that there were in Komaròf 2,000 inhabitants of both sexes.

These *skits* of Kerjenèts the Emperor Nicolas was not content with shutting up, he had them razed to the ground about 1850. Against these humble haunts of Old-Ritualism he displayed an animosity almost as fierce as that of Louis XIV. against Port Royal. The women recluses, banished from their rustic cloisters, showed themselves in no way inferior to the French king's victims in energy. More than one of their obscure abbesses might have compared with Mother Angélique Arnauld. Between the French Jansenists and the Russian *staroviêrs* it would be easy to discover numerous points of resemblance, notwithstanding the chasm dug between them by ignorance on one side and erudition on the other. As was the case at Port-Royal-des-Champs, the reverence felt for the victims of persecution clung to the walls of the convents which official orthodoxy had demolished. Some of the nuns who were expelled from the monasteries on the Kerjenèts returned to keep guard over the desecrated graves, to which Old-Believers flock from all parts of the empire.

Moreover, the *skits* soon re-formed at no great distance. The nuns who had been driven out by Nicolas's order now appeared before their people graced with the fascinating halo of martyrdom. Several of them exercised a mysterious influence over the Orthodox themselves—especially Mother Esther, formerly abbess of Olénief. Bezobràzof saw her towards the close of the reign of Alexander II. an octogenarian, still wielding the abbess's crozier.* Around her and her former nuns, women and young girls had gathered and lived under their rule as a community. In and around the little town of Semiònof there are many so-called "cells," *i. e.*, small cabins, tenanted by Old-Believers of various denominations. The children are there taught to read and work as well as to pray according to the ancient rites. *Staroviêr* nuns

* See Vlad. Bezobràzof, *Études sur l'Économie Nationale en Russie*, vol. ii., p. 93 (1886), and A. Petchersky's works.

do not live cloistered behind gratings. They travel on their communities' business ; they go about tending the sick, and especially reading the prayers for the dead in the houses of their wealthy co-religionists. This is to them an abundant source of income.

There still are in Russia, principally in the north and east, a great many such *skits* and convents which have no legal existence. New ones are founded all the time, especially for women. These "houses"—(*obîteli*, literally "dwellings")—are one of the forces of the Schism. They are doubly attractive to Russians, because they realize not only the people's spiritual, but also, in a measure, their terrestrial ideal. The Old-Believers' practical sense finds full satisfaction in the cells of such a "house" (*obîtel*). Nothing suits the national taste so well as labor in common under the rule of an elected head. Domestic economy, thrifty management, is in great honor in these *skits ;* they glory in these household cares quite as much as in the intelligence of sacred things. One of Petchersky's heroes, Potàp Maksìmytch, will not believe the accusations against Father Mikhaïl because everything is in such beautiful order in his community. The rich Moscow merchants who endow these *skits* "for their soul's salvation," and make a point of having their daughters brought up in them, take great pleasure in seeing that everything goes by rule, that order and plenty reign throughout. They seek in this the satisfaction of their taste, one might say of their æsthetic feeling as well as of their moral sense. They take an amateur's delight in the old *eïkons* and the old pre-Nikonian manuscripts ; they revel in the old hymns sung by women's voices, fresh and pure ; they admire the old-Russian embroideries and marvellous needlework which are the principal occupation of the nuns and the young novices, the *biêlìtsas*.* These young *biêlìtsas* are said to be one of the attractions of these convents. Marriage is not forbidden, but they can marry only "on the sly." So that pretty romances are some-

* *Biêlìtsa*, from their white garments (*biêl*, white), something between a novice and a boarder.

times enacted behind these morose walls. If the profane are to be believed, however, they also shelter intrigues anything but edifying. These schismatic "houses" are first of all anxious to avoid scandal. Young sheep that have strayed find there a discreet asylum, and the children of sin are brought up as orphans.

The religious metropolis of the Schism, Hierarchists and "No-priests" both, is at present Moscow. The *skits* which are dispersed over the empire or nestle at the remotest ends of it, were not always equal to the management of the *raskòl's* affairs. Rivalries and dissensions were of frequent occurrence and sections divided into smaller groups. Then the two branches determined to create each its own centre in the very heart of the empire, in Moscow. Both succeeded at the same time, and—by a favorable contingency they could hardly have hoped for—with the government's sanction. It was to a public calamity, the breaking out of the plague in Moscow under Catherine II., that the sectarians owed this good turn in their fortunes. Great epidemics, by violently casting the people back on religion and their old beliefs, are generally favorable to the Dissenters. This was shown at the time of the great cholera visitation in the first half of the present century as well as during the plague of the eighteenth century. In its helplessness before the scourge, the government strove to enlist the sympathies of all classes. The *raskòlniks*, at all times distinguished for their spirit of enterprise, offered to establish at their own expense a hospital and a cemetery for their co-religionists. The government of Catherine II. was too "enlightened" to refuse the permission; it was given in 1771 and, almost within the year, were founded the two institutions which remained ever since the religious centres of the *raskòl*, one by the Hierarchists, at Rogòjsky, the other by the "No-priests" at Preobrajènsky. This recalls the semi-official recognition, as "funeral colleges" or associations, which the Christians of the third century obtained from pagan Rome during the very era of persecutions.*

* Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, vol. i.

But the *raskòlniks* did not burrow in catacombs. In the suburbs of Moscow, on hitherto desert land, there arose two vast establishments probably unequalled in Europe. The cemetery was enclosed with walls, and within the enclosure hospitals were built, monasteries, churches, constructions of all sorts. The awe which surrounded the dead and the pity which sheltered the sick protected the retreats of the leaders of the Schism and the movements of its agitators. Around the cemeteries and in the adjoining quarters sprang up groups of houses and workshops tenanted by Schismatics. The proscribed creed thus established, at the very gates of the ancient capital, its own city and citadel, one might almost say its own Kremlin. The founders of the "cemeteries" obtained from the government a sort of charter, leaving to them the management of their foundations. Rogòjsky and Preobrajènsky could have each a board of directors, as independent management; they could have each a seal and a fund, and statutes approved by the authorities, in other words they took up a position recognized by the State. Money and bribery did the rest.

The cemeteries branched out on all sides into affiliated communities. Their administrative council became a synod, whose injunctions were obeyed from end to end of the empire. From all parts of Russia money flowed in. Thanks to the gifts and bequests of dissident merchants, considerable wealth rapidly accumulated behind those walls. Nor was this all. The *raskòl's* practical, mercantile genius, the positive side of the Russian character, asserted itself there as it does in all the *raskòl's* dealings. The cemeteries became business centres no less than religious centres. They became a combination of convent, seminary, and chamber of commerce, a consistory and an exchange. The two hospitals and the adjoining quarters offered a safe refuge to sectarians under pursuit, to deserting soldiers, to vagabonds sporting forged papers. In this crowd of outlaws the wealthy leaders always found workers at half price and blind tools.

Such a power, gradually growing up in the shade, favored by the tolerance which marked the reigns of Catherine II. and Alexander I., could not but be endangered by publicity. Various misdemeanors were brought up against the cemeteries, they were compromised in will cases and accused of using undue influence to secure bequests; lastly the trump card was played against them which is kept in reserve against all similar institutions, they were accused of forming a state within the state. Rarely, it is true, has the accusation been better merited. Under Nicolas I., an inquest struck a blow at the cemeteries from which they never quite recovered. Their funds were confiscated, their buildings sequestrated. A government commissioner was adjoined to the management of their hospitals, and in the churches where, for fifty years, the services of both branches of the Schism had been celebrated, priests sent by the Holy Synod officiated.

In the course of my travels, I visited Rogòjsky, the centre of the Hierarchist section. With its walls and several churches, the place looks very much like any great Orthodox convent. On entering, one was overcome by a sensation of sadness and forlornness. The cemetery, planted with trees, looked shabby and neglected; there was a feeling of painful constraint in the air. There is a hospital and a home for old people, like the establishments kept by our own Little-Sisters-of-the-Poor. At the time of my visit about one hundred infirm inmates of each sex were cared for there; the wards were many, but low and small. The hospital appeared rather humble and ill-supplied, considering the wealth ascribed to the Old-Believers; perhaps they are disgusted at the supervision exercised by the State, or else they are afraid of showing their wealth too much. Everywhere men could be seen, praying before ancient *eïkons*. All these people—old men and women, invalids and nurses—had an honest and simple look which went to the heart. As we walked through the wards, they would rise and bow low, bending the body in two, after the old Russian fashion, as they do before their *eïkons*. Luxury has been reserved for the

churches. The largest, the summer church, is high and spacious ; the walls and cupolas are covered with paintings, as those of the Assumption in Moscow. The Old-Believers pay enormous prices for the old *eïkons* which make of their churches a sort of archæological museum. They showed them to us lovingly, expatiating on their antiquity, distinguishing in true connoisseur style between imitations and archaïc originals. Their reverence for *eïkons* is exactly the same as with the Orthodox Russians and expressed in the same ways : their Virgins are crowned with the same diadems studded with precious stones. The only difference is that the Old-Believers admit none but ancient *eïkons* or copies from them. After the paintings we were shown the old Slavic books, the texts which are made to testify against the new liturgy. The altar, as in all the churches of the Greek rite, is concealed by the high screen, the *iconostàs ;* but here an unexpected sight met our eyes : the central folding doors of the *iconostàs* were made fast with leather thongs, bearing the imperial seal. This cut off the entrance to the tabernacle, so that the church was virtually without an altar. "We can no longer celebrate the mass here," our guides explained ; "we have to be content with the services which can be recited without a priest. We have our own clergy, but they are forbidden to officiate here. They want to force upon us priests appointed by the Synod : but we won't have them." Thus, in their own metropolis, the Hierarchists were reduced to a semblance of divine service without a priesthood, and were no better off than their adversaries, the "No-priests." *

The Hierarchists have a clergy ; and this clergy is no longer

* The seals affixed to the altars at Rogòjsky were removed in 1880, in direct opposition to Count Dimitri Tolstòy, then High Procurator of the Holy Synod and Minister of Public Instruction. Indeed, this was the occasion of his fall. It appears that the Count, finding himself alone of his opinion in the Committee of Ministers, gave to understand that his colleagues had been bribed by the Schismatics. In consequence of the tumult which this affair raised, he was compelled to resign from both his posts, and it was only several years later, under Alexander III., that he once more came into power, this time as Minister of the Interior.

borrowed from the Orthodox Church, nor composed of runaway or degraded priests. They have their own bishops, consequently an independent hierarchy, and, by a bold stroke, the head of this hierarchy has been placed abroad, out of reach of Russian power. All the *staroviêrs'* efforts to found an episcopate were, through many years, fruitless. An Orthodox historian avers that, in their despair at finding no living hand to consecrate bishops for them, some Old-Believers actually proposed to have recourse to a dead one.* This insane suggestion was not acted upon. "Even if a dead bishop's hand should be placed on the head of the candidate," objected the more timid, "his lips would remain dumb —and who among us has the right to speak the consecrating words which accompany the imposition of hands?" More than once schismatic communities in search of a bishop were imposed upon by bold deceivers. The manner in which the Hierarchists, after vainly waiting for two hundred years, at last did secure a hierarchy, is one of the most curious incidents of church history in the nineteenth century.

It was with the assistance of allies on whom they had never counted, and who, most of them, would have disavowed any share in the transaction, that the Schismatics at last succeeded in realizing their dream of an independent hierarchy. The Old Moscovites—the most conservative lovers of nationalism and ancient Russia, found associates in the promoters of cosmopolitan revolution, the sworn foes of Russian greatness. When Alexander II. came to the throne, the Russian revolutionists were conscious—as they are to-day—of being separated from the popular masses by an abyss. This abyss they attempted to bridge by means of the *raskòl*. With its millions of adepts, whose numbers seem all the more terrifying that they never could be ascertained with any degree of accuracy, it seemed to offer to the agitators a handle wherewith to gain a hold on the people. Where could an opposition be found more easy to organize than these popular churches

* Philaret, Bishop of Tchernìgof, *History of the Russian Church.*

confined within the lower and ignorant classes, yet which held in trust so great a portion of Russia's capitals, brought up in bitter hostility against the established order of things, and numbered such crowds of adherents among the most warlike militia of the empire? Was not this the vulnerable point of the Russian colossus? Could not the rebellious spirit of Stenka Rázin and Pugatchòf be aroused amongst the Old-Ritualists? Could there be any difficulty in inciting to a rising against the Tsar sectarians who regarded him as Antichrist? It seemed as though all there was to do was to collect and combine these scattered forces and impart to them a vigorous impulse in order to shake the great empire of the North to its bases.

The issue was tried. Advances were made to the Old-Believers from two different sides—direct advances from the head-quarters of the Russian revolutionary emigration in London; roundabout advances from the Polish revolutionary emigration. The former was planning to unite in one common design young Russia and old Moscovia, revolutionary atheism and religious conservatism; the latter proposed to combine two no less opposite things: the Latin and Polish interests and the Old-Moscovite, schismatic spirit of the *staroviêrs*. To win over the *raskòlniks*, the London emigrants started a paper specially devoted to the interests of the Schism. They sent emissaries, they treated in London with representatives of the "old faith"; not to scandalize them, the leaders of the emigration, it is said, abstained from smoking in their presence. All the same no common action could be arrived at, owing to the too great incompatibility between the two parties' principles. This attempt had no other result than the publication of some of the most important documents we have on the *raskòl*.*

* The *Collection of Government Information on the Raskòlniks*, and the *Collection of Government Ordinances Concerning the Raskòlniks*, both published in London in Herzen's printing office, from papers surreptitiously obtained in various Russian chancelleries. These documents were edited by Vassìli Ivànovitch Kelsief, a former seminarist, a socialist in theory, a

The Poles had still wider ideas. The fulcrum for their lever which most of their fellow countrymen vainly look for, not in the interior of Russia, but in the border lands, in Ukraïna and Little-Russia, a few of their exiles fancied they could find in the very heart of the country, among the Old-Believers. A vast intrigue was set on foot, and later described in the Russian papers by the man who had been its most active promoter. A Pole, then in the service of the Porte, conceived the bold scheme of giving the Old-Believers a centre of gravity outside of Russia, with a view to making the leaders of the Schism subservient to the Tsar's enemies. The Hierarchist sects, from their principles and the fact of having colonies on Turkish and Austrian soil, seemed more apt to lend themselves to this project. There was, very near the Russian frontier, at Dòbrudja, by the mouths of the Danube, a nest of *staroviêr* Cosacks, who had come there from the Russian territory in the eighteenth century, in conseqnence of an insurrection, and had kept up their intercourse with their brethren in Russia. The Polish emigrant, now a Bey and Pasha, entered into communication with these outlawed Cosacks. He tried to dazzle them with prospects of the restoration of the "old faith" and the ancient Cosack liberties, remotely hinting at the possibility of a Cosack *staroviêr* republic, in which Poland would naturally have found an ally.*

To pave the way for this peculiar anti-Russian Panslavism which, from this unnatural connection, was even more chimerical than the other, the first thing needful was to give the Old-Believers

mystic by nature, whom Herzen also employed as his principal emissary in his negotiations with the Old-Believers. After wandering about in the East and attempting to start there a sort of *staroviêr* phalanstery, Kelsief got disheartened, returned to Russia, and gave himself up. He was set at liberty. He is said to have died insane.

* This man, Tchaïkòfsky, known in Turkey as Sadyk-Pasha, had made a certain name for himself with short stories in Polish literature. Like Kelsief, he ended by throwing himself on the Russian Government's mercy. This was in 1873. Afterwards he wrote in Russian magazines, especially in Katkòf's *Russian Messenger*. He committed suicide in 1886.

the consistency and cohesion which they lacked, to place at their head a sort of pope or patriarch, and keep him where he could be safe from attacks and persecution. What the Schism could never hope to find in its native land—an independent episcopate, it did not seem impossible to procure among the innumerable prelates of the Constantinopolitan Church, so many of whom got deposed or fell into disgrace. The *staroviêrs'* dream would have been to unearth a bishop who had remained true to the "old faith." In their ignorance they firmly believed that in the East, by the cradle of Christianity, there must have survived a clergy of their creed. Their emissaries had repeatedly visited Syria and the Eastern Orthodox metropolies, to find that the very name of the Russian "old faith" was unknown. After much useless searching, the *raskòlniks* settled in Austria and Turkey were fain to be content with a certain Greek, former Bishop of Bosnia, Ambrose by name, who had been deposed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. The improvised Metropolitan of the Schism took up his abode, in 1846, in one of the *staroviêr* convents of Bukovina, at Biêlokrínitsa (or Fontana-Alba—"White-Fountain"—as the Roumanians translate the name). At one time, in the course of their negotiations with Herzen, the leaders of the *raskòl* thought of transferring their new metropolitan see to free England. But that would have hampered their communications with Russia.

Biêlokrínitsa, situated in a province partly Ruthenian, partly Roumanian, at the junction of the three great empires where the Slav race is dominant, was admirably suited to be the seat of the new religious power. Austria, always suspicious of the underhand Panslavistic game ascribed to the Russian cabinet, could not refuse her hospitality to an institution which would enable her to repay Russia's intriguing in kind. After having been by turns expelled and recalled, imprisoned and set at liberty, according to the fluctuating relations between the two empires, the Metropolitan of the White-Fountain ended by being peacefully and firmly seated just on the other side of the Russian frontier. His authority

was readily recognized by the Old-Believers of Austria and Turkey, proud of owning the head of the Schismatic hierarchy. In Russia there was some demurring. There were those who would not submit to a foreign prelate, whom they in their *naïve* ignorance called "a *pope* from over the seas." But the leaders and the majority did not hesitate long; a convention of "elders" at Rogòjsky promptly signified their acceptance of the Metropolitan at Biêlokrínitsa. It is probable that they were not sorry to have the head of their church on foreign territory, *i. e.*, out of reach of the secular authorities. They unconsciously followed the dictates of an instinct which attracted them towards independence. By removing the head of their church out of the country, they virtually made it invulnerable.*

The authority of the new Metropolitan once recognized, the Old-Believers proceeded to create an entire hierarchy. From this obscure convent in Bukovina, a mitred monk, having neither name nor fame, divided the dominions of the Emperor Nicolas into dioceses, appointing bishops who knew of no authority but his, doing with Russia what Pius IX. had done with England, when without consulting the English government, the Vatican covered Great Britain with a network of Catholic dioceses. These bishops of the *raskòl* sometimes were disguised as merchants and known only to their flocks; but the working of this occult episcopate was greatly facilitated by the Dissenters' money and the corruptness of the police. From all ends and nooks of Russia, gifts flowed abundantly to Biêlokrínitsa, which had suddenly become to the Old-Believers what Rome is to the Catholics. Thanks to the secret bond which unites all the *raskòlniks* and helps them to find

*The Old-Believers also had their books published abroad. Thus, in the convent of St. Nicolas, surnamed Manuelos, in Roumania, they reprinted the standard works, the classics of the Schism, such as the *Replies* of Andréï Deníssof, and the *Zitimenos*, an apology of the sign of the cross with two fingers, of Alexis Rodiònof. These editions are remarkable no less for purity of text, than for typographical beauty. In Kolòmna, Galicia, they issued a paper, the *Staro-obriàdets (Old-Ritualist)*.

friends and shelter wherever they are, the emissaries of the Metropolitan Cyril, the Russian successor of the Bosnian Ambrose, travelled all the roads of the empire in comparative safety.

Such a government as the Russian, under such a ruler as Nicolas I., could not look with an eye of kindness on a foreign subject, established at the country's very frontier, and tolerate his addressing millions of Russian subjects as master and pastor. The White-Fountain inspired sundry advisers of the Crown with a dread equal to the hopes it had aroused among the rebellious subjects of the throne. Timid people already saw in their mind's eye the spurious pontiff marching along at the head of hostile hordes, inciting crowds of Old-Believers, as he went, to rise in arms. "What *would* happen should there be war with Austria, and should the Metropolitan Cyril, clad in the ancient patriarchal robes, lead on the Austrian battalions! The pontifical blessing with the cross of eight branches would do a hundred times more harm than the Austrian cannon." * These fears were as much exaggerated as were the expectations of the foreign promoters of the new metropoly. The champions of old-Russian customs, the uncompromising representatives of the national principle, never could side with the enemies of Russia, with Latins and Westerners. This was seen in the Crimean war. Deaf to all suggestions from the promoters of the Schismatic hierarchy, the bulk of Old-Believers kept quiet, the more discontented merely awaiting the judgment of God, neither *staroviêrs* nor Cosacks forgetting for a moment that the Turk, own brother to the Tatar, is the hereditary foe of Holy Russia. The Porte found scarce a handful of auxiliaries in the small schismatic colonies established on her lands.

Together with all classes of the nation, the Old-Believers were, so to speak, lifted off their feet by the tidal wave of hope which, at the accession to the throne of Alexander II., swept over the

* From a memorial written for presentation to the Grand Duke Constantine by Mèlnikof.

land. So great was their trust in better times, that the elders of Rogòjsky invited the Metropolitan Cyril to come to Russia and pay a visit to his flock. With the help of a disguise and a false passport, aided by the blindness—or possibly the secret connivance—of the authorities, he actually came to Moscow, in the beginning of 1863. A general, or, as the Old-Ritualists termed it, an œcumenic council of the bishops and delegates from all *staroviêr* communities was held under the presidency of the pseudo-Metropolitan from Biêlokrínitsa, before the gates of the ancient national capital. This council, composed of merchants, monks, and apostate priests, drew up the statute of the new hierarchy. It really seemed as though the Schism, at last provided with an episcopate, had definitively constituted itself into a homogeneous and self-governing church—when intestine squabbles broke up this scarcely attained unity. At the same time that the Old-Believers of Rogòjsky found themselves in possession of an independent clergy, they also were confronted by stubbornness and unexpected demands on the part of that clergy. The laymen, who had grown into the habit of ruling their church with a high hand, did not always find their newly created hierarchy as accommodating and submissive as their quondam pastors, stolen from the official Orthodox Church. The council of Rogòjsky having decreed the nomination of a vicar of the Metropolitan from the White-Fountain, who was to reside in Russia, the new head of the schismatic church, who had already shown himself chary of imparting his powers, displayed the greatest reluctance to delegate them to a permanent representative. Hence a conflict, which threatened the scarce pacified Hierarchist branch with more splittings and scissions.

Events then came to pass in the outer world which headed off the debates in another direction. While the *staroviêr* council was still in session, the Polish insurrection broke out (1863). Everybody knows to what pitch of exaltation national sentiment was raised throughout the empire by the Poles' immoderate demands

and by their threats of foreign intervention.* The Old-Believers did not remain unmoved in the universal commotion. Carried away by genuine patriotic impulse, possibly not unmixed with calculation, their leaders made advances to the government. To remove all doubts as to their sincerity and all suspicion of their connivance with the State's enemies, the merchants of Moscow proposed that the outlandish Metropolitan should be sent home and all intercourse with Biêlokrínitsa temporarily suspended. Cyril had to go, and those same Old-Believers who had been in open contention with the tsars through two whole centuries actually sent the Emperor an address, to assure him of their devotion to throne and fatherland! At so critical a moment, such a spontaneous manifestation from the most uncompromising representatives of the Old-Russian spirit could not but be favorably received.

In their desire for reconciliation, the Rogòjsky men were not content with this address. They sent round to all "the children of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of the old faith" a circular or encyclical letter, in which the doctrines of the Schism were presented in the form least objectionable to the Church and the State. Of this encyclical letter, which was printed in Yassy, over two millions of copies are said to have been sent out. "The Old-Believers of the Hierarchist persuasion," this document declared, "are agreed with the Greco-Russian Church on all matters pertaining to dogma. They worship the same God, the same Christ, and are in reality much nearer to this Church than are those sects which repudiate the priesthood." The circular vehemently denounced the revolutionists, the foes of religion and native land, "the brood of the godless Voltaire," and ended by proclaiming that the official Church and the Church of the Old-Believers, being agreed on all fundamental dogmas, should be able to live side by side in mutual forbearance and all Christian charity.

* See the author's book, *Un Homme d'État Russe* (Nicolas Miliútin), a study on Russia and Poland in the reign of Alexander II. (Paris, 1884.)

Such language, from the descendants of those maniacs who once excommunicated Church and State, shows what progress has been accomplished within the *raskòl*. How utterly disappointing for the foreigners, who were so anxious to see therein the promise of a general unhinging of the empire! What a scandalous defeat for the fanatics! Of these, there were enough left in Moscow, and the "No-priests" again found themselves divided into two factions, if not two sects—the adherents and the adversaries of the circular.* While the more enlightened among the *staroviêrs* thus showed themselves broad in their views, a considerable number took up again the most narrow notions, even to the ignorant argufying on the spelling of the name of Jesus. The opponents of the liberal circular contended that the Christ-*Iissùs* of the Orthodox could not be the same as the Christ-*Issùs* of the Old-Believers, but was none other than Antichrist, who simulated the Saviour's divine name. A council, convoked at the White-Fountain in 1868, merely envenomed these discussions, and resulted in the desertion of some of the *raskòl's* most eminent followers.

Since that time the Hierarchists (*Popòftsy*) or Old-Believers proper, remained split into three unequal sections: 1st, those—not numerous—who reject the entire Austrian hierarchy, and are content to get along, as heretofore, with priests stolen from the official Church; 2d, those who recognize the new hierarchy and adhere to the encyclical letter of 1862; 3d, those who, while recognizing the new episcopate, reject the encyclical letter as being steeped in heresy. Between these three sections—especially the second and third, which are by far the most considerable—the war is brisk. Each has its bishops, and these occasionally excommunicate and depose one another. In more than one city, especially in Moscow, liberals and conservatives have been known to erect

* See, on all these contentions, N. Popòf, *The Hierarchists' Encyclical Letter*, and especially N. Subbòtin, *The Contemporary Annals of the Schism*, and *History of the Biêlokrinitsa Hierarchy* (in Russian).

altar against altar, pulpit against pulpit. For several years schismatic Moscow had two parallel hierarchies, each of which anathematized the other. It is no wonder, therefore, if the Hierarchists lost ground; and the ground they lost the "No-priests" gained, so that we are told by old observers that the numerical proportion which formerly was in favor of the Hierarchists is being gradually reversed.

The creation of an Old-Ritualist episcopate did not, then, put an end to the dissensions between the followers of the old rite. The spirit of sectarianism prevailed. The comparative tolerance shown them in the reign of Alexander III. seems to have still more activated their quarrels, by giving their bishops leisure to attend to their rivalries and recriminations. For many years, under Nicolas, even under Alexander II., they could visit their flocks only clandestinely and in disguise. Towards the end of the latter reign almost all the *staroviêr* bishops were in exile or in jail. The State had treated these pseudo-bishops as usurpers who unduly appropriated a dignity to which they had no sort of claim.* Those who fell into its hands, the imperial government locked up as rebellious priests in the convent-fortress of Sùzdal, which is used as a prison for the clergy. They were set at liberty only in 1881, when Lòris-Mélikof was in power. There were three of them; one of whom, Kònon, was an octogenarian, and had spent twenty-three years behind the bars. The other two, also very aged men, had been prisoners for about twenty years. When they were set free, in deference to the loud demands of the press, these confessors of the "old faith," the *Gòlos* reported, appeared to have been generally forgotten.

Ever since they have been free to plant the true cross on Russian soil, the Old-Orthodox prelates frequently meet in council or

* And yet, from the theological standpoint, one hardly sees how the validity of this "Old-Orthodox" hierarchy, which holds its powers directly from Eastern bishops, can be impugned. It stands towards the Greco-Russian Church almost exactly in the same position in which the Jansenist hierarchy of Utrecht stood towards the Roman Church.

synod to deliberate on the affairs of their church. There are now about fifteen who reside within the empire. Of this number four or five belong to the fanatical faction which rejects the encyclical letter. They all have assumed the titles of the great episcopal sees. Those who reside in Moscow and Kazàn have proclaimed themselves archbishops. The late Anthony, self-called Archbishop of Moscow, was scheming, so I was told, to emancipate himself entirely from the Austrian metropoly and to have himself recognized as Metropolitan—if not Patriarch—of all Russia. The greater number of these mitred schismatics are quite uneducated. Several, as for instance, Sabbatius, the present "archbishop" of Moscow, are former tradesmen, with no knowledge of theology. The most unlettered keep secretaries, who take charge of the correspondence and frequently are the real managers of diocesan affairs. Like their Orthodox colleagues, the schismatic bishops usually reside in convents or *skits*. They lead a comfortable, sometimes a luxurious life. The Old-Ritualists of Moscow have built for their "archbishop" a veritable palace.

The wealthy *staroviêr* merchants treat their prelates with great liberality as regards money; but they are often exacting and dictatorial. Through money they hold them. Sometimes they show them so little respect, that one or two of these bishops of the Austrian hierarchy have, for this very reason, deserted their episcopal throne and even abjured the Schism. Still, the position is sought after, because it is so lucrative. The pastors are elected by their flocks, and the merchants, who rule the affairs of the *raskòl* with a high hand, generally choose men whom they can keep dependent on themselves. Theological quarrels are complicated by rivalries between the nabobs of the Schism, by conflicts between local interests, and sometimes questions of personal pique. If the bishops sometimes have reason to complain of their flocks, the latter have not always reason to be satisfied with their pastors. Some there are who have incurred the suspicion of simony. This same Sabbatius has been accused of lowering the dignity of the

priesthood by bestowing the sacrament of ordination indiscriminately on men devoid of information or morality, who wish to be priests only as a means of making money out of the devout of their creed. It will be seen that, even while breaking with the Church, the Old-Believers could not entirely escape the abuses which are laid at the door of the official clergy. Indeed, what difference there is, is not always to their advantage. Fortunately, however, the Hierarchists have, besides their priests and bishops, their "spiritual councils," a sort of consistory composed of laymen, mostly elders and "reading men" (*natchòtchiki*), who keep an eye on the clergy and hold it in a certain degree of subjection.

The Church—or rather, perhaps, the State—could not fail to take advantage of the dissensions among the Old-Ritualists in its efforts to break up the Schism and bring back into the pale of Orthodoxy the moderate section of it—the *Popòftsy* or Hierarchists. Seeing that they made the first steps towards discarding an obsolete fanaticism, it was natural that the Holy Synod should think a few concessions on forms sufficient to conciliate the more enlightened portion of them. Taking as basis the encyclical letter, the occasion of so many dissensions, it seemed there was nothing to do but to draw up a document formulating the entire reconciliation between the *staroviêrs* and the Orthodox. Yet, and in spite of the liberal manifestations of the leaders, it is no easy thing to agree on the actual stipulations of a treaty of peace. Each side stands to its colors. The official hierarchy is not minded to acknowledge itself in the wrong, and the Old-Believers will not re-enter the Church except through the great front door, with flying colors and to the chime of the bells. It is not enough for them to be received with the kiss of peace ; what they want is that the official hierarchy should greet them contritely and repentantly. That the ancient rites should be tolerated does not content them. What they demand is their solemn rehabilitation with the concurrence of the Eastern patriarchs : for, they argue, the old books and the old rites having been condemned by a council, must be reinstated also by a council.

The Russian Church, to make peace with her rebellious children, has not yet called together an œcumenic council of the Orthodox world: she persists in looking on her differences with them as on a family matter. Yet she has made to them one concession which, to certain churchmen of the eighteenth century, might have looked like a disavowal of the past. The Holy Synod (the "permanent council") has recalled the anathema which the council of 1667 had hurled against all the adherents of the old rites. More than that: the Holy Synod officially declared in 1886 that the Orthodox Church had never condemned the ancient rites or the ancient texts, except in so far as they symbolized heretical interpretations; that what the Church had striven against was solely the Dissenters' rebellion, their disobedience to the hierarchy established by Christ. And in fact, the Old-Believers, by resisting the injunctions of the episcopate and accusing it of heresy, unwittingly denied the authority of the Church, or else located the Church outside of the hierarchy and the ecclesiastical authorities, in themselves, in the Christian people, in whom tradition is vested. If they did not realize this themselves, the bishops did, and therein, to them, lay the importance and malignity of the "old faith." "If we burn you, if we torture you," the Patriarch Joachim said already to the first *raskòlniks*, "it is not for the way you cross yourselves, it is for your rebellion against Holy Church. As to the sign of the cross, make it any way you choose." *

* Macarius, the Metropolitan and historian, holds that such was the view which Níkon himself took of the matter. Had he remained in power, he would certainly have granted to those who disapproved of the liturgical reform—as he actually did to the arch-priest Nerónof—the permission to maintain the old rites, and, instead of provoking the Schism, he would have averted it. Other historians, on the contrary—Kostomárof, for instance, and Shtchápof,—will have it that he did provoke the Schism by the asperity of his personal character and his despotic proceedings. There is a whole historical school which avers that the old books were rather a pretence, an occasion, than the cause of the Schism. According to these historians, the true cause was the discontent of the people against the tendency manifested by the bishops to alter the relations originally existing between churchmen and laymen, in such a way as to benefit the high clergy.

As early as the end of the eighteenth century, the government and the clergy had made use of such views as precedents, to smooth the way for the Schismatics' return. It seemed as though the permission to keep the ancient books and the ancient ceremonies must suffice to bring back men whose object in rebelling had been not to change the old forms of worship. And so, after holding out over a century, the supreme ecclesiastical authority conceded to the Old-Believers the right of keeping the ritual which had been in use prior to Níkon's reform. By an *ukàz* dated 1800, and framed at the instigation of the Metropolitan Plato, the Holy Synod consented to the ordination of priests who were to officiate according to the ancient rites. To the adherents of this new church was given the name of *yédinoviêrtsy—i. e.*, "united in faith." It was by means of a similar concession to the *utraquists* that the Roman Church put an end to the Hussite war. Petitions presented to Tsar Alexis attest that such a compromise would have satisfied the first Old-Believers. A hundred years later their descendants were no longer content with it. In religious as in political difficulties, tardy concessions are often rejected with contempt by those who once humbly implored them. The official Church, in persuading herself that all differences bear on externalities, made the same mistake as the Old-Believers when they pretended that they had rebelled against her authority only on account of the rites. The question is no longer entirely one of ceremonial. Through the long struggle the Schism has gathered a spirit of its own, an individuality, habits of independence and liberty which make reconciliation very difficult.

The right of adhering to the ancient rites was not a sufficient inducement. There was the fear that, under the guise of a compromise, it was really submission that was aimed at; that the government and the Synod would treat it as merely a transitory expedient, a sort of vestibule or porch where Níkon's adversaries would be allowed a short respite before being re-absorbed into legal Orthodoxy. And besides, the government, while inviting

the Schismatics to adopt the form of Orthodoxy which received the name of *yédinoviêriyé*, strictly forbade its subjects hitherto reputed loyally Orthodox from having anything to do with it. True, this strictness has partly been relaxed of late years, and Russians entered on the regular church registers have been, in some cases, authorized to have recourse to priests of the "united faith." The "ancient rites," all the same, retain a subordinate position as regards the ceremonies in use since Níkon. There were two ways of attracting the great bulk of the Old-Believers: one—to place the two rites on a footing of equality, leaving the faithful free to choose between them; the other—to constitute the *yédinoviêrtsy* into an autonomous church. Neither way was taken. As a consequence, the greater part of the Old-Ritualists look on the whole transaction as a snare, a trap—and so call it (*lovùshka*).

Between this creation of the *yédinoviêrtsy* by the Orthodox Church and that of the "Uniates" in the Polish lands by the Court of Rome and the Jesuits, there is a resemblance which has never been noted. In both cases a similar end was pursued by means of a half-measure which, in both, aroused the same mistrust. It is almost as though Russia, to bring back her Schismatics, imitated the proceeding by which Rome and Poland strove to conciliate their Polish subjects of the Greek rite. Wittingly or not, the Russian government simply appropriated the very tactics it was combating when used by Rome and the Poles. The imitation remained incomplete; hence, in part, its want of success. The Roman Church allowed the "Uniates," besides their ritual and their liturgy, their own bishops and hierarchy, while the Russian insists on forcing on the "united Old-Believers" priests ordained by her own bishops and obedient to them. This is one of the reasons of the Old-Believers' opposition. No matter that the Orthodox bishops are willing to consecrate them according to the old ritual, that does not satisfy them. Most of them will not step into this official fold, where the pastors perform the ancient rites only out of obedience, and the bishops look down on

their flock's revered ceremonies, at best, with contemptuous tolerance.

This is why the Schism was scarcely scotched by a compromise which ought, it would seem, to have put an end to it. In spite of the yearly accessions duly mentioned in the High Procurator's reports, the number of the *yédinoviêrtsy* is not much over a million, and of this number many appear to have come in only *pro forma* and for the sake of a quiet life. In 1886 they had, in all the empire, only 244 churches, and of these many remained almost empty. Then there are among them the indifferents, the "worldlings," who do not go much inside the house of the Lord. Others, after pretending to accede, go on frequenting the Schismatics' chapel. Some openly return to the old fold and do penance for their weakness. Such relapses are known even among the clergy. So in 1855, Father Verkhòfsky, priest of a "united" church in Petersburgh, left his parish and fled to Biêlokrínitsa. And those who do stay in the "united church" generally manifest more sympathy with the Schismatic Old-Believers than with the Orthodox of the new rite. They really are nothing more than another faction of the *Popòftsy*. Most of them remain fanatically attached to the old ritual. The tolerance which the Established Church shows to their customs they by no means reciprocate. One had better not pray in their churches after the "Nikonian" fashion. I was told of a man who was brutally put out because he had inadvertently crossed himself with three fingers during one of their services. These old-rite Orthodox are just as particular as the Schismatics to use only the ancient musical notation in "crotchets" or crooks (*Kriukì*). They have a printing-office of their own in Moscow. Their churches are consecrated specially for them, and they have officially recognized convents. Such is the *skit* of Pokròfsky near Semiònof.

The main obstacle to final pacification probably lies in the independent habits acquired by the Schismatics. Having got into the way of electing their priests, they don't care for a priest ap-

pointed and treated like any other *tchinòvnik*. To get them to "join," their right of electing, or at least nominating their priests should be respected. By one of those transformations which frequently occur in the history of revolutions and heresies, the *raskòl's* initial point of departure, the ritualistic formalism of the first Old-Believers, has ceased to be the main cause of the Schism's persistency. In its struggle against official Orthodoxy, it found a new principle of being. If Hierarchism still endures, it is because it embodies popular resistance against the interference of the State in church matters, because it has become a protest against any kind of dependence, real or apparent, in religion.

There was a manuscript petition circulated among the Old-Believers under Alexander II. In it, it was said that the Established Church did not represent Catholic Orthodoxy, but only a Russian, Moscovite, synodal official Orthodoxy, whose head is not Christ but the emperor, and which allows bishops to be appointed by the secular power; a State institution based on the sign of the cross with three fingers; a Greek ritualism, or a ritualistic creed, believing in the dogmatical importance of certain details in the ritual and erecting them into articles of faith. Is it not a curious thing to see those Old-Believers turning the tables and accusing the Established Church of what they stand charged with themselves—formalism and servilism?

What the *staroviêrs* of the Hierarchist persuasion are really asking for, is, in a way, the separation of temporal from spiritual things. They demand the liberty of the Church, nor at all realize that they, by their long rebellion, have been the first to weaken her. They forget that, by impairing her popularity, they have really contributed to make her more and more subject to the secular power. One of their chief grudges against official Orthodoxy is its dereliction of the old church constitution and the suppression of the Patriarchate.* Some of them want it restored,

* The abolition of the Patriarchate, with the design of subordinating the sacerdotal authority to that of the Tsar is one of the proofs the Schismatics bring of Peter the Great having been Antichrist.

never thinking that such a power placed over them would not harmonize at all well with their religious habits, their semi-presbyterian customs.

They embody two distinct tendencies, which do not usually go together: they are anxious to make the Church independent of the secular power, but not that church government should be left entirely in the clergy's hands,—rather to make more room in the Church for the initiative of laymen. While asserting the necessity of a priesthood, the Hierarchists are not any more inclined than the "No-priests," or indeed the most orthodox Russians, to abdicate into the hands of the priests. As far as that is concerned, there is not in any of the Russian sects the slightest vestige of sacerdotalism or clericalism, and this is not the least curious trait of the Moscovite character. An autonomous church self-governed, yet controlled by the faithful through an elective clergy,—a national, popular, and democratic church—such seems to be the religious ideal of the Old-Believers. Looked at from this point of view, the *raskôl*, born of ignorant squabbles, and grown strong upon a sort of crude scholasticism, assumes an European and modern aspect; it represents, in Eastern Christianity, aspirations which have frequently deeply stirred the Western churches. In view of such tendencies the best means of paving the way for the re-union of the *staroviêrs* to the Established Church would be to reform the latter, to increase her liberties, and admit more largely the elective principle, which is deeply rooted in Russian manners; to raise, morally and materially, the standard of the clergy—for in Russia as everywhere else the shortcomings of the priest have not been the least among the causes of heresy.

BOOK III. CHAPTER VI.

Organizations and Doctrines of the "No-priests" (*Bezpopòftsy*)—Greater Difficulty for them of Forming a Church—Their Division into Numerous Sects—The Principal ones: *Pomòrtsy*, "Theodosians"—Questions at Issue between them—The Fanatics and Politicians—Submission to the State—Praying for the Emperor—Marriage and Family—All Sexual Union Illicit—Theory and Practice of Celibacy—Free Union—How the Greater Number of the "No-priests" had to Give up their Original Position—Sectarians who Persist in it—"Tramps" (*Stránniki*)—Vagrancy as a Religious Duty—Two Degrees in the Sect: the "Pilgrims" and the "Hospitallers"—Other Extreme Sects—"Mutes," "Deniers"—"Non-prayers"—The last Term of the *Raskòl*.

It was far more difficult for the other section of the *raskòl*, the "No-priests" or *Bezpopòftsy*, to form a church. The fundamental principle of the sect—the abrogation of the priesthood—threatened to cast them out of the pale of dogmatic Orthodoxy, at the same time as it deprived their communities of the most potent of ecclesiastical bonds. With them, individual fancies could run riot unbridled; there was no barrier to check innovation; the very fiend of dissension and heresy was let loose. They are sects of a sect, or, as Bossuet said of the Protestant sects, "pieces broken off a piece." Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that either the Reformation or the *raskòl* are really what is called "going to pieces." Such doctrines are from the start fatally doomed to everlasting changes. They are essentially unstable, incapable of steadiness and of unity. It is on the day when they cease to differ and split that their real decadence begins.

The *Bezpopòftsy*, having renounced ordination, now have no ministers but the "elders," mere lectors or readers, having no sacerdotal dignity. To read and expound the Scriptures, to bap-

tize and sometimes hear confessions, such is the sum of their duties. There are communities in which these duties may be entrusted to women. These lectors are sometimes most ignorant, and then again deeply read in sacred literature. It is not unusual to encounter some who are superior to the average Orthodox priest; as a rule they have greater influence over their people than the Hierarchists' *popes* over theirs.

The Presbyterian simplicity of the priestless sects' services does not imply the rejection of all external form of worship; far from it. While casting off the clergy, most of their communities have preserved intact all the Russian devotional practices, the superstitious reverence for relics and *eïkons*, the scrupulous observance of fasts, all the minute formalism which begot the Schism: the signs of the cross repeated hundreds of times, the profound salutations, the prostrations. Of all these outer signs they are even more profusely lavish, as though to make up for the emptiness of the service, which can preserve so few ceremonies, from the lack of priests. For the purification of market-bought food certain sects have fixed one hundred such salutations; for a burial, two hundred; for the reception of a neophyte, two thousand a day for six weeks, with twenty prostrations to every hundred. Even more than the Hierarchists, these men have a superstitious horror of tobacco, of sugar, of certain meats—the hare, for instance. In short, they sink deeper and deeper into gross materialism.

Now that there is a tendency in the Schism to deviate from the lines along which it has run for over two hundred years, the "No-priests," with no hierarchic barrier to hold them back, are being carried away, by their negation of all authority, towards rationalism. This is quite a recent development. For a long time they vied with the other section in fidelity to rites and tradition, trying hard not to omit a tittle of either, in spite of having no clergy. In the history of their fluctuations and dissensions, squabbles on ritual and forms hold a large place. As an instance,

take the so-called "title on the cross"—the letters inscribed above the Saviour's head. One sect actually got its name from them—*Titloftsy*. They would not have the four Slavic letters answering the *I N R I* of the Latin crucifix. This title of "Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews," given to Christ by the Roman soldiers, appeared to them as a sacrilegious derision which they refused, even seemingly, to indorse, and they substituted for them the Greek initials and final letters of His name, *I C X C* (for "*I*issùS *C*hristòS"). After this, can we wonder that the only sacrament left them, that of baptism, should have occasioned interminable quarrels and endless dissensions? Some performed it according to the Orthodox rite, omitting only the unction with the holy chrism, as they could not consecrate any. Others re-baptized adults, at night, in running rivers; some few, in the quest for pure baptism, baptized themselves with their own hands. As to the other sacraments, some gave them up, having no priests; others kept up a semblance of them. Thus certain *Philìppoftsy* confessed to an *eikon*, in the presence of one of their elders, who, instead of the absolution, spoke these words: "May thy sins be forgiven thee." With "No-priest" sects, the confessor, who can be either a man or a woman, is merely an adviser.

It is not only by their attachment to the externalities of worship and their hair-splittings about ritual that the priestless section of the *raskòl* has long been fully as retrograde and illiberal as the other, but quite as much—and still more—by its way of interpreting "the reign of Satan," its views on the state, society, marriage, and life generally. It is among these *Bezpopòftsy* that fanaticism has shown itself most uncompromising. Leaving out the maniacs who burned themselves to death to escape the rule of Antichrist, their principal sects always have shown a most Oriental dread of contamination. All contact with one not of their sect, and especially the "Nikonians," was to them pollution. The "Theodosians," would not eat or drink with "the profane," whom

they designated as "Jews." One of their grievances against another sect, the *Pomòrtsy*, was that the latter went to the same bath and drank out of the same glasses as other people. The forty-five rules laid down by their theologians in 1751, at the "council of Vetka," mostly bear on nothing but the avoidance of impure contact. They brought to the matter a truly Hebraic zeal, mixing up, as in certain chapters of Leviticus or Deuteronomy, the loftiest moral precepts and the minutest external observances. One of the rulers of the Theodosian code forbids the consumption of market-bought provisions unless they are purified by means of certain formulas. Another forbids to enter their chapels in a red shirt. Such were, at a still recent period, these radicals of the Schism, among whom rationalism is now slowly infiltrating.

While they reject the priesthood, the *Bezpopòftsy* have monks. They have *skits*, or eremitic colonies, for both sexes. These colonies are, as with the Hierarchists, their main centres and rallying points. Many of the minor sects have taken their names from this or the other *skit*. It was in the northwest, around Lake Onéga, in those almost polar regions, so well prepared for the Schism by their isolation, that the first great community of "No-priests" was formed, which may be regarded as the mother of all the others. Around a few hermits' huts, built on the banks of the river Vyg, numerous Schismatics, with their women and children, formed a settlement—a sort of theocratical republic embosomed in the dark forests, and which found in Andréï Deníssof, one of the luminaries of the Schism, a wise lawgiver.* Peter the Great, on one of his journeys, was struck with the industrious life led by this free commune of Dissenters, and much as he detested the Schism, he spontaneously accorded them various privileges. The doctrines which prevailed in these colonies spread over all the

* Andréï Deníssof and his brother Simon, also one of the *raskòl'*s master spirits, were cultivated men of high birth: they had been known in the world as *Knìazes*—princes—Myshètsky. This is an exceptional case, of which no other instance is known after the first years of the Schism.

region known as the *Pomòriyé* or "Land by the Sea," extending between the great lakes and the White Sea, hence the sect's name of *Pomòrtsy*. Among the many communities which sprang from this one and some of which became its rivals, there is one which took the lead, owing to the wealth of its members and the strictness of its doctrines: it is that of the "Theodosians" (*Fedosséyeftsy*), named after a certain sacristan (*diatchòk*), who died in prison in the beginning of the eighteenth century. So that the 'No-priest' section early formed, not into a centralized and united church, but into a sort of confederacy headed by this powerful Theodosian community.

It was the Theodosians, directed at the time by Kovỳlin, one of those typical Russian merchants who combine to such a marvellous degree practical sense and fanaticism, who gave to the *Bezpopòftsy* their material and moral centre, the cemetery of Preobrajènsky. This establishment, founded under Catherine II., at the very time of the Moscow plague, somewhat preceded the rival establishment of the Hierarchists at Rogòjsky, and became more powerful still. Kovỳlin obtained that the hospital adjoining the cemetery should be exempted from all control and supervision on the part of the church authorities, and that worship should be conducted according to the sect's own rites, the management to be appointed by the founders and to render no accounts to any one but these. But, owing to the frequently subversive doctrines held by the "No-priest" section, Preobrajènsky could not, in the long run, but arouse more suspicion, become more obnoxious still than Rogòjsky. The Theodosian cemetery was denounced as a den of thieves, of counterfeiters, of the most frightful debauchery. It is not impossible that the austere sectarians may have concealed many a fraud under the guise of charity, and that immorality may have occasionally assumed the mask of asceticism. All the same, to have ruled the Schism for a hundred years, at a period of history when institutions are notoriously short-lived, both Preobrajènsky and Rogòjsky must have possessed great qualities,

not to say great virtues. Had the heads been foreign to all sense of duty, had they not obeyed a profound conviction, both the mighty cemeteries would soon have sunk to the condition of ordinary churchyards. One cannot help a feeling of admiration for these Moscow merchants, unconstrainedly governing a free association within an autocratic state, handling immense sums uncontrolled—a fund which is said to have reached some twelve million roubles—an enormous capital for the time. Preobrajènsky, like Rogòjsky, has been invaded by the police and the official clergy. The Theodosian cemetery was desecrated under Nicolas. The *raskòlniks* were allowed to keep their hospital; their church was taken from them. The celebrated Metropolitan of Moscow, Philaret, purified the cathedral of the Schism. The "No-priests" in the hospital had to hear, wafted to them from the church of their fathers, the singing of the "united" priests appointed by the Holy Synod.

Were the doctrines held by these "No-priests" such as to entitle them to the tolerance characteristic of modern times? It was assuredly a harder task to reconcile their tenets to reason, to civilization, than those of the Hierarchists. Of the two fundamental principles of this section, one—the rejection of the priesthood and the sacraments, necessarily led them, as regards marriage, to immoral practices, while the other—the belief in the reign of Antichrist, brought them to revolutionary, anarchical conclusions. The practical application of these two tenets has been the stumbling-block which caused the division into *Pomòrtsy*, Theodosians, Philippians (*Philìppoftsy*); and on their respective manner of interpreting both, on their teaching concerning marriage and family on one hand, the nature and rights of the secular power on the other, depends the State's attitude towards them.

What sort of submissiveness to the sovereign, of obedience to the laws, is to be expected from heretics who preach that, ever since the Patriarch Níkon and the Tsar Alexis, Russia has been under Satan's rule? What is to be looked for from such men but

open rebellion or latent revolt? This applies to all extreme sects: the Philippians who recognized no other sovereign than the King of Heaven, no power but that of the angelic hierarchy, and who burned themselves to death to escape from the domination of the servants of Satan; the *Strànniki* or "Tramps," who, in order to have no communication with the henchmen of Antichrist, to this day keep breaking all social bonds. These maniacs, indeed, have on their side the strictest logic; but in religious affairs the triumph of logic does not endure forever. The era of fanaticism and extravagances is succeeded by that of policy and moderation; on dogmatic absolutism follow corrective compromises, mitigating interpretations. So it has been with the "No-priests." Since the archangel proved tardy in blowing his trumpet and the Supreme Judge in no hurry to descend from the clouds, this world of perdition had to be got along in *some*how. As happened in the West after the year 1000, people took a fresh start, seeking for a new sense in Revelation and the learned doctors. Few indeed are the Schismatics who still look on the Tsar as on the incarnation or the lieutenant of Satan. Some give a spiritual interpretation of the reign of Antichrist; others wait for him to manifest himself in some tangible manner, and both meantime quietly obey the laws, without asking whence they come, and are, most of them, as good citizens, as loyal subjects, as their fellow-countrymen, who believe themselves to be living under the paternal rule of God.

Since a large number of Schismatics more or less ostensibly profess seditious tenets, the government, when it began to relax its strictness, was naturally led to demand from all dissident communities some external sign of submission. This token of allegiance was demanded from their religious services, as though the better to make sure that the sect's doctrines were not meant to incite to sedition: prayers for the Tsar were demanded from the Old-Believers equally with the official Church, or rather the omission of this portion of the liturgy by the scrupulous guardians of liturgical traditions was regarded as an overt act of insubordina-

tion. The absence of prayers for the sovereign is the more shocking to a Russian ear that it occupies a very prominent place in the services. It is not a mere *Domine salvum fac imperatorem*, but a long litany in which the members of the imperial family are mentioned one by one, and which the deacon's fine base voice recites with particular unction. These honors seem to be meant not so much for the secular head of the State as for the protector of the church, the defender of Orthodoxy. Now the Dissenters refused to use the Byzantine formulas of "most pious," "most faithful emperor," "Orthodox prince," as applied to a sovereign who, in their opinion, had lapsed into error.

This question of praying for the emperor was, in the eighteenth century, one of the main causes of the separation between the *Pomòrtsy* and the Theodosians. The former, having heard that the Empress Anne was sending out inspectors to their colonies on the Vyg, decided they would invent some kind of liturgy including the sovereign; the Theodosians reproved them for this concession, calling it an act of apostasy. The *Pomòrtsy* did have scruples; they were willing to pray for the *tsar*, but not for the *imperator*, this latter title being, in the opinion of most *raskòlniks*, one of the names under which Antichrist conceals himself. Many even of the Hierarchists will not pray for the sovereign at all, on the ground that to ask of God, in conformity with the ritual, that He should give the secular power victory over its foes really amounts to asking for the ruin of the "old faith." Still the "No-priests" are not averse from giving this power other tokens of submission. The rigid Theodosians themselves have singularly relaxed their original strictness. In the most stubborn communities common sense and the spirit of conciliation have begun to prevail. We saw the Theodosians of Preobrajènsky sending loyal addresses to Alexander II. and wedding gifts to his children no whit less heartily than the Old-Believers of Rogòjsky. It is for universal tolerance to do the rest. But even as things are now, the enemies—foreign or native—of the Russian government

will meet with no more encouragement from the Russian Schismatics, be they Hierarchists or "No-priests," than would a foe of France from French Protestants.

Between the *Bezpopòftsy* and the State—or rather between them and society,—therefore, one question still remains open: that of marriage, of family. For them, as we have seen, marriage as a sacrament no longer exists. This view is common to all the congregations; at the same time it is the main occasion of all their dissensions. Does the loss of the sacrament involve the absolute suppression of marriage and make of celibacy a universal obligation, or do divine mercy and the good of society authorize some substitute? Of this capital problem every possible solution has been proposed and advocated.

The more moderate have preserved or restored the conjugal bond. Marriage, they say, is not merely a sacrament, it is also a civil union, necessary for the propagation of the species, and not to be dispensed with as a means of protecting weak human flesh against debauchery. Being unable to have their unions consecrated by a priest, they content themselves with the blessing of the parents and the kissing of the cross and Testament in the presence of the family—the most solemn form of oath with Russians. Others—not a few among the *Pomòrtsy* for instance—hold that, marriage as a sacrament having been abrogated, its essence resides entirely in the mutual consent of the two consorts, and conjugal life legitimately lasts only so long as this consent endures. Love, say some, is, of its nature, divine: it is for the union of hearts to decide on the union of lives. One is amazed to find among rustic sectarians the doubly-refined theories of our advanced novelists on the divine right of love and the subordination of marriage to sentiment. Numbers of these lovers have put into practice in their lowly *izbàs* the heart-stirring utopia of George Sand's *Jacques*. Many a village *bàba* has, like Abailard's Heloïse, foregone the name of "wife," finding it sweeter to owe all to love and love alone.

What the greater portion of these "Agamists" or "contemners of marriage" (*Bezbràtchniki*) object to under the name of "conjugal union," is the indissoluble union of the sexes. Under specious theological pretences, many are glad to shuffle off a yoke which appears to them in the light of a social convention. Like many a self-styled philosopher, these merchants or peasants seem to regard time-honored Christian marriage as a superannuated institution. They put forth their utmost ingenuity, to substitute for this tyrannical contract, from which there is no escape for either the man or the woman, some forms of union better suited to the exigencies of human nature. And these ignorant Agamists, the miserable dupes of superstition, find enough lunatics among their cultivated fellow-countrymen, who are ready to extol them as the harbingers of a better future and the pioneers of social progress. I have met society women who have admitted that they envied their plebeian sisters this noble beginning. They are gratefully admired in certain circles for putting in practice the "equal rights of the sexes," the "emancipation of woman" from "domestic serfdom"; they are pointed out as something to be proud of, heaven save the mark! "Catch your peasants of Normandy or Burgundy daring such a thing!" a Moscow student vauntingly said to me. The fact is that, at the two extremes of Russian thought, the "Agamist" Old-Believer and the revolutionary innovator profess much the same views on marriage, and the more radical in practice is not always the most subversive in theory. More than one of these "No-priests," with all his learning got out of old books, is ahead of the times in enacting the ideal offered to modern youth by the "men of the future" in Tchernyshèfsky's novel, *What is to be Done?* There be those among these fanatics of the sign of the cross with two fingers, who carry progressive spirit the length of having the children fathered by the community and brought up at its expense in special homes.

Free love—this is the consummation at which most of the Agamists arrive. Under cover of religious scruples, a singular

experiment is being carried out in these obscure ranks. In the villages where custom regulates the division of inheritances, where the *mir* portions out the land at will among its members, it is possible for the Agamists to elude one of the difficulties inherent to this mode of union—the illegitimacy of the children. In the rural world, where the man cannot exist without the woman, where the two together form the economic unit, the rejection of marriage does not necessarily do away with the family. It can still subsist, though after a precarious fashion. These remarkable unions, which are based only on the free will of the consorts, are sometimes environed with forms which enhance their dignity, and lend them a certain stability: such are the sanction of the parents and the publicity of the act. In certain localities, couples who have decided to enter into a conjugal association, walk about together at fairs and in market-places holding hands, or each the end of a kerchief, as though to announce to the world: "See, we are one." There are forms that are sanctioned by usage also for ruptures or divorces. The couple separates in the presence of parents, relatives, and friends, after going through a great many ceremonial salutations. These unions, which a whim can break, are often lasting and harmonious —so we are told—as though consorts free to part at any time felt all the greater mutual attachment and tenderness, or as though a knot liable to be untied at any moment were, for that reason, drawn less tight.

It is not impossible that the simplicity of rural manners, and the earnestness of the people's convictions mitigate the false and unwholesome traits of such situations. But under all this poetry and fine seeming, free love bears the same ineffaceable taint among Russian sects as among the alleged "reformers" of the West. Say what you will, it is after all nothing but a state of concubinage, with all the deceptions, the disappointments, the heartache which go with ill-assured unions. It is no infrequent occurrence for a sectarian to have his wife's position legalized, by getting a

regular priest to marry them in approved fashion, after which they both go home and confess and perform whatever penance the community imposes on them.

Some sects have indulged in every abuse and scandal the world has ever known in countries where divorce is easy. Men and women have been seen to come together without earnest purpose, and separate as lightly. This is especially the case in cities, where the woman is less of a necessity ; where the workingman sees in a family only a burden. This is why the Schismatics, who, as regards temperance and honesty, may well claim a higher moral standard than the average Russian, are more immoral as regards sexual relations. Indeed, many of these contemners of marriage openly declare their preference for libertinism, extolling the free union of men and women as the true fraternal, the one holy and Christian love. And even in villages, fathers have been known, we are assured, to encourage their daughters to lead an immoral life, praising them for bringing future laboring forces into the house, allowing them any and everything, excepting only marriage. Like certain lay moralists, some of these Old-Believers appear to have reached the conclusion that all that bears on the relations between the sexes does not belong in the province of morals.

Yet even free love is perhaps less of a nuisance than the maxims of the more rigid sects, which carry the principles of the Schism to their extremest consequences. In the eyes of sundry "No-priest" communities, all intercourse between the sexes is illicit, as nothing can supply the place of the lost sacrament. With some of these sectarians, Ivan Turguénief once said to me, the ascetic idea appears to reinforce the theological idea. Sexual intercourse is to them, in itself, impurity, and marriage, which consecrates it legally, an abomination. If they condone libertinism more easily than marriage, it is because the former sin can be redeemed by repentance and abstention, while from the latter there is no escape.

The Theodosians put the gruesome teaching into a formula or saying, which the concision of the language makes doubly striking, and which can be but lamely rendered at best: "Married, unwive; unmarried, don't wive." *(Jenàtoy, raz-jenìss; nié jenàtoy, nié jenìss.)* So bachelors and spinsters were forbidden to wed, and married people to live as such: "Let not the youth take a wife, let not the husband use his rights," says a sort of rhymed catechism; "let not the maiden enter into wedlock; let not the wife bear children." Couples convicted of having transgressed this rule, found guilty of bringing children into the world, were expelled from the community or subjected to humiliating penances. And so it came to pass that those who adhered to these rules, but whose flesh had proved weak, were sorely tempted to remove the proofs of their weakness—and infanticide became one of the crimes charged against the lay monks of Preobrajènsky. It is said that a great many bodies of new-born babies have been fished out of a pond adjoining their cemetery. In order to remove such temptations, the Theodosians founded vast orphan asylums in Moscow and Riga. Certain fanatics, it is said, atoned for their sin by burying alive the fruit of it. The Theodosians have always denied these things; yet they are the indirect outcome of their teachings. "When a child is conceived, nowadays," it is said in one of their manuscript poems, "it is no longer from God the Creator, but from the Devil that the human soul comes."

A society so powerful through its wealth and industry could not hold to such opinions forever. Several communities seceded, and went back to normal marriage. A larger class contrived to secure the joys of married life without forfeiting their position in the sect as celibates. They would live with one woman, whom they would, in the house, treat as a wife, and whose children they would bring up as their own legitimate offspring. These shamefaced adherents of marriage the strict Theodosians nicknamed "Neo-gamists" *(novojòny)*. The stern guardians of celibacy and advocates of libertinism closed their chapels against such weak-

lings, and even refused to eat or drink with them. Such an attitude could not last forever; the two parties have come to terms.

A change has come over even the most inflexible Theodosians. What they now insist on, in common with the majority of *Bezpopòftsy*, is, a civil celibacy which by no means excludes a man's living conjugally with a woman. Among these men, who seemed ready to turn Russia into one vast monastery, the reaction has been so great that the Theodosians of Moscow came a few years ago to reject monachism as well as the priesthood, on the ground that, without priests, there can be no monastic consecration. In virtue of this new principle some of their most prominent monks have thrown away the veil and cassock and have taken a housekeeper—literally a "cook" (*striapùkha*), for it is by this most practical title that the Theodosian designates the helpmate whom he virtually makes his consort. Judging from that, women would not seem to have gained much by the theories of the Agamists. The same might be said of the children, the great difficulty in every system of this sort. For them the Agamists have found nothing better than orphan asylums where the parents are free to place their offspring. So, on the whole, they do not seem to have solved the problem of free union in a very satisfactory way. In reality, they simply live in a state of concubinage, exactly like numbers of workmen in our cities of the West. All the difference is, that, through all the aberrations of sectarianism, the "No-priests" have preserved a religious faith and a positive code of morals, and therefore these unions, with them, have at least more decency, more chances of peace and enduringness. If it were possible for the utopia of a free family, unrestrained by legal bonds, to be accepted with impunity, it could be only under cover of religion. At the hearth of the man who believes, there is always God, whose invisible presence shields the woman and the child.

On this question of conjugal life and family, as likewise on that of the reign of Antichrist and submission to the State,

the "No-priest" section has become much less impracticable. Their wrong-doings are common to them with men who have nothing to do with the "old faith." The modern "No-priest" repudiates the fierce doctrines of his predecessors; he contests their authenticity or their interpretation; at a pinch he has recourse to the press or to justice to refute what he calls slanderous misrepresentations. It is no longer the leaders of the Schism who proclaim these maxims, subversive of morals, but its enemies who unearth them in old books and manuscripts left by the doctors of the sect, to make use of them against it. No matter if their theological adversaries accuse them of inconsistency—many a new form of worship owes its being to just such inconsistencies as these. If the savage spirit of the old *Bezpopòftsy* is not dead yet, it is really alive only in a few extreme sects, in one queer sect in particular—the *Stràvniki* or Tramps.

The most shocking aberrations of the early "No-priests" have been professed still in the full glare of the nineteenth century by the Tramps, also called "Runners" (*biêgunỳ*), self-styled "Pilgrims." A deserter of the name of Ephim, who became a monk in one of the Theodosian *skits*, was their first apostle. He conducted a sort of revival at the close of the eighteenth century. The belief in the actual reign of Satan is the corner-stone of the Tramps' doctrines. They repudiate any sort of concession, denouncing the inconsistencies of the modern "No-priest" as rank apostacy; they admit of no compromises whatever, and will have no intercourse with Satan's representatives, *i.e.*, the State and the authorities. The Tramp takes his cue from the ancient prophets and retires into the thickest of the forests, whither the servants of Antichrist have not penetrated. He especially keeps away from cities, those accursed Babylons, where reside the ministers of the Prince of Darkness. The Tramp's motto is, the text: "Leave thy father and thy mother, take up thy cross and follow me." With true Moscovite realism—the realism which has made

the Schism, he takes the command in the most literal sense, forsakes his farm and his family and makes it a test of piety to have no hearth of his own under the heavens.

It must be owned that this queer sect is less queer in Russia than it would be elsewhere. It is at all events thoroughly Russian and seems born of the country's nature and the people's tastes. The *mujík's* fondness for an itinerant life is well known and has often been described as a "nomadic instinct." The vastness of his plains, with the low horizon, seems to lure him into endless, aimless wanderings. From the depths of his forests mysterious voices call to him; it has its sirens, like the sea. There are few countries where man is more strongly tempted to give up settled life, the narrow prison of a civilized existence, for a free and wild natural state. Is it a wonder that in such a land rustic doctors should have been found who condemn the former and erect vagrancy into an ideal of holiness? Where does man feel himself nearer to God than in the solitude of the woods and under the starry roof of heaven? It has been noticed that this sect has its most numerous adherents in the north, the forest region, where itinerant trades have at all times been in high honor, where many peasants are away from home half the year, plying some trade or craft in more productive parts of the country. Local habits made the people receptive to the Tramp's teaching. The central point of the sect is accordingly in the government of Yaroslavl and the neighboring districts.*

For the *Stránnik* there is no salvation except in isolation and flight. He forsakes his homestead, his wife and children, leaves the village and the commune where he is legally registered, bent on having neither family nor known residence. As a token of having broken with society, the Tramps reject passports and

* It is a noteworthy coincidence that this province is one of those where the proportion of those who can read is greatest, where the Schismatics, especially the "No-priests," are most numerous, and where morals are laxest: out of four spinsters, one is sure to be a mother. See Bezobrázof, *Études sur l'Économie Nationale de la Russie*, vol. ii. (1886).

all papers by which their identity can be proved ; this is the first condition of entering the community of "true Christians." In lieu of passport, a Tramp carries papers with maxims of the sect written on them, or simply a cross, or sentences like the following : "This is the true passport, endorsed at Jerusalem." There are Tramps of both sexes. They practise a sort of communism, admit of no social distinctions, and regard all men as equal. They look upon themselves as monastics, and address one another as "brother" and "sister." They agree with the most rigid *Bezpopòftsy* in proscribing marriage, which, they hold, only serves to cover sin. They prefer illicit relations, on the ground that the married man gives himself up to evil forever, whereas the celibate who has weakly yielded to the promptings of the flesh finds both atonement and purification in the reprobation of men. Some really practise polygamy, having mistresses in different villages, or dragging along with them women who share their nomadic existence. Having no regular means of livelihood, the Tramps will steal once in a while, invariably justifying the act on the ground that, the world being under Satan's rule, every attack on society is a protest against the domination of hell.

It cannot be expected that every one who adopts such a doctrine will forthwith proceed to carry out all its maxims. Like all sects of which the dogmas do violence to human nature, the *Stràvniki* are naturally divided into two classes. Thus it was with the Albigenses, who also believed in the reign of Satan, rejected marriage, and repudiated the Church as a demoniacal institution. They admitted two grades of adepts : the "perfect," who carried out the code in all its rigor and purity, and the mere "believers," who were permitted to lead the ordinary life, on condition that they should always remain in communion with those of the "perfect" grade. The *Stràvniki* have a similar organization. There are the "pilgrims" or "runners," who are always on the go, and the "residents," who stay in the world, pay their taxes, and go to church if necessary. The mission of the latter is

to provide their more perfect brethren with shelter, which office has earned for them the name of "hospitallers." Of these two classes, one may be said to be the initiated, and the other—the catechumens or novices.

Only the former receive the "Tramps' Baptism"—a ceremony which is performed at night, in some desert place, and binds the recipient to the life of the saints, the "pilgrims." Some will use for this baptism no water but that of heaven's own rain or some out-of-the-way marsh; the rivers, they say, are polluted by the followers of Antichrist. Each of these "pilgrims," man or woman, has a wooden bowl and spoon, an *eïkon* in metal; they neither pray nor eat with the profane, not even with the brethren who shelter them. They have neither church nor chapel, but have divine service in secret retreats, usually in forests, hanging their *eïkons* on the trees. The "hospitallers" are permitted, in consideration of their weakness, to put off their entrance into perfect life, as the early Christians sometimes put off baptism till their end was near. But it is only a reprieve: before they leave this world they must do the right thing, cut themselves off from all temporal ties, leave home, wife, and children. When taken seriously ill, or when they feel the approach of death, they have themselves carried into the woods, or some wild solitary spot, or at least into somebody else's house, there to receive baptism and to breathe their last as beseems a "Pilgrim," a "Tramp." While they live in the world, they often have in their *izbàs* hiding-places, where transient pilgrims are concealed. Their dwellings have several doors and are generally arranged so as to put the police off the track. The adepts of both grades know one another by certain tokens and formulas. Sometimes a "hospitaller" entertains a "pilgrim" without asking him any questions, or talking to him, or hardly seeing him at all. This complicity enables the apostles of vagrancy to travel over immense tracts, preaching renunciation of the world as they go, finding safe shelters everywhere, and indeed living not unfrequently on the fat of the land.

The liberality with which they are entertained in fact often proves an incentive to charlatans and escaped convicts to play the itinerant prophets.

The reign of the Emperor Nicolas was the most flourishing period of "tramping." The active pursuit kept up by the authorities only increased the sect's popularity. As for recruits, it could always count on runaway serfs, on convicts escaped from Siberia, on deserters—for the term of military service being twenty years at that time, it amounted to civil death. The sect spread like wildfire in regiments and prisons; it found neophytes and missionaries in that large class of vagrants—passportless tramps—which was always being so ruthlessly chased by the police. It is especially in this its extreme branch that the Schism appeared as the expression of popular resistance against the vexations inflicted by the social order, against long-term military service, serfdom, and German bureaucratism. In certain governments of the north-east several hundred Tramps were arrested every year. Then, between them and the police, would ensue dialogues like the following*: "Have you a passport?"—"I have."—"Let see." And the "pilgrim" would present a paper drawn up in apocalyptic jargon, interspersed with maxims something like this: "They who persecute thee are preparing for themselves a place in hell." "Who did you get this passport from?" asks the officer. "From the King of Heaven, the Almighty Ruler of the universe," replies the "pilgrim."—"You have no legal passport then?"—"No."—"Why not?"—"Because the sheets given out by the police all bear the seal of Antichrist" (the eagle on government stamped paper).—"You want to go to jail?"—"I am ready to suffer anything. Torments do not terrify me. I fear neither the wild beasts, nor the ministers of Satan." And the pilgrim would go on in this exalted strain, unwittingly rehearsing, for the *ispràvnik's* benefit, the speeches which the Christians, in the *Acta Martyrum*, recite to the pro-consul. The more of these monomaniacs

* Livànof, *Schismatics and Jailbirds*, vol. i., pp. 6, 7.

were condemned, the more were brought in, for persecution greatly enhances the attractiveness of this sombre craze.

"Tramping" is not dead even yet. One still hears of a Tramp prophet once in a while. Towards the last days of Alexander II., a certain Níkonof, an old soldier and deserter like the founder of the sect, preached vagrancy to the peasants of Olònets. The police got hold of him in 1878, for the third time. The first time he had escaped; the second time he had been delivered by peasants. To catch him in his den, the police had to watch for a time when the peasants were all out at their work. Such extreme cases are rare nowadays. The views of even these uncompromising non-conformists are undergoing a curious transformation. Some of their apostles, it is said, are leaning towards a sort of mysticism, tinged with rationalism. They reduce dogma and Scripture to allegory, rejecting feast days, fasts, and all external forms of worship. This is not a solitary phenomenon in the history of the Schism. This change of front is still more marked in one or two other extreme sects of the "No-priest" section. It is worth looking into.

Among the heresies issued out of the Schism which broke out in the seventeenth century, we will mention the "Mutes," the "Non-prayers." The Mutes (*moltchàlniki*) have made their appearance quite recently in Bessarabia, on the Lower Volga, in Siberia. Of this sect little is known, as is but natural, since to them the first condition of salvation is silence. They abstain from speech entirely, probably also taking literally some saying in the Scriptures. Haxthausen tells how, under Catherine II., a governor of Siberia, Pestel by name, had vainly tried torture on them, —he could not make them open their mouths; not when he poured boiling wax on their bodies, and applied the Eastern bastinado to the soles of their feet. Modern judicial proceedings have not been much more successful. Under Alexander II., in 1873, "mutes" of both sexes suffered themselves to be sentenced to transportation to Siberia by the court of Saràtof, without replying a word to a

single question, witnessing the entire proceedings in the attitude of uninterested lookers-on. These Mutes are perhaps only a variety of the Tramps. Among the sectarians on the Lower Volga, known to the clergy under the name of "Montanists," there were some, about 1855, who had taken the vow of silence and wandered about, acting like idiots.

A little better known is a sect called the "Deniers," which holds that, since Níkon and the rejection of the priesthood, there is nothing sacred on earth any more: all holy things, they say, have been taken up to heaven. They arrive at the negation of all external form of worship, rejecting all ceremonies, the sacraments, *eïkons*, and admitting only direct recourse to the Saviour. Hence they are sometimes called "the Brotherhoods of the Saviour."

The instincts of negation which lie latent in the No-priest section of the Schism have full play in the sect of the Non-prayers (*niémoliàki*). Here we see the Schism, having gone the whole round of evolution, reach the antipodes of its point of departure. The founder of this sect is reputed to have been a certain Zímin, a Cosack of the Don, formerly a Hierarchist. He was a brave soldier, decorated with the cross of St. George. He was caught preaching and was sent to the Caucasus in 1837. No one knows what became of him there. The doctrine rests on an original conception, that of the four ages or seasons of the world. These are: The spring, or pre-paternal age, from the creation of the world to Moses; the summer, or age of the Father, from Moses to Christ; the autumn, or age of the Son, from the birth of Christ to the year 1666; the winter, or age of the Holy Ghost, which began with the Nikonian heresy and is to last to the end of time. This theological calendar is evidently derived from the idea which many *raskòlniks* entertain, that the reign of Antichrist forms one of the great epochs of history; the peculiarity about it is that the age of Antichrist turns out to be that of the Holy Ghost also.

The argument is as follows: The hierarchy having allowed

the beacon light of faith to go out, the old worship is abrogated. Salvation can no longer be gained by the help of material rites. All external ceremonies having lost their virtue, God should be henceforth worshipped only in spirit. The orisons which our lips utter have ceased to please Him; as to prayers read out of books or memorized, they are worthless in His eyes. The only prayer agreeable to Him is that which comes from the heart and is uttered in spirit. Does not our Heavenly Father know without our asking Him all that we need? Stretching the principle to its extremest consequences, the Non-prayers reject feast-days, fasts, relics, *eïkons*, even the Cross, which has become useless in the reign of the Holy Ghost. They have renounced baptism as well as the other sacraments. They marry without prayers or ceremonies, on the ground that the consent of the consorts and of the parents is sufficient. They condemn funeral rites as a form of impiety, asserting that the body which is of the earth should simply be given back to the earth.

The principle of the worship of the Holy Ghost—the Spirit—they apply to the Scriptures, averring that they must be understood spiritually. Starting from this maxim, they see nothing but allegories in the dogmas of Christianity and the facts narrated in the Gospels. Christ's birth, passion, death, resurrection, are to them so many symbols. So the Virgin Mary is Virtue, of whom the Divine Word is born. They interpret similarly the Saviour's second coming, the Last Judgment, the resurrection of the dead, which takes place every day, being simply the conversion of sinners. Certain investigators will have it that they have come to deny the immortality of the soul, and to believe that after death there is nothing.

This is the Schism's *Ultima Thule*. After having for more than two centuries sent out shoots in all directions, this luxurious tree, which has its roots in superstition, bears as its latest fruit—rationalism; the richest blossom which unfolds on this stalk watered with the blood of martyrs, is—deism. True, not many

among the *Bezpopòftsy* go the length of the "Non-prayers"; but many lean towards a sort of radicalism. The absence of a hierarchy, the controversies between sect and sect, the free interpretation of the Scriptures, acknowledged as the only authority left—all these things turn their steps the way of rationalism. From the old books which they persist in treasuring they gradually draw new ideas, which would have greatly scandalized their fathers, those champions of the letter, whose descendants protest more and more violently against literalness. The most shocking of their dogmas, the actual reign of Antichrist, has become to many the starting-point of spiritual renovation. They interpret it allegorically, and extend the same method to other beliefs as well. In their polemical disputes with Orthodox theologians, one not unfrequently hears a Cosack *raskòlnik* declare "We live under a new heaven." This is an idea which opens a wide field to innovations and daring inferences. While the fathers looked on religion as one immutable whole, not one iota of which it was for any living soul to alter, the sons have come to apply to it the modern idea the most opposed to the "old faith"—that of evolution. Many contend that what was good in another age, for Christians in their infancy, is no longer suited to our own age and to adult Christians.

The very names of "Old-Believers" and "Old-Ritualists," in which they once gloried, many now reject, preferring to call themselves simply "Christians," and arguing that the real Old-Believers are the followers of the Established Church, or, more correctly still, of the Old Law—the Jews. Numbers of "No-priests," and even of Hierarchists, scornfully cast back in the Church's face the charge she makes against them—of making religion consist in a set of ceremonies. The "Non-prayers" are not alone in transforming dogmas into allegories, and the sacraments into symbols. There are enough others who say that the true communion means feeding on the word of Christ and living according to the law. A few, in their controversies with the Or-

thodox, go so far as to repudiate the authority of the Scriptures, and to maintain that the Gospel to be believed in in the first place, is that which is written in the heart. The extreme left of the Schism arrives at the same conclusions as the radical sects who started from the opposite pole.

If mysticism has not entirely disappeared from the teachings of the "No-priests," it is now frequently found allied to a simple-minded rationalism. This combination even seems to be a distinctive trait of modern Russia's religiosity. The bulk of Schismatics is assuredly far from having discarded all the traditions and prejudices of the "old faith"; but ideas foreign to their fathers find their way almost everywhere. In the old skins a new wine is fermenting, which threatens to burst them.

BOOK III.—CHAPTER VII.

Sects not Connected with the Schism; their Division into Two Groups—The Mystics: *Khlystŷ* or "Flagellants"—General Characteristics of the Mystic Sects: Prophetism, Incarnations; Christs and Mothers-of-God—Legend and Doctrine of the Flagellants—Their Rites—How they work themselves into a Trance—Flagellants in Monasteries—Cultured Flagellants—*Skakunŷ* or "Jumpers"—Licentious Rites—Love in Christ—Bloody Rites—How Certain Sectarians Take Communion.

The schism born of Níkon's liturgical reform is only, so to speak, the upper tier of the Russian Dissent. Below the *raskòl* proper, *i. e.*, below the two tiers of Old-Believers—Hierarchists and "No-priests"—there are sects which have nothing to do with the great revolt of the seventeenth century, sects of entirely different origin, pervaded with a different spirit, some of them showing rather Gnostic than Christian affinities, and displaying the popular character under a new aspect. Their starting-point is not a rupture with the Established Church in the name of traditional Orthodoxy; it is a revolt against Eastern Orthodoxy generally, if not against the entire Christian tradition. The Russian sects in their context present this singular contrast that some are punctilious to pettiness, others again radical; some apparently attaching themselves only to insignificant details, while others reject at one sweep form and substance, worship and dogma, so that within the circle of dissent are to be found the two extremes,—the narrowest conservatism and the most revolutionary spirit of innovation. This contrast is accounted for partly by the national character, always in extremes, and partly by the constitution of

the Eastern Church, which is like Roman Catholicism in this, that all the stones of the dogmatic structure are so closely fitted and joined that you cannot dislodge one without pulling down the whole building.

Varied and mutually opposed as they are, the sects which have no connection with the *raskól* of the seventeenth century all have one common standpoint: contrary to the others, they attach little importance to ritual, to ceremonies. They claim that the Christianity they profess is entirely spiritual, detached from the letter and from literal interpretation. In this sense, these heresies, otherwise so dissimilar, may all come under the head of reaction against the "old faith" and the formalism of the Old-Believers. Here the Moscovite genius throws off the trammels of form as well as of tradition, and, giving full scope to its propensity for close logical reasoning, goes straight to last conclusions.

The origin of all these different sects is more or less obscure. Their roots appear to reach out beyond the national soil, some to the East, some to the West, making connection with both Europe and Asia, and keeping in touch at the same time with the lost beliefs of the early centuries of our era, and with the gropings of modern conscience. It has been possible to historically trace several of these heresies to foreign influences, to contact with Europe before or since Peter the Great. These particular influences, obscure and hitherto little known, were possibly the only ones which could have directly reached the people. The principal among these sects have been designated by some Orthodox prelates—as a reminder of their supposed filiation or from certain similarities—by the name of "Russian Quakerism." The doctrines thus designated are too manifold, too original even in imitation, to be suited by a foreign name. Like the heresies of the early ages of the Church, they present a singular mixture of naturalism and mysticism, a queer jumble of heathen notions and Christian ideas. The resemblance between some of these modern, ignorant peasant sects and the most famous heresies of

the Roman world is so striking as to have earned for them ancient names.*

The radical or eccentric sects, while unanimously proclaiming the reign of the Spirit, are divided into two groups or camps, according as they appeal more to the imagination or to reason, encourage the transports of inspiration or the cool speculations of reflection. This gives mystical and rationalistic sects, the former leaning towards the Gnosticism of old, the latter towards something like the modern Reformation; the former reproducing, even exaggerating, the aberrations of the blindest illuminates, the latter inclining towards an expurgated worship, a Christianity stripped of dogmas and rites, very nearly akin to Western liberal Protestantism.

There are islands or isolated continents—Australia for instance—where we meet, alive still, animal and vegetable forms which would seem to belong to earlier ages in the scheme of creation, since they are found nowhere else except in the fossil state. Russia can show Europe something of the kind. Away in the remoteness of her rural regions, strange doctrines lurk, misshapen and monstrous heresies, which might belong to the hybrid ages of the Crusades or of Imperial Rome. And, facing these survivals of a long dead past, rise revolutionary doctrines of modern cut, incomplete, or rather embryonic, whose boldness seems an effort to reach a new world, so that even at the bottom of these religious aberrations we can detect the Russian spirit, drawn towards two opposing poles, struggling between an obsolete past and an uncertain future. That alone would lend an interest to the more original among these popular manifestations. In their confused stammerings one sometimes seems to grasp the secret aspirations of this people which has been accused of being dumb, because it never could express itself in any language save that of religion.

* The "Montanists," for instance, so named for one of the leading heresies of the third century. See Kelsief's *Collection*, etc.

There is one feature common to all heresies which may be designated as archaic and mystical, because of their primitive forms: it is prophetism, a belief in unceasing communications from Heaven, through inspiration and visions. These illuminates hold that the era of revelation is not closed, or is reopened for the benefit of the modern world. And as there are prophets, so there still are incarnations of the Deity. More than one hamlet on the banks of the Volga or Okà lays claim to the same glory as Bethlehem. The peasants of more than one remote district have heard new christs reveal to them a new law. Of all Christian countries, it is in Russia that such claims are advanced with the greatest cynicism—or guilelessness; it is perhaps the only country where it is still possible for impostors or lunatics to successfully arrogate divinity. "I am the God announced by the prophets, come down on earth the second time for the salvation of the human race, and there is no God but me." Thus Daniel Philìppovitch, the incarnate god of the *Khlystŷ*, or "Flagellants," declares in the first of his "twelve commandments."* Such an assertion sufficiently characterizes the mental condition of a portion of the people. This persistent anthropomorphism covers a sort of unwitting paganism, of incurable polytheism similar to that in the midst of which the Gospel was preached and propagated.

The two leading mystic sects are the *Khlystŷ* or "Flagellants," and the *Skoptsŷ* or "Eunuchs." The designation of "Flagellants" is really a nickname, alluding to a real or imaginary practice of these sectarians; it is familiar from the well-known fanatics of mediæval Europe. Besides, there is a pun in it. The adepts call themselves "the community of Christ" or "of the christs," *Khristòvsh-tchina*, of which name their deriders have, by the slightest alteration, made *Khlystòvsh-tchina*. The names by which they most habitually call themselves is "People of God,"

* S. V. Reoùtsky, *Liùdi Bŏjii i Skoptsŷ*, Moscow, 1872, and Kelsief's *Collection*, etc. Also Dobrotvòrsky, *Liùdi Bojii*, and A. Petchersky, *In the Mountains*.

(*Liùdi Bojii*), and "Society of Brothers and Sisters." While the clergy will have it that they are akin to the Quakers, the people frequently speak of them as *Farmazons*, a corruption of "Freemasons." Moreover the general appellation of *Khlystŷ* may be applied to several descriptions of mystics. Little is known about the origin of these "People of God." Some assert the heresy to be exceedingly ancient, and to have come to Russia from the Bulgarians, or from the East along with Greek Orthodoxy. Others tell us it was born in Russia, about the middle of the seventeenth century, of contact with the Western merchants who at that time already frequently came to Moscow. If we believe certain writers, the sect originated with a certain German fanatic of the name of Kullmann, who was arrested as heresiarch under Sophia's regency and publicly burned in Moscow in 1689. This Kullmann, whose ideas were much like Jacob Boehm's, rejected the Scriptures and preached the reign of the Holy Ghost, giving himself out, it is said, for the Christ. Having met with little success at home, he is said to have tried the Russians and made several proselytes among them.

The *Khlystŷ* of the lower classes claim a national as well as a supernatural origin. They have a sacred tradition—or rather a gospel—concerning their first prophets, a deserter, Daniel Philìppovitch by name, and a serf of the Narŷshkin family, Ivàn Sùslof. But this gospel had no evangelist. One of their fundamental dogmas is never to write down their doctrines, partly to leave full freedom to inspiration, and partly to keep from the profane the mysteries of the faith and the secrets of their worship. When their god appeared on Russian soil, one of the first precepts he gave was: not to confide his teachings to the pen; one of his first acts: to throw all his books into the Volga. The book of life which we must learn to read is written within our hearts. According to the *Khlystŷ's* tradition, the true faith was revealed to Russia in the reign of Peter the Great. It was brought down from heaven by the Father Himself, who descended to the top of Mount

Gorodìn, in the government of Vladímir, and there took human form. Thenceforth, in this incarnation, he bore among men the name of Daniel Philìppovitch ; his worshippers give him the title of "Lord God Sabaoth" ; it has a Gnostic ring. Daniel, they will tell you, begot, on a woman a hundred years old, him who is known as Ivàn Sùslof, and whom he, before reascending to heaven, recognized as his son and christ. Their followers entitle themselves "worshippers of the living God." These "People of God" seem to have an absolute craving for the actual presence in their midst of a visible, live incarnation of the Deity. Hence a whole series of christs, succeeding one another by a sort of filiation or adoption. Each generation has one ; nay, each community boasts a flesh-and-blood christ.

It sometimes happens that this gross heresy reaches the same conclusions as the hyper-refined symbolism of one or other philosophical system. It appears, from the teachings of certain *Khlystŷ*, that it is in man's own power to unite himself to the Deity and to incarnate it in his own body. This spiritual incarnation, with them, is to a great extent optional ; every believer may receive the call. The Holy Ghost—the Spirit, which breathes where it lists—may descend on all, and make christs of them. And indeed there are communities whose members profess a sort of mutual adoration. Jesus, they say, became God by His holiness ; so every man may aspire to become god in human form. This divinization is open to women as well as men ; only they receive the title of *Bogoròditsa* or Madonna, "Mother-of-God." Thus there are multitudes of christs and madonnas, not counting prophets and prophetesses. Some women have even had the title of "goddess,"—*Bogìnia*,—conferred on them. This mystic apotheosis is probably one of the attractions of the sect.

The legend of their first christ is a curious and puerile parody on the Gospel. Ivàn Timofèyevitch selected twelve apostles, with whom he preached, on the banks of the Okà, the twelve commandments of his father Sabaoth. The new christ was arrested

by order of the Tsar, scourged, burned, tortured in many ways, but nothing could wrest from him a betrayal of his faith. Lastly he was crucified near the sacred gate of the Kremlin. This legend, a broad burlesque on the Gospel narrative, may have been originally inspired by the tragic end of Kullmann. But it did not satisfy the worshippers of Ivàn Sùslof. One passion and one resurrection were not enough for this peasant christ; after rising from the dead, he was recaptured, and again crucified. To prevent a second return to life, his persecutors flayed their victim's body. But a woman threw a winding sheet over the bloody remains, and lo, the sheet clung to the body and covered it with a new skin, after which the christ of the Okà again resurrected and lived many years in Russian lands, before ascending to heaven to be reunited to his father.

For more than a century the *Khlystŷ* of the central provinces rendered pious homage to all that recalls their incarnate gods—the villages where they were born, the houses wherein they dwelt, the spots where they were interred previous to their ascension to heaven. Although they looked on marriage generally as impure, the members of the families of Daniel Philìppovitch and Ivàn Sùslof were authorized to wed, that the sacred blood which flowed in their veins might not dry up in the spring. In the borough of Stàroyé, thirty versts from Kostromà, there still lived, towards the end of the reign of Nicolas I., a spinster of the name of Ulyàna Vassílief, whom the *Khlystŷ* regarded as a sort of divinity, because she was the last of Daniel Philìppovitch's descendants. To put an end to the adoration paid her, the government at last was forced to shut her up in a convent. Then the heretics, having no member of their god's family left them, turned their veneration to the places which had been sanctified by his presence. A house in Moscow where Daniel Philìppovitch had lived at one time was to them for many years a sort of *santa casa*, and the village of Stàroyé remained their Bethlehem or Nazareth. There is in this village a well which had the privilege of supplying

the water used in baking the bread for their communion. It was taken all over the country in the winter, when it was easy to carry it round in blocks.

The preposterous legend of Ivàn Sùslot's twice repeated death and resurrection is inadequate to account for the success of a sect which has found its way into all the provinces of the empire; so are the twelve commandments of Daniel Philìppovitch, preached by his son Ivàn. They are merely an ascetic code; one forbids the use of fermented drinks, another the attendance at feasts and weddings. Swearing oaths and stealing are condemned, marriage and sexual intercourse absolutely forbidden.* Young people are enjoined not to wed; married people to live as brother and sister. On this point they are as strict as the strictest "No-priests," from whom they may have borrowed in more than one instance. Yet among the twelve commandments there are two which may possibly contain the key to the sect's success: they are the precept which commands to believe in the Spirit, and that which enjoins silence. "Believe in the Spirit" means "believe in inspiration; believe in yourselves; believe in the transports and delusions of imagination"; it is, summed up in one brief sentence, the recognition of visions and the promise of the extatic trance, with all the fascinations of mysticism. This is attractive, but the command of secrecy enhances the attraction. At all times doctrines veiled in twilight and taught in a whisper have sent a delicious thrill to adepts' brains and senses. There is a charm in initiation and clandestine rites which flavors religion with the spiciness of intrigue and the anxious sweetness of forbidden pleasure. "These precepts," says Daniel's Dodecalogue, "keep them secret; reveal them not to either thy father or thy mother. Let men lash thee

* The commandment which denounces thieving—one of the weaknesses to which the peasant most frequently yields—contains an image of singular power, well calculated to strike terror into simple minds:—"Steal not. If a man has stolen so much as a single *kopek*, that *kopek* on the Day of Judgment shall be laid on his head, and the sin shall be remitted him only when that *kopek* shall have melted in the fire."

with the *knùt*, burn thee with fire—suffer and say nothing." With such discipline it is no wonder that so little really was known about these heresies for so long a time. The better to screen themselves from profane eyes, the *Khlystŷ*, like the *Skoptsŷ*, and all sects which are virtually outside the pale of Christianity, conform outwardly to the Church, attend the services, and receive the sacraments.

The success of the "Flagellants" appears to be due not so much to their ethics or dogmas as to their secret rites. They have been suspected of immoral practices, of nocturnal debauches, as have been all sects whose doctrines fly the light, whether it were the mysteries of ancient paganism or the secret reunions of the early Christians. Some of their communities may have justified the suspicion, but this coarse attraction is not needed to account for the diffusion of such sects. Appearances, in these matters, are sometimes deceptive; one may be misled by the fervent similes, the vivid and voluptuous figures of speech so dear to all mystics. At the meeting of these "People of God," as at those of all illuminates, the senses do play a part, but mostly only a subordinate one. They are deliberately made use of for an end. It is the body's business to act on the spirit, it is for the senses to prepare the extatic trance. Not content with soaring up to God on the pinions of prayer or contemplation, along the spiritual paths indicated by the Church, certain souls, too ardent for such slow methods, seek a shorter way to God by calling in the aid of artificial means and physical irritants. Extasy is long in coming and must be aided by stimulation of the senses. Mechanical proceedings are invented for the purpose. There are several, of different kinds, which have been in use among visionaries at all times and in all religions. Under pretence of reaching God with the spirit, the body is brought into action. While claiming detachment from earth and senses, while longing to be transfigured, if but for one hour, into pure spirit, the mystics are thereby liable to fall into a sort of materialism. This is the case with the *Khlystŷ*.

Like several ancient and a few modern Anglo-Saxon sects, they have introduced into their services the element of bodily motion, and dancing is no less a part of them than singing. Their habitual rite is the circular, rotatory movement of increasing velocity, which is in use, for the same end, with the Mussulman Dervishes and with the Shakers of North America.

Their meetings usually take place at night. Men and women are all in white. After the introductory singing of hymns and invocations to the god Daniel and the christ Ivàn, the head of the community reads select passages from the Scriptures, for instance these words of St. Peter, borrowed from the prophet Joel :—"It shall come to pass afterward, sayeth the Lord, that I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh ; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy ; your old men shall dream dreams and your young men shall see visions." Then a performance begins not unlike that which travellers go to Turkey and other Mussulman countries to witness—the *tekié* of the "whirling Dervishes." A few adepts commence to move in a circle, gradually the others join them. They move slowly at first, then with increasing swiftness, which at last reaches a giddy speed. Men and women, young and old, seized with a sort of contagious frenzy, are whirled into the same vortex. They revolve at first in measured time, holding hands, singing, heaving sighs and sobs, the men in the centre, the women on the outside. When excitement reaches the highest pitch, the magic circle is broken ; every one follows his or her own inspiration, and the pious transports assume the most varied forms. Here a man, taken with a convulsive tremor, works himself into extasy by a uniform motion of the body ; there another noisily pounds the ground, stamping his feet, and leaps into the air ; a third goes swaying around in a sort of furious waltz, while still another revolves rapidly on his own axis with eyes tightly shut, lost to conciousness. Some hypnotize themselves, by gazing fixedly on one point, for instance a dove painted on the ceiling. Among the *Khlysty* as among the Dervishes, there are devotees so skilled

in these holy gymnastics that they appear motionless from the exceeding rapidity of their rotatory movement; the eye no longer perceives a human form, but only an uncertain, blurred phantasmal shape. The garments of the mystic whirlers swell into balloons, their hair bristles on their heads, a whirlwind seems to sweep through the room. The crowd of devotees then presents a weird and even gruesome sight, which must affect the nerves of the proselytes not less violently than the dance itself. In their frantic excitement, they become oblivious of the outer world. A high functionary told me that he had known of cases when the police had broken in on a meeting and caught them in the act without the helpless fanatics noticing the intrusion or stopping their rotations. They stop only when they drop down exhausted. If one or more faint away or go off into convulsions, it is a sign of the Spirit's coming. Their breath comes in sobs and jerks; sweat streams from their brows, as from a bather's body in a Russian vapor bath. This faintness, this sweat, the fanatics compare to the weakness and the bloody sweat which overcame Christ in the garden of Gethsemane, and with the swaying of their extended arms they imitate in their dances the fluttering of angels' wings.

These religious whirlings bear the expressive name of *radiênіyé* which signifies "fervor, zeal." It is to them a divine joy as well as a pious ceremony. They love to feel the film coming over their eyes, their heads swimming, their breath going. The progressively accelerated dance, the prolonged rotation, act on the nerves and brain after the manner of an intoxicant or a narcotic. The initial stage of dizziness is succeeded by a sort of drunkenness, a state of hallucination comparable to that produced by opium or hasheesh. The *Khlystŷ* themselves call these sacred rounds their "spiritual drink." Sometimes, and for the same purpose, they have recourse to other devices, especially to scourging with rods, whence their popular designation, which means "flagellants." It is said that some have been known to burn their flesh in the flame of the wax candles. The prophetic frenzy is induced by this *radiênіyé*

or sacred dance. Fragmentary sentences, often not to be made out, incoherent and unintelligible words, are received as revelations from above in unknown tongues. In this state of exaltation the sectarians believe that the Holy Ghost speaks with their lips. This, to them, fully explains the fact that their prophets, most of the time, do not understand or remember their own prophesying. Not content with extatic trances or revelations, some *Khlystŷ* have recipes for procuring visions. Thus they will sometimes dance a whole night long around a vat or large tub filled with water with wax tapers stuck all round the rim. When the room is filled with vapors and the water becomes turbid, the fanatics drop to their knees and fancy that they behold a golden cloud above the tub, and in that cloud Christ himself, as a babe or youth all clad in light. In all such temporary aberrations must be taken into account the reciprocally exciting action of the fanatics on one another, the magnetic contagion which intensifies delirium into dementia. These gatherings of men and women, who have come there for the express purpose of seeking extasy, are ripe for every kind of nervous accidents—convulsions, cataleptic crises, and all those hypnotic phenomena which simple souls take for tokens of inspiration or celestial ravishment. The same thing has been seen in France, in the eighteenth century, in the case of the Protestant "Shakers" in the Cévenne Mountains, and the "Convulsionaries" of the cemetery of St. Médard in Paris.

The "People of God" are divided into groups, known to them under the designation of *koràbl*—"ship, nave." This organization, being similar to that of the Masonic "lodges," is, perhaps, what earned for the *Khlystŷ* the nickname of *farmazons*—Freemasons.* Each *koràbl* or "ship" comprises the Flagellants of

* Freemasonry was introduced in Russia by Schwartz and Nôvikof, and took a rapid development under Catherine II. and Alexander I. The "lodges," however, were closed by Catherine and suppressed by Nicolas at the same time as the secret societies which had prepared the insurrection of the 14th of December, 1825. At the present day there are no Freemasons

a given city, village, or district. Each has its prophets and prophetesses, whose inspirations are its rules,—which naturally leads to diversity of creeds or rites. Each also, as a rule, has its own christ and madonna. Their first christ, Ivàn Sùslof, had his "immaculate virgin." These "Mothers-of-God" and prophetesses—especially the latter—do not always possess the charm of beauty and youth; they do not even invariably practise celibacy. Some are widows or separated from their husbands. For "holy virgins" the *Khlystŷ* generally prefer handsome and robust girls, to whom they render worship as to an incarnation of the Deity. This has led scholars to suspect that, under this degenerate form, lurked the ancient worship of nature and the generative principle, and even to identify these *bogoròditsy* with Mother Earth, whose name, they tell us, frequently occurs in the hymns that are sung for their glorification. It seems that the majority of "ships" do not precisely elect their madonnas, but rather "discover" them; they are proclaimed by inspired acclamation. The illuminates prefer for the part women of a hysterical temperament, naturally predisposed to extasy; a young girl who is strongly affected by the dancing, or else a *klikùsha*—one who is "possessed," and cries out unconsciously; meet saints for such a gathering!

While the Old-Believers of both rites were, ever since Peter the Great, confined within the lower classes, the mystical sects, such as the *Khlystŷ*, have at times gained an entrance into higher spheres. From the *ukàzes* and other official documents of the eighteenth century, it appears that this particular sect had adepts then in all ranks, from merchants to princes, among foreigners as

in Russia, at least, officially. The Masonic emblems are on show in the museums, especially in Moscow, as archæological monuments. The Russian Freemasons would seem to have been imbued with mystical tendencies. The question has sometimes been asked whether there was no link between them and the cultivated *Khlystŷ*, of whose existence in St. Petersburgh there can be no doubt.

well as Russians, among churchmen no less than among laymen. And very remarkable it is, that this doctrine, so subversive of Christianity, should have spread principally among monks and nuns, and among the peasants attached to convents. It may possibly even have been born in the twilight of cloisters. Some have attempted to account for this by considering the teachings of the "People of God" in the light of a protest of the lower monastic clergy against the harsh rule and lax morals of the higher. It would be natural to see therein simply a reaction against the empty Byzantine formalism. However that may be, baptism by the Spirit seems to have been secretly preached within the walls of Orthodox convents. Whole communities of men and women —for instance, the famous Diêvítchi Monastery in Moscow—have certainly been infested with the pious hallucinations. Monks, especially nuns, are said to have opened their cells to the fascination of the mystic dance. It is asserted that "flagellant" prophets —beginning with Ivàn Sùslof, their first christ—have been buried in places of honor in Orthodox churches, notably in the Ivànofsky Monastery. To put an end to the scandalous worship rendered the remains—they call them "relics"—of the *Khlystŷ* saints, the Empress Anne was forced to have them unearthed and burnt by the hangman.*

The same phenomenon occurred in the first half of this nineteenth century, under the Emperors Alexander I. and Nicolas I. A society of mystics of this description was discovered, in 1817, in a building belonging to a member of the imperial family, the palace of the Grand-Duke Michael in Petersburgh. This society, after being dispersed by the police, was again discovered in a suburb, twenty years later. The meetings of 1817 took place in the apartment of a colonel's widow, under the direction of a certain Madame Tatàrinof, famous in the annals of Russian mysticism. They were

* See Kelsief's *Collection*, etc. Reoùtsky (*Liùdi Bojii i Skoptsŷ*) gives in an appendix a list of seventy-five persons, priests, deacons, monks, and nuns—mostly nuns—who were prosecuted as *Khlystŷ* from 1745 to 1752.

attended by officers of the guard and by high functionaries, at the same time with soldiers and household servants of the palace. There also secrecy was the first condition of initiation, and the existence of the society was accidentally betrayed by the interception of a letter written by one of the members. The object of these meetings, directed by Madame Tatàrinof, was to invoke the Spirit and to induce extasy. Besides this, the adepts, applying to themselves the promises of St. Paul to the early Christians, claimed the gift of prophecy. Alexander I.'s Minister of Cults, Prince Galìtsin, is suspected of having honored these meetings with his presence. For him, as probably for others among the spectators and actors of these devotional performances, the whole thing may have had no other interest than that of a spicy manifestation of higher religious dilettantism.

"Like the "Flagellants" of the lower classes, these aristocratic illuminates greeted one another by the names of brother and sister; and the familiar address, together with the freedom prevailing at these pious meetings, the sweet ordinance of mutual love, and the delightful complicity of a common secret, may have been the chief attractions to both sexes. In the place of the canticles of the rural *Khlystỳ*, modulated on the rhythm of folk-songs, the community of the "Michael Palace" had hymns in literary language, versified after the manner of Derjàvin, or else borrowed from the poets of France, Germany, or England. Their favorite authors were, it is said, Madame Guyon and Jung-Stilling. It was the time when the Russian nobility, tired of Voltairian scepticism or Encyclopædic materialism, was sliding down opposite declivities, towards mysterious doctrines and occultism; when Saint-Martin found disciples and Cagliostro admirers; when Freemasonry, under Nòvikof's management, pervaded the empire, while in the person of Joseph de Maistre, Jesuitism insinuated itself into the higher spheres of Petersburgh society. In this world, open to every breath from abroad, on this soil where all European ideas sprouted and grew, illuminism too throve at one time.

But this Russian illuminism, whether or no it came originally from Europe, soon retreated into the nation's lower strata, where it became materialized and degraded. In the peasant sphere it struck out into all the aberrations to which the dogma of free inspiration naturally leads. Below the ascetic zealots there sprang up communities governed by impure doctrines, addicted to obscene rites, to sensual forms of worship. There as elsewhere, those who, in their overstrained exaltation, claimed that they could soar above human nature, were unable to maintain themselves on the steep heights of mysticism ; their fall was abrupt and deep. Inspiration being placed above morality as well as above dogma, the aberrations of the imagination were succeeded by aberrations of the flesh. Extasy was sought in sensual rapture, and these sectarians of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, like certain primitive peoples and certain ancient religions, appear to have given, in their rites, a place to the union of the sexes. It is possible that we should see in this not so much a deliberate concession to carnality as a guileless admiration before the most mysterious of nature's mysteries. All infant peoples have been inclined to ascribe to it a religious character. The act which perpetuates the human kind and makes the creature a participant in the Creator's work may well appear to a childlike soul as something supernatural, as the meetest act of worship, the most pleasing to the Father of all life.

Yet there is no proof of the *Khlystŷ* having divinized the act of generation and sanctified voluptuous rapture. Nor should we believe that all their communities are given to these excesses, (*svalnòy griêkh*). What has given rise to this accusation is probably the fact that, after their *radiêniyé*, which often lasts a whole night, exhausted with their whirlings and scourgings, brothers and sisters drop down as dead and go to sleep where they lie. It was natural that this practice should have been misinterpreted ; and besides, it offered opportunities for evil which may occasionally have led to abuses quite opposed to the original

character of these nocturnal gatherings, the more so that scourging with nettles, as practised by the *Khlystŷ*, is not generally used, as is well known, for the purpose of deadening the flesh and inducing pure extasy. The charges made against the Flagellants, appear to be mostly unfounded, but it does not follow that they always are. The devotion—one might say the adoration—of a Flagellant for his christs and prophets is such that he thinks himself bound to obey all their behests as direct inspirations of the Holy Ghost, even when apparently opposed to vulgar morality. It is quite possible that, in some of their communities, as is the case with the Tramps, theoretical asceticism may have been supplanted by a sort of religious lust. In their contempt of the body, which many of them regard as a creation of Satan, agreeing in this with the Manicheans, these adepts of a crude mysticism could very well persuade themselves that the soul, being made by God and in His likeness, cannot be polluted by the pollution of the body. For others, the carnal sin may have been a means of breaking the pride of the spirit, for there are many paths that lead from mysticism to impure doctrines and rites. It is therefore not to be wondered at if, in the secret meetings of the *Khlystŷ*, whether they were of the people or of "society," the chaste names of charity and Christian affection have sometimes been used to cover indecent practices and sacrilegious loves. "Fraternal embraces and angelic salutes" may, here and there, have found a place in the ritual. The communion of sexes may have been called in to complete the communion of souls, and the holocaust of the flesh to complete spiritual sacrifice. From testimony collected by the Holy Synod in the eighteenth century, it appears that certain communities were in the habit of ending up the sacred dances by a supper taken in common, and immediately after these *agapês* the brothers and sisters gave themselves up freely to the delights of "love in Christ." Similar practices were imputed to the cultured *Khlystŷ* of the Michael Palace and to the nuns and novices of the convents Ivànofsky and Diêvítchi, as well

as to the rustic adorers of Ivàn Sùslof. Man—and woman still more—is a strangely complex being, and—to use Pascal's words—"that which makes the angel, makes also the beast." Primitive natures, whose senses have long been dormant, may be filled with a religious awe and a sort of dizzy fascination at the to them unknown mysteries of sensual joys. There are virgins who plunge into them frantically in proportion to the dread they had felt. Sex exercises on certain temperaments a tyrannical attraction of which they can rid themselves only by yielding to it; while, by a sort of perverted intellectuality, certain hyper-sensitive or *blasé* natures delight in combining erotism with mysticism, in mutually sharpening and intensifying the delirium of the senses and the intoxication of the supernatural one by the other. Some illuminates may even have used gregarious debauchery as an ascetic proceeding, a means of deadening the body by satisfying it; sensuality could, in this way, serve the same ends as mortification and likewise become the prelude to inspiration and extasy.

A sect nearly akin to—not to say a branch of—that of the Flagellants, the community of "Jumpers" (*Skakunŷ*), offered an instance of such obscene mysticism. It made its appearance first in the *environs* of St. Petersburgh, and appears to be of foreign, Western origin. It showed itself first among the Protestant Finn population round about the capital; the Russian peasants of the interior only appropriated it. The Jumpers were noticed for the first time in the reign of Alexander I.; they were a variety of the *Khlystŷ*, from whom they differed in little but the manner of their movements.

Instead of keeping up a rotatory motion, they jumped; whence their name. They also met secretly, if in winter, in some lonely hut, or if in summer, in the woods. The head of the community struck up a hymn in a slow movement which he kept accelerating, the rhythm getting more and more lively. All at once he began to jump, and the others followed suit, still singing. The jumping

and singing increased in swiftness, and broke into louder shouts and wilder leaps as enthusiasm rose higher. The time for revelations arrived in the midst of these transports. The peculiarity of this singular rite was that it was performed by couples who had previously formed engagements for the sacred dance, precisely as for a ball. At the meeting of the Petersburgh Jumpers, the officiating chief sometimes declared, when exaltation reached the highest pitch, that he heard the voice of angels. Then the leaping stopped, the lights were put out, and the couples gave themselves up in the dark to the celebration of "love in Christ." At these meetings every sentiment, every appetite was considered an inspiration which it was lawful to obey. Incest itself was not regarded as a sin, since, the adepts explained, all the faithful were brethren and sisters in Christ. The principle of love being, in their eyes, supernatural, to obey its dictates was a religious act. Accordingly, marriage was to them an impious thing, and they married and gave in marriage only the better to dissemble. In justification of their maxims, they referred to the most indelicate Bible-stories —of Lot's daughters, of Solomon's harem. In addition to these disgusting practices, the Russian or Finn sectarians around Petersburgh had repulsive and abject rites. So communion with them consisted in a close contact with the head of the community, who was regarded as a living Christ. To the ordinary disciples the impudent prophet gave his hands or feet to kiss, to the more fervent his tongue. These sectarians, however, were distinguished for their sobriety, like the Flagellants. A zealous Jumper was known by his pallor.*

* Kelsief's *Collection*, etc. It is not impossible that both *Khlystŷ* and *Skakunŷ* may sometimes have been maligned and that they may have been only a variety of Quakers. In the reign of Alexander I., their meetings having been forbidden at the instance of the Lutheran ministers, whose flocks supplied the bulk of the sect, the Jumpers protested. "Our divine service," they declared in a petition to the Minister of Cults, "consists in sacred singing and readings from the Bible, accompanied with salutes of brotherly love and endearments of Christian charity; in pious discourses from preachers whom the Spirit moves to stand up before the meeting; lastly in prayers with

The efforts of both clergy and police were unavailing to prevent this sect from making its way into the interior, where they were to get mixed up with the *Khlystŷ*. The Jumpers of the districts of Petersburgh and Peterhof had been dispersed, the men put in prison, the women in houses of correction. At the end of a few years, communities of Jumpers were discovered in the governments of Kostromà and Riazàn, Smolensk and Samàra, to the north and the south, to the east and the west of Moscow. In Riazàn, licentiousness had assumed a more mysterious and solemn form. After the usual dances had been performed by a chosen group of adepts of both sexes, a woman, entitling herself *Bogoròditsa* ("mother of God"), summoned the young girls to enjoy "the love of Christ," personated by a peasant. Enacting a parody of the parable of the wise and foolish virgins, she sang a rhymed hymn inviting all present to a sort of carnal communion : "Draw near, O ye brides, for lo, the bridegroom cometh, who will lovingly receive you. Yield not to slumber, close not your eyes, O maidens, but keep your lamps trimmed and burning." This mystical call to libertinism was received by the audience with salutations and signs of the cross. In other communities, even this poor show of occultism was dispensed with ; the hideous reality was stripped of all veils. The *Khlystŷ* and Jumpers of the government of Smolensk stripped themselves naked at their so-called "services," whence their nickname of "Cupids." It was possibly a similar custom which earned for the survivors of Madame Tatàrinof's circle, discovered in Petersburgh in 1849, the name of "Adamites," which had already belonged to a sect of the early ages. With several groups of these *Skakunŷ*, the mystic character had vanished entirely and erotic songs had taken the place of hymns. The sect was recruited among young men and young girls eager for sensual pleasures.

quaking of the body, bending of the knees and prostrations, with weeping, groaning, or invocations, according to the feelings called forth by the preacher's word."

These inconsistencies—or perhaps rather these combinations of asceticism and naturalism,—are not the only ones to which we are treated by these sects of illuminates. To the licentious rites sundry visionaries have added—or substituted for them—bloody ceremonies; for suffering and death could meetly have a place in these doctrines and their manifestations. Generation and death—the two extremes of all human things, the *alpha* and *omega* of every living being,—are the two things that strike the imagination most violently, and both, with immature peoples, assume almost equally a religious aspect. From times immemorial thinkers given to fantastical lucubrations have joined the two in the mysterious twilight of temples. This was the main characteristic of several cults of the ancient East, especially of Syria. Why should not modern superstition have hit on the same association of ideas, here and there, in Russian *izbàs*? To untutored minds, blood has always been the great purifier. Even at a time of high culture, under imperial Rome, the bloody aspersion of the sacrificial bull and ram was the last effort of expiring paganism. Sacrifice, the offering of the living victim, has at all times been the supreme religious act. The great originality of Christianity consisted in substituting for it the mystic sacrifice of the Lamb. Can we wonder that by a sort of retrogression or atavism, there should have still existed, in the lower, obscure strata of a semi-pagan people, among the descendants of barbarous, only superficially converted tribes, natures so gross and crude as not to be content with the symbolical sacrifice of the Lord's Supper and to return clandestinely to the actual sacrifice of flesh and blood? For this is what has been repeatedly imputed to certain Russian sectarians, more especially to the Flagellants. They have been suspected over and over again of substituting the blood of a child for the wine of the eucharist. It is notorious that this kind of religious cannibalism is one of the imputations which the followers of different cults have most frequently flung in one another's faces. The charge has been made against the Christians by the pagans, against the

Jews by the Christians. The bulk of the *Khlystŷ* probably deserves it no more than that of immorality. Still there is much to show that these stories are not all pure inventions. They accord too well with sundry other practices but too well proved against these queer mystics.

This is how the *Khlystŷ* accused of joining bloody rites with licentious ones appear to have proceeded to what they called communion. Instead of using only black bread and water, as is the custom with the majority of Flagellants, they took the flesh and the blood of a new-born babe—not any babe indiscriminately, but the first-born son of an unmarried maiden, raised by this maternity to the rank of *Bogorŏditsa* or "Mother-of-God," and greeted as such in their meetings, at the sacred dance or *radiênіye*:—"Thou art blessed among women," the prophetesses said to her, prostrating themselves before her; "thou shalt give birth unto a Saviour, and all the kings shall come to worship the Heavenly Tsar." While this parody of the angelic salutation was being enacted, the old prophetesses stripped the new madonna of her garments; she was placed naked on an altar, just below the *eïkons*, and the faithful filed up to her and kissed her hands, her feet, her breasts, bending low before her with profuse signs of the cross. They addressed her as "the sovereign queen of heaven" and besought her to hold them worthy of partaking of her most pure body in communion, when "a little christ" (*Khristŏssik*) should be born of her by the grace of the Holy Ghost. When, in consequence of the sacred dances in which she took a leading part, the *Bogorŏditsa* bore a child, that child, if a girl, became in its turn a madonna. If a boy, a *Khristŏssik*, it was immolated on the eighth day after birth. It is said by some that the babe's heart was pierced with an instrument similar to the liturgical lance which is used in the Eastern Church to cut up the consecrated bread. The heart and blood of the "little christ," mixed with flour and honey, served to make the cakes for the eucharist. This was called "taking communion in the blood of the Lamb." At such hideous realism did these

so-called mystics arrive: they needs must have, for their communion, real flesh and real blood. Some, it is asserted, took the blood warm, and left the flesh to be desiccated and reduced to a powder, with which the eucharistic cakes were prepared. At other times, it was a pure young maiden, a willing victim, whose left breast was cut out amidst dancing and singing, and was partaken of as the true eucharistic food.*

Such rites could be only isolated monstrosities, if only because it would not have been possible to celebrate them except at long intervals, in remote localities. They must have been a still greater rarity in modern Russia than the bloody African *voodoo* in America, the sacrifice of "the hornless he-goat," still in use among the negroes of Haïti. In Russia such stories are given the less credit that the Russian peasant, as a rule, is such a very gentle creature. Still there are aberrations into which fanaticism betrays men and which it is impossible to doubt, and they make us less sceptical about even such horrors as those just described. Can we ever forget that there have been found lunatics to preach self-destruction, by fire or steel, while others commended the slaughter of infants and children? Communion is possibly not the only sacrament which superstition strives to improve by means of bloody rites. I have been told that, in I know not what district, certain fanatics, branded with the nickname of "leeches," taught that new-born babes should be baptized in their mothers' blood. And should such tales appear to us incredible, there is a sect now, which, to everybody's knowledge, practises the baptism by blood or fire, giving the word a still more abominable interpretation. We allude to another mystic sect, nearly akin to the *Khlystŷ* in its origin and dogmas,—the sect of the *Skoptsŷ* or Eunuchs.

* See the Metropolitan Philaret's *History of the Russian Church, Fifth Period*, vol. iii.; Haxthausen, *Studien*, vol, i., ch., xiii., p. 345; Livânof, *Schismatics and Jailbirds*, vol. ii., p. 276; Reoûtsky, *Liùdi Bòjii i Skoptsŷ*, p. 35.

BOOK III. CHAPTER VIII.

Mystical Sects—The "White Doves" or *Skoptsy* (Eunuchs)—Mutilation as a Means towards Ascetic Living—Baptism by Fire—Mutilation of Both Sexes—Married Eunuchs—How the Sect is Recruited—Its Means of Propaganda—Dogmas and History of the *Skoptsy*—Their Affinity with the *Khlysty*—Their Christ in the Eighteenth Century—Their Organization in "Ships" (*Korabli*)—Their Millenarism—Peter III. and Napoleon their Messiahs—The *Skoptsy's* Favorite Pursuits—Their Love of Gold—Their Wealth—Advantages of Having Eunuchs as Cashiers—Laws against the *Skoptsy*—Their Trials—Spiritual Eunuchs.

Mystics like the Flagellants, illuminates professing ascetic or sensual doctrines, making inspiration the law of faith, have existed at all times among peoples whose imagination in the matter of religion never lost its original fervidness. But a sect which erects the most degrading practice of Oriental slavery and harem life into a religious system, into a moral obligation—such a sect has probably been seen nowhere but in Russia. It is easy enough to find for the *Skoptsy* spiritual ancestors in paganism, and even in Christianity, from the priests of Atys or Cybele, whose self-mutilation seems to have been only a piece of naturalistic symbolism, down to the learned Origen, who, in the mutilation of the body, sought peace for the spirit. It is partly this idea of the great doctor of the Church which inspires the Russian sectarians, but not that idea alone. Emasculation is a form of asceticism—the most radical maceration of the body, the most efficient of penances. In their hatred against the senses and the flesh, the *Skoptsy* go to the root of temptation. They hold that the surest way of attaining extasy and the gift of prophecy is to set the spirit free from the body's desires. In order to unite himself with God, man must become similar to the angels—and they are

sexless. These frenzied dreams and vagaries are poetically developed and set forth in the sectarians' hymns and poetry. In allusion to this ideal purity, they give themselves the symbolical appellation of "White Doves" (*Biêlyiê Gòlubi*). In their hymns they boast of being whiter than driven snow. They are the pure, the saints, who walk untainted through this world of sin, the virgin beings who, in the Revelation, follow the Lamb everywhere.

Foreigners have sometimes fancied they could trace, in the doctrine reprobating generation, the logical conclusion of pessimism. For what, apparently, can be more logical? Life being evil, let it be stopped in its spring; generation being responsible for life, let *that* be radically stopped. Yet this is not the stand which the Russian *Skoptsy* appear to take. If they suppress in themselves the reproductive faculty, it is not because their hand has lifted the deceptive veil of Maya, because their will has cut itself loose from life and they refuse to be any longer accomplices of nature by going into her snares. Their enforced frigid chastity is not the first step in "the negation of being." They have nothing in common with either Schopenhauer or Buddha; they are not so much pessimists as mystics. Their object is not the end of the species, but the perfection of the individual and the glorification of God. They do not profess that life in itself is an evil, and they are not anxious to be delivered from the burden of existence. Their views are not so much of a philosophical as of a theological nature; they do not overstep the circle within which all Russian sects move.

As regards marriage and generation, sectarianism in Russia has run riot in two absolutely opposite directions. It has culminated at one end, in the shameless libertinism of certain "No-priests" and the impudicity they miscall "love in Christ"; at the other in the obligatory celibacy of some deniers of marriage, and the mutilation of the "White Doves." In their horror of "carnal doings" the Eunuchs come very near to certain "No-priests." Nor is this the only point of contact between the two. Between

these fanatics, who stand apparently alone, and the plain Old-Believers it were not impossible to find more than one resemblance, and, with all that they so widely diverge in their aberrations, not dissimilar tendencies. In the first place, there is the Russian nature, which, in the Eunuch no less than in the Theodosian and the Tramp, is always prone to go the whole length, undeterred by any extreme. Then there is, even in these mystics, seemingly the most widely remote from it, the old Moscovite realism, which insinuates itself even into illuminism, materializing asceticism, and making salvation to depend on a surgical operation. It is still the worship of the letter, the love of literalness—the very thing which is usually most repugnant to the mystic. The rock on which the *Skoptsŷ* take their stand is the text in Matthew XIX., 12: "For there are eunuchs which were so born from their mother's womb; and there are eunuchs which were made eunuchs by men; and there are eunuchs which made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it." Again, Christ has said: "If thy right eye leadeth thee into temptation, pluck it out and cast it from thee; if thy right hand leadeth thee into temptation, cut it off and cast it from thee." This advice these modern followers of Origen, erect into a command as blindly as the *raskòlniks* do other texts no less hard to interpret literally. This text, by which they justify their most unnatural practice, is not the only one which they take in a literal sense. They do the same with the Prophets and Revelation, with Daniel and St. John.

It is not usually on children or very young boys that the *Skoptsŷ* perform their main rite, but on mature men, when the sacrifice is the hardest and the operation most dangerous. This bloody initiation has several grades: the mutilation is partial or complete; the latter is known among the sectarians as "the royal seal," the former as the "second degree of purity." Women are not always spared the gruesome baptism. But with them, it is generally the faculty of nursing children which is destroyed, not

that of bearing them. The maiden's budding breast is amputated or disfigured. Sometimes both breasts are entirely removed. In some cases, the sacrilegious steel attacks more intimate parts, but these operations, performed by unskilled hands, seldom disable the unfortunate victims for a mother's functions. These outrages on human nature have been brought to light by many a trial; the surgical proceedings used for these abominable rites have been discussed in full court. Judges have seen octogenarian women and maidens of fifteen, seventeen, twenty, all variously deformed by the fanatics' knife or shears.* The youthful victims, at the dawn of life, had lost the bloom of youth; their faces, like that of the men had become prematurely withered. A few declared they could not remember the time when they had undergone the savage treatment. It is not impossible that the rites of the *Skoptsŷ* may occasionally have been confounded with barbarous practices to which ignorant parents were led by other superstitions. Old chronicles record the fact that such mutilations were practised in heathen Russia's earliest ages, and they are said to have been tracked in our own times among certain Finn tribes.

It seems, at first sight, that such a religion can recruit its followers only by means of proselytism. Yet this is not entirely the case. The *Skoptsŷ* do not absolutely condemn marriage and generation. Considering themselves as the elect of God, as the keepers of His holy teachings, there are those among them who think it right to bring into the world children, future propagators of the true faith. It is frequently only after the birth of a child that the father enters the purely spiritual state. The child grows up with the knowledge of the sacrifice which will be demanded of it. The man who, when the hour has struck, would refuse to submit to the baptism of blood, would become the target of the sectarians' vengeance; and they form a vast association which spreads, net-like, over the whole empire, whose members, like

* See, for instance, in the Kùdrin trial, the testimony of the physicians and the examinations of the accused. Moscow, 1871.

those of political secret societies, take it on themselves to do justice on traitors and deserters. Lugubrious tales are told on this theme. One *Skopètz*, for instance, had a son who, when he reached man's estate, ran away from home and went abroad and married. Fifteen years later he thought it safe to return to his native land. He was recognized by his father, and—disappeared.

Whether for the purpose of perpetuating their tenets with their race, or the better to blind the authorities and, at the same time, secure for themselves the advantages of the married state, the *Skopksŷ* frequently marry, and these marriages, though entirely or prematurely barren, frequently appear very happy, as though such unions were all the more peaceful from the absence of passion. If certain accounts are to be believed, there are, among these White Doves, husbands good-natured enough to tolerate that their wives should bring them children to which they themselves can lay no claim. Married or not, with or without heirs of their own blood, the *Skoptsŷ* could not keep up their sect out of their own numbers. They have to look for proselytes, and to get them they spare neither pains, nor wiles, nor money. The sacrifices which they make for this purpose are accounted for by their doctrines. Like most Russian sectarians, they are millenarians. They are waiting for a messiah, who is to establish his rule in Russia and give the empire of the earth to the saints, the pure. But the Book of Revelation expressly announces (vi. : 10, 11) that this messiah will not appear until the number of the saints be complete. In order that the latter Christ may come and give the empire to them, it is necessary that the number of men marked with the seal of the Angel should reach 144,000. All their efforts therefore tend towards the achievement of this apocalyptic number.

Wealthy merchants frequently devote their entire fortune to this propaganda. They do not disdain to eke out the promise of eternal bliss with the coarse allurements of earthly well-being. Sometimes their bribes are addressed to poor people, especially

soldiers; sometimes they buy children from needy parents, to bring them up in their faith. They prefer boys and youths, whom they strive to convince of the necessity of "killing the flesh." They sometimes succeed so well, that cases are known of boys of fifteen or so resorting to self-mutilation, to save themselves from the temptations of early manhood. These apostles of purity do not always scruple to have recourse to violence or deceit. They ensnare their victims by equivocal forms of speech, and having thus obtained their consent virtually on false pretences, they reveal to the confiding dupes the real meaning of the engagement they have entered into only at the last moment, when it is too late for them to escape the murderous knife. One evening two men, one of them young and blooming, the other old, with sallow and unnaturally smooth face, were conversing, while sipping their tea, in a house in Moscow:—"Virgins will alone stand before the throne of the Most High," said the elder man. "He who looks on a woman with desire commits adultery in his heart, and adulterers shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven."—"What then should we sinners do?" asked the young man. "Knowest thou not," replied the elder, "the word of the Lord? 'If thy right eye leadeth thee into temptation, pluck it out and cast it from thee; if thy right hand leadeth thee into temptation, cut it off and cast it from thee.' What ye must do, is to kill the flesh. Ye must become like unto the disembodied angels, and that may be attained only through being made white as snow (*biêliêniyé*)." "And how can we be made thus white?" further inquired the young man.—"Come and see," said the old man. He took his companion down many stairs, into a cellar resplendent with lights. Some fifteen white-robed men and women were gathered there. In a corner was a stove, in which blazed a fire. After some prayers and dances, very like those in use among the Flagellants, the old man announced to his companion: "Now shalt thou learn how sinners are made white as snow." And the young man, before he had time to ask a single question, was seized and gagged, his

eyes were bandaged, he was stretched out on the ground, and the apostle, with a red-hot knife, stamped him with the seal of purity. This happened to a peasant, Saltykòf by name, and certainly not to him alone. He fainted away under the operation, and when he came to himself he heard the voices of his chaste sponsors give him the choice between secrecy and death. Once they had undergone the ordeal, nothing remained to those initiated against their will but to accept the ever ready lavish bounty of the chiefs and make the best of it.

We know at what time the Eunuchs began to form communities in Russia; but it is not known whether they are connected, by some obscure process of filiation, with the religions of the Orient. The date at which they manifested themselves as a distinct sect is not very remote. This heresy, which looks the least modern of all, appeared in the eighteenth century, about 1760 or 1770. It was the new capital, the European city on the Neva, which they elected for their Jerusalem. The founder or organizer of the sect, Andréï Selivànof, preached his doctrine in St. Petersburgh in the time of Napoleon I. He died under Nicolas, as late as 1832. The White Doves revere this man as an incarnation of the deity. They render him the same worship as the Flagellants render Ivan Sùslof. These two sects, be it remarked, have much in common, as well in their dogmas as in their forms of worship, so that one may be said to be an off-shoot from the other. That of the *Skopstŷ* may be said to be the final expression, an exaggeration, of that of the *Khlystŷ*—perhaps a reform. The first *Skoptsŷ* came from a community of *Khlystŷ*, and Selivànof's savage asceticism may have been only a reaction against the mystical libertinism of Sùslof's followers and worshippers.

In imitation of the "people of God," the Eunuchs base their worship entirely on inspiration and prophetism: to induce extasy, they employ similar artificial means, especially the rotatory movement—the dance, which they also designate by the name of *radiéniyé* ("zeal, fervor"). They also wear at their meetings

long white linen tunics and symbolical girdles. Selivànof, the sexless god, used, in his lifetime, to preside personally at these exercises, in a house in Petersburgh which was, until quite lately, owned by one of the sect. The White Doves admit to their gatherings all the initiated, even though they have not received the "baptism by fire." Like the Flagellants, they conform outwardly to the practices of the Established Church, the better to escape suspicion; also they are similarly divided into "lodges," known under the same mystical name of "ships" (*korabli*). In Selivànof's time, the Petersburgh "ship," steered by the self-styled christ, was distinguished among the adepts by the name of "royal ship." In their allegorical mode of speech, the affiliated communities were merely small boats in the wake of the ship which carried, as pilot, the "living god." Nor are the Eunuchs without their prophetesses and madonnas. Indeed women, especially one of the name of Anna Romànovna, have had a great share in the invention and diffusion of the doctrine. Not unfrequently it is the women who, with their own hands, transform the men into angels.

With the White Doves emasculation is not merely an act of asceticism, it is a logical consequence of the dogma they uphold. Their entire doctrine is based on an interpretation of the original sin which is by no means new, but which had never before been developed to such rigorous logical consequence. The Eunuchs hold that the carnal union of our first parents was the first sin committed; which sin can be redeemed only by this expiatory sacrifice. Thus they reject, or, more correctly, upset the fundamental dogma of Christianity—redemption through Christ. It is not Jesus, but their eunuch christ Selivànof, whom the White Doves recognize as the redeemer, and it was not by death on the cross, but by self-mutilation, that the new saviour delivered the world. This sacrifice his followers are bound to imitate. They do, indeed, vouchsafe to Jesus the title of "Son of God," but they interpret it in their own way, making Him out a sort of pre-

cursor of Selivànof. They ascribe to His teachings an esoteric meaning. Their occult object, they affirm, was mutilation; but, this occult doctrine having been forgotten or corrupted, the advent of a new christ was needed to perfect the redemption of the human race, one who would teach and practise the doctrine of mutilation in all its force.

This saviour, whose second coming in the flesh the White Doves expect, manifested himself in the reign of Catherine II. Nothing is known of his origin; the probabilities are, he was nothing but a peasant who had eluded conscription. Before he became the founder of a religion, he had, for a long time, led a life of wandering. He was at first taken in by the Flagellants, but broke with them. It was in one of their communities, then ruled by an aged prophetess, Akulína Ivànovna, almost a centenarian, that the new faith was proclaimed, and the true god "recognized" in the person of Selivànof. He was a man of no education whatever, could neither read nor write. His oral instruction was received and treasured by his disciples, who multiplied rapidly. He was arrested as instigator of the new heresy, knouted, and banished to Siberia, whence he returned in the reign of Paul. Strange to say, this peasant appears to have been possessed as much with political ambition as with religious fervor, for he gave himself out not only as son of God, but also as prince and legitimate emperor. These two kinds of pretenders have been equally numerous in modern Russia, where they could not but captivate a people both ignorant enough to be credulous and fond of the marvellous, and sufficiently conscious of oppression to nurse vague dreams of deliverance, and therefore ready to welcome with equal guilelessness a false tsar and a false christ. Selivànof, however, was probably the only impostor who appeared in both capacities at once.

Like his contemporary, the *raskòlnik* Pugatchòf, Selivànof gave himself out for Peter III. To this day the sect identifies the two—the emperor and the sectarian.* In the beginning, under

Catherine II., when the people were constantly on the alert, waiting for the reappearance of the dethroned sovereign, this second pretence may have been only a means to ensure the better success of the first. The idea may not have occurred to Selivànof at all, but have been suggested to him by the ignorance or wile of his adepts. Certain it is that he had himself designated, in the prayers which were addressed to him in his lifetime, as "god of gods and king of kings." The old *bogoròditsa* ("mother-of-god") Akulìna Ivànovna was awarded by the White Doves, equally with her spiritual son, not only divine honors, but royal titles. To the initiated she was no other than the Empress Elizabeth, whom they made out to be the mother of Peter III. The *Skoptsy* have a story that Paul had a fancy to see the man who proclaimed himself his father, and for that purpose sent for him from the remote part of Siberia whither he had been banished. There is, a ballad recording the alleged interview. This tradition appears to me to be unfounded. Paul seems to have seen in the man merely a maniac, and had him placed in a lunatic asylum. He was set free in the reign of Alexander I, through the good offices of a Polish nobleman, Elinsky by name, a secret convert to the sect, which then already numbered many wealthy followers in the capital.† For eighteen years more this singular messiah lived in Petersburgh, in the house of one of his disciples, receiving the homage of his worshippers in his double capacity of god and tsar, working hard to propagate his doctrine, sometimes even, it is said, doing neophytes the honor of performing on them with his own hand the principal rite of initiation. The security and

* It has sometimes been hinted that Pugatchòf, without being an Eunuch himself, was affiliated to the sect. This is not very probable. If he really ordered prisoners to be mutilated, it was probably a cruel whim which had nothing to do with religious fanaticism.

† The Eunuchs, like the Flagellants, appear to have gained converts, under Alexander I. in the privileged classes, among officers and government employés. So much, at least, results from the police notes, on which Nadèjdin drew for his study on the sect. See Kelsief's *Collection*, vol. iii.

impunity enjoyed for so long a period by this doubly-dyed impostor can be accounted for only by the wealth which the leading members of the sect disposed of, and by the moral condition of Russian society under Alexander I. In 1820, Selivànof was at last arrested again and shut up for the rest of his life in a monastery at Sùzdal, where he died in 1832, one hundred years old, in a state of second childhood.

It is the firm belief of the sect that Selivànof—or rather Peter III. who had reappeared under this name—is not dead. He lives on, in some Siberian wilderness, whence he is to return, at the head of a celestial host, to found the realm of the saints. Curious in truth is the fate of this prince of Holstein dethroned for his utter misapprehension of Russia, then made the deity of the queerest of all Russian sects.* Certain *Skoptsŷ* have appointed Napoleon I. whom they claim as one of their own, to be the future assistant of Catherine's most unwarlike spouse in establishing the reign of universal righteousness. Other sectarians, nearly akin to both the *Khlystŷ* and the *Skoptsŷ*, have made of Napoleon their only messiah, and render to his likenesses the same devout homage as the White Doves to those of Peter III. The possession of the latter prince's pictures as well as of Selivànof's, is one of the tokens by which Eunuchs are known. They also have other emblems ; for instance, the presentation of a crucified monk, evidently meant for their late redeemer. King David dancing before the ark is another favorite type of both Eunuchs and Flagellants.

In spite of all the precautions they take against detection, the *Skoptsŷ* are generally betrayed by their appearance, by their coun-

*The reason why Peter III. has retained such popularity among the dissenters of all sects is that he gave them liberty of conscience. Moreover, while despoiling the convents of their lands, he ordered these lands to be distributed among the peasants who worked them. Now, both *Khlystŷ* and *Skoptsŷ* were largely represented among the convent serfs. It is no wonder that these peasants should have fancied that the man who gave them lands and liberty was the imperial liberator, the messiah they were expecting.

tenance, their voice. Like the soprano singers of the Papal chapels, the *Skopètz* is known by his flabby yellowish skin, his sparse beard, his sharp voice, with something effeminate and wavering in gait and glance. By these tokens every inhabitant of Moscow or Petersburgh knows the followers of Selivànof among the money-changers. The police alone appear innocently unconscious of their presence.

For the *Skoptsŷ's* favorite trade is that of money-changer. They love to handle gold, silver, bank notes. Their counters have seen the beginning of many a great fortune which grew to its later dimensions in some industrial pursuit. Whence comes this predilection for a trade of which, in other countries, the Jews seem to have the monopoly? From a religious idea, or from political calculation? Do they dream of paving the way, by their wealth, for the rule of their messiah? Are they merely desirous of securing weapons against a police which, until so lately, was venal? To this question, which was asked at a trial, a witness replied that they were money-changers because they did not feel physically strong enough for anything else. It might be more just to say that they have a preference for the trade in precious metals because, being ensured against certain temptations, they have so much greater chances of success in financial operations. "Were I a banker," a Russian once said to me, "I should not want anybody for my cashier but a *Skopètz*. For a cash box as well as for a harem, there is no safer keeper. At the bottom of every case of defaulting or breach of trust there is a woman. With these people you can sleep soundly and in peace." Such seems to be the opinion prevalent among the *Skoptsŷ* themselves. One of their chiefs said at a trial that, gold being the sovereign ruler of this world, it was best to strike at the root of all that can divert our thoughts from it. The *Skopètz*, who knows neither youth nor passion, is capable of devoting an entire lifetime to the pursuit of wealth, with an unswerving regularity and persistency which usually belongs to old age or at least to mature middle age. Unham-

pered by wife or family, with few or no children, he is much more free to acquire and, after acquiring, to save. Millionnaires, therefore, are no rarity among the *Skoptsŷ*, and all these riches they have always devoted to the propagation of the sect, which, in its turn, supplied them with reliable agents and cashiers. They usually hand their wealth down by adoption ; the patron frequently bequeathes his fortune to one of his employés. A dispute over the estate of a *Skopèts*, who died in prison in 1874, before his trial came on, was one of the occasions of the famous trial of the Abbess Metrophania. The intriguing churchwoman asserted that she held bills of exchange to the amount of 600,000 roubles from the millionnaire eunuch, whose liberty she had promised to procure. A *Skopèts*, towards the reign of Alexander II., devoted five million roubles to the erection of a home for aged people and children.* The existence of such means of action accounts for the persistency of this repulsive heresy. This great wealth, united to this great devotion to material interests, constitutes a certain similarity between the *Skoptsŷ* and other dissenters. This pre-eminently mystical sect, these illuminates a-hungering for prophecy, have not proved wanting in the positivism, in the mercantile spirit characteristic of the Great-Russian and the *raskòlnik*.

It would seem that, to put an end to Selivànof's barbarous heresy, it must suffice to isolate its followers and leave them to die out without posterity or proselytes. This means has long been in use ; but, in spite of the law's utmost rigor, it has not proved very successful. It is in the mental and moral state of the nation that this sect's doctrine, like that of all other sects, finds its nourishment. Neither jails nor transportation did much towards ridding the empire of it. In the reign of Nicolas, these fanatics were often made soldiers of. One particular town in the Caucasus, Maran, was for a long time garrisoned exclusively with these ex-

* Called, after its founder, the "Timènkof Home." It is situated in Petersburgh and was built by a banker of the *Skopèts* persuasion, whom an Orthodox merchant converted on 'Change. The wealthy Eunuch had inherited his money from his former patron.

traordinary troops. Now they are sent to the remotest wilds of Eastern Siberia. This was the sentence passed, in the reign of Alexander II., on the merchant Plotìtsin and the brothers Kùdrin, in 1869 and 1871. In the trial of the former about forty persons of both sexes were implicated; in that of the latter about thirty. Plotìtsin, arrested with his sisters, was the head of the White Doves of the government of Tambòf. Like the majority of his co-religionists, this wealthy merchant pretended to be a zealous Orthodox churchman. He had built chapels and endowed hospitals. In his house, in the very centre of the town of Mortchànsk, a spacious cellar with an iron door had been discovered. It was the operating room. The shrieks of the victims could not be heard outside, and those who died under the knife were buried on the spot. The press announced that there was another contiguous cellar, containing a fabulous treasure of ever so many millions of roubles in gold and silver. The treasure had vanished into thin air when the inquest began. Public credulity would have it that it had been spirited away by the police.

Plotìtsin was sentenced to transportation, along with twenty of his accomplices. He was sent to the shores of the Pacific, where he beguiled his leisure by starting docks for the construction of steamers. The authorities could not but encourage so praiseworthy an undertaking. When the first steamer was launched, he went on board, under the eyes of the police, to try the engine, and—headed it towards San Francisco. This took place in 1879. In the same year, the court of Ekaterinburgh (in the Ural, government of Perm) sentenced to transportation forty-two White Doves of both sexes. They are usually arrested and prosecuted in batches, a whole "ship" at a time. In 1876, one hundred and thirty Eunuchs or affiliated adepts were indicted at one swoop before the court of Simferòpol in Crimea. They were merchants, small burghers, mechanics. The forty-two of Ekaterinburgh were peasants who led an ascetic life. They eschewed spirituous drinks, they did not smoke, and ate no meat. "The

flesh of animals," they said, "is accursed, for it is the produce of sexual intercourse." Otherwise, all observed the ordinances and rites of the Church. All refused counsel. They simply referred to the text of the Gospel (Matthew xix. : 12) which they consider to justify their doctrine.*

To escape pursuit, a certain number of *Skoptsŷ* have emigrated, mostly to Roumania, where they are confounded with the Old-Believers under the name of *Lipovans*. No measure has yet been able to arrest the progress of the sect. In 1871, at the trial of the brothers Kùdrin, an expert, Mr. Biêliàyef, professor at the Theological Academy of Moscow, asserted that the number of mutilated adepts, far from subsiding, was on the increase. Still, and in spite of everything, a doctrine which imposes such a baptism, cannot count on millions of followers. Their number is estimated at two or three thousand—hardly that.

The law is strict—and rightly so—in dealing with the adherents of the false Peter III. Every eunuch is compelled to have himself inscribed as such on his passport, and is always under police surveillance. Persons employing eunuchs or having them on their premises must inform the authorities of the fact. Once arrested, an eunuch cannot easily escape imprisonment or transportation, but money of course hushes up many such cases. While eunuchs are pursued and prosecuted at all ends of the empire, many openly walk the great thoroughfares of the capitals. On 'Change in Petersburgh there was still, not long ago, a bench known as "the *Skoptsŷ's* bench." Sometimes an imperial *ukàz* comes out, announcing that So-and-so has been mutilated in his youth against his will and does not belong to the sect. The manner of the White Doves' propaganda and their proselytizing among children hardly allows of punishing any but the apostles or oper-

* Sometimes isolated cases of mutilation come before the courts. So in 1879, the court of Odessa had to pass judgment on a case of "injury done to the genital parts out of pious zeal." Quite recently, in 1887, a convict of the name of Tchògol, while resting on the way to his destination, took advantage of the night to operate on himself and his four children.

ators. Now especially, when these cases are sent before juries, public sympathy acquits these blind victims of fanaticism.

The *Skoptsý* appear to form a corporation whose members hold together, a sort of mutual-aid association, after the manner of Freemasons. They are said to have a staff of secret emissaries through whom they correspond, from end to end of the empire. The adepts know one another by various tokens; one is a red handkerchief laid out on the lap while conversing. These cruel fanatics are, in daily life, the mildest, most honest of men. They are distinguished by frugality, probity, simplicity of manners and habits. Their gatherings are harmless. They sing hymns, and take communion in the shape of bread made of black rye or purest white wheat flour.* There is nothing criminal about them but their doctrine and their rage for making proselytes; yet even that is far less horrible than the greed of those parents in Italy who sell their children to be made soprano singers of. It is said that of late a new spirit has come over the followers of these unnatural doctrines, and that many of them now incline to take the Gospel text and their master's ordinance in an allegorical sense, emasculation to be understood and practised as chastity. Already under the Emperor Nicolas the police had discovered a branch of the sect which called itself "spiritual." Its head was an old soldier of the name of Nìkonof, who had known Selivànof personally, and claimed to be his successor. Though mutilated, this reformer denied the necessity of mutilation. It would be rather curious to see the most barbarous of Russian sects transformed into a harmless community of lay monks.

* Some writers will have it that they sometimes use for communion the blood from the wound inflicted on a child; but it is far from proven.

BOOK III. CHAPTER IX.

Rationalistic and Protestant Sects—*Molokàns* and *Dukhobòrtsy*—Their Origin and Theology—Singular Doctrine on God and the Soul—How these Sectarians Look on Society and the Secular Power—Radical and Socialist Tendencies—Communists: Application of their Principles—*Stundism:* How, from the German Colonies in the South, the Spirit of Reform Reached the Peasant—Doctrines and Progress of the *Stundists* or Russian Evangelicals—The *Sabbatists* or *Judaïsts:* Whence do they Come?—Unitarians with Jewish Rites.

Khlystŷ and *Skoptsŷ*—Eunuchs and Flagellants—are not more entitled to the name of Christians than are the American Mormons. These two sects are not so much heresies as adulterations, awkward imitations of Christianity. The worship of the Spirit is understood in a different way from theirs by a large portion of the people. The *mujik*, in striving to free himself from the superstitions of ritualism, does not always rush into the aberrations of illuminism. Reform tendencies which might be called Protestant, rationalistic, are represented in Russia by several sects, some of them quite old, others very recent. Among the former there are two nearly related to each other, which are bracketed together both by doctrine and history. They are the *Dukhobòrtsy* or "Wrestlers of the Spirit," and the *Molokàns* or "Milk-Drinkers," so named from the fact that they freely use milk food on the days when it is forbidden by the Church.* While they admit

* Such is the most plausible explanation of this queer name. The etymology of it has also been sought in the name of a small river in southern Russia, which, from the chalky color of its waters, was called *Molòtchna*, (the "Milky"), and on the banks of which several colonies of *Molokàns* were established.

fasting, they say it should be principally spiritual. Some of them, it is true, abstain from pork, scaleless fish, and the articles of food forbidden in the Old Testament ; but they explain this abstinence on hygienic grounds.

The *Molokàns* and *Dukhobòrtsy* are distinguished from the bulk of the Russian people, generally so particular in all these observances, mainly by their contempt for the traditional forms of worship. They reject, as something very like materialism and idolatry, the majority of external practices, ceremonies, and sacraments. The Wrestlers and the Milk-drinkers embody the reaction of reason against the orthodox formalism of the "old-faith." Excess of ritualism, whether in Church or Dissent, leads to the negation of the ritual ; disputes concerning ceremonies lead to the rejection of the ceremonial. "The *raskòlniks*," said one of these contemners of form, "would go to the block for the sign of the cross with two fingers ; as for us, we don't cross ourselves at all, either with two fingers or with three, but we strive to gain a better knowledge of God." Like the extreme Schismatics, the "No-priests," these sects do not recognize any priesthood ; the reason they give, however, is not that the Church has forfeited the sacerdotal power, but that the true Church needs no clergy. "There is no pontiff," say the *Molokàns*, "no teacher of the faith but Christ. We are all priests." We find the same idea among many *Bezpopòftsy*, who also claim that they have restored the primitive priesthood—"the priesthood of Melchisedek." The *Molokàns* are usually content to have a plain elder or *presbyter* preside at their meetings, a mere brother invested with no sacerdotal character, with no power over the community, not even a special garb to be worn at divine services.

God is Spirit, and wishes to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Such is the fundamental maxim of these "spiritual Christians." This maxim they apply with the logic characteristic of the Russian peasant. "If God is Spirit," says the rigidly consistent *Molokàn*, "He should be approached in spirit only, and an

eïkon is neither more nor less than an idol." To the official exhorters who presented to them the image of Christ, the sectarian peasants of New-Russia replied :—"That is not the Saviour ; that is a painted board. The Christ we believe in is not a Christ of copper, gold, or silver, but the living God, Christ the Saviour of the world." Nothing can be simpler than the worship of these two sects. The *Molokàns* have neither churches nor chapels ; God, they teach, has no temple but the heart of man. They interpret literally St. Paul's saying, "Ye are the temple of God." "A church," they say, "is built not of beams and boards, but of ribs," meaning that it is the Christian's breast, not a construction by human hands. They meet for worship in their own houses ; divine service, with these peasants, consists of the Lord's Prayer, readings from the Scriptures, and the singing of Psalms.

The *Molokàn* rejects with contempt the mystic ladder, made up of sacraments and heavenly grace, which the Church has erected between heaven and earth. He either does away with the sacraments altogether, or accepts them allegorically. The baptism by water is to him ineffectual ; it is the living water the Christian needs, the Word of God. Penance consists merely in repentance ; the spiritual Christian confesses to God or to his brethren, as St. Paul enjoins. The true communion,—partaking of Christ's flesh and blood—is reading His Word and meditating over it. While they eat bread together in memory of the Saviour, they see no mystery in the act. So marriage with them is not consecrated by a ceremony, but by love and the mutual understanding of the consorts. They have no other wedding than the parents' blessing.

The worship of both the *Molokàns* and the *Dukhobòrtsy* is easy to know ; not so the origin and theology of the two sects. They appear to proceed indirectly from the Reformation of Luther and Calvin. The foreigners who came in such numbers to Russia ever since Peter the Great's time, and even before him, may be said to have brought the seeds of heresies on the soles of their shoes. The rationalistic sects were born in the southwest of the

empire, on the confines of Europe, but students have striven to trace them to Russian or Slavic beginnings. The *Molokàns*, who claim that they have preserved or found again the primitive teachings of Christ, trace their own origin as far back as the Rùrikovitches. Some writers will have it that they are descended from the heretics or freethinkers of the sixteenth century, especially from one Bàshkin, who was condemned in Moscow, in 1555. Yet it was not till the eighteenth century that Protestant tendencies became embodied in the two twin sects of the *Dukhobòrtsy* and the *Molokàns*. Among their precursors is named a physician of the name of Dmitri Tverìtinof, who was prosecuted in 1714 for preaching Calvinism. The first apostle of the Wrestlers of the Spirit appears to have been a retired soldier or sub-officer, probably of foreign extraction, possibly a German prisoner, who turns up, about 1740, in a village of Ukraïna. There he found some Russian disciples, who spread his teaching among their own people. The Ukraïna was at that time a haunt of exiles and sectarians of all kinds, both Russians and Poles, and therefore the very soil for the production of sects. We are told that, as early as 1791, the tenets of the *Dukhobòrtsy* were embodied in a sort of profession of faith, ascribed to the Ukraïnian writer Skozovoda, whose moral and religious writings are said to have exerted a great influence over the Spiritual Christians. From the Ukraïna the new doctrine passed into the region of Tambòf, where it was propagated by a prophet Pobiròkhin by name. This appears to have been an overbearing, violent man, a mystic and fanatic, who ruled his adherents in true despot fashion. His son—or perhaps brother-in-law, Ukléïn, a stone-cutter, headed an opposition and founded a dissenting community, from which the Tambòf *Molokàns* are said to have originated. This Ukléïn developed the doctrine on purely rationalistic lines and eliminated from it all mystical elements. Before the close of the eighteenth century the *Molokàns* had already spread as far as the Volga and Moscow.

These novelties did not escape the attention of the clergy and

the government. The name "*Molokàns*" is found in a report of the Holy Synod as early as 1765. Paul persecuted these reformers for reasons of a political rather than a religious nature, their theological radicalism betraying them into a sort of political radicalism. Alexander I. showed them greater tolerance, after having ordered an investigation to be held in their villages by the senators Lopukhìn and Meletsky. The sectarians who, under Paul, had been partly banished to Siberia, requested to be settled together on new lands. About 1800 lands were accordingly assigned them on the river Molòtchna, near Melitòpol, north of the Sea of Azof. The *Dukhobòrtsy* there constituted themselves into a sort of agricultural commonwealth, under the direction of Kapùstin, a former corporal, who became their lawgiver and governed with a practical sense amounting to genius, a trait often found among Russian sectarians. Colonies of *Molokàns* were established near by and formed a separate community. The adherents of both sects lived there peaceably for half a century, in the neighborhood of Mussulman Tatars and German Anabaptist colonists, whose doctrine may have influenced their own. This camp of Israel in the steppes received several noteworthy visits, among others that of the Emperor Alexander I., who was drawn towards the Molòtchna by his propensity to illuminism. In 1817 or 1818, some English Quakers felt impelled to seek the acquaintance of these far-away brethren, whom they had been led to look upon as their co-religionists. They rejoiced at the discovery in Russia, of a new Pennsylvania, and discussed, through interpreters, religious questions with some of the leading Wrestlers, marvelling at their knowledge of the Scriptures, but rather dismayed at the boldness of their speculation.* Some twenty years later, in 1843, Haxthausen visited the Molòtchna ; but the greater part of the *Dukhobòrtsy* had then already been expelled. At the death of Kapùstin, their lawgiver, they fell into a state of anarchy, and in

* See *The Quakers*, by Cunningham, Edinburgh, 1868 ; Livànof, *Schismatics and Jail-birds*, vol. II. ; Haxthausen, *Studien*, v. I., p. 412.

1841 the Emperor Nicolas I. ordered all heretics who would refuse to return to the Orthodox fold to be transported to the Caucasus. Nearly 8000 sectarians of both denominations were then forced to emigrate into Transcaucasia. There they founded villages which are prosperous to this day. A few groups of these exiles pushed on into the extreme lands conquered by Russia. Several thousands of them were living in the territories of Batùm and Kars in 1888, as farmers and gardeners. They were, as sectarians so often have been, the pioneers of Russian colonization.

The Wrestlers of the Spirit and the Milk-drinkers differ in some points of their respective doctrines. The former sect, at present less numerous than the other, is the more original as to its beliefs. Its rationalism is impregnated with mysticism. It has been said that many a resemblance can be found between the modern *Dukhobòrtsy* and the *Bogomils* of the Middle Ages, and Russian students, jealously unwilling to owe anything to the West, even fancy they can discern secret infiltrations from the Bulgarian heresy into the Russian. The doctrine of the *Dukhobòrtsy*, in spite of its occasional obscurity, is probably one of the boldest efforts of untutored popular thought. From such sects, consisting of peasants, many of them illiterate, no very well-defined theology can be demanded—more 's the pity.*

While the *Molokàn*, like the Protestants, would base religion on the Bible, the *Dukhobòrets* allows the sacred books only a secondary importance. He allows a wide place to tradition instead, and designates man by the name of "the living book," in

* One anecdote will show to what extent the doctrine of such heresies can carry vagueness and indecision. A professor of the theological Academy at Kief, Novìtsky, undertook to expound the doctrine of the *Dukhobòrtsy*, of which he, in common with most people, had but the vaguest idea. To his astonishment, they wrote to thank him. The book of the Orthodox critic was bought up by the heretics, to be used as a catechism, so that the price of the pamphlet rose to fifty roubles and more, and the unfortunate author found himself looked upon rather askance. The book was reprinted in 1882. As to the *Molokàns*, a declaration of faith has been published in Geneva, in their name, which shows considerable knowledge of the Scriptures.

opposition to the dead books in paper and ink. Christ, they say, was the first to prefer the spoken to the written word. Wherein they are most original is in their belief in internal revelation. They hold that the Divine Word speaks in every man, and this internal Word is the Eternal Christ. They reject most dogmas or interpret them symbolically : so with the Trinity, the Incarnation, Redemption. These ignorant peasants interpret the Mysteries after the fashion of Hegel's disciples. The Incarnation, they aver, takes place in the life of every believer : Christ lives, teaches, suffers, resurrects, in every Christian. They deny the original sin, holding that each man is responsible only for his own transgressions. If they do admit an original stain, they trace it back to the fall of souls prior to the creation of the world,—for, in their semi-gnostic theology, they believe in the pre-existence of the souls. This belief has caused them to be suspected of barbarous, if logically consistent practices. Haxthausen was remarking on the vigor of the people on the Molòtchna :—"No wonder," replied his guide. "These Wrestlers of the Spirit put to death weak or ill-shaped children, on the ground that the soul, being the image of God, should inhabit only an unblemished body."

Some of these peasants have carried their speculations to the extent of allowing God only a subjective existence and identifying Him with man. "God," they say, "is Spirit ; He is in us ; then we are God." The *Dukhobòrtsy*, like the *Khlystỳ*, address salutations to one another at their meeting,—to do honor to the living manifestation of God, they explain. The prophet Pobirò-khin, one of their spiritual leaders in the eighteenth century, is said to have explicitly taught that God does not exist by Himself, but is inseparable from man. It is for the righteous, in a way, to give Him life. Thus these peasants have arrived, after a fashion of their own, at the *fiat Deus* of some of our philosophical systems. They take pleasure in repeating on all occasions that God is man ; the divine Trinity they declare to be : memory, reason, will ; and in accord with this conception, they deny eternal life, Paradise,

and Hell. Paradise must be made a reality of earth; there is no essential difference between this and future life. The human soul is not transferred after death to another world, but is united to another human body, to lead a new life here on earth. The *Dukhobòrtsy* thus wander away from Christianity. Christ, to them, is only a virtuous man. "Jesus is the Son of God in the same way that we call ourselves His children; our old men," they say, "know more than He did." Their idea of the Church is in conformity with their theology: they consider it to be the assembly of those who walk in light and righteousness, no matter to what religion they belong, whether they are Christians, Jews, or Mussulmans.

Such a doctrine, in such a sphere, could not attract many followers. And, indeed, the *Dukhobòrtsy* never have been very numerous. There are hardly a few thousands of them, while the *Molokàns* are counted by the hundreds of thousands. Their tenets are too abstruse to achieve many conquests among an uncultured class of people. "Spiritual Christianity" could hardly gain ground among peasants except under a more accessible form. Hence the success of the Milk-drinkers. With them, there remains hardly a trace of mystical idealism; it has evaporated and left almost pure rationalism. They interpret the sacred books with no whit less freedom, basing their teaching on the same saying: "The letter kills; the spirit quickens." As they have adherents in regions far removed from one another, various groups and shades of opinion can be distinguished among them. They do not all appear to believe in the historical reality of the Gospel narratives. But they contend that it matters little, since everything in the Gospel must be taken figuratively. The *Molokàns* are unmistakably Unitarian, and it is no small surprise to a foreigner to encounter, at home in obscure peasant communities, the Christianity of Newton and Locke. It puts one in mind of how Socinianism was accepted in Poland, when it found so few adepts in Western Europe, as though the contact with Jews and Moham-

medans made it easier to the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe to go back to the Hebrew conception of the unity of the Deity.

Both *Molokàns* and *Dukhobòrtsy* have been accused of repudiating temporal as well as spiritual authority. They have been made responsible for the maxim that governments are made only for the wicked. The social conceptions of these rationalists lead to a sort of democratical theocracy. Church and society, say the *Molokàns*, are one and should not be separated. Civil society is really the Church, and, as such, should be constituted on the evangelic principles of charity, equality, and liberty. Here we have, almost literally, the motto of the Revolution, with this capital difference, that the first term of the ideal proposed is charity, and the point of departure is God. "The Lord is Spirit," the *Molokàn* says with Paul (2 Corinthians, iii., 17), "and where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." The true Christian must be free from all laws and human obligations. Even though earthly authorities were established by God, they were so established only for the children of the world, for the Lord hath said of Christians: "They are not of this world, even as I am not of this world" (John, xvii., 14). Human laws were never made for the saints. The true Christian should obey not these changeable laws, but the eternal Law of God, inscribed by Him on the tablets of our heart.

In this way the *Molokàns* arrive at the contempt of all authorities and positive laws. Their theological radicalism brought them to political radicalism, which they justify from the Scriptures. Like the Quakers and the Moravian Brethren, with whom they have many common traits, both *Molokàns* and *Dukhobòrtsy* object on religious grounds to swearing oaths and making war, accepting literally those passages of the Gospel which forbid to swear and to draw the sword. Indeed, many of them have been known to refuse the payment of taxes as well as military service. Christ, indeed, bids "give unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's";

but the "Spiritual Christian" is only God's, and owes nothing to Cæsar.

But those among them who attempted to carry these maxims from theory into practice, were severely repressed by Nicolas I. Many were knouted and transported; others were declared insane and shut up in asylums. The Milk-drinkers saw that they would have to bow to the common law, and compromises were advocated, just as in the extreme sections of the *raskòl*. The *Molokàns* of the Don now admit that it is lawful to be a soldier and to bear arms for one's country. Others have shown such stubbornness in not bearing arms, that it was deemed wiser to employ them in the ambulances and the various auxiliary departments. Many submit to the laws and established authorities, yet continue to deny them theoretically. They not only do not recognize the monarch as the anointed of the Lord, they contest *in toto* the utility of monarchism as an institution, basing their objections on those of Samuel against Saul's royalty. Along with the imperial power, they reject all distinctions of classes, grades, and titles, as contrary to the Gospel. Now that, in spite of these revolutionary maxims, they live peaceably under the rule of those very authorities which they repudiate in theory, they are suspected of submitting only from necessity and with the mental reservation that, the moment they are strong enough, they, the true Christians, will rise and shake off the yoke of the children of the world and establish the reign of the saints.

Like the majority of Russian sectarians, the *Molokàns* have apocalyptic hankerings. Their rationalism has not been proof against hopes of a millennium. They, no less than other people, have their dreams of a renovation of the earth, to take place at no very remote period, and await, under the name of "Empire of the Ararat," the universal rule of righteousness and equality. It is reported that, in 1812, the Cosacks arrested a delegation of *Molokàns* or *Dukhobòrtsy* from the South, who were sent to Napoleon, to inquire if he were not the liberator announced by the prophets.

Out of this sect of Milk-drinkers there issued a group, which would not wait for the establishment of the "Empire of the Ararat" to put in practice their dreams of social transformation. They preached community of property, and assumed a name which can hardly be translated into any other than that of Communists (*∂bsch-tchiyé*). At their head was a certain Popòf, who began his apostolic career by distributing all his possessions among the poor. Whole villages of the government of Samàra adopted this doctrine, which, doubtless, is far less repugnant to the Russian than it is to the French nature. To cut this singular propaganda short, the government transported Popòf with his principal adherents beyond the Caucasus. After years of wretchedness, the prophet succeeded in gathering about him a new community. For this he was once more transported, this time to the wilds of Eastern Siberia. He was said to be living still, somewhere about the Yenisséï, in 1867.

Popòf's teaching was inspired directly from the Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles. In placing their possessions in common, his disciples intended to imitate the first Christians. Like them they came and laid their worldly goods at the feet of the apostles, whose number they had fixed at twelve, in order to make the similarity complete. Money, houses, live stock, and agricultural implements—they owned all these things in common as they did the land. They had no personal property of any kind. Each village was to form a community, but for greater convenience' sake, each community was divided into several groups, among which the live stock and implements were divided. In each group there were managers of both sexes who took charge of the various departments—housekeeping, cooking, clothing. The central administration were elected by the community. To make their utopia possible, these Communists were compelled to give their villages a constitution of monastic strictness. Their founder, Popòf, ended by entirely suppressing the liberty of discussion and interpretation so dear to the genuine *Molokàn*. Submission to the

authorities he declared to be the first duty, insubordination the greatest sin. This was the necessary outcome of the Communistic system. These pious phalansteries could not have been kept together by anything short of perfect obedience on religious grounds. And even so Popòf's disciples soon tired of such a bondage. Their zeal cooled off; they ended by dividing the common possessions among the different families. Of their original organization they retained little save a communal storehouse into which every household is bound to deliver one-tenth of all the crops, for the benefit of the needy members. These Communists—who are so no longer—are now found only in Transcaucasia, in the village of Nikolàyefka.

Popòf was by no means the only apostle of communism among the Russian village people. Forest and steppe have many a time heard the same gospel announced. Towards the end of the reign of Alexander II., one Grigòrief was preaching to the *Molokàns* the doctrine of common property not only in lands and chattels, but also women, on pretence that, Christ having delivered man from bondage, the true Christian should enjoy all things freely, love as well as the rest.* Communistic propensities crop up among many sects, otherwise very different from one another. So the Tramps are told by their prophet Eugene that the words "mine" and "thine" are accursed of God. So certain varieties of Flagellants (*Shalopùty*) attempted, about 1860-1870, to introduce communistic doctrines in their villages. Aside from the sects where communism was formally preached, many of the Dissenters' eremitic colonies (*Skits*) were veritable phalansteries, where the inmates lived alike, labored in common, and divided equally the profits from their labor. And truly, if communism *can* ever be anything but utterly utopian, if it is capable of practical, even if only partial application, it can be so only under religious discipline, and with charity as motive power. Religious communism is the only form that has any chance of enduring, not only because

* Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, 2d ed., vol. I., p. 456.

it is based on love and ruled by faith, but because its vital principle is not so much covetousness of the goods of this world, as renunciation of these goods; for it is not the poor who wish to despoil the rich, but the rich who are willing to share with the poor. A vast difference this—*all* the difference between religious and revolutionary socialism; sufficient to enable the one to subsist occasionally, in small volunteer communities, while the other is wholly and utterly unrealizable. The itinerant prophets and the sectarians who pretend they are going to transform human societies and inaugurate a sort of heavenly city on earth may be illuminates, yet they are not half as absurd as our so-called reformers, who dream the same dream, with God and faith and love left out. Of the two—Popòf's disciples and our communists or mutualists—it is not the peasants who would build on the Gospel who are the most gullible.

Shall we then say, as sundry Russians appear to think, that in the bosom of these obscure associations are sprouting seeds of social renovation? We do not think so. Not because of the ignorance, or of the numerical insignificance, or the dispersion of the groups of peasants who are working out these peculiar experiments, but because they are possible only under the wing of religion, and even should they be successful under such protection, they could not endure a moment were that protection withdrawn. In order that, out of these tiny beginnings should issue a transformation on a large scale of property, family and State, Russia would first have to be transformed, as it is many *raskolniks'* dream she should be, into a sort of theocratical commonwealth or monastic federation.

On the other hand, it were a mistake to see in the more or less communistic tendencies of this or that sect, merely a consequence of their doctrines. The tendencies are there, in the people, and, so to speak, in the soil.* Shall we say the same of the brotherly spirit which animates all these little sectarian communities? That

* See vol. I., ch. VII.

also can be found in the germ in the national genius and the communal institutions; but it blossoms out fully only under the shelter of faith. If it is manifested with greater force among the Dissenters, it is because they are, as a rule, the most religious of all peasants. The "Spiritual Christians," in this respect, are not behind any of the *raskòlniks*. The *Molokàns* do not suffer any of their people to be destitute; but they can prevent poverty only by charity, by giving aid where it is needed. That is a great deal easier in small rural democracies than in large industrial centres. The same with equality, which some of these sectarians carry to unnaturally exaggerated lengths. The *Dukhobòrtsy* proclaim the equality not only of the sexes, but the ages. They even proscribe the names of "father" and "mother." The children call their parents "the old man," "the old woman" (*starìk*, *starùkha*), or else by their Christian names: Peter, John, Martha. The women assert their equality with their husbands by drinking and smoking just as they do.

In Little Russia, evangelical rationalism presents itself under a form simpler and more novel—*Stundism*, one of the latest and already most vigorous sects of the empire. Two circumstances impart a peculiar interest to this new-born sect; it is probably the only one which did not have its roots among Great-Russians, and the only one which is a direct outcome of Western Protestantism. *Stundism* was discovered in 1867 or 1870. In a few years it spread over all southern Russia. The fact aroused the greater wonder that the Little Russians had never before shown any proneness to sects. Another noteworthy thing is that the south, not the north, of the empire has been the starting-point of most rationalistic sects,—of *Stundism* as well as *Molokànism*. In France also Protestantism gained a greater hold on the south than the north.

Stundism showed itself first in the surroundings of Odessa, in New-Russia,—a region where, for several generations, German colonies have settled, Lutheran or Mennonites. From these Ger-

man colonies came the doctrine and the name—*Stunda*. It is a recent phenomenon, for these Germans, as a rule, kept aloof from their Russian neighbors and had very little influence over them. They are mostly of Souabian origin, very pious, and are in the habit of coming together to read the Bible. These gatherings were known at the old home by the name of *Stunden* ("hours"),* whence the nickname of *Stundists*, given to the Russians who frequented them or had such themselves. A pastor of the village of Rohrbach, towards 1860, came on the thought of inviting the Little-Russian peasants of the neighborhood to these meetings—not with the idea of converting them, as that is forbidden by law, but of improving their morals. While admitting them into the society of the Friends of God (*Gottesfreunde*), he took care to exhort them not to desert the Orthodox Church. His advice was not followed. The visitors at the *Stunden* imbibed the Protestant spirit and seceded from the Church. The cradle of *Stundism* thus appears to be Raslopol, a village contiguous to that of Rohrbach. The peasant Michael Ràtushny, who is regarded as the founder of the Russian *Stunda*, adopted the tenets of the Anabaptists or Mennonites, enjoining on his adult proselytes a second baptism. Another peasant, Geràssim Balabàn, denies the necessity of a second baptism and rejects certain rites retained by the Russian Baptists. His followers, who appear to be the more numerous, entitle themselves "Evangelical Brotherhood."

Whether you call them Baptists or not, the theology, of these new Evangelicals does not seem any too well defined. Like most Russian sects, they appear to have ideas much more clear-cut on morals and worship than on dogma. Being, as natural with peasants, preoccupied, in the first place, with practical life, they began by reforming worship and the observances, caring little for the rest. They rejected almost all the sacraments, some doing away even

* Compare the French word *heures; livre d'heures*, "prayer-book." The name *Stundists* has also been derived by some from a German well-known pious manual called *Stunden der Andacht (Hours of Devotion)*.

with baptism. At first they retained some of the rites and holidays, but gave them up afterwards. So they gave up the Easter holidays after much discussion. They agree with the *Molokàns* in absolutely repudiating the idea of a clergy. In the beginning they had at the head of their communities an elder, or "elder brother" (*starshii brat*), who presided at their meetings; now the functions of this elder brother are reduced to very little. Divine service is mostly confined to the singing of Psalms, readings from the Bible. Every one is free to speak and comment as the spirit moves him on the sacred text, so that polemical discussions are not unfrequent at these meetings. One of the causes of their success appears to be that they preach in the local Little-Russian dialect. The *Stunda* made the greatest progress at the time that the harmonious southern tongue was most severely treated.

The contempt for externalities is the predominating feature of *Stundism*. Hence it was in many places found easy to excite the fanaticism of the Orthodox population against these blasphemers of the Virgin and the saints. The first sign of a family having adopted the *Stunda* is the disappearance of the *eïkons* from their place of honor in the right-hand corner of the *izbà*. A few years ago the *Stundist* converts in a village of the government of Kief quietly took down their *eïkons* and carried them to the priest, to whom they gave them, declaring they had no further use for them. A certain spirit of thrift combines with the religious scruples of these novel iconoclasts. The practice is in their eyes not only an impious and idolatrous one, but a bootlessly expensive one as well; it is somewhat in the same spirit that they reject the sacraments and services. They are perfectly obedient towards the authorities, they pay their taxes regularly, but they will not, in spite of prosecution, have recourse to the ministrations of the clergy; they are like our revolutionists in that they appear to regard the clergy as a costly body of parasites.

On their adversaries' showing, the *Stundists* are noted for their probity, their temperance, their industry. "Ever since our peas-

ants have gone heretics, I cannot say enough in praise of them," a Kherson landlord said to me ; " they don't get drunk any more, don't steal, keep their engagements." These people's mode of life and prosperity attract more proselytes than preaching. The neighbors adopt their doctrines in order to become sharers in their well-being, just as the first adepts were allured by that of their German neighbors.

Like almost all sectarians, the *Stundists* hold learning in high esteem. Their entire religion is based on the Bible alone, and the necessity of reading the Bible makes them anxious to go to school. Ideas of liberty and independence filter into their villages, together with free investigation. Young couples refuse to bend the neck under the patriarchal yoke of the old-time Russian family law. The women take their ground as their husbands' equals, not their drudges, and are accordingly among the most infatuated apostles of the sect. The *Stundists* have the same levelling and communistic tendencies as the *Molokàns* of the same parts. They form a society of brethren and sisters in which all the members are equal. The equal division of lands is said to be advocated there—quite a novelty in New Russia, where the periodical partitions of the Great-Russian *mir* are not in general use. Land should belong to all alike, these rustic reformers teach ; each man should own only as much as he can cultivate. This is the peasant's idea all over the empire.

The rapid growth of *Stundism* is one of the most curious phenomena of this century's last quarter. Neither the clergy's exhortations nor the police's or even the courts' interference have been able to stem the tide of desertion from the official church. Fines and imprisonment have been tried in vain. The *Stundists* may be treated as were the *Molokàns* at one time : they may be transported to the farthest ends of the empire—the Caucasus,—it is to be feared that, in this as in the former cases, the exiles will be only so many missionaries.

The question has been raised whether between the *Stundists* and

the *Molokàns* a fusion will take place, or whether, on the contrary, the *Stunda* will crumble away into minor sects. That is a question of only secondary importance. The really important thing is the hold which these rationalistic doctrines are gaining on the peasant. Rationalism and free discussion penetrate even into the old *raskòl*, as we have seen. Among the descendants of the most fanatical Old-Believers, one can hear, nowadays, maxims not less bold and subversive than among the proselytes of the German Anabaptists. The "No-priests" also proclaim "We are the Church." Some of them go the length of teaching that, to the Christian, common bread is communion bread, and that he who lives on his own labor takes communion every day. Not a few Russians already predict the impending dissolution of the *raskòl* into the radical sects. Rationalism gradually permeates and dispels the haze of mysticism which hangs over the Russian plains, it slowly insinuates itself into those dense rural masses which appear at first sight so impervious to Western ideas. But it does not affect the *mujik* as it does the peasant or laboring man of Western Europe, under the form of an abject materialism, or of an idle and flippant scepticism ; it comes to him under the shelter of religion and in the name of faith. Far from shutting down contemptuously the sacred volume as a story-book fit for children, from which an adult has nothing more to learn, these so-called rationalists find their inspiration, even in their aberrations, in the Word of Christ, and in that Word seek for truth and light.

As between the godless denizen of our great cities and the boldest of these heretics, this alone would make a difference in favor of the Russian. He still retains beliefs, on which he can hang his ideas of morality and lean in his weakness and suffering. The Russian peasant remains religious even in his revolt against the Church. Even when he apparently no longer looks to religion for the bliss of a paradise outside the world he lives in, he still looks to it for guidance and happiness in his sublunary existence. If he too, like others, sometimes brings down his hopes from

heaven to earth, it is to religion, the ancient Paraclete, he looks to open for him his new Eden. The obscure process of evolution which takes place in the Russian sects is far more akin to the Reformation of the sixteenth century than to the "infidelity" of our own times. In the wreck of traditional dogma, the consciousness of God and soul remains afloat.

There is, in the depths of the people, something stranger yet than these Protestant, reformed sects: there is a sect with Jewish tendencies, more ancient, yet less known, the Sabbatists (*Subbotniki*), who have substituted Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, for Sunday. Can this sect, with its leaning to Jewish rites, be called a Christian heresy? Are not the Russian Sabbatists, like the *Marranos* in Portugal, the descendants of Jews coerced or allured into baptism, and who, from generation to generation and more and more confusedly, secretly handed down the ancestral faith and rites? A justice of the peace in southern Russia, who had had opportunities to observe Sabbatists in his court room, assured me that they recalled the Jewish type. Yet this does not appear to be habitually the case. They do not seem to have any Semitic blood. Those of them who were cited before our justice of the peace on the charge of holding clandestine meetings appeared ignorant of the origin of those traditions to which they were so stubbornly attached. To all the questions, all the objurgations of the magistrate, they made the usual reply of all dissenters: "It is the faith of our fathers." The justice being compelled by the law to fine them, with the warning that they would be more severely punished for a repetition of the offence, the poor wretches replied that all they wanted was to keep the customs of their ancestors, and that they were ready to endure anything for the sake of them.

These semi-judaic sects are no new thing in Russia. These Sabbatists, now lost in the obscurity of the lower classes, are the last survivors of a heresy which, in the fifteenth century, found

its way into the highest clergy and became a danger to Russian Orthodoxy. Certain Jews of Nòvgorod, a very learned one, Zachariah, in the number, taught the Christians to deny the Trinity, Redemption, the divinity of Christ. Under their influence, a portion of the Nòvgorod clergy simplified Christianity till they reduced it to a sort of Judaïsm. This shows that rationalistic tendencies were not unknown in Russia long before our times. Ivan III. transported the seed of them from Nòvgorod to Moscow when he transferred thither the priests Dionysius and Alexis from the ancient republic. At one time these Judaïsts were sufficiently powerful to seat one of their own people, Zossim, in the patriarchal chair. But they could not overcome the resistance of the episcopate. They were anathematized by the Councils of 1490 and 1504; the chief heresiarchs were sentenced to the stake or to claustration in convents, and the heresy appeared to vanish from the Russian lands.* But it had paved the way, in Russia, for the later radical sects, and, in Poland, for the Unitarians of the sixteenth century.

At the present day it is chiefly in the southern provinces, in the neighborhood of the regions inhabited by Polish Jews, that the Sabbatists are met with. Their presence has sometimes been ascribed to an Israelite propaganda, but no one will admit this supposition, who knows how little modern Jews care for making proselytes.† Still, this accusation was, about 1880, the occasion (or the pretence) for the expulsion of the Jews from certain districts of the governments of Vorònej and Tambòf. The Sabbatists have been, all through the present century, one of the most persecuted sects. Alexander I., Nicolas I., Alexander II.

* Special students ascribe the rise of the sect mainly to the deception experienced by the devout who were looking for the end of the world to complete the period of seven thousand years from the Creation, the era then in use in Russia. The fatal year having come and gone without Christ coming back to earth, the Gospel, the Apostles, and the Fathers stood convicted of error or deceit in the minds of believers.

† M. N. Gradòfsky, in his studies on the situation of the Jews in Russia, proves that no Israelite was ever implicated in the numerous trials of Sabbatists.

repressed them consistently, showing the greatest anxiety to extirpate this heresy in the south of the empire, as though fearing it might denationalize those villages where it gained a footing. Most of these Sabbatists were transported to the Caucasus.

Whatever its source or filiation, Sabbatism is hardly anything but a form of Unitarianism. Readers of the Bible came to reject the dogma of the Trinity, then turned back to the Mosaïc dispensation and gave the Old Testament precedence over the New. At the same time, they adopted certain Jewish rites, including that of circumcision. They expect the Messiah and believe that the reign of Israel will begin in the year 7000 from the creation of the world. Like the Mormons, who are also in a way Judaïsts who have returned to patriarchal polygamy, some Sabbatists would be willing to allow several wives, even while being habitually content with one. They observe the Biblical prescriptions concerning pure and impure meats, but in so doing only conform to the ancient usage of the Russian Church, which for a long time kept up the prohibition of feeding on bloody meats and the flesh of smothered animals. Among the Sabbatists exiled to the Caucasus there arose, about 1860, a group of ultra-Judaïsts under the name of *Ghéry*. They called to them a Jewish Rabbi and substituted Hebrew for Russian in their prayers. Russia is not the only Christian country where Sabbatists or Sabbatarians have made their appearance. They can be found in Hungary, in Transylvania, and there, as in Russia and ancient Poland, they have always been in contact with Israelites, Socinians, and Unitarian Christians. Detested and despised as they are, the Jews have nevertheless, by their mere vicinity, aroused religious investigation, inspired attempts at reconciling the old with the new faith. Down to these latter years, there lived in the monastery of Solovètsk, on an island of the White Sea, an old man of the name of Nicolas Ilìn, who had been shut up there for no other guilt than that of preaching to the miners of the Uràl a gospel which, while despoiling both Church and Synagogue of their particular dogmas and rites, aimed at uniting both in a new form of Unitarianism.

BOOK III. CHAPTER X.

Recent Sects in the People and in Society—Continued Production of Sects—Psychology of the Sectarians—Prophets and Prophetesses—Instances of New Heresies—A Contemporary Sectarian Type: Sutàyef—His Theology and Political Ideas—Sects among the Upper Ten: *Radstockism* or *Pashkovism*—The "Lord-Apostle"—How the Gospel is Preached in Drawing-Rooms—Propaganda among the Lower Classes—Count Leo Tolstòy—His Intellectual Kinship with the Village Prophets—Similarity in the Ideas and Proceedings of Both—Non-Resistance to Evil the Fundamental Dogma of Christianity—Tolstòy as Social Reformer—Christian Buddhism and Evangelical Nihilism.

SECTS beget sects. They are like the grasses of the steppes, which sow their own seed. New ones keep coming up, and get registered almost every year. One wonders at the persistence of the sectarian spirit, ten generations after Peter the Great and thirty years after the Emancipation. Neither the reforms of Peter nor those of Alexander have yet modified the mental condition of the people. It has not had enough of two centuries to adapt itself thoroughly to the ways of modern states. Serfdom is no more; but the peasant dreams the same dreams still. What the Tsar's ministers could not give him, he expects to receive from special envoys of God. Then, over and above its vague social aspirations, which its childlike imagination clothes in religious forms, this illiterate people has its spiritual needs which the Church has not yet been able to satisfy; what it does not find in its clergy, it seeks at the hand of its village prophets.

In the new sects as in the old ones, deceit and fanaticism are closely allied and often combined, sometimes so closely—as in such heresiarchs as Mohammed or Joe Smith—as not to be distinguishable. Like the Tuscan David Lazzaretti, the *santo* of Monte Amiata, numbers of these little Russian Luthers are, at once or

by turns, wily and high-strung, credulous and cunning, intriguing and guileless.* The clash of the superstitious spirit that lives in the masses with the sceptical spirit of the age, the contact of popular faith with individual unbelief, lend themselves more than ever to religious frauds and jobbing.

What strikes one first, is that this peasantry, so wide-awake in many ways, should, in religious and political matters, have remained so simple-minded and guileless. It is quite as capable now of accepting false prophets and false tsars as in the times of Pugatchòf and Selivànof. The most brazen impostor still finds dupes. In 1874, during one of our first Russian trips, a curious case came before a justice of the peace. It was in a district of the government of Pskof, on the high-road between Berlin and Petersburgh. A rumor had spread that five thousand maidens were to be sent from this province to "the land of the Arabs," to be given in marriage to negroes, while their place at home was to be filled by as many imported negro girls. The district of Opòtchka was in a panic. Parents hastened to marry off their girls at the earliest legal age, and there was a continuous succession of weddings. An inquest brought out the fact that this fable had been invented by a tavern-keeper of the name of Yàkovlef, to increase his profits, since a wedding brings in at least as much to the dealer in *vòdka* as to the church.

A people accessible to such fables is still more open to mystifications covered with the veil of faith or adorned with the halo of the supernatural. In this same government of Pskof, a year or two later, this barefaced mercantile fraud was matched by an impudent religious swindle. In 1872 a sect was discovered, in the vicinity of the city of Pskof, the founder of which, a certain Sera-

* See Giacomo Barzolotti: *David Lazzaretti di Arcidosso, detto il Santo, i suoi Seguaci e la sua Leggenda*, Bologna, 1885. Lazzaretti, who was killed in 1879, by *carabinieri*, at the head of a procession, also preached a gospel promising to the peasants, in the near future, a partition of the good things of this world. He left disciples, many of whom expect his resurrection.

phin, a runaway monk, addressed himself preferably to young girls. They were known under the name of "the Clipped" (*Strìjenitsy*), because Seraphin made them cut off their hair, then sold it. Nor was the cynical "prophet" content with swindling his victims; he was accused of preaching salvation through sin, on pretence of increasing the Saviour's glory by making a free use of His merits. Seraphin had concocted the most fantastic legend about himself. He was said to be invulnerable and to have the power of baffling pursuit by sudden transformations. Such scoundrels reconcile one to the articles in the Russian code against pseudo-prophets and pseudo-miracles.

Next to the charlatans come the seers. In a country where the people still believe in spells and incantations, where idiots or "innocents," "naturals," are still regarded as inspired, visionaries are numerous. With many of them, illuminism borders on lunacy, and it is not to be wondered at that the police shuts up these messengers of God in asylums. This has been the fate of several, notably of one Adrian Pùshkin and his disciple Kòrobof. This Pùshkin, originally a merchant in Perm, finding speech and writing inadequate, expounded his doctrine in symbolical paintings. He had discovered a new revelation in the male and female human body, taken as a living representation of eternal truths. He was forever sending letters to the ministers and to the Tsar, urging that the time had come to deliver the earth over to all, as being God's own property. He ended by being incarcerated, for about fifteen years, in the monastery of Solovètsk on the White Sea, where he stayed till 1882. This queer messiah found a "witness," a physician, Kòrobof, who made his escape from Russia and started in Geneva a periodical which he described as "the first official organ of the sons of God." *

* The *Viêstnik Pràvdy (Messenger of Truth)* for which intermittent pamphlets were substituted in 1882. Mr. Kòrobof kindly addressed some prophetic warnings to us, with a view to our salvation. He paid the same compliment to several prominent men—Mr. Flocquet and Mr. Lockroy in the number—in 1885.

Be they impostors or illuminates, these itinerant apostles are always noted for the peculiarity of their doctrines; they outdo one another in eccentricity. Prophetism is the characteristic of most extreme sects, ancient or new. In the language of sectarians as well as in that of the Bible, the word "prophecy" does not exclusively mean the foretelling of future things. Prophets frequently announce nothing but the accomplishment, at a near or farther date, of the promises or threats contained in the Scriptures. This is really preaching, and can be termed prediction only in so far as the orator gives his discourse the form of a vision or inspiration. We were told by one who had, with considerable difficulty, got himself admitted among the audience of a famous prophetess, that he was sorely disappointed at hearing nothing but rantings about the coming reign of Christ and seeing how the old babble was as devoutly received as unexpected revelations. There was a rhythmic swing to it, though, which makes of the trite flow of words something like a versified chant. The talent of improvisation has long survived in the North, and a prophet sometimes is just an *improvisatore*. He now utters vague conventional formulas which cannot but strike home to some of the hearers, and now delivers long discourses, in which it is easy to find something which comes true, wholly or in part.

A noteworthy fact is the great number of prophetesses and the prominent part which women play in the majority of sects. There are madonnas as there are christs; generally they go in pairs, and the impulse comes from the woman as often as from the man. Thus, about 1880, a prophetess, Xenia Ivànovna by name, founded, in the province of the Don, an ascetic sect, the adepts of which abstained from marriage and the use of meat. Nor is it only among the illuminates and the mystics that women's influence is so great, but also, though in a lesser degree, among the Old-Believers and dissenters of all kinds. Religion is almost the only domain where the peasant's wife shows herself her husband's equal, sometimes even his superior. "Were Aksinia

to contend with her husband on some worldly question," A. Petchersky says somewhere, "she would get a good snubbing for her pains. When the question is of eremitic settlements, or any religious matter, it is another thing. Then not the husband, but the wife is the head; Aksinia decides, and snubs her husband." From this fact some writers have drawn an unexpected conclusion. Seeing that the Russian peasant considers woman as an inferior being, they query, would questions of dogma be left to women, if men gave their minds to them very seriously? Piety is to the peasant a matter of household import and, as such, concerns chiefly the housewife. We recognize in this argument the determination of certain Russians to make out their countrymen of the lower classes to be indifferent in the matter of religion and, as they put it, "unconsciously sceptical." But the position is by no means justified by the mere fact of the peasant women's influence in schism or heresy. The Russian woman asserts herself wherever she finds a field open to her. The peasant woman's field is religious propaganda, as political propaganda is the woman student's field. The phenomenon is the same at the two extremes of the nation. Moreover, Russia is not the only country where woman is gifted with the spirit of proselytism. The weaker and naturally more pious sex plays a prominent part in all religions. The Anglo-Saxon sects also have their prophetesses; in that society of a higher culture average there also are women illuminates, who claim supernatural powers and arrogate semi-divine titles. The American *khlystý*—the Shakers, have at their head a "mother," a "bride of the Lamb of God." And in England itself, the Shakers of the New Forest were quite lately ruled by a certain Mrs. Girling, whose visions were accepted by the community as authorities in matters of faith.

It is a spectacle monotonous in its very diversity, this everlasting production of sects. All these obscure doctrines, which cannot be determined and settled by publicity and regular teaching, have something incoherent about them, which exposes them to

constant fluctuations. They are like certain beaches of shifting sand which are continually made and unmade by the wind. These confused heresies are sometimes only the expression of a given moment's aspirations. Each important event in the life of the people gives birth to a sect, which, at the time, is the formulate expression of the people's wants or preoccupations.

Thus then it came to pass that the Emancipation, which, by ridding the people of its main grievance, seemed destined to strike a great blow at sectarianism, momentarily caused new sects to be born. The discontent which rankles in the peasant's breast anent the conditions of the redemption of land, took, in many a portion of the empire, a religious form. "The land is God's," rustic prophets proclaimed, "and God wills that all His children should enjoy it freely, without paying any dues on it." At other times it is the taxes which the peasant refuses to pay in the name of an alleged vision, putting forward religion and Heaven where our revolutionists would intrench themselves behind man's natural right. This form of resistance has occurred frequently in many parts of both North and South; it occasions most peculiar debates. "Why won't you pay the taxes?" asks a functionary of some peasants on the Don.—"Because the end of the world has come."—"Who has told you that story?"—"It has been brought down from the seventh heaven."—"By whom?"—"By John the Baptist and St. Barbara." And the examination goes on in this strain until it leads to the discovery and imprisonment of "John the Baptist." In a district of the Ural, the same objection was made, a few years ago, because a man with a golden book had appeared. Nobody had seen him, but everybody believed in him. It is easy to picture the awkward position in which police and judges are placed by a resistance based on such a line of argument. There is no choice but to arrest the propagators of the heavenly messages.

Most of the sects revealed in the last twenty or thirty years are radical. Almost all reject the priesthood and the rites of the

Church; they are divided between the two tendencies we have described. Both *Khlystŷ* and *Molokàns* have competitors and continuators; but the proportion between the two groups is inverted. Semi-gnostic mysticism now produces scant and feeble offshoots. In 1870, in the towns of Troïtsa and Zlatooùst, we have the Dancers (*Pliassunŷ*), a sort of *Khlystŷ*, who ostensibly attend church. In 1872, in the district of Beliòf, appears the "creed of Tombof," so called from its founder, a sub-officer whose teaching is said to have been somewhat like that of the *Skoptsŷ*. About 1880, in the province of the Don, there are the Self-Gods (*Samobòghi*), so named because, like the *Dukhobòrtsy*, they arrive at the deification of man. In 1868, in a village of the government of Tambòf, a group of zealots appeared, who considered themselves as purified and all other men as impure and vowed to hell; their head was a poor and obscure burgher of the name of Pànof, who gave himself out as the Christ. In 1866, in the government of Saràtof, we find the Computers (*Tchìslenniki*), so named from their manner of computing the holidays. They inverted the whole order of the church calendar, displacing the solemn church feasts, transferring the day of rest from Sunday to Wednesday, celebrating Easter on the Wednesday of the Holy Week. All these alterations they justified from a book alleged to have dropped from heaven. These Computers, whose head was a plain peasant, taught that there was neither Eucharist nor clergy; that every man has a right to hear confessions and perform divine service. They were accused, like the monk Seraphin of Pskof, of preaching salvation through sin.

The Protestant tendency is represented by *Stundism*, whose rapid conquests we have recorded. Heresies more or less similar to that sprang up in the north and centre of the empire. I shall mention one, which was unearthed in 1871, in the city of Kalùga, among the lower urban population. The founder of this sect, whose doctrine was preached in taverns and tap-rooms, was, like Joe Smith, the Moses of the Mormons, a shoemaker. His name

was Tìkhonof; his doctrine was not unlike that of the Non-prayers. Like them, he rejected the sacraments, asserting that baptism, confession, and communion must be spiritual acts, and that no intermediary should be allowed between God and man. He taught that true religion admits only of a spiritual cult; even prayer, consisting of words shaped by mortal lips, is too material to please God. The uplifting of the soul and sighs from the heart are the only meet offering, the only meet prayer from a Christian. It is accordingly by frequent and long-drawn sighs that the shoemaker of Kalùga and his disciples do homage to God, whence they have been named Sighers (*Vozdykhàntsy*). The strange conclusion at which this rigid spiritualism arrives, this curious confusion or association between the aspirations of the soul and the inspirations of the lungs is another sample of the untutored Russian's naïve realism.

Of all the sectarians of the last quarter of a century the most remarkable is, beyond a doubt, Sutàyef. He is the best known, and would deserve to be so, even were he not the teacher and inspirer of Leo Tolstòy. Sutàyef is a peasant of the government of Tver. He can serve as the type of all these northern peasants who, unassisted, seek for truth in the Gospel, each by himself. They fashion their religion to suit themselves after the sacred book, while they can hardly read. Each verse which they decipher with painful effort, one by one, assumes in their mind an immense importance; at each page they imagine they have come upon a new truth, unknown to men. Sutàyef had been married some time before he knew his letters. It was while working in Petersburgh, as a stone-cutter, through the winter that he taught himself to read, almost unaided, in order to seek for the true faith in the Gospel. One day in 1880 the *Messenger of Tver* announced the appearance of a new sect, the *Sutàyeftsy*. Like the *Stundists*, they were said to reject the sacraments; but they differed from the Russian Baptists in that they had never come in contact with

any Protestant colonists. Everything with them was spontaneous and genuinely Russian.*

Sutàyef is described by the priest of his parish as having been, of all peasants, the most pious, the most assiduous at all the services. When he rebelled against his pastor he was over fifty years old. The rupture was brought about by a dispute on the fee for burying a little grandson of his. When asked why he did not go to church any more, he replied: "Because one is not better for going there and because everything there has to be paid for. Besides," he added, "I have the church within myself." His entire doctrine flows from this maxim, equally dear to mystics and rationalists. It was in vain the priest of the village got the archpriest (*protopòp*) to admonish him. Sutàyef and his followers held their own, Gospel in hand: "We are new creatures, regenerate creatures. We lived in error; now we know." The chief of police was sent out to them. They disposed of him with a ten-rouble bill. Sutàyef, being charged with forming a sect, replied: "We form no sect. We merely wish to be true Christians."—"In what, then, consists true Christianity?"—"In charity." This word sums up his religion. The whole law to him is in one thing—charity. What this peasant aims at is "a new life, the organization of a Christian life."

He holds ascetic austerities in as little esteem as mystical aspirations. Idealist as he is, his teaching is all directed towards practical life. In that he is thoroughly Russian. He wants to transform life by charity, and looks to the Gospel to bring back

* See, on Sutàyef, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1st of January, 1883), a study by Mr. E. M. de Vogüé, after Mr. Prugàvin. The latter went to the village of Shevérino to study Sutàyef, and has told of his conversations with him in the *Russian Thought* (*Rùsskaya Mysl*) for October and December, 1881, and January, 1882. The same writer has undertaken to compile, under the title of *Raskòl-Sektàntsvo*, a sort of encyclopedia of Russian heresies. The first volume, devoted to the bibliography of the *raskòl* proper and the sects issued from it, appeared in 1887. The second volume is to contain the classification and characteristics of these sects. The bibliography and classification of the other heresies are to fill two more volumes.

peace and justice among men. On being asked by Mr. Prugàvin, "What is truth?" he replies: "Truth is charity in common life." Here again he shows himself a genuine Russian. He is not selfishly preoccupied with his own salvation; he is intent on the good of his brethren, on the salvation of the community. Religion with him is reduced to the practice of justice; nothing to him is useful or sacred but what teaches man to lead a better life. If he considers rites and sacraments as superfluous, it is because he has not observed them to make men better. Accordingly he consistently repudiates the priest's ministrations. A grandson is born to him—he will not let him be baptized; another dies—he wants to bury him in his garden, on the plea that the whole earth is sacred, and, being forbidden, hides the body under his floor. His daughter gets married—he performs the marriage ceremony for her himself, and when they say to him, "You do not recognize marriage," he replies: "I do not recognize the sort of marriage which is a lie. If I fight or quarrel with my wife, it is no marriage, because love is not there." When he marries his children all the advice he gives them is to conform their lives to the Divine Law and to treat all men as brothers.

Such is the gospel of this simple-minded man; and, with the doubly strong logic of faith and ignorance, he draws from this love-principle inferences which, unbeknown to him, are subversive of both society and State. This stone-cutter's idea is to reform the world, beginning with his village. Indeed, to him this is the essential thing, for he too, in his own way is a millenarian. Like all the solitary readers of the New Testament, he has, on long winter evenings, pondered over the Book of Revelation. He waits for the New Jerusalem. He prepares the way for its coming. His apostolate has but one object—to establish the reign of God on this poor vice-tainted, sorrow-ridden earth. As to another world, believer as he is, he has but a wavering faith in that. "What there is up there," he says, pointing to the sky, "I don't know. I have not gone to the other world; maybe there

is nothing but darkness there." And he goes on repeating: "The Kingdom of God must be brought on here on earth."

And how is this Kingdom of God to be made a reality? For a peasant, nothing can be simpler. All there is to do is to abolish individual property which begets envy, theft, hatred. It is communism conceived as a recoil from sin; community of goods will destroy egotism. The nobles, the rich, must "give back the land to those to whom it of right belongs." They will do so of their own accord, once they are convinced. For Sutàyef will have violence done to none of his brethren; no one is coerced in the Kingdom of God. For the great revolution to be achieved there needs only a little light in the mind, a little love in the heart. Of commerce and of money, the great demoralizing agent, Sutàyef disapproves as much as of property. He had 1,500 roubles savings—he distributed them to the poor. He had debt titles—he burned them up. With property and money, the courts of justice, now unnecessary, disappear, then the tax-collectors and all the functionaries who live on the people, then the army, for war is suppressed, since all men are brothers. When the *Starshinà* (elder) of his commune comes to him for his tax assessment, Sutàyef answers with Gospel texts. The *Starshinà* pays himself by seizing one of the refractory tax-payer's cows. When cited before the courts, the reformer opposes to the laws of men the Word of God. The same with military service. His youngest son, Ivan's, turn comes; he is summoned and ordered to take the oath. The youth objects that we are forbidden to swear. He is commanded to take a gun; he refuses, merely saying: "It is written, 'Thou shalt not kill.'"—"You fool," a good-natured officer retorts; "there is no war; your time will pass in barracks." Arguments are useless. The mutineer is thrown into prison, put on bread and water—he takes no food at all. At the end of three days they have to take him out of prison, lest he starve himself to death. He is sent to Schlusselburg, to a disciplinary company. One of the soldiers who compose his escort, moved by his talk, becomes a

convert. Are these not traits worthy of the Acts of the Apostles? Truly, at so many centuries' distance, souls and spirits are the same, whether subject to Tsar or Cæsar.

All these conceptions of the peasant reformer, both in religious and political matters, we find, almost word for word, in the late works of Count Leo Tolstòy. What the novelist teaches, the peasant practises. On matters of state and government a man like Sutàyef can have only confused ideas. His political theories are thoroughly Russian, theological as far as they go, and wholly childlike. To him there are in authority only the good and the bad. "The bad" are the functionaries whom he knows, the *tchinòvniks* of all grades who levy the taxes and put people in prison. "The good"—there is only one "good," the Tsar, whom no one sees and who is enthroned far, far away. "If only the Tsar knew!" exclaims Sutàyef, with crowds of his brother peasants. One day he starts for Petersburgh; he wants to "warn the Tsar." Vain effort! He is not allowed to approach the Tsar. The crestfallen reformer is compelled to go home without having accomplished his object, and accuses himself of lack of persistence. Sutàyef has only a few hundred professed followers; but there are thousands of peasants who, while they want the pluck to apply his doctrine, are in sympathy with it. Their name is legion—these nameless prophets who go about among the people preaching a similar gospel.

Simple, primitive natures are not alone tormented with the longing for religious renovation. In the higher classes, among the cultured and hyper-refined, there are found souls hungry for truth and disgusted with the staleness of the traditional viands served by the official clergy on its ponderous golden plate. The century ends as it began. As in Madame Krudener's and Speransky's time, the Petersburgh society, half detached from Orthodoxy, seems at times possessed with a craze for getting up some other creed.* And, just as in the times when they de-

* See E. M. de Vogüé: *Le Roman Russe.*

lighted in Saint Martin or Swedenborg, it is usually abroad that the epicures look for their spiritual nourishment.

Petersburgh society, towards the close of the reign of Alexander II., set up a sect which rivalled the *Stunda* of the peasant South, and might be called the "drawing-room *Stundism*." In the capital, the imperial residence, the stirrers of souls could not be plain Protestant ministers or common German colonists. A very different prophet was needed for so fastidious a public. And lo! the Word of God was brought to them by an English lord. It was a vocation with Lord Radstock; he had entered his apostolic career at Eton; he had continued it in the Queen's army. He had even been heard in a few select houses in Paris. But it was in Petersburgh that the noble missionary was to gather the richest and choicest harvest. He soon became the rage. The spiritualists, who were in great favor at the same time, found in him a dangerous competitor. He delivered his familiar homilies at evening receptions, at five-o'clock teas, just as the popular prophets held forth in taverns, around the steaming samovar. Lord Radstock usually preached in French to the Russian ladies. The "lord-apostle" gave the sceptics ample occasion for jeering and mocking.* But the evangelical seed sprouted vigorously, for all that it fell on carpeted floors.

Lord Radstock found a valuable assistant in a certain Mr. Pàshkof, a wealthy landholder, a fashionable society man, renowned in his young days as a waltzer. A lady with whom he used to dance told me that he once began to catechize her during a mazurka. Other gentlemen joined Mr. Pàshkof, Count Korf in the number, and even a former minister, Count Alexis Bòbrinsky.

It would be unjust to look on *Pashkovism* or *Radstockism* merely as one of fashion's vagaries. Lord Radstock made his appearance in Petersburgh in 1878-9, at a most unquiet time, at the beginning of the nihilist crisis, when many were the souls which, having gone astray, were seeking comfort and guidance. Neither

* *The Lord-Apostle*, is the title of a satirical novel by Prince Meshtchersky.

Radstock nor Pàshkof claimed that they had invented a new doctrine. They avoided all semblance of dogmatical controversy, merely commenting the gospel. The success of this drawing-room revival was due principally to the fact that it answered a spiritual need too long neglected by the Orthodox clergy. Since the priests would not preach, laymen preached in their place.

The *Pashkovites* are not outside the pale of the Church. They are a living proof of the great latitude which can be enjoyed within her ancient precincts, from the lack of authority on doctrine. For the teaching of these Orthodox Evangelicals is tinged with Protestantism, with Calvinism ; it is based on justification by faith, wherein it differs from that of Sutàyef and others, who declare religion to consist entirely of works. The *Radstockists* believe themselves to be assured of salvation when they feel intimately united with the Saviour. "Have you Christ?" Lord Radstock used to ask each of his hearers ; "seek and ye shall find." While the English lord could address only society people, Mr. Pàshkof extended his apostolic work to the lower classes. He gathered together in his own house all sorts and conditions of men, whom he and his friends instructed how to "seek Christ." This was a great novelty for Russia, where the cultured and illiterate were not heretofore in the habit of being served with the same intellectual nourishment. Similar gatherings took place in Moscow and other cities, under the patronage of society women, who took particular pleasure, in their own *salons*, in seating the footmen behind the masters. Mr. Pàshkof was not content with preaching himself to peasants and workingmen ; he supplied them with translations of the tracts so dear to English piety. Such tracts and selected sermons were scattered broadcast in thousands of copies. Mr. Pàshkof quickly became popular among dissenters. Many sectarians, when making a short stay in the capital, would call on him. Sutàyef's sons regularly sent home to their father the *Pashkovite* pamphlets. Mr. Prugàvin came across them in the Caucasus, in the Uràl, in Siberia.

So long as *Radstockism* was confined to the privileged classes, the government did not pay much attention to it. If there is freedom anywhere in Russia, it is in the drawing-room. It was different when the propaganda passed from the dress coat to the sheepskin. The people, with their innate logic, did not always observe, in their attitude towards the Church and clergy, the deference dictated by good taste which persons drilled in the compromises of society life continued to show them. It happened, so one of Mr. Pàshkof's friends told me, that some peasants heard him discourse on the uselessness of ceremonies and observances; and the first thing they did on returning to their *izbàs* was to throw their *eïkons* out of the window. The imperial government then thought it time to institute proceedings against the preaching aristocrats. Mr. Pàshkof was sent out of Petersburgh and advised to stay on his estates, then invited to travel abroad. Count Korf also had to leave the capital. The society founded by these gentlemen was dissolved in 1884; their press organ, the *Evangelical Sunday Paper*, was suppressed. On the whole, Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef did not treat these white-gloved apostles with much more consideration than the sheepskin-clad prophets. "Even in the highest social spheres," he said in one of his annual reports, "there have been found benighted persons who have forsaken the faith of their fathers to follow the absurd teachings of ephemeral sectarians." He accuses them not only of disturbing simple minds in their faith, but of lending moral and material support to the popular sects, more especially the *Stundists*. "Society" in Russia is seldom proof against official disfavor. *Pàshkovism* was already dying out. Still, the severity displayed by the authorities does not seem to have put an entire stop to the evangelical propaganda, at least in the provinces. So, in 1886, the Nòvgorod court sentenced to imprisonment two men guilty of preaching "the Pàshkof heresy." In the following year a new apostle of the same doctrine was announced in the same parts. The High Procurator complains in his reports that certain noble landholders

meddle with proselytizing. And indeed, even should the watchfulness of the official shepherd of Russian souls avail to keep from the fold all the wolves in sheep's clothing, many still would remain infested with a sort of unconscious Protestantism. Had Lord Radstock never come for the edification of the Petersburgh aristocracy, the semi-mystical, semi-rationalistic Evangelism which he represented would have been just as rife among the Orthodox of all classes who still keep a lamp burning night and day before the holy *eïkons*.*

Must it then be left to foreigners to bring to Russia the Word of Life and Righteousness which those who hunger for it long for alike in palace and *izbà?* Should it not rather be the privilege of her own sons,—her flesh and blood? And who, of them all, would seem more fit for the work than some of her great writers, men like Tolstòy or Dostoyèfsky, those magicians of the soul, who found the secret of merging in their own person both the cultured man and the untutored child of the soil, and to put into words all the troubles and tortures of the Russian spirit? Both have attempted, each in his own way, to utter the same revelation, to announce the same message of love. Dostoyèfsky's vivid faith spent itself in a sort of apocalyptic and humanitarian mysticism, warm and winning, but too vague to yield a solid doctrinal body. Not so Tolstòy. Less bashful or more simple-minded, he is not afraid of teaching a new form of Christianity. On this account he comes within the scope of this study; he has his place marked out in the gallery of contemporary sectarians between Sutàyef and Pàshkof.

Tolstòy is altogether spontaneous, Russian, national. Cut him away from his native soil—he will be a riddle. If we would comprehend his religious and social ideas, we must place Leo Nico-

* *Radstockism* is not the only doctrine borrowed of late by Russian society from abroad. We may mention a group of *Irvingists*, with a complete hierarchy of apostles, prophets, pastors, evangelists. This doctrine, first proclaimed in England in 1830 by Dr. Ed. Irving, was introduced in Petersburgh by one Dr. Dietmann. Its followers have a chapel there.

làyevitch in the frame of Russian life, in the midst of the peasants with whom he has associated so much. He, the aristocrat, belongs to the family of seers and saints bred by the *raskòl*. His religion is a growth of the same soil and has a decided local flavor. The articles of his *Credo* might be found in the lispings of the village apostles. One would almost think he had condensed and codified the incoherent doctrines of the popular sects. His ideas seem like a synthesis or the sum total of an addition. Not that the great novelist can be called an echo or a reflection of the *mujik*. Far from that—few men have a more marked individuality. He is, in all things, inclined to reject ready-made views and to make his own creed. But, in spite of his birth and bringing up, his mind is of the same stuff and temper as that of his peasants; he is a man of the same blood as the rustic prophets. It is, in a way, Sutàyef or a *Molokàn*, university-bred.

Sooth to say, the great writer is himself a primitive nature. He is familiar with the art, the literatures, the sciences of the West; but nothing of all that has made much impression on his Russian soul. In the sphere of religion as in that of social science, Leo Nicolàyevitch is nearly as unsophisticated as Sutàyef himself. He too believes that the saving word, the talisman which is to heal all ills to which mankind is heir, has yet to be discovered; he too believes that all there is to do in order to find it, is to take the Gospel and read it properly. He too is self-taught in theological and economic matters, seeking truth through the night all by himself, by the light of his solitary lamp. Though not ignorant of what others have done before him, he prefers to forget it. What matters it to him that the world, being old, has for ages worked over the sacred book and the eternal puzzles? he has the Russian's love for the *tabula rasa*. He insists on learning all things by his own lights, and finds no difficulty in persuading himself that all things are yet to be found out. At times, Tolstòy is astonished at being the first to see what millions of Christians had looked for before him. But that does not make him doubt

his discovery. He has the confidence of the youth or of the unlettered, untaught man of the people, who thinks that all things are yet to be discovered or resolved. He says "*My* Religion." It is "his," for he has made it for himself; and how has he made it? After the manner of popular reformers.

Same methods, same proceedings. He opens the Gospel and questions it as he would a new book, fallen from heaven but yesterday, perceiving therein unknown truths, hidden meanings. Like Sutàyef, he is nearly fifty when he first bethinks himself of seeking in the old pages the true teaching of Christ. The great difference between them is that he, instead of being content with the Russian or Old-Slavic version, goes to the original, the Greek text. He summons his classic lore; he seeks the assistance of the best dictionaries; but all this scientific apparatus makes no real difference in his exegesis, as regards either proceedings or results. Like his illiterate predecessors, he scans the sacred text verse by verse. His interpretation is mostly literal and all that his erudition, at times ingenious, does for him, is to convince him that the literal sense is the only admissible one. Little he cares that Christianity, when understood after this manner, ceases to be the great religion fitted to all men and becomes a sort of ascetic rule to be practised by a chosen few. Christianity, as the Church teaches it, could not transform mankind: that alone is to him sufficient condemnation of the Church. For, at one in this with his lowly brethren, Tolstòy demands from the Gospel neither more nor less than a radical transformation of all human societies.

Tolstòy was not always religious, or was so for a long time unbeknown to himself. He was sixteen when one of his schoolmates informed him that there was no God; the discovery had just been made. "During thirty-five years of my life," he tells us, "I have been a nihilist in the word's most liberal sense—one who believed in nothing." How then did he "get religion"? He tells us in his *Confession*; we might know from his novels. P. Bezùkhof and Levin have initiated us in all his doubts and spirit-

ual wrestlings and given us a presentiment of the quarter whence peace and light were to come to him. Nihilism bore for Tolstòy the bitter fruit of pessimism. He was obsessed with the thought of death ; it cast a shadow over all the joys of life. Like Levin, he has more than once thought of taking his own life. Whence then did salvation come? Whence it came to the men of his novels—from the *mujik*. Tolstòy had long noticed that the mystery of life puzzles the cultured classes more than the illiterate ones. The riddle which torments the reading man does not exist for millions of human creatures, who have found its solution without effort, without seeking for it. What no amount of study could teach him—the meaning of life and death—an old peasant woman, his nurse, knew it : she had faith and knew not doubt. Such is the idea which came to master Leo Nicolàyevitch—and a thoroughly Russian idea it is. In order to comprehend, we must go to school to the simple, the untutored. Tolstòy took a peasant for his guide —just as his heroes did. Like them, he encountered one fitted for the task. But, while he returned to religion, he did not return to Orthodoxy ; and in that again he showed himself the disciple of numbers of peasants. The secret of life fell from Jesus' lips, but the Church, the keeper of His Word, disfigured it. Christ's Christianity disappeared under the lying commentaries of His official interpreters ; it is harder to find than it would be if the Gospel had come down to us half obliterated and charred, among the nearly incinerated manuscripts found in Pompeii.

And what is that treasure which this Sarmatian has discovered and which no one—neither Greek nor Latin nor Teuton—had perceived before him? He has discovered the evangelical ethics, buried for the last fifteen hundred years under the growing heap of worldly compromises. He has read the Sermon on the Mount, and he has found that the foundation of Christian faith is non-resistance to the wicked. This rule is so disconcerting to human nature in its sublime simplicity that Rome and Byzance ventured to impose it only on voluntary exiles from the

world, in the shade of the cloister. The Russian makes it imperative on every Christian. Indeed he demonstrates that in that rule alone is the whole of Christianity. The key to the doctrine is this line of Matthew: "It is written: eye for eye and tooth for tooth. But I say unto you, withstand not those that would harm you." Non-resistance to evil—this is the pivot on which the teaching of Jesus revolves, the "core" of His doctrine. "Turn the other cheek also"—this is the essential precept, the positive command of the Master. After that, is it possible to call oneself Christian and have a police and prisons? Is it possible to confess Jesus Christ and at the same time "to elaborate with premeditation the organization of property, courts of justice, armies, State institutions? in a word, to organize a manner of life the reverse of all that Jesus teaches?" Jesus has said "Ye shall not swear"—and Tolstòy, taking his stand on the Greek text, demonstrates that the prohibition can have only one sense: "Have no courts of justice." Jesus has said "Ye shall not kill"—and that can be understood in only one way: "Ye shall have no armies, shall not make war." He has said "Ye shall not swear"—and that means "Ye shall not swear allegiance to either tsar or tribunals." And so on, with all the rest of evangelical advice, erected into absolute commands—a new decalogue, made binding for peoples no less than individuals. The mysterious godfather in *The Godson* teaches him that evil is not destroyed by courts of justice, prison, or death; that, the more men pursue it, the more they increase it. *Ivan the Imbecile* shows us that a nation which does not defend itself has nothing to fear from its neighbors. To disarm invaders, all it has to do is to give up everything to them. Let the Russian keep still—neither Turk nor German will molest him.

The Gospel, thus interpreted, is the negation of State, society, civilization. Tolstòy does not care. He takes little more interest in the State than does the *raskòlnik* who sees therein the Kingdom of Hell. He does not recoil—genuine Russian, and

Old-Russian that he is—from any consequence of his doctrine. To the author of *My Religion* Church, State, culture, science, are only so many hollow idols, condemned by Jesus, by the prophets, and all truly wise men, as being "of evil," the spring of perdition. He believes, after a fashion of his own, in the reign of Satan. He is willed, like so many others, to destroy this accursed society and to renew the face of the earth. In order to do this it is sufficient to put in practice the evangelical precepts. Only let men dwell together as brethren—they will of themselves realize here on earth the Kingdom of Heaven, which is simply peace among men.

Are these ideas novelties in Russian lands? Do we not recognize in the great novelist's teachings what we have repeatedly encountered in those of obscure village reformers? Are these not the lispings of *Molokàns* and *Dukhobòrtsy*—the dreams they attempted to make realities in their settlements on the Molòtchna? Did they not also undertake to establish the reign of God on earth by founding that of equality and fraternity? Did they not, long before Tolstòy, forbid the taking of oaths and declare that the children of God had no need of courts of justice and human laws? Had they not, long before, condemned war and the soldier's profession, at one in this with Christians of all times and lands, with the English Quakers and the German Mennonites? Yes, there is a vast deal of old stuff in all these novelties; and if there is anything that is Tolstòy's own, it is the tender strain of his charity. Still, even this tenderness is found among many of his peasant competitors. *Mujiks* have preached before him that love was the whole of Christianity. To gain the knowledge of "what makes men to live," Sutàyef did not wait for the prophet of Yàsnaya Poliàna. Between the peasant and the former master the resemblance is marvellous. It lies at the doctrine's inner core, and if, of the two, one has borrowed from the other, it is not the peasant.

Tolstòy has met Sutàyef. He has consulted him on the peo-

ple's ills. He has learned from him the secret how to be of use to the sufferers. Strange fate that brought these two together—the uncultured son of the soil and the aristocratic writer, and that in the country where the distance between the two extremes of society is greatest! And he who, of the two, received most is Tolstòy—he freely admits it; what, indeed, *could* a society man teach a man of the people? What the cultured gentleman, in the retirement of his study, formulated into fine maxims, the stone-cutter had long practised. But even more than Sutàyef's words, his life was to Tolstòy a revelation. He knew that Sutàyef's son went to jail rather than carry a gun and swear an oath. He knew that Sutàyef would have neither lock nor fence on his place, that he left his barns and closets open, and that, when anything had been stolen from him, his first care was to set the thieves at liberty. Sutàyef was the master; Tolstòy the disciple, the evangelist, the doctor, who wields the pen and expounds the doctrine; he is the Plato of the rustic Socrates.

There is another feature which Tolstòy has in common with many a popular apostle: he is, after a way, a rationalist, even while he takes the Sermon on the Mount literally—like the *Molokàns*, like Sutàyef himself. Like the latter, he cares very little for dogma. His religion aims only at life this side of the grave. What there is beyond, Sutàyef ignores completely. Tolstòy explicitly denies future life. He became a Christian, yet remained a nihilist. He admits of no other immortality for man than that of the race. He contends that true Christianity knows of no other. Jesus, he says, has always taught the renouncement of self; with this doctrine, that of individual immortality, which affirms the continuance of each personality, is in direct opposition. The belief in the soul's survival after death is, like that in the resurrection of bodies, only a superstition, contrary to the spirit of the Gospel.

Tolstòy agrees with Sutàyef, the *Dukhobòrtsy*, and many others, in placing salvation in this present life. It is here on

earth he intends to build the divine Jerusalem. He does not wait till Christ descends, borne on clouds; he believes neither in prophecies nor in miracles. He is indeed a millenarian, but after the manner of Comte and Fourier; with this difference, that he asks neither science, nor wealth, nor politics for the key to his Paradise, knowing how powerless they all are to insure happiness. For the regeneration of the human kind he looks exclusively to the inner transformation of the human individual, and in that he is assuredly wiser than the majority of reformers who sneer at his utopias. Like his humble brethren, he seeks the road which leads to the mysterious "White Waters" (*Biélovòdy*), where there are neither priests, nor *ispràvniks*, nor tax-collectors, nor recruiting officers. He can boast of having discovered the road to this Eldorado, this Eden, once lost, now found again—let men but follow him thither; they have only to forswear sin and practise virtue. If men lived as brethren together, there would be no need of police, of soldiers, of courts of justice. The flaw in the argument lies in the belief that the mass of humanity ever could thread the narrow path of self-renunciation, and an entire people enter through the low door of abnegation.

What Tolstòy is altogether too prone to forget to take into account, is—human nature, or (what comes to the same thing) the time-honored dogma of the Fall, which symbolizes all the weaknesses and miseries of our nature. He seems at times to believe in innate goodness, to think that man can be made good simply by being freed from all bonds. Such is the reliance he places on internal self-discipline that he tolerates no coercion or restraint of any sort. What orthodox believers expect from divine grace, he seems to expect from nature—to which his entire doctrine does violence.

What is the political and social ideal of this mystic, who would inflict on men a life so contrary to all the appetites of the old Adam? It is, to a great extent, a return to the natural state—true, after having eradicated from the natural man the most in-

veterate of natural instincts. Humanity must renounce all that makes the honor, the security, the beauty of life. Tolstòy takes up again Rousseau's paradox. Only with him the abstraction of the philosophers of the eighteenth century has become a thing of flesh and blood: the "natural man" has found his incarnation—the *mujik*. Like Rousseau, Tolstòy believes that, to be happy, men only need cast off the fictitious needs of civilization. Do not object progress, industry, science, art: so many big words void of sense. Contempt for civilization, which he denounces at times with even greater harshness than Jean-Jacques Rousseau, does not, with Leo Nicolâyevitch, proceed from personal misanthrophy or disappointed self-love, but from compassion for the sufferings of others. Like numbers of popular reformers, he has reasoned himself into the belief that the poverty of some is due to the wealth of others; that to allow the wealthy to retain luxuries amounts to taking from the poor the necessaries of life. He concurs in the verdict that every man who lives on an income is a parasite, "exactly like the bug which devours the foliage of the tree that bears it." That money should bring interest is, in his eyes also, rank iniquity. He is inexhaustible in sarcasms on the "fantastic rouble," from which a few kopeks are filed every year without its ever being used up. He goes even further: he banishes money from his republic—money, which enables man to appropriate work not his own, and has established a new form of thraldom worse than the old, an "impersonal slavery" which is more inhuman than personal slavery. If every family is not able to produce what it consumes, he wants the products to be exchanged *in natura*.

Every man, Scripture teaches, should live of the labor of his hands, in the sweat of his brow. Here again Tolstòy goes beyond Rousseau; work, to him, is more than a duty, it is a moral healer, the agent of salvation. This is another of those ideas which he has in common with the humbly born sectarians. The *Molokàns* also make of work a religious duty, asserting it to be as indispen-

sable to man as bread and air. It has been said that Tolstòy extols manual labor as a counterpoise to brain work, as a hygienic measure calculated to maintain the balance of the human being. This is not his only, nor even his principal reason. This laborer of the mind prides himself on bearing muscular labor the same exclusive respect and liking as do the common people. In many of his short stories he makes merciless fun of barren brain work. "Work" to him is, *par excellence*, agricultural labor, work spent on the earth ; all men should live by that. That again is a thoroughly Russian idea. Tolstòy has published at his own expense, a pamphlet by a Sabbatist, in which it is demonstrated, from the Bible, that every man ought by rights to dig and turn over soil at least thirty-five days in the year. Industrial labor, unwholesome alike for body and soul, should be abolished and cities suppressed. Tolstòy has for these impure Babylons the repulsion of a genuine Tramp. He would have everybody leave the cities, where men "consume without producing," in order to live a-field, after renouncing all the artificial needs of urban life. The problem of pauperism is most simple. Sutàyef has disposed of it summarily : all you have to do is to take the poor who live in cities and distribute them among the *izbàs* of the peasants.

This doctrine of his, the noble reformer has put into practice himself, so far as a Russian of his class can do so. If he has not distributed his possessions among the poor, it is from a conscientious scruple as the father of a family, and also because alms do not do any real good : it is not with money that men can be helped. Tolstòy lives in the country ; he ploughs, makes hay, cuts his crops with his own hands, and his robust health is benefited by the labor, for there is about this philosopher nothing abnormal, unbalanced, his nerves are perfectly sound and under control. He is not an epileptic like Dostoyèfsky. He has a trade for the winter, like every thrifty Russian peasant. He makes boots which sell. Once he found a pair in a friend's house, in a glass case, labelled *Boots made by Count Tolstòy*. He is not only

a shoemaker, he also can repair stoves; but his preference lies with the soil; the broad hand which has written *War and Peace* delights in handling the plough. For all that he sneers at and looks down on the "makers of books," Tolstòy has by no means thrown away his pen. He does not sow only oats and rye, but also ideas; he is a tiller not of the soil alone, but also of souls. He takes pleasure in opening the uncultured minds of his low-born brethren; the truths which he discovers he sows broadcast over the virgin plains of rural Russia.

Tolstòy has been likened to Schopenhauer. Then again a Hindoo flavor has been found to his doctrine, as though Russia's whole religious effort led up to a sort of Christian Buddhism. This is both true and false. By some sides of his doctrine: the pessimism which is his starting-point, his indifference to progress of any kind, the way in which he exalts the lowly, by his philosophy of renunciation and his religion of charity without God, by his debilitating dogma of non-resistance, he does touch on Buddhism; the reformer of Tùla might have been born on the fabled slopes of Mount Meru. But the similarity lies almost entirely in the dogma, the theoretical notions. And in nothing does the divergence between the Russian spirit and the genius of India show better than in this similarity of creeds and systems. Tolstòy may seek deliverance in the casting off of personality; but at the very moment when he seems about to be absorbed into Buddhism, he deliberately turns his back on it in his conception of practical life. The ideal of the energetic farmer of Yàsnaya Poliàna is not the emaciated fakir or the *rishi* crouching in solitary meditation, motionless, lost in rapt contemplation of his own navel. He commends non-resistance to evil, but that does not imply passiveness or ataraxy. He is more of a mystic than an ascetic. He preaches action, not contemplation.* The Russian

* This liking for action is the more remarkable that no contemporary writer has carried introspection and self-analysis farther than Tolstòy, not one has been more than he the spectator of his own thoughts, his own feelings —a mental attitude which ought, it would seem, to paralyze activity and will.

escapes Buddhism through love of work, of exertion, of muscular labor. If he urges his disciples to fly cities and renounce the comforts of life, it is not to take them into the desert to do penance or to shut them up in a cell, devoting them to austerities and prayers. Tolstòy appears to have little use for fasting and orisons. Again, while usually inclined to take evangelical advice literally, he does not preach celibacy. He is not, like the *Skopets* or Schopenhauer, opposed on principle to propagating the race. He merely enjoins on each man to love only one woman. To him, deliverance from the ills of life lies in action, the development of physical energy, not to say animal energy. Fortunate inconsistency! By a sort of moral sleight of hand due to his northern temperament, this Slav, who but just now was on the road to quietism, arrives at the law of labor, at redemption by labor.

This is not the only difference, one might say opposition, between Buddhism and Tolstoïsm. The two doctrines differ almost as much in their idea of salvation as in the means towards salvation which they offer. The Buddhist has in view first of all individual salvation, each person's deliverance. Tolstòy, like most Russians, aims in the first place at the salvation of men in general, the collective deliverance of the race, the regeneration of society; and this he proposes to accomplish here on earth, in this present life, which is evil only inasmuch as it is not sanctified by love.

Tolstòy's doctrine might be perhaps better defined a sort of Christian nihilism than Christian Buddhism. It is not only the theologian and the philosopher in him who are nihilists, it is also the politician, the social reformer. Like Sutàyef, he really is an evangelical nihilist, if we may be permitted to bracket the two words. On many points he is at one with the revolutionary nihilists, who, after a fashion of their own, are also men who have faith. "Saving only his aversion for strife and resistance (though a like feeling can be met with among sundry of our friends), Tolstòy's ideas are nearly akin to ours," a Russian refugee once

said to me. Lavròf has written a paper on purpose to demonstrate this assertion.* And in truth, few levellers would demolish so many things as this apostle of charity. He frequently outherods Bakùnin and Kropòtkin. Not one of his fellow-countrymen has been harder on capital. Not one has been more stoutly an internationalist: "What seemed to me shameful and bad," we read in *My Religion*,—"cosmopolitism, the repudiation of one's own country, now appears to me as a great and good thing." Concerning the army, justice, law, he holds the same principles as Kropòtkin. He concurs in Kropòtkin's belief that the surest means to suppress crime would be to raze all the prisons and to burn all the codes. Compare the two books: Tolstòy's *My Religion* and Kropòtkin's *Words of a Revolted Spirit* (*Paroles d'un Révolté*), which both appeared in French in the same year of 1885—the conclusions arrived at are similar. Is there anything wonderful in that? the revolutionary prince and the atheist-theosophist are both seers and believers. The same vision has come to both. Tolstòy is not less an anarchist—*i. e.*, a partisan of "an-archy," "no-government,"—than either Bakùnin or Kropòtkin. He would not be frightened at an amorphous society. Do away entirely with government: out of what is termed dis-

* Among the Russian revolutionists, there have been some whose ideas concerning the use of force against evil are singularly like Tolstòy's. Towards 1875, in the beginning of the nihilist crisis, one group was formed, whose chiefs, Tchaïkofsky and Màlikof, while repudiating all established authorities, denounced all violent measures. They gave their doctrine a religious character, preaching the divinization of man, or, as they worded it, "the religion of divine humanity." According to them, God, who is vainly sought in Heaven, dwells in ourselves. Each human being has the Absolute Being at the core of his essence—each human being is God. To do violence to a human being is sacrilege. To teach men to know their own divinity is the only road to salvation. To transform society, it is enough to awaken in men the consciousness of this their divinity. To the violence perpetrated by those in power, the persecuted ones should oppose only the affirmation of their divinity. It will be seen that the ideas of these men-gods recall those of the *Dukhobòrtsy* while they anticipate on those of Tolstòy. The men-gods no longer exist in a group. Màlikof has returned to Orthodoxy.

order a "free order" will be evolved. He would not be averse from experimenting in this sense on nations, as he has done on his school at Yàsnaya Poliàna. He is quite sure that all men, if only left to themselves like his own nice *mujiks*, would at once initiate a universal era of peace and justice.

Yet here again there is a capital difference between this nihilist and the others. It is not only that dynamite is absent, it is that all Tolstòy's hopes bear on a thing which is contemptuously overlooked by most socialists: the Christian religion and Christian brotherhood. The lever with which he proposes to raise mankind up to the new paradise is the Gospel. It is quite easy to make a new society, a new political economy, once you eliminate self-interest. This is—and we made the same remark concerning his ignorant predecessors, the *Molokàns* or communists,—this is what makes this religious visionary less chimerical than the revolutionary utopists. It lies entirely with men to realize his dream of social regeneration. To turn this miserable earth into a heavenly abode, there is really little to do but to put into practice the Sermon on the Mount. What is chimerical, we should say and repeat to Tolstòy, is not your evangelical panacea, but your hope to have it adopted by a whole people, though it were your good and great Russian people. Never mind. There is method in Tolstòy's madness. The madmen, he may well say, are those blind enough to refuse to follow him.

In spite of all his illusions and exaggerations, Tolstòy's doctrine comes from a healthy mind. The promised land, the eternally longed for, he seeks within man, not without. He feels the powerlessness of revolutions, the insufficiency of laws and of science itself to transform society. Inasmuch as he affirms that material progress must be based on moral progress, his teaching is beneficial. He is the people's lover, not their flatterer. He preaches emancipation through conversion. True, in history—that of war as of peace—Tolstòy believes only in the people, in the nameless masses, the unconscious forces, the infinitely small.

He knows nothing of hero-worship : the Russian spirit, he says, does not much believe in great men. To him, it is the soldier who wins battles ; the general has nothing to do with it.*

But even while crediting the people, collectively and individually, with every success and honor, he by no means deifies them : He is just as sternly set against demolatry as against hero-worship. And while he exalts the peasant before the man of culture, his portraits of him are not in the least flattered. His pictures of peasant life are not idyls. His peasants frequently appear like what Taine used to call "mystical rascals." Read *The Power of Darkness*, where Tolstòy shows us his villages "glued in sin," similar to abject brutes. By what does this *mujik*, whom he at the same time reviles and offers us as a model, raise and redeem himself? By faith and charity. His favorite hero is Akìm, an old day laborer whose speech is a sort of lisping and stuttering ; the lowlier and the more unintelligent the man, the more Tolstòy delights in showing, burning in his soul, the bright light which is man's real greatness—the moral sense. He loves to show us, in the opaque darkness which shrouds his peasants as with a pall, the tiny glimmer of conscience, the pale flame of the night-lamp which illumes their benighted souls. There, in their hearts, is the principle of regeneration ; thence only can true light dawn on them.

To be the apostle of the people—such is the mission which Tolstòy appears to have set himself in his green old age. He too "went forth among the people" ; he made it his joy to share their life and labors ; only he was more fortunate than his predecessors, for he knew how to speak the *mujik's* language and to make himself understood of him. He went among the people, not to stir up ill-feeling and covetousness, but to teach them love and sacrifice. Racine, having forsworn the stage, put into verse biblical tragedies which noble maidens acted before the Great King. Tolstòy, having forsworn novel-writing, indites popular

* See Mr. Alb. Sorel's fine lecture *Tolstòy the Historian—Revue Bleue*, 14th of April, 1888.

tales and has them peddled around at a few kopeks a copy, claiming no royalty for himself. "Not so long ago," he said in 1886 to Mr. Danilèfsky, "we numbered in Russia a few thousands of readers; to-day these thousands have grown into millions, and these millions of men are there before us, like hungry birdlings with open bills, saying to us: 'Gentlemen writers, throw some food to us; we are starving for the living word.'" And he, the author of *War and Peace*, gives the food which is suited to their lowly grade of culture—stories and legends. They sell by the million copies, for Tolstòy speaks to the people after the people's heart. He has, in his legends, adopted the beliefs of his new readers; his rationalism no longer proscribes miracles and supernatural agency. At the very time that the writer in him seemed to have died in making room to the Christian, he opened for Russian literature a new vein, national at once and popular. Even from the standpoint of art—that inferior and heathen standpoint for which he would blush to care—his moral works are not devoid of beauty. He has found again the evangelical parable, a thing which no one but a Russian writing for Russians would have thought of. While he labours for the edification of his brethren only, he, almost against his will, produces artistic work.

It is never the greatest writers who accomplish religious revolutions. Leo Nikolàyevitch probably has not as many disciples as the apostles in *kaftàn* and sheepskin. His doctrine is too much lacking in dogmatic framework to serve as skeleton to a sect, a church. Rare indeed are the adepts who put his precepts in practice. Here and there a noble landholder attempts to imitate him by living a peasant's life on his estate. But if the whole of Russia does not become a convert to "his religion," she nevertheless is influenced by his teachings. His ideas, lightly veiled in their form of stories and legends, are like those winged seeds which the wind carries such distances. Presented under this childlike form and clothed with the harmless charm of the supernatural, "Tolstoïsm," brought down to a sort of

poem of charity and universal brotherhood, becomes a manifestation of the ideal truth—that most ancient and trite truth: that neither science, nor material progress, nor money possesses the secret of happiness. This is a commonplace which it is good for a people to hear again at the eve of a new century, and the author of *The Godson* has not fallen into second childhood because he tells it in child stories.*

* If Dostoyèfsky's religious ideas had better defined outlines, it would be interesting to compare them with Tolstòy's. They sometimes bear a singular resemblance to them, while retaining a personal character and, so to speak, a different accent. Take for instance the end of Dostoyèfsky's last novel, *The Karamàzof Brothers:* many traits of "Tolstoïsm" will be found there. So, in the mysterious speech in which the monk Zossìm addresses his disciple Alexis in a dream, he reveals to him that the whole glory of man lies in action and charity; that the true paradise is life and love; that hell is the torture of those who cannot love. He tells him that it is the people who carry in themselves the germ of Russia's and mankind's salvation; that the humbler, the nearer to the beast is a man's condition, the nearer he is to truth, because he is near to nature. He teaches him that to satisfy one's wants means to multiply them; that the world's science is lie and its liberty bondage; that the people must repudiate the violent means preached by demagogues; that power is with the gentle, and that the reign of justice is drawing near. At the end of this judiciary novel we even find on the dead lips of Father Zossìm the position so dear to Tolstòy, *viz.*, that the judge has not the right to judge.

BOOK III. CHAPTER XI.

Legal Position of the Schism and the Sects—How the Government's Attitude towards the Schism has often Varied—Appeal of the Church to the Secular Arm—Long Persecutions—Incoherence of the Legislation—The Use of Spiritual Weapons in the Struggle against the Schism—Public Colloquies or Disputations between Orthodox Theologians and *Raskòlniks*—Rights lately Awarded to Schismatics—Their Attitude towards the Nihilists—Advantages which they have Derived from it—How far from Complete their Emancipation still is—Conclusion of Book III.—The Sects and Russia's Religious Future—Can a New Form of Christianity Emerge from the Russian Heresies?

The government's attitude towards the different sects has been singularly variable. From the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth, it has passed through three principal phases. Tsar Alexis and his son Theodore persecuted the Schismatics as heretics and rebels to the Church. Peter the Great pursued them as perturbators and rebels to the imperial reforms. Catherine II. and her descendants have treated them alternately with leniency and rigor, striving at one time to bring them back into the Church, at another to reconcile them with the State. In this latest period the imperial policy loses every trace of consistency: the *raskòlniks* are by turns smitten and tolerated, spoken fair and threatened, according to the sovereign's humor and the wind that blows at a given moment.

Certain partisans of the Orthodox Russian Church claim for her the glory of never having used compulsion in matters of faith. This assertion is contradicted by the entire history of the Schism. I cannot see that the Church ever scrupled to call in the assistance of the secular arm. Torture, banishment, the stake—all the punishments in vogue in the West, have been inflicted on *raskòlniks*, at

the clergy's instance. The Council of 1666 demanded against them civil penalties. The Patriarch Joachim unhesitatingly declared, in 1682, to one of the martyrs of the "old-faith" at the foot of the stake, that the flames should purge the Church from the reproach of heresy. "What apostles ever taught to maintain faith by the *knùt*, by fire, by the gibbet?" asked the *protopòp* Avvakùm in his autobiography. He was burned in reply. If Peter the Great substituted fiscal measures for tortures and death,—if, at the breath of the West, his successors gradually showed greater tolerance, the credit belongs chiefly to the sovereigns—to the intellect of Catherine II., to the kind heart of the three Alexanders.

That the Church should have had recourse, against her adversaries, to prison, to fine, to transportation, to degradation from civic rights—there is nothing surprising in that. Being a State institution, it was natural that she should fight the Schism with the State's weapons and power. The administration and the police were the clergy's natural auxiliaries. To this day the interference of the lay power in spiritual affairs is consecrated by over one thousand articles of the Russian codes. To guard his flock, the priest called in the police which "drove and whipped the stray sheep back to the fold." * And as this was merely a matter of service with the police, who dealt only with bodies, not with hearts, the war waged on the Schism was almost wholly external. As Aksàkof remarked, in church matters as in all other matters, it is appearances that are to be kept up,—decorum.† The priest did not care any more than the *ispràvnik* for the state of the souls, so the attendance of worshippers was full. Neither laymen nor churchmen took much thought of healing the inveterate cancer

* *Works of Ivan Aksàkof*, vol. iv., pp. 91, 92. Elsewhere (in a letter as yet unpublished) the illustrious Slavophil wrote to his father (October 30, 1850): "Russia will soon be divided into two halves: on the side of the official world, of the government, the unbelieving nobility, the clergy which turns people's heart from the faith, will be Orthodoxy; all the rest will be included in the Schism. The bribe-takers will be Orthodox; the bribe-givers will be *raskòlniks*."

† *Works of Ivan Aksàkof*, vol. iv., p. 42.

of the Church—only of concealing its progress. The great historical wrong committed by the clergy was to lend itself to this sacrilegious farce and share the profits from it with the police. Uncompromising fanaticism would have been preferable as regards its dignity. The bribe system, if not as barbarous as the Spanish *auto-da-fé*, is more repulsive.

While Church and State have not entirely given up the use of temporal weapons, they have acknowledged the inefficiency of these weapons. The clergy is returning to the true spirit of its calling, and has more and more recourse to spiritual weapons—preaching, missionary work. The bishops now apply themselves to training their priests for polemical warfare. The seminaries have made a special branch of the study of the Schism. That the priests may no longer be a scandal to the Old-Believers, the Holy Synod, in 1887, forbade the clergy from smoking, taking snuff, and playing cards. The Orthodox Church, in imitation of Rome's tactics, has enrolled a militia of missionaries specially destined to combat the *raskòl*. Lay brotherhoods and societies formed for the purpose of carrying on propaganda work have been enlisted to aid the Church. Libraries have been endowed for the use of Schismatics. Efforts are made to win their children through the schools. At Viàtka, a missionary, Father Kishmensky, went so far as to drill his schoolchildren, little peasants all, in controversial bouts against *raskòlniks*.

As Schismatics don't much care to hear the preaching of the "priests of Belial," the Orthodox clergy made the advance of inviting them to free disputations, at which both parties bring forth their arguments. These "colloquies," as they are called, were in vogue in Moscow already in the time of Nicolas I. They took place on the public square before the Kremlin, and the people, as in Byzance of old, flocked, an impassioned audience, to these theological tournaments. These colloquies fell into disuse about the middle of the present century, but have become quite frequent

again during the last fifteen years. They are held regularly both in Petersburgh and Moscow; professors and seminarists improve the occasion to display their learning and dialectic powers. Bishops are present and do not disdain to descend into the arena occasionally themselves. Thus, at Poissy, the Cardinal of Lorraine agued against Théodore Bèze; thus, at Hippone, St. Augustine challenged the Donatists—*raskòlniks* of Africa—to public discussions, before an entranced crowd, which interrupted the disputants with its plaudits or groans.

These scholastic bouts, in which the combatants smite one another with old texts and superannuated scrawls,—just as though modern soldiers were to fight with cross-bows and arquebuses,—throw us back three or four centuries. Coming out of a lecture-room or court of justice where the cultured Russian outdid the West by the boldness of his theories, we are suddenly dropped into the midst of the Russia of the first Romànofs; we listen to a discussion as to whether Antichrist has yet come or no. Thus in 1888, at the Salt Exchange in Petersburgh, Professor Ivanòfsky was demonstrating, with a great outlay of erudition, that Antichrist had not yet appeared, that he must be a man of sin in flesh and blood, and bear the sign of the Beast. To the "No-priests" who affirm that the reign of Antichrist has begun, it is triumphantly objected that the prophets Eli and Enoch have not yet made their appearance. The *raskòlniks* are not easy to disarm, They disconcert their opponents by the boldness of their strokes and the nimbleness of their retorts, dodging with agility the arguments in which it seems they must be caught. Some will take shelter behind very awkward positions, such as the query whether God has always kept His promises. The most expert are redoubtable champions, subtle dialecticians, skilful fencers, prompt to take advantage of a default in an adversary's armor, now taking their stand on the letter of Scripture, now reducing it all to allegory. In fact, the champions of Orthodoxy do not always come out victors in these passages of arms of which each party likes to

claim the credit. Many a presumptuous *pope* has been silenced by the Schismatic "readers." As a rule, therefore, only approved athletes are allowed to enter the lists.

Yet the defenders of the old rights fight with inferior weapons. Even though they are given a sort of safe conduct for such encounters, they are conscious of a certain constraint, they feel cramped in their movements. They do not always dare to speak their mind unreservedly. So it is awkward for them to state in so many words that the Tsar is Antichrist, or that Antichrist resides in the temporal authorities. They can reply to their adversaries only what their adversaries are willing to hear. If the discussion takes an ominous turn, the Orthodox chairman adjourns the sitting. If the dissenters are getting the best of it, police vexations are apt to make them pay for it. So the missionaries of the Church sometimes find no opponents. Even in Petersburgh it has happened that dissenters would rise to reply, but sit down again at the advice of a co-religionist who feared they might be expelled from the capital.* A paper—the *Gòlos Moskvỳ* (*Voice of Moscow*)—took the liberty of giving a full stenographic account of these debates; it was suppressed. After that it will be easily believed that the leaders of the *raskòl* don't much care to take part in the debates. The lower classes, indeed, frequently come only on official invitation. In rural districts the missionaries too often convoke the *raskòlniks* in a tone of command, enjoining on the village elders to prepare a meeting-place,† and holding their discourses in an official strain little calculated to win souls.

But the Orthodox clergy, in its fight against the Schism, has auxiliaries it did not call for, yet who do more for its success than preaching. The spirit of the age—luxury, the love of comfort, fashion, in a word the devil and his pomp, wrest more souls from the Schism than the exertions of the ministers of God. The pub-

* See *Viêstnik Evròpy* (*Messenger of Europe*), March, 1888, p. 363.
† See *ib.* February, 1887, p. 836.

lic-house, the factory, the newspaper, the railroads, the army—these are so many dissolvents of old customs, so many foes to the "old faith." The best tactics would, after all, be to trust to life and the contagion of modern manners—to civilization. Many of these crude heresies are like those sickly plants which love darkness and can exist only in grottos or cellars; they cannot stand broad daylight. The best missionary to deal with the Schism is neither the priest nor the government official; it is European culture, it is liberty which out of this tangle of sects will promptly sift those that are entitled or able to live. A Russian has said: "If the *raskòl* could last two centuries, it is because the Russian people have slumbered through ten." This paradox is not without a share of truth: how many of those queer sects might be set down as the nightmares of a sleeping people! Leave them to wake up: the barren visions of the night will vanish of themselves.

To the precautions and vexations of over two centuries is due the fanaticism of the dissenters. To conciliate them and bring about an understanding between them and the Church and State, the first thing to do was to right their grievances. The government at last saw that, and good has already come of it. Unfortunately, in this as in all things, it stopped half-way, and shrinks as timidly from giving the dissenters entire liberty as it did some time ago from subjecting them to the extremes of persecution.

One cause of legislative incoherence and the everlasting contradictoriness of administrative measures is the habit of confounding all these heterogeneous sects under one common name, which creates a sort of deceptive unity and induces the authorities to apply the same rules to all. Hierarchical Old-Believers and anarchical "No-priests," Flagellants and Milk-Drinkers, retrograde conservatives and radical revolutionists, massed and mixed under the sweeping designation of Schismatics or Dissenters (*raskòlniks*) were put down and condemned with equally iniquitous rigor. When the decision was reached at last to discriminate

between the various doctrines, so widely different, the administrative classification was not less conducive to confusion and discontent. The dissident communities were divided into two great categories: "the pernicious" and "the less pernicious sects," as though, between them, there could be a difference only in the degree of evil. That was more an ecclesiastical than a secular standpoint. To this day the sects reputed dangèrous are not merely those which, by their creed or practice, imperil morality or the political order, but more especially those communities whose doctrines attack the fundamental Orthodox dogmas. By the side of the Eunuchs, the Flagellants, the Tramps, we find on the official lists the innocuous Milk-Drinkers, the ignorant Sabbatists; so that, in the repression of heresy, the government appears to act now on one principle, now on another, defending now social, now confessional interests.

To this source of confusion must be added another—the lack of a fixed legislation, or rather the lack of concordance between the laws and the instructions about the manner of applying them. Until quite lately the conduct of the administration with regard to the sectarians was subject to a double set of rules: to a public legislation, laid down in the written codes of the empire, and to secret administrative prescriptions, frequently at variance with the code. Hence, contradiction and incoherence in the orders issued, arbitrariness and venality in the carrying out of orders received. Under Nicolas I. it was a secret committee which, by means of secret ordinances, governed matters pertaining to the Schism. The dissenters, kept in ignorance of the regulations which shaped their fate, were given up defenceless to the cupidity of the lower officials and clergy. *Tchinòvniks* sometimes went so far as to extort ransom from imaginary penalties.

Such a state of things could not subsist in the midst of Alexander II's reforms. The question of dissent is one of those which preoccupied the Liberator ever since his accession to the throne. In October, 1858, a circular—secret, after the baleful bureaucratic

habit—temporarily freed the *raskòlniks* from the most outrageous of the vexations to which they still were subjected. At the same time a commission was appointed to study the question from the legislative side. This reform, undertaken by Alexander II., was not carried into effect until 1883 and 1884, under Alexander III. Until then, the restrictions imposed on the dissenters' civil and religious liberty had been maintained as a matter of law. It was the law which disqualified peasants for communal positions, merchants for guild privileges, and all for appearing as witnesses against Orthodox persons; the law, which forbade them from passing beyond the frontiers of the empire; the law, which quite lately still forbade them from building new chapels or even repairing the old ones, except in that part of the roofing over the altar. True, there is always in Russia the resource of arbitrariness to correct the strictness of the Code, and well did the dissenters know the saying: "The law is a slackly stretched rope; big people step over it, little people creep under."

The first thing for the legislator to do was to give the non-conformists a civic standing. Alexander II's government made the attempt in 1874, at least for the eleven or twelve hundred thousand *raskòlniks* admitted by official statistics. The question, it must be acknowledged, was a ticklish one. Hitherto the clergy were the sole keepers of the birth and death registers, and as the law admits only of religious marriage, the dissenters were condemned to contract none but clandestine unions and to bring into the world none but illegitimate children. They were as cruelly situated as the French Protestants ever since Louis XIV. The law blamed certain sects for repudiating marriage, yet made it impossible for them. Whole villages lived on for years without either births or marriages being registered. Ostensibly, the peasants were content to adopt foundlings brought to them by women who made it a business to take in orphans. In reality they were their own children whom the women brought back to them after having had them baptized according to the *raskòl's* rites. Thus

the country's morality average was perceptibly lowered in Europe's sight by the legal fiction which counted all dissenters' children as illegitimate.

How get out of such a position? Two issues presented themselves, which seemed equally impracticable: to recognize the forms of marriage in use among dissident communities, or institute civil marriage for them. In the way of the former solution are the interests of the Church, the surreptitious manner of recruiting the Hierarchist clergy, the practices in use in the "No-priest" branch, many sects of which admit neither clergy nor marriage. Against civil marriage militate not only the maxims of the Church and the habits of the people, but the Schismatics' own prejudice, who, on this point, are mostly agreed with their adversaries. The problem to be solved was this: to institute a civil marriage registration without civil marriage and independently from any form of religious marriage.

The legislators hoped to conciliate everything by opening, for the Schismatics, special registers to be kept by the police. Their marriages were to be entered on the simple declarations of the consorts and their witnesses, without the civil agent making any inquiries concerning a religious ceremony. The State did not join them in marriage; it only gave them a certificate of their marriage declaration. The registering was preceded by the publication of banns during seven days. A divorce could be given only by the secular courts, which were to try the cases by the laws in force for Orthodox subjects.

It was hoped to open in this way a form of regular wedlock to all sectarians alike, without actually recognizing any sect. This law seemed calculated to be a veritable blessing to the Schismatics: most of them would have none of it; some from distrust of the police which keeps the new registers, others possibly from a fear of alienating their liberty and the right of getting divorced at will. The failure of the law of 1874 shows how many legal difficulties the Schism raises. After having so long molested

them in a thousand ways, the government finds difficulty in getting them to believe in its honest good-will. It will take years of tolerance to overcome the habit of distrust rooted in two centuries.

At one time it almost seemed as though Alexander III. were going to inaugurate his reign with the emancipation of the Old-Believers. The dissenters had the good fortune of seeing their rights enlarged at a time when the liberties of all other Russians were curtailed. They, almost alone, were not made to suffer under the severities called forth by the criminal actions of the revolutionists. That was but just. For no class of the nation kept aloof more stubbornly from all manner of plotting than these dissenters, persecuted and fleeced by the imperial police for generations. As in the times of Herzen and Kelsief, they remained deaf to the instigations of the makers of revolutions. From certain depositions made in the course of the trials of Adrian Mikhaïlof and Dr. Weimar, it would appear that a few nihilists renewed the attempt made forty years ago by the London refugees. But Jeliàbof and Sophia Perôfsky with their friends have not won over one of these Schismatics, who hold that Russia is ruled by Antichrist.* If they are revolutionists, they are so after an entirely different manner from the nihilists bred by the so-called "intelligent classes." The day may yet come when the Russian dissenters will play a part analogous to that of the English nonconformists, but they are far from being prepared for it now. In spite of their manifold grudges against the "minions of hell," the inveterate Russian instinct inclines them to the side of tsarism. While anathematizing the imperial power, the majority remained devoted to the Tsar. The sovereign knows this and trusts them. On the 1st of March almost all the Cosacks of Alexander's escort were Old-Believers; several of them were injured and one was killed by the splinters of the same bomb which killed the Em-

* I know of only one sectarian, a Geneva refugee, Kòrobof, who partly adhered to the revolutionary programme and proclaimed, in the name of Heaven, the deposition of "the so-called Romànofs."

peror. The dissenters' loyalty is so high above all doubt that, during the nihilist crisis, a man who was lost sight of since—Mr. Tsitovitch, editor of the *Béreg*—proposed to seek among them the elements of a conservative third-estate, to be opposed to the radical "intelligence."

What has Alexander III. done for these insubordinate but faithful subjects? By the laws of 1883 and 1884 he granted them many rights which the Code had hitherto withheld from them. For the first time the law recognized their right of meeting for prayer and celebrating divine service after their own rites. The laws which restricted their civic rights have been abrogated. They are free to reside anywhere in the empire and to travel abroad. They are authorized to enter the merchant guilds and qualified to fill public positions and to receive honorary distinctions. That is certainly something, but it is not enough. The dissenters are no longer ranked with rebels in a state of insurrection against the established authorities, but their emancipation is not complete. If they are at last given civil equality, they have not yet obtained religious liberty. In fact, these rights which Alexander III. conceded to them, the administrative authorities already allowed them practically to enjoy—for a consideration. What they have gained, is a better defined legal status. Still, the rights awarded them, especially in religious matters, are very restricted and precarious even yet.*

The new laws abound in fissures, through which administrative arbitrariness can easily ooze. The dissenters now have the right to celebrate their own worship, but under restrictions unknown to Jews, Mussulmans, or heathens. They are not allowed any public ceremonies; their priests cannot even take the dead to the cemeteries. Their own mother country still refuses to the Old-Believers liberties which foreign countries never contested them. When Danubian Bessarabia returned to Russia, the dissenters of

* See a study by Mr. Kuvaïtsef in the *Juridical Messenger* (*Youridîtcheskii Viêstnik*), April, 1886.

Ismaïl and Kagúl had need of a special *ukàz* to enable them to keep on ringing their bells. The *raskòlniks* have not yet the right of freely building chapels with their own money. It still rests with the authorities to forbid the opening or repairing of their oratories, to expel their priests and "readers," to prohibit the printing or sale of their prayer-books. Can the Schism, then, be said to have conquered religious liberty? Besides, we must not forget that the rights conceded to dissenters are given only to a small minority. Over nine tenths of them, being registered, against their will, as Orthodox, continue to be treated as deserters from the Church, and, as such, remain liable to judicial and administrative penalties.

The emancipation is far from complete. Much remains to be done. Yet sundry ecclesiastical and civil authorities think that too much has been done. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, in his reports, has expressed a dread lest the concessions made to the dissenters may be taken as an encouragement to the Schism. It seems that the leaders of the *raskòl* have taken advantage of this admission to talk their adherents into the idea that the State at last recognizes the "old faith as the true one." In view of all the restrictions maintained by the law, one really must be very simple to believe in this conversion of the government. Since the promulgation of the new laws, it appears that many bashful *raskòlniks*, who used to attend church and pay the priest, have refused to conform any longer. The clergy and the High Procurator complain. The great obstacle to liberty is always the fear that the people may desert official Orthodoxy.

Instead of taking its stand, in dealing with the sects, on the secular point of view, the government insists on judging them from the ecclesiastical point of view, from which the *raskòl* is and remains a scourge, a plague, a pernicious error, a contagion which the State is bound to stop. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, in his yearly reports to the Emperor, speaks of heresy and the Schism as a bishop might, a pontiff, using, in speaking of the dissenters, the most insulting epithets known to the theological vocabulary. Nor is

it only the immoral or extravagant doctrines which received this official lashing, but the most innocuous as well, which in any other country would enjoy the fullest liberty,—*Stundism* for instance. In certain villages, under Alexander III., the lower clergy and the police have been known to incite the rabble to violence against the *Stundists*, and go unpunished. The clergy of course stand up for their dues. So, in 1884, a *Stundist* peasant, of the name of Strigùn, was arraigned before the assizes at Odessa for having dared to say that *eïkons* are nothing but idols. Conformably to the code of criminal procedure, such cases are tried with closed doors, and juries can be composed only of Orthodox members. And so, notwithstanding that the jury conceded attenuating circumstances, he got three years and nine months. Cases of this kind come every year before the courts or the justices of the peace. And where the *Stundists* and the *Molokàns* are not prosecuted before the courts, they are left to the tender mercies of administrative discretion, which strikes more surely and makes no noise. If the old Schism has, by two centuries of suffering, conquered comparative liberty, the new sects, even those whose doctrines seem the least calculated to provoke the rigor of the law, are still the target of persecution. The crime of heresy or apostasy still stands in the Code, and the language used by the High Procurator of the Holy Synod, a layman, is hardly such as to inculcate on the clergy or the police a spirit of tolerance.

If we would gauge all that is still wanting to the complete emancipation of the Russian dissenters, we merely need compare their condition in regard to the Orthodox Church with that of the English non-conformists in regard to the Anglican. The question will never be settled and the people's conscience set at rest until the *Stundist* and the *Molokàn* are as free as the Baptist and the Quaker are in England. That day has not yet dawned, even for the small group of Old-Believers who are recognized by the law. Privileged as they are, they cannot be said to enjoy all the rights necessary to free worship. There is one right without

which religious liberty must always be incomplete: the right of founding and endowing churches and clergy. Now the Russian law does not recognize any dissident institution as having a civil individuality; consequently, no disposition made in favor of their churches is of any legal value. Thus it was that, in 1887, the courts broke the will of a merchant of the name of Tchubŷkhin, who had bequeathed to the Grómof Cemetery, owned by the Hierarchists of St. Petersburgh, several hundred thousand roubles, to build a hospital. If, in spite of these legal obstructions, the *raskólniks* have their oratories, hospitals, and asylums, it is because they make use of the same roundabout proceedings as do religious congregations in Italy and France in similar cases. The property funds belonging to dissident communities are inscribed in the name of four or five persons who form a sort of syndicate. When a member comes to die, the survivors elect a co-religionist in his place. In this manner, *raskólniks* belonging to different denominations perform sometimes considerable transfers of property. And, to the honor of the autocratic government be it said, as opposed to certain French democrats in their dealings with Catholic communities, it never dreamed of issuing inquisitorial laws, to prevent dissident communities from supporting their own charities.

If we clamor for liberty to be given the old Schism and the formless peasant heresies, it is not because we expect from the free development of them anything like a religious revival or a social renovation. There is nothing to presage the growth, out of this tangled jungle of sects, of a tall-stemmed tree, with branches widespread enough to shelter a world.

True, Russia turns out to be a laboratory of religious ideas as well as of social reforms. Why then should not a modern gospel be elaborated in the brain and heart of her rustic prophets—a gospel which illiterate apostles may some day—in a century or two—go forth and preach to overbearing Europe? Many are the think-

ers, both native and foreign, who believe that Russia is called to a lofty religious mission. Her mystic genius, her thirst of live truth, the natural turn of her imagination, the juvenile fearlessness of her thought, her liking for bold experiments, her people's faith, "her instinctive distrust of the human intellect, her contempt for abstractions and all that does not directly bear on life, whether moral or material," *—all these are traits which seem to point to her vocation. The people's ideal—for it is one of those who still have ideals—is at once religious and social; it does not separate the divine from the human. It looks as though it is through religion that the "Russian idea" is to be realized—that vague national idea of which patriots have only caught confused glimpses. Where else could be found, for the giant Russia, a historical mission bearing any proportion to her territorial size? In the fields of philosophy, of art, of politics even,† nearly all has been said, nearly all has been tried. The last come among the nations of Europe has little chance to bring to the world a new revelation. The field of religion being more mysterious, and having been less deeply ploughed up by these latter centuries, there seems some reason to suppose that it may more easily yield discoveries. May be it only seems so. A religious renovation may prove, after all, as hard to effect as one in philosophy or politics. Supposing that the era of great spiritual revolutions is not irrevocably closed, that a new faith can even yet mount from the depths of the popular conscience to the cultured upper layers, what is there to assure us that Russia is to be the initiator of it? True, she seems—this enigmatical Russia!—to be in quest of new religious formulas as well as of new social forms. But is she the only nation in such travail? And even if all mankind feels the same longing, is that a reason why its longing should be satisfied right now? That living word for which the modern world impatiently clamors—it may be long yet before Heaven sends it to us.

* Vladìmir Soloviòf, *Russia and the Universal Church*, 1st part (1889).
† See Vol. II., Book VI., Chap. IV.

Indeed, is that supreme word, for which weary humanity thirsts, unspoken yet? And if it *was* spoken, some twenty centuries ago, has it not been commented on in so many different ways that it is hard to make it yield any new sense? Can Russia really contend, as do Tolstòy and Sutàyef, that Christianity has never yet been understood? Can she even only hope to rejuvenate it, or is she going, after ten centuries, to find for it a national form independently of the old traditional moulds?

One ambition, at all events, is still open to this faith-abiding people: not so much that of inventing a new type of Christianity as of appropriating the evangelic spirit. It is chiefly there Russia can show herself original; thereby she still can surprise our ageing West which is fast becoming heathen again. This is what numbers of her reformers, lettered or illiterate, instinctively comprehend; almost all care less for dogma than for the evangelic virtues. Their ideal, unconsciously half the time, is the application of Christ's ethics to public no less than to private life. Social or political questions, even international questions—these believers would solve them all by charity and mildness. What, in other countries, saints and sages have seen only as an idle dream, what kings and inquisitors have vainly striven for with the help of rack and stake—the construction of a Christian State, this Christian people does not despair of achieving, and counts on love alone to make it a success. Let us not deride its youthfulness. To bring the Gospel into a nation's life, to extract out of it, so to speak, social virtue, to bring out of it the reign of universal brotherhood and divine peace: happy the people who would take up such a mission, and ill-advised whoever tries to discourage it! But let us beware of the old millennium utopia! Earth can never be a Paradise. Never will the Russian see his vision of justice and love fully realized. That can never be given to beings of flesh and blood.

Some Russians, emboldened by their rationalistic sects, seem to think that Russia's mission is to save Christianity by stripping

it of its forms and dogmas. Another illusion likely to be torn to shreds by experience! To retain of Christianity only the spirit, the divine essence,—charity and morality; to sublimate the Gospel if one may say so—others have dreamed that dream before the Russian Slav. To separate, in religion, the soul from the body, keeping the former alive and leaving the other to perish—I hardly know a more hopeless undertaking. One man may succeed in it, possibly a generation; a people—never. The vial once broken, what will be left of the perfume as it evaporates?

BOOK IV.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE DISSIDENT CREEDS.

CHAPTER I.

The National Church and Alien Confessions—Privileges of the Orthodox Church—Historical Reasons for them—The Ancient Bond between the Russian Nationality and Orthodoxy—National and Political Distrust against Alien Cults—System of Religious Intrenchment—Proselytism Forbidden—In what Way Russia Understands Liberty of Conscience—Official Theory regarding it—The Right of Proselytism not Inherent to it—That Right Reserved for the National Church—How the Church Makes Use of her Privilege—Her Proceedings in Matters of Propaganda and the Pseudo-Orthodox—Russian Missions.

Aside from the ten or twelve millions of dissenters in permanent revolt against the official Church, the Tsar numbers, in his empire, over thirty millions of subjects wholly independent of Eastern Orthodoxy: Catholics, Protestants, Armenians, Jews, Mussulmans, Buddhists.

Up to Peter the Great, Russia was, apart from a few Mohammedan Tatars, an exclusively Orthokox State. As she extended her frontiers in Europe and Asia, she had to make legal room for the religions of the annexed countries. At every acquisition the tsars engaged to respect the religion of their new provinces. They were and remained for all that the Orthodox Tsars, jealously bent on preserving for their own Church her ancient monopoly amid their old subjects. This acounts for Russia's confessional policy. The Orthodox Church remained the Russian Church still; she claimed every favor and every right. The other cults, introduced into the empire by conquest, were sanctioned for the

conquered peoples, not for the Russians of Old-Russia. The Pole was allowed to remain a Catholic, the Tatar a Mussulman, the German a Protestant, the Jew a Jew, but the Russian was to remain Orthodox; and every conquest achieved by Orthodoxy over alien or dissident cults was regarded as an advantage gained by Russia over foreign nationalities.

Nor is this all. On entering into the autocratic empire, the dissident cults had to bow their necks to autocracy. England also has, like Russia, a national Established Church. Whence then comes it that the two countries' attitude towards alien confessions is so different? It comes, in great part, from the difference in their political institutions. In England only one confession has an official position,—the others are ignored. In Russia all the tolerated confessions (the *raskòl* always excepted) are also recognized by the State, whose hand weighs heavily on all. The Russian system is not unlike the French, with this difference, that in France there is neither established church nor autocracy. The Petersburgh government is quite willing to tolerate, even subsidize, all religions, on condition that they shall all bow to the autocratic *régime* and that none shall trespass on the domain of the ruling Church. No other state recognizes so many religions. All the great creeds of the world seem to have their trysting-place in Russia. The law proclaims them all free. It not only grants them, as Rome or Spain did until lately, individual liberty of conscience, but also the liberty of public worship. On the Nevsky Avenue (Perspective), opposite the Orthodox church of Our Lady of Kazàn, there is a Catholic church, a Lutheran church, an Armenian church, so that the main thoroughfare of the capital well deserves the surname of "Tolerance Street." On the fair grounds at Nijni, church and mosque face each other. The Russian people are naturally tolerant. If there are restrictions to religious liberty, they are due to political reasons more than to religious feeling,—to the form of government and to national distrust.

For the Russian Church, as has already been pointed out, is not only a State church, but an essentially national one, so strongly knit by history and habits to the existence of Russia that it really seems as though, outside of her, one cannot be a Russian. In the eyes of the government as well as of the people, the quality of Orthodox Christian is (even now) the surest pledge of patriotism and loyalty. Moscow is indeed the legatee of Byzance, who had made of the Orthodox faith the cement of the Greek Empire. Russia, in this respect, resembles Turkey, where religion has always been synonymous with nationality. This Oriental tradition appears an anachronism in modern Europe, in Holy Russia it has historical roots which keep it alive. It is Greek Orthodoxy which has welded into one the ethnical elements out of which the Russian nation has been formed. Moscovia has encountered other religions only among her enemies, in Europe and in Asia. This is a serious obstacle to the cohesion of the empire, and especially to its liberal development. It is rather unsafe, too, for a state which comprises peoples of so many and various religions, to rest national unity on a church. There is a risk of religious assimilation delaying political assimilation. To the provinces where alien religions predominate, russification appears as a goal to be reached only through apostasy; to such Russians as would feel inclined to leave the pale of the Orthodox Church no way seems open but to drop their nationality, since their country repulses them.

The official designations clearly accentuate this position of heterodox creeds as regards the ruling church. In government language, the non-Orthodox confessions are called "foreign confessions." This expression in itself directs the suspicion of Russian patriotism to about one third of the Russian subjects. That such a designation is, historically, well founded, makes it only more advisable that it should be given up. Heterodox creeds are met with only in alien provinces, or in such as have long been under foreign rule. From north to south they stretch on both

sides of Orthodox Russia, in two strips of varying width, generally following the ethnographic boundaries. From the Bothnian Gulf down to the Austrian frontier, they are Protestants, Catholics, Jews; on the east side, along the Ural, the Volga, and the Caucasus, they are Mussulmans with a sprinkling of heathens. The alien creeds number in the empire about thirty-five millions of adherents, over twenty of them in Europe.* Each of these alien religions has some particular region, where it predominates: Protestantism in Finland and the Baltic Provinces; Catholicism in Poland and Lithuania; Islamism in several districts of the Ural, of the Crimea, and the Caucasus. Is it not obvious how embarrassing a government must find such a territorial partition, which binds each creed to a province, a race, often some particular language? Ireland and England present, in this respect, no such marked contrast as do Russia and some of her annexed lands. For the Russians, "Catholic" means "Pole" and "Protestant" means "German." This accounts for Russia's attitude towards non-Orthodox confessions. She looks on them as vehicles of foreign nationalities, she dreads to see them denationalize provinces which, in the name of history, she claims as her own. Just as Islam, in the eastern governments, is to her a reminder of the Tatar rule, so Catholicism and Protestantism in White-Russia, Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, are in her sight a Polish or a Teutonic importation—reminders of humiliation endured through all her stormy youth. Having no way of removing them from those regions where they are rooted, her mind is set on not suffering these alien confessions to trespass on good old Russian soil. Her religious legislation is thus accounted for. If it does violence to the principle of liberty of conscience, the fault lies less with the Church's fanaticism than with the patriotic fears of the government and nation.

* Russian statistics are not to be implicitly relied on in matters of religion any more than of nationality. We shall see that official statistics count as Orthodox numbers of Christians and even of Mussulmans who positively declare they are not.

The confessional partition into provinces and nationalities might well cause uneasiness to the State. Possibly the best remedy might have been letting the evil spread. Were they left free to expand, the different religions, by interpenetrating and overlapping, would of themselves have done away with geographical and ethnographical demarcations. By getting diffused among the Russians, they would have lost their alien character. But such a remedy was both too slow and too bold for a government whose habit it is to seek national unity in religious unity. So Russia chose the opposite method. Any other government would probably have done the same. The object of her legislation was to confine the alien confessions within their historical boundaries, to keep them intrenched among the peoples who had received them from their ancestors. Everybody is free to remain true to the religion of their fathers, but forbidden to make new proselytes. That privilege is reserved for the Orthodox Church alone; it is explicitly so stated in the text of the law. Everybody may enter that church; nobody may leave it. Russian Orthodoxy has doors which open only one way.

The confessional laws fill out several chapters of vols. x., xiv., and xv. of the voluminous collection known as "the Code." Every child born of Orthodox parents is perforce Orthodox; so is every child born of a mixed marriage. Indeed such a marriage is possible only on this condition. True, there are Western churches which demand the same engagement, to give the nuptial benediction to a mixed marriage; but the civil law does not sanction it; the consorts' conscience is left free to submit to the demand or not. There can be no such freedom in a country where religious marriage is the only legal one, where the church registers irrevocably settle the question. These regulations have sometimes given occasion to the sequestration of children, like that of the young Jew Mortara, for which Pius IX was so much blamed at the time. Apart from the violence to conscience, such ordinances do harm by placing obstacles in the way of unions between mem-

bers of different churches and, consequently, of the amalgamation of the different nationalities.

One article of the Code forbids Orthodox Russians to change their religion; another states the penalties incurred for such offences. The stray sheep is, in the first instance, paternally exhorted by his parish clergy, then made over to the consistory, then to the Synod. A term of penance in a convent can be inflicted. The apostate forfeits all civic rights; he cannot legally own or inherit anything. His kindred may seize on his property or step into his inheritance. Proselytism being the official church's privilege, it is forbidden to oppose her making use of the monopoly conferred on her by the law. It is a crime to advise anybody to abandon the Orthodox religion; it is a crime to advise anybody against entering it. Should a Russian desert the national church, it becomes the duty of his father, his mother, his nearest relatives to inform against him. The civil and military authorities are enjoined to see that these laws are enforced.

It is not enough to keep within the pale of Orthodoxy the Russians who were born in it; it is essential not to allow the dissident creeds, and consequently the nationalities which they represent and which excite patriotic distrust, to be swelled by conversion. Hence another general measure. The dissidents are not to proselytize among themselves. The Orthodox Church admits of no competition in the matter of the propaganda monopoly. The empire is a field the religious cultivation of which she has reserved for herself. She alone has the right of sowing the gospel seed. Jews, Mohammedans, Pagans, are not to enter into Christianity through any but the official door. In this way it is expected they will be made Russians as well as Christians. The Lithuanian Jew who lives among Catholics is not to adopt their faith; the Mussulman who, in Transcaucasia, dwells side by side with the Armenian, cannot receive baptism from him unless duly authorized by the Minister of the Interior, who, in his decision, consults only the good of the empire. To instruct an infidel in their own

tenets, the Catholic and the Protestant must have an imperial permit, special in each individual case. This legislation gives rise to the queerest ordinances. In Transcaucasia, an Armenian may baptize a Mussulman if the latter is so ill as to make death appear certain ; but in case of recovery, the conversion remains open, pending confirmation by the governor of the province.

Such are the Russian laws. Can they be said really to respect the liberty of conscience? Can a man be said to possess religious liberty who cannot change his religion? What kind of liberty is that which is denied choice? and can the priest or believer feel free, who is not allowed to propagate his belief? The law takes its stand on the principle that proselytism is not necessary to the free practice of worship. The principle has been duly formulated. A man who has the courage to stand by his ideas, Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, has given to Europe the official theory of Russian liberty.

The Evangelical Alliance once forwarded to Alexander III. a petition in which the Western Protestants pleaded in favor of entire liberty being given to all Christian denominations alike. The Emperor transferred this document to his former tutor, Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, who replied to it in 1888 in an open letter addressed to the President of the Swiss Committee of the Alliance, Mr. Naville.* "Nowhere in Europe," the High Procurator of the Holy Synod asserted, "do heterodox religions enjoy so perfect a liberty as in the midst of the Russian people. Europe persists in not recognizing the fact. Why? For the single reason that, with you, religious liberty, as inscribed in your laws, implies the absolute right of unlimited propaganda. That is the main cause of all your recriminations against the restrictions which our laws impose on those who would turn the faithful from Orthodoxy or abjure our faith." These laws, the High Procurator explains,

* This letter was published in February, 1888, in the *Church Messenger* and in the *Journal de St. Pètersbourg ;* this imparted to it a doubly official character.

have only one object,—that of protecting the national church against the attacks of her adversaries. Setting aside the abstract question of proselytism, he avers that "Russia having received her vital principle from the Orthodox faith, it is her sacred duty, bequeathed to her by her history, to shield the Church from all that could threaten her safety—a duty which has become the essential condition of Russia's existence as a nation. In Russia," he concludes, "the Western denominations, far from laying aside their domineering ways, are always ready to attack not only our country's power, but her unity. Russia cannot allow them the right of free propaganda. She will never allow that the Orthodox Church's children should be taken from her to be enrolled in alien flocks. She declares as much openly, in her laws, and appeals to the justice of Him who alone rules the destinies of empires."

It will be seen, from this remarkable document, that Russia does not mean yet for a while to withdraw her protection from the Established Church. But, suppose such a system is justifiable from political considerations—politics never were scrupulous in the choice of means,—it remains to be seen whether it proves efficacious. And to claim that such laws do not encroach on the liberty of consciences, simply argues ignorance of what it means to be free. The letter of Alexander's confidential friend is instructive in this respect: it shows that entire religious liberty is the more difficult to establish that official Russia does not even comprehend the idea. A little more and certain people would assert—I *have* heard it said—that Russia is the only country in possession of true religious liberty, because proselytism is an attack on that liberty. Yet the very thing which is forbidden to others, is encouraged in the Established Church.

This church has no occasion to be proud of such official protection. The imperial government shows not only little confidence in the force of truth, but little faith in the Church's right or in her clergy's zeal. The Code says so openly and the Holy Synod by implication; the Church, left to herself, is incapable of holding

her own against her adversaries, be they Protestants, Catholics, or dissenters. She has to intrench herself behind the law. Poor Church! The State forgets that, in lending her its police and bails, it lowers and disables her.

Religious liberty such as Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef extols culminates in one word—coercion. For a church which, being a spiritual building, has no foundation but faith and no cement but her children's free choice and spontaneous love, the Russian laws substitute a church of material construction, based on the penal code, the living stones which compose it held together by the mortar and iron clamps of force, its doors, in Aksàkof's words, guarded not by angels but by *gendarmes* and policemen, who do not, indeed, compel people to enter, but have orders not to let anybody out. Occasionally, though, a gentle push towards the ever open entrance of the official fold is not considered unfair.

Russia's system in regard to alien religions is to corner them and keep them down. No encouragement is refused the Orthodox propaganda, nothing forbidden. Layman or churchman, everybody is bound to leave the field open for it. To assist it, there are societies patronized by the imperial family. The Russian missions are a political as much as a religious enterprise. Besides material force, the government places at its disposal every possible stimulant. Each year the High Procurator publishes the bulletin of the conquests of armed Orthodoxy over adversaries previously disarmed. Christ said: "Ye shall be fishers of men." The Russian government baits its apostles' lines. Quite lately still, in Asia and even in Europe, the heterodox used to be lured with concessions of lands or exemption from taxes. In a country where all good things come from the government, everybody fully realizes the advantage of belonging to the same church as the tsar. There are premiums for the converters as well as for the converted. Any Orthodox Christian who has brought about the baptism of one hundred Jews or infidels is entitled to the cross of St. Anna.

The results of such a system are easy to guess. The majority of conversions registered by the State are entirely external. In matters pertaining to religion, externality and conventionality, the great obstacle to progress, are as universal as in other branches. Of the faithful inscribed in the priest's "metrical books," many are Orthodox—or even Christian—only in name. They are not so much the followers as the bondsmen of the Church. For a large number, Orthodoxy is a sort of serfdom sanctioned by the law. Among the converts of alien races numbered for the last century in the official reports, there are thousands who, after two or three generations, still persist in their fathers' heathen practices. On the missionaries' and High Procurator's own showing, proselytes are often harder to keep than to win. Converts from the Reformation, from Rome, the Synagogue, Mohammed, or Buddha frequently lapse from the new faith, publicly or in secret. New-comers find themselves in the position of dissenters chained to the Church by the law. Hence false Christians, sham followers of Orthodoxy, and bad Russians. Official proselytism is to the national church a source of corruption. Hypocrisy is fomented by the law, sacrilege enjoined by the penal code, on pain of fine and imprisonment. Sham Orthodox converts, like dissenters, purchase the priest's connivance or the police officer's silence. The legal privileges enjoined by the Church result in the demoralization of clergy and people. While sowing Orthodoxy, official apostleship reaps infidelity. The State is not a greater winner at this game than religion. The good derived from doubtful conversions is compensated by the rankling discontent which is rife among Russia's dissident or heterodox subjects.

In many a part of the empire, the heathen or the Mussulman is easily found under the thin Orthodox veneer. Tatars of Kazàn, Christians through many generations, have petitioned to be allowed to return to Islam. Can we wonder at that? Numbers of Mussulmans or idolaters—Tatars, Tchuvàshes, Kalmyks, Buriàts, allogenous Finno-Turks or Mongols, both in Europe and Asia,

have been induced to accept baptism by force or wile. Impromptu conversions of whole villages or tribes are no unusual thing even yet. Here an instance, from one of Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef's reports. The affair occurred under Alexander II., in the Transbaïkal Mission. A native Siberian, Prince Gantimùrof, ordered the Orotchens who dwelt on his lands to assemble on a certain day on the banks of the river Samter, to be vaccinated. He came accompanied by a missionary, who addressed them in a discourse on the beneficent effects of this operation, and ended with the advice to cleanse their souls in the purifying baptismal waters. Prince Gantimùrof lent his authority to the preacher's twofold motion, and thirty Orotchens were then and there, first vaccinated, then "baptized in the quiet waters of the Samter." * This killing of two birds with one stone is a modernized version of the summary conversions practised by Vladìmir and Charlemagne. Presents are frequently distributed among the neophytes, for the sake of which some have themselves baptized over and over again, like the sturdy Saxons of old. It is not surprising that these so-called Christians should return to Islam or Lamaïsm. In many tribes heathenism still reigns under its grossest form—Shamanism; but then the Shamans themselves frequently are baptized.

The clergy has come to understand that the baptismal water is not all that is needed to make Christians. In order to attach to the Church the allogens of Europe and Asia, the Holy Synod, since 1883, authorized the use of native languages equally with Old-Slavic at the Church services. So that the Greek liturgy is now celebrated in the following languages: Tatar, Tchuvash, Tcheremiss, Mordvin, Votiàk, Buriàt, Yakut, Tunguz, and Samoyèd. In the line of translations into Oriental languages, the Brotherhood of St. George rivals the Bible Society of London. At the same time the missionaries have taken to founding schools among the allogens. Now this is the right way.

The Russian missionaries have already shown that they can,

* The High Procurator's report for 1883.

on occasion, dispense with coercion and temporal allurements. Their efforts have repeatedly extended beyond the boundaries of the empire. We do not refer to the attempts at detaching from Rome the Catholic Slavs of Austria and Turkey. That is a pre-eminently political undertaking ; journalism and the subsidies of the Moscovite committees have a greater part in it than preaching.* But the Russians have carried the Gospel to the Chinese, the Coreans, the Japanese. In China, in spite of the relations existing between the two empires, the mission residing in Pekin has achieved but insignificant results. With the Coreans the Russian missionaries have been more successful ; but the majority of their Corean converts are colonists established on Russian lands. It is in Japan that the Orthodox propaganda has been most successful. The Russian Church has a bishop there ; in 1888 her proselytes numbered from 12,000 to 15,000, with 200 chapels and a seminary in which were over 100 students. Unfortunately, the prosperity of this religious colony has already been disturbed by differences between the Russian teachers and the native neophytes.

The West has hardly the right to be severe on the methods adopted by Russia in her part of the world. Fully one half of Europe has been converted by just such means. True, it was some thousand years ago. But in spite of the calendar, many a region on both sides of the Ural has not got beyond the ninth or tenth century. Christianity is the only door through which European civilization can be carried to the Uralo-Altaïc tribes. Therefore, however we may disapprove of anything like encroachment on the liberty of conscience, we hardly can blame Russia for encouraging the diffusion of the Gospel. But Russian proselytism does not stop there. It does not direct its efforts only against uncultured paganism or even against cultured alien religions,

* Possibly, political aims were not foreign to the sending of a Russian mission to Abyssinia in 1889. Still, it appears that these Ethiopian Jacobites are looked on in Petersburgh as co-religionists who are merely to be led back to the original purity of the Orthodox rite.

such as Islamism and Buddhism; it makes war with no less ardor against Judaism, Protestantism, Catholicism. Indeed it is in its campaigns against the other Christian churches, where civilization has nothing to gain, that the Orthodox propaganda exerts itself most passionately.

A Russian bishop has said: "Our confessional partitions do not mount up to heaven." It is not this maxim which the rulers of Russia have made their motto. But then their orthodox zeal looks less to heaven than to earth. It is from political considerations they won't let people work out their salvation in their own way. The Russians have a royal road to heaven, wide, straight, smooth, well gravelled, with deep ditches and tall fences running on both sides, so that one who has taken it cannot swerve from it. There are, indeed, parallel roads, officially classified; but they are ill kept, full of holes and ruts; only outsiders are allowed to use them. That is how alien religions stand to the Established Church.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER II.

Foreign Cults: Christian Denominations—How Russia Strives to Impose on the Various Confessions a Constitution Analogous to that of the Russian Church—Armenians. Russian Policy, and the Armenian Hierarchy. The *Catholicos* of Etchmiadzin and the Statutes—Protestants. Lutheranism and Germanism. Orthodox Propaganda in the Baltic Provinces. Means Employed by Official Proselytism. Mixed Marriages—Catholics. Latinism and Polonism. The Roman Catholic *College*. Papacy and Autocracy. Numerical Insufficiency of the Catholic Clergy—Difficulties in the Way of Filling its Ranks. Mass Without a Priest. Suppression of the Convents. Restrictions to Religious Liberty. Substitution of the Russian for the Polish Language in the Church. Civil Disqualifications of Polish Catholics—The Churches. Suppression of the *Union*. Methods Employed to Bring Back the United Greeks. Persecution of the Last Uniates—On the Reunion of Both Churches. Advantages it would bring to Russia. Obstacles.

HAVING examined the State's relations to the Orthodox Church, let us compare to these its relations to the other cults which have followers in the empire. Nothing can show more clearly what, in the constitution of the Established Church, pertains to religion and what to politics, or policy. All churches alike are subject to the principle which rules everything in Russia—autocracy, the only difference being that the national Church, from her spirit and traditions, finds this guardianship of the State, which is to her as much a protection as a bondage, less irksome than the others.

The government strives to give all the cults in the Empire the bureaucratical organization of the Established Church. It finds this doubly convenient: in the first place, by keeping them under Russian control independent of any foreign power; in the second, by centralizing all the church business, so as to keep it well in

hand. This applies especially to the Christian denominations. Catholics, Armenians, Protestants, had to lend themselves to the Russian administrative practices. Each denomination had to accept, under various names, a sort of central synod, "assisted" by lay representatives of the secular power. Each has its consistories, invested, with regard to its own flock, with functions similar to those which the Orthodox consistories exercise with regard to Russian subjects of the Greek rite. The ecclesiastical constitution established by Peter the Great is a sort of Procrustean couch to which all the churches have been successively adjusted, to the lasting damage of several.

Of all Christian persuasions, the easiest to bend to the Russian system of Church government is probably the Armenian church, which, by its constitution, liturgy, discipline, comes nearest to the Greek Church. What separates the Armenians from the Greeks, and also the Latins, is that they recognize only the first three councils. As they repudiate the Council of Chalcedon, they are accused of being Eutycheans, though they themselves disclaim it. As a matter of fact, the difference which for fifteen centuries has kept apart the Greeks and Armenians, is of a political rather than a religious nature, for here, as almost everywhere in the East, these theological quarrels are the cloak for national rivalries.

In Russia, as in Turkey, the Armenians hold a position higher than their numbers would seem to warrant. There are a million of them, possibly a million and a half, or about one third of all the Christian Haïkans; for geographers are not agreed on the total number of Armenians. Their spiritual head resides in Russia, and that gives her another hold on the East. She can easily take a stand in Asia as the protectress of the Armenians, as she did lately in Europe with regard to the Orthodox Christians. She took care to insert in the treaty of San Stefano a clause on the Haïkans who remained Turkish subjects. She can the more easily play off this patronage that the Porte ignored Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and did not, as she promised, erect a bulwark

between herself and the Russian Caucasus, in the form of an autonomous Armenian state.

As the next best thing to autonomy and liberty, Russia offered safety to these Asiatic Europeans. Numbers of Armenians accordingly emigrated out of the Sultan's into Russian dominions, prefering Russian order to Ottoman shiftlessness. The "Christian Jew" has prospered so well in the Caucasus that I heard the fear expressed, in Tiflis, that he might "armenianize" all Transcaucasia. The Armenians are not absorbed in commerce in Russia any more than in Turkey—they gave several distinguished men to the army and the administration. In the last Oriental war, two Armenians, the Generals Làzaref and Lòris-Mélikof commanded the Russian troops in Asia Minor, and no one will have forgotten with what vast powers the latter was invested during the last days of Alexander II.

Of the Haïkans subject to the Tsar, few are "united" to Rome. The majority belong to the great Armenian Church, also called Gregorian, from Saint Gregory, "the Illuminator," who, in the fourth century, gave her her constitution and her liturgy. At the sumit of the hierarchy is enthroned the hundred-and-eighty-second successor of the "Illuminator," invested with the title of "Catholicos." This high pontiff, to whom the entire "non-united" Armenian clergy is subject, has his see in the convent of Etchmiadzin, on the legendary slopes of the Ararat. The Emperor Nicolas I. took care to get this traditional center of Armenian Church out of Persia's clutches. The Russian eagle, while it holds in its talons the head of the hierarchy, has control of the entire body.

The possession by Russia of the humble Armenian Vatican keeps the Haïkans who reside outside of the empire in a sort of religious vassalage. We have there, on a small scale, a problem not unlike that to which the fall of the pope's temporal power gave rise at Rome. This problem the Russian government solved with a high hand in its own favor. It regulated the position of

the Catholicos by the Statutes of 1836, a sort of guarantee law which the Armenians are compelled to submit to, although contesting its legality. According to tradition, the Catholicos must be elected by the delegates of all the Armenian dioceses in the world. The imperial government presides over the elections and has not been content with regulating at its pleasure the votes of the diocese, admitting some, annulling others. Instead of having that prelate proclaimed, in conformity with the canons, who obtained the largest number of votes, the Tsar arrogated the right of substituting for the nominee of the majority the prelate who secures the next largest number. The Statutes consider the election of the diocese as a simple nomination of candidates, among whom the Emperor reserves to himself the right of appointing the Catholicos. Fancy the King of Italy choosing a pope between the two cardinals who got the largest votes in the conclave! With this system, Russia is assured of having at Etchmiadzin a pontiff wholly devoted to her. Nicolas I. and Alexander II. always accepted the elected of the majority. Alexander III. broke with this custom in 1885; he gave the see to the candidate of the minority. The Catholicos thus became a Russian dignitary subject to the Tsar's nomination. The foreign Armenians, who are the most numerous, protested in vain against the statutes of 1836 and the election of 1885. They had to submit; for their only alternative was to set up an anti-Catholicos, and they recoiled from the schism which would have followed.

This mode of election to the highest see was not the only alteration introduced by Russia into the constitution of the Armenian church. A synod of bishops and archimandrites appointed by the Tsar, after the fashion of Petersburgh, was placed by the side of the Catholicos, with a lay procurator, whose interference in religious affairs is not at all to the clergy's taste. It complains about it in Russia in an undertone, quite loudly abroad; but it is too politic to enter into a conflict with the Russian power. Under Alexander III. the Armenians had an extra grievance

against the imperial bureaucracy. They owned hundreds of parochial schools, endowed by private persons and managed by their clergy. The control of these schools was taken from the Catholicos. This is one of those measures of centralization and russification which are carried out from end to end of the empire. No church can have autonomous schools in an autocratic state. The Armenians complain that Russian is substituted for the Armenian language in these schools founded by their fathers. They are afraid the government may want to reduce Armenian to a mere liturgical language.

Sometimes, indeed, a show has been made in Petersburgh of a wish to reunite the Armenian to the Established Church, leaving between them no difference except in the rites. The Russian Orthodox Church would then have her own Uniates, like Rome. But such ideas would be met with distrust by the Haïkans, who would be afraid of endangering their nationality as well as their religious autonomy. Communion with the Holy Synod at Petersburgh would seem to them only a first step on the road to absorption. "Union with Orthodoxy," one of their bishops said to me, "would preface russification. To know what would await us, we have but to look at our neighbors in Grùzia (Georgia). Their church is older than the Russian by many centuries: yet Old-Slavic has almost everywhere been substituted for Grùzian."

With the Protestants, also, religion is not always alone concerned. Protestantism has for a long time been one of the most favored among alien confessions, as it was the first to be recognized by the State. It was in order the better to model its constitution after that of the Established Church, that Peter the Great, in organizing his own church, borrowed from the Protestants. Lutherans and Calvinists had their local consistories, overtopped by a general consistory, assisted by an imperial procurator. There are from five to six millions of Protestants, mostly Lutherans. Over two millions reside in Finland, where Lutheranism is the

established church. Administered by three bishops, served by a clergy which forms one of the four estates represented at the Diet, the Lutheran Church enjoys there the most entire liberty. It is not quite the same south of the Gulf.

In the three Baltic provinces, Lutheranism still predominates, numerically and socially; but from whilom supremacy it is lowered to the rank of a merely tolerated confession. Peter the Great, when he annexed Livonia and Esthonia in 1721, guaranteed to them the continuance of their church's rights and privileges. Catherine II. made the same promises to Courland in 1795; and the three provinces having always shown themselves loyal, it cannot be said of them, as of Poland, that their rebelliousness has relieved Russia of her word. And yet the three provinces saw the religious liberty sworn to them restricted in various ways.

Protestantism there has been the victim of the russifying policy. It was natural that there especially, in the ancient domain of the Swordbearers, Lutheranism should be considered as the ally of Germanism. The community of faith was almost the only bond between the various elements of the Baltic population, between the thin German layer and the two plebeian populations, the Letts and the Esths.* To detach these from the religion of the aristocracy—the Ritterschaft—was to isolate the German nobility and burgherdom, to cut them morally off from the country population. The champions of Orthodoxy have taken in hand the conquest of Livonia with the greater zeal that there, as in White-Russia and Lithuania, they allege that the country was originally Orthodox, and should be purified from the Western contamination. Their historians have demonstrated to their own satisfaction that, on these misty shores, the Greek faith had preceded the Latin, and consequently the Teutonic heresy. In some parts the Lutheran peasants, Letts or Esths, still go to the Russian midnight mass at Easter. It matters little if the Russian missionaries are accomplishing rather a restoration than a con-

* See Vol. I., Book II., ch. v.

quest. Conscience does not wait on history. If historical right had anything to say in religion, the Russians might as well go back to Perùn.

The first campaign of official proselytism takes us back to the reign of Nicolas I. Over 100,000 peasants, Letts and Esths, were brought into Orthodoxy about 1840, by Count Protàssof. They had hoped to obtain some Crown lands. The crusade ceased or slackened under Alexander II., but took a fresh start under Alexander III. The annual average of conversions had amounted, in the preceding reign, to a few hundreds; they now began to be numbered by thousands. Whole parishes desert the Lutheran *Kirka (Kirche)*. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef disclaims all use of such coarse lures as his predecessor Protàssof was blamed for. In 1887 the Orthodox authorities again warned the clergy not to promise neophytes any material advantages. But conversions, even if not directly traceable to material interests, usually have some motive of a temporal nature back of them. They are due less to the missionaries' eloquence than to race and class opposition. The Lett or Esth peasant's inborn dislike to the German landholder is the converters' best argument. They represent the dereliction of the "German faith," as a sort of emancipation from the Teutonic yoke.

If Lutheranism has not yet been entirely thrown over by the whole Lett and Esth population, it is only because they are afraid of jeopardizing their nationality. This feeling is especially strong among the Letts, who are more cultured than their Finn neighbors, the Esths. Conversions are accordingly less frequent among them. "We want to stand apart from the Germans," a Lett patriot said, "but not to be merged in the Russians." Quite a number would, for this reason, rather incline towards Baptism. One of the Orthodox propaganda's attractions, indeed, is that they celebrate divine service in the local languages; but the Lutheran pastors, though Germans themselves, resign themselves more and more to the use of their flocks' barbarous tongues.

National feeling, however, is not the only hold Russian proselytism has over the Baltic region. The lay apostles of Orthodoxy do not always scruple to have recourse to the allurements officially forbidden. Everybody is aware that, to be on the authorities' good books, the best way is to adopt the Russian faith. I was told the story of a rascal who used no other recipe to get out of prison. It is a way, within everybody's reach, to get protection. Even apart from such inducements, conversions are encouraged by a sort of premium of great value to peasants. The Senate has recently exempted all the non-Lutheran peasants from the taxes or dues to Lutheran churches. Nothing could be juster, it would seem. It cannot be right to make an Orthodox peasant pay the tithe to a church which is not his. Yet the question is not quite so simple. The Lutherans aver that these church taxes are incumbent not on the individual, but on the land. They can be got rid of only through redemption. It is a fact that *in natura* dues can be commuted into a sum of money, after a tariff established by the landholders, with their tenants' agreement. The latter, the former say, cannot liberate themselves by an act of apostasy. To remove the tentation from the people, some landholders have taken the tithes on themselves, raising by so much the rent of their lands.

One of the government's chief preoccupations in its proselytizing work is to construct churches and schools. The *Ritterschaft*, which owns nearly all the soil, will not allow any to be built on their land, so nothing remains but expropriation. For the purpose of building a church or school, the administration is empowered to expropriate everything save dwelling-houses. The most zealous Lutheran may see the Orthodox priests settle down on his lands to ply their propaganda among his peasants. On the other hand the majority of rural schools had been opened by the nobility and placed by it under the control of its own pastors. In these three provinces, beyond comparison the most educated in Russia, there were over 2000 Lutheran schools. Alexander III.

secularized them in a way, in order to russify them, by handing them over to the Ministry of Public Instruction. No blow was ever more keenly felt by Lutheranism.

That, after all, is a measure such as all states allow themselves to the cost of alien clergies. The same cannot be said of the legislation concerning mixed marriages. Nicolas I. issued laws ordering all children born of wedlock between Protestant and Orthodox parents to be brought up in the Greek faith. Alexander II. restored to the Livonians the right of bringing up their children as they pleased. That would seem a measure not only humane but politically wise, the State being strongly interested in the fusion of nationalities ; but such a liberty in Russia was a privilege. As such, Alexander III. suppressed it ; in 1885 he issued an ordinance commanding the draconian regulations of Nicolas I. to be applied to all alike. Again—Alexander II. had tolerated the return to Lutheranism of thousands of peasants who had been enticed into Orthodoxy, in his father's time, by fallacious promises. Alexander III. in this case also, enjoined the strict enforcement of the law. General Zinòvief, Governor of Livonia, admonished the people of his province, in 1887, to bear in mind that persons who, being registered as Orthodox, allow their children to follow the Lutheran rite, are liable to imprisonment, and in danger, in virtue of articles 158 and 190 of the penal code, to have their children taken from them and the education of them entrusted to third persons. As to the pastor guilty of admitting such Orthodox persons to the sacraments of his church, he incurs the heaviest penalties. This is what Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef, in his open letter to Mr. Naville, denounces as "hindering the spiritual fusion of the local population with the mother country." For this crime, numbers of pastors have been recalled, imprisoned, transported. Whether Catholic or Protestant, a heterodox minister of the altar must forget the Gospel parable, and beware how he runs after the sheep that has strayed from his fold.

That Russia should strive to conquer morally the material con-

quests of Peter I. and Catherine II., is all very well, for the pushing attitude of Germanism in the borderlands invites such action in self-defence ; but the worth of her system of russification may well be doubted. She seems to pursue as her object an external, material assimilation, caring little how much she jars on the feelings, the manners, the conscience, of her alien subjects. Not by such proceedings did France win the hearts of the Alsatians, Protestants as well as Catholics. There is danger that the policy of russification at all costs may defeat its object and relax, by overstraining them, the bonds which it is meant to tighten. So far, there have been in the Baltic provinces only what might be called "particularistic" tendencies ; there was no separatist party. Should one be formed, Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef will have been one of the promoters.*

The most ill-treated of all Christian confessions tolerated in Russia has always been Catholicism. Official prejudice and popular antipathy were in league against it. Historically as much bound up in Poland as Orthodoxy in Moscovia, the Roman faith has the privilege of arousing special grudges and mistrust. The Russian dreads it almost as much for his culture as for his nationality : in his capacity of Russian he fights "Polonism" in it ; in that of Slav—"Latinism," which he suspects of choking the Slavic genius.

The Russian Empire has between nine and ten millions of Catholics, *i.e.*, more than Ireland and Belgium put together. This number, in spite of official proselytism, increases steadily, by the mere fact of the normal increase of the population. These Catholics are not all Poles or Lithuanians. Some may still be met

* There are in Russia, besides the Lutherans and Calvinists, several millions of Mennonite or Anabaptist colonies. The government has always shown itself liberal in its treatment of these small communities, which awaken no political distrust. A portion of these Mennonites emigrated to America, to escape military service, when it became obligatory for all. Many returned. The government, out of deference for their religious scruples, exempted them from active service.

with among the White-Russians and the Little-Russians (*Biêlorùssy* and *Malorôssy*), and these, though not "polonized," generally call themselves Poles. The long-established association of names here turns against the government: the *Biêloruss* peasant who attends the *kosciôl* (Catholic Church), when questioned, replies he is a Pole, because "Catholic" and "Pole" are, to him, synonyms. It is these Russian Catholics whom the Orthodox propaganda especially makes its mark, being conscious of how slight a hold it has on the others. To the Pole and the Lithuanian their church is only the dearer for the war waged against it by Petersburgh and Moscow. It is a mania with the Russians to extirpate in their Western provinces the religion which, of the semi-sceptical Poland of the end of the eighteenth century, has made the most profoundly Catholic country of the nineteenth. Every blow struck at his national church has wedged it deeper still into the Pole's heart of hearts. To this day, if you want to realize what the faith of a people and the intensity of its prayer can be, go and look at the crowds kneeling in a church in Poland.

Of all the confessions recognized in the empire, Catholicism is the hardest to bend to Russian administrative forms. The Roman Church, like the others, was to have been forced into a constitution cut out after the pattern of Russia's Most Holy Synod. Above the bishops the imperial government placed a sort of Synod—the "Roman Catholic College," which sits at Petersburgh, under the presidentship of the Archbishop of Mohilef, Primate of the Empire. This "College," which Rome recognizes only as having in charge the administration of the temporal church affairs, is composed of delegates elected by the diocesan chapters and sanctioned by the government. The Catholic dioceses are provided besides, like the Orthodox ones, with consistories, the members of which are appointed by the secular authorities, on the bishop's nomination. All this bureaucratic machinery fits in awkwardly with the Catholic hierarchy, and the Roman see has always striven to free the bishops from it. The Popes Gregory

XVI., and Pius IX., complained many a time of the restraint inflicted on the episcopate by placing it under the control of the diocesan consistories and the Petersburgh "College." * They protested against the presence in these assemblies of imperial procurators, or lay secretaries appointed by the ministers. Leo XIII., in his turn, never ceased, in his negotiations with Russia, to claim for the bishops the untrammelled care of their own dioceses.

It will be seen from this how difficult it must be to strike any kind of *modus vivendi* between Petersburgh and the Vatican. The differences which everywhere arise between the Holy See and the temporal power out of the Catholic idea of the Church and the national conception of the State are harder to solve in Russia than anywhere else. Hence, between Petersburgh and Rome, those interminable negotiations so often suspended and taken up again. Even when an understanding is arrived at, it seldom stands the test of facts, since the papacy cannot submit to lay interference contrary to the canons, and the imperial government will not give up its administrative routine.

Partly from deliberate intention, partly by the mere fact of its institutions, the Russian government's action tended to reduce Catholicism to the condition of a mere rite, differing from Orthodoxy only in its discipline and its liturgy. By putting obstacles in the way of the relations between the bishops and the Vatican, by placing above the episcopate a sort of synod dependent on the Tsar, Russia took the soul out of Catholicism. Already at the time of the first partition of Poland, Catherine II., assisted therein by Bishop Siestrencewicz, strove to shut up her Catholic subjects within the boundaries of the empire, doing all she could to loosen the chain which bound them to Rome, so as to leave between them and the Holy See only the bond of communion, instead of that of jurisdiction. Fortunately for the papacy, however, there

* See *L'Esposizione documentata sulle costanti cure del Santo Padre Pio IX. a riparo dei mali che soffre la Chiesa Cattolica nei dominu de' Russia e di Polonia.* (Rome, 1866).

was no country in the world where the Catholics were more anxious to remain united to the centre of Catholicism. The Russian Tsars could not present their subjects of the Latin rite with a national Polish Church ; their efforts to detach them from Rome were all doomed beforehand. The Catholics residing in Russia being more Catholics than Russians, it was not easy to drill them into a schism. The government learned the lesson ; and if some few among the advisers of Nicolas I. or Alexander II. nursed the dream of a Latino-Slav church independent from Rome, the imperial cabinet appears to have given up this chimera.

There are twelve Catholic dioceses in the Russian dominions : seven in the Kingdom of Poland, five in the rest of the empire. The sees are often vacant. When a bishop dies, years elapse before his successor is appointed, and among the living there are always some in confinement or banished from their dioceses. Thus, recently, the Bishop of Vilna, Krymieniecki, was residing at Yaroslavl. Bishops and priests alike complain of not being free in the exercise of their ministry. The secular power is fond of having its say in the administration of the dioceses ; it does not scruple to uphold priests who rebel against episcopal authority. The bishops, narrowly watched, cannot communicate freely with the Holy See. They cannot even undertake a tour of pastoral visitation without the sanction of the local governor.

The Catholic clergy does not suffer from want of liberty alone ; the number of priests is insufficient and the State puts hindrances in the way of adding to it. For over sixty years the number of dioceses, of churches, of seminaries has been systematically reduced. If the clergy is short of priests, it is not because young men shrink from a calling which may easily lead to Siberia ; it is because priesthood is made difficult of access. There are, indeed, seminaries ; there is even at Petersburgh, under the name of "academy," a sort of Catholic theological faculty. There are State purses in these establishments, but the number of seminarists is limited and not everybody is admitted. A severe exami-

nation has to be passed, and after that a permit is needed, which is not granted indiscriminately. The government is suspicious, especially of Poles, for whom it prefers to substitute Lithuanians. Many are the parishes which have no priest at all, or are cared for by missionary priests who "come round" at long intervals. In some parts, the Catholics, being deprived of priests, find themselves reduced, if they are not willing to dispense altogether with divine service, to come together and sing hymns and canticles.

I once was present, in the reign of Alexander II., at one of these lay services. It was a Sunday in Lent, in old Nòvgorod, where, as in all Great-Russia, there are no native Catholics. I had been directed to a Roman Catholic chapel, on the other side of the Vòlkhof, behind the Kremlin. It was on a floor above a sort of low and dark barn. I found there some hundred persons, hardly three or four women in the number. The audience was mostly composed of soldiers from Poland or Lithuania, with a sprinkling of Poles banished to the city for political reasons. The altar, decked with a white cloth and two lighted tapers, seemed prepared for mass. As I was wondering why the priest did not appear, I was told there would be no priest; that there was, indeed, in Nòvgorod, a Polish bishop, kept there in banishment many years, but he was not permitted to officiate in public. The faithful, almost all of whom held books, began to sing the mass, interspersing the Latin prayers with Polish canticles, frequently kneeling before the silent altar. That same evening I was told, at the governor's, that the shanty in which the chapel was, threatened to collapse and the commandant had been warned not to let his soldiers go there any more. This priestless mass, in a tumble-down barn, was an apt symbol of the situation of the Catholics in Russia. Even this satisfaction is not always accorded the pastorless flock. In certain provinces of the West they were forbidden to assemble in the church at all, to pray together. So, in 1888, the Governor of Minsk, a Prince Trubetskòy, enjoined the Catholic deans to keep the churches of vacant parishes closed and not to

allow divine service in them in the absence of a priest. The ordinance, it is true, is motivated by the fact that prayers had been sung in Polish, "a language forbidden in the parishes."

The monks cannot make up for the numerical insufficiency of the secular priests. The greater portion of the convents were suppressed in consequence of the insurrection of 1863, and in those that were left, the number of monks and nuns was limited by *ukàz*.* They can no longer take in novices, unless the number has fallen below a certain figure. In Lithuania, the finest monasteries were taken from the Catholics. So the convent of Pojaïsk, built in the seventeenth century for the Camaldolenses, is now the residence of the Orthodox Bishop of Kòvno. In many a borough the Catholic *kosciòl* has been capped with a green cupola, and converted into an Orthodox *tsèrkov*. The Jesuits, whom Catherine II. had admitted and entrusted with the education of the aristocracy, are at present rigorously excluded from the empire. In 1878-79, when a few Dominicans were called to the church of St. Catherine in Petersburgh, the government was very particular to get an attestation signed by the general of the order, that those foreigners were really Dominicans and not Jesuits. Not so long ago a learned Jesuit, of Russian extraction but born a Catholic, was refused the permission to enter Russia for the purpose of making researches in libraries.

One thing struck me in the Polish churches: the priests read off their sermons. "Do not wonder at this," somebody explained; "sermons must be submitted to the censor: hence, must be written out. Nor do the bishops' ordinances escape the censor's office. This is not the only restriction to the liberty of religious teaching. For preaching or catechism, the clergy are not always allowed to use the language of their flocks. Formerly the ministers of alien religions were forbidden to preach in Russian,

* I have told in another place, from unpublished documents, how all the convents in Poland were closed on the same night. See *Un Homme d'Etat Russe*, etc., chapter xiii. (Hachette, 1884).

as that was supposed to lay their Russian hearers open to proselytism. Nowadays, the government encourages what it used to discountenance. It now subordinates religious to political considerations, and strives to introduce the use of Russian into both the Catholic and Protestant churches. It causes Roman and Lutheran prayer-books to be printed in Russian, at the risk of placing their doctrines within the people's reach. And, indeed, a Russian edition of a Protestant version of the Psalms has in more than one place been the means of starting the *Stundist* propaganda.

The Catholics are opposed to the introduction of Russian, often quite as much out of religious as out of national feeling. If the prayer-books have been done into Russian by Orthodox translators or complaisant Catholics, they are an object of suspicion to the clergy and the flocks. Then, as a priest pointed out to me, the Polish language is rich in Catholic works of all sorts, while Russian gives access only to a literature saturated with a spirit hostile to Rome. Lastly, even outside the Kingdom of Poland, Polish is the native or adopted language of the majority of Catholics. In Lithuania, and even as far as White- and Little-Russia, official Russian is not the people's mother tongue and is not always more familiar to them than Polish. It will be easily understood that the Poles, who, in the Western Provinces form the majority of the Catholic element, must feel hurt at having the schismatic masters' language substituted for their own, sanctified as it is to them by so many saints. To put an end to this resistance, the imperial government addressed itself to the Holy See. This, indeed, is one of the most delicate points in the negotiations which are always pending between Petersburgh and the Vatican. With the best wish to give the Tsar satisfaction, the papacy hesitates to overlook the Poles' protests. The Holy See knows that, in Ireland, it more than once found itself awkwardly placed for having seemingly sided with the English. So it does not care to sacrifice its Polish children to a government which has never ceased from its efforts to detach them from the Catholic

Church. To turn this church itself into an instrument of russification would put Polish faith to a rough test.*

To the demands of the Petersburgh bureaucracy, the majority of Catholics can demur on the ground that the government, while it wants them to pray in Russian, does not treat them as Russians. The Polish Catholics in the Western Provinces live under exceptional laws from which they are delivered the moment they forswear the Roman faith. And these very Poles, officially designated as aliens, are to be compelled to speak to God in the official language! There is a lack of logic there. If we are to be treated as Russians, they say, let them begin by relieving us of the civic disqualifications which weigh us down. But the government of Alexander III. has done exactly the contrary. Alexander II. had taken from the Catholic Poles the right of buying or leasing land. These laws did no good to anybody but the Germans; yet Alexander III. not only did not mitigate them, he aggravated them by his *ukàz* of 1884. In all the West of the empire only Russians can acquire rural real estate, by purchase, bequest, or deed of gift, and to be recognized a Russian, one must be Orthodox.

That which every modern government guarantees to its subjects—equality before the law, and free access to all public positions, the Catholics, as well as the Jews, are deprived of in practice, if not in theory. And where the doors are not shut on them, they hardly ever rise above the lower rungs of the bureaucratic ladder. If a Catholic, like Mr. Mohrenheim, is appointed ambassador, he turns out to be of foreign origin. In certain departments,—especially that of public instruction, the most important from a religious standpoint,—the exclusion of Catholics is carried to the extremest lengths. It was decided, under Alexander III., to have only Orthodox teachers in the Western Provinces, even where the Orthodox form a minority. Even private

* In rural Lithuania the clergy does not scruple to use the local language. The government has been content with russifying the alphabet.

careers are barred against Catholics. I have it as a positive fact from the directors of companies in the West, or in Poland, that they were asked confidentially for a list of their employés, classified as to religion, whereupon they were rebuked for employing too many Jews and Catholics, and warned that this might bring them into disfavor. There has been some talk of closing every position on railroads against all non-Orthodox candidates, and if it was not done by *ukàz*, it is being done gradually, under administrative pressure. The manner of making the sign of the cross remains the test of nationality.

Besides the Catholics recognized as such, there are those whom the government insists on classing, against their will, as Orthodox. Their position is lamentable. The practice of their religion is absolutely forbidden them. Fancy what it must be to a Catholic to be deprived of the priest who alone can bind and loose. Of these pseudo-Orthodox there are tens of thousands in Lithuania, in White-Russia, in Poland; Catholics at heart, they are, as Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef expresses it, "compelled to remain within the pale of Orthodoxy." The High Procurator complains almost every year of the stubbornness shown by these victims of official proselytism. Among the peasants converted between 1863 and 1870, many, he states in his reports, are obstinate in their wish to return to Latinism. Can this be wondered at, when the "conversions" were obtained by seduction or intimidation, when whole parishes are admitted into the Church at the request of a few individuals? Half the missionaries have been functionaries, police agents, common soldiers at a pinch. Russian papers have mentioned, among these apostles, a Mussulman commissioner.* Sometimes a person's presence at an Orthodox ceremony has been taken as an act of adhesion, so that there are people who have changed their religion without knowing a thing about it.

After this, it will not be wondered at that, in certain portions

* See *Viêstnik Evròpy*, March, 1881, pp. 366–367.

of the West, people don't seem quite to know to what religion they belong. From the High Procurator's reports it appears that it is no unusual thing for peasants to attend indiscriminately Slavic or Latin mass. They stand, so to speak, on the fence between the two churches, like the inhabitants of a border province, which, in time of war, repeatedly passes from one to the other state. There are some whose ancestors were brought back to Orthodoxy more than fifty years ago, but who, at the distance of two or three generations, have not yet forgotten the faith of their fathers. If the matter is looked into closely, it will be found that the majority of these apparently bi-religious peasants attend the Orthodox service from constraint, and the Catholic service out of inclination. So true is this that, in parishes where the Orthodox are nominally the more numerous, the Russian church remains empty while the Catholic one overflows with worshippers.* Many functionaries make no secret of the fact that numbers of White-Russian and Little-Russian peasants, if left to themselves, would go back to Rome. Indeed, patriots see therein sufficient reason to deny these Western brethren religious liberty. To remove the temptation, it is often thought best to close the *kosciòls* of a whole neighborhood. Thus, in 1886 or 1887, the Governor-General of Warsaw issued an ordinance prohibiting services in the church of Terespol, lest the Roman mass should attract converted Uniates. In 1886 Alexander III. went so far as to decree that, in the districts where Uniates reside, no non-Orthodox church should be opened except with the consent of the Orthodox clergy.

In the Polish provinces annexed by Catherine II. there were two or three millions of these Uniates or United Greeks, mostly native White- or Little-Russians, who recognized the supremacy of the Pope while retaining the Greco-Slavic rite. The union dates from the Council of Brest (in Lithuania) in 1595. It was the master-piece of Rome and the Jesuits. It was a bridge thrown between the two churches; a means of bringing together the Slavs

* The fact is recognized by several Orthodox writers.

of the East and of the West, of giving moral unity to the Slavic world, cut in two, for so many centuries, by religion. It was a piece of practical Panslavism, but Panslavism directed to the good of Rome and the West. That could not suit Moscow. The Poles saw in the Union a bond between the Greek and the Latin subjects of the Commonwealth. To the Russians it was a barrier between the Orthodox of Great-Russia and their brethren in the West. What Polish policy had achieved, Russian policy took to task to undo. That took a century. Catherine II. and Nicolas I. "brought back" to Orthodoxy the Uniates of the empire; Alexander II. brought back those of the Kingdom of Poland. This is probably the only region on the globe where the pontifical rule has receded since the Reformation.

Nicolas I. and his High Procurator, Count Protàssof, once a pupil of the Jesuits, wrested from Rome in this way two millions of spiritual subjects in 1839. "You are Russians," they said to the Uniates; "you belong to the Greek rite; you must join the other Russians and return into the pale of the Greek Church." At the head of the Uniates Archbishop Siemaszko had been placed, a man who, on his own showing in his *Memoirs*, had accepted the episcopal dignity with the express intention of destroying their church. In spite of the complicity of a high clergy picked for the purpose, the "reunion" skilfully prepared through the preceding twelve years, was not effected unresisted. The *knùt* and Siberia played their part in it. The Russians have just one argument in exculpation of their line of action: that the proceedings used to make the Union were no whit better. That may be; but what was done in the sixteenth or seventeenth century would seem to be rather out of place in the nineteenth.* Between

* This is what a Slavophil, passionately Orthodox, Yùri Samàrin, wrote to his father on this subject, in 1842 (the letter is in French): "It is we who have become persecutors. We have taken up, towards the Catholics, the converse position of that which we occupied in the seventeenth century, and all the blame which we rightfully cast on Rome will now fall back on us. It is pitiful." And in another letter of the same year he

the method pursued by old Poland and that pursued by modern Russia, there is at all events this difference—that Poland, great as was her zeal for the Union, allowed non-united Orthodox parishes to subsist under her rule, with their churches, congregations, and clergy, while Russia has strenuously wiped out to the last vestige of the Union. If the Tsar had his will, there should by rights be no Uniates any more. Their church has been suppressed by imperial *ukàz*, as though it were some district institution.

The Union, then, was swept from Russian soil. But there still remained, under Alexander II., 260,000 Uniates in the Kingdom of Poland, which had a separate administration at the time. After the insurrection of 1863, Miliùtin and Tcherkassky had the good fortune to discover, in the very heart of Poland, a nest of Ruthenians or Little-Russians, who had retained the Greek rite. This served as basis to the russifying campaign. These Uniates, surrounded on all sides with Latin Catholics, were much attached to the Union; the authorities wisely forbore from a direct attack. Count Dmitri Tolstòy revived Protàssof's tortuous methods. These last United-Greeks had a bishop devoted to Rome; he was removed. They had Basilian monks hostile to "the Schism;" their convents were closed. From familiar contact with the Latins, these Uniates of Kholm had come to allow the introduction into their churches of certain customs foreign to the Greek rite, such as organs, bell-ringing at the consecration of the Host, benches for the worshippers, scapularies and rosaries: all these things were suppressed; the rite was to be restored to its primitive purity. Once the Uniates' churches had been made exactly like the Russian ones, they were told: "We have the same churches, the same liturgy; we should have the same pastors and the same faith." Ruthenian russophil priests were called in from Galicia for this "purifying" work. The peasants were

wrote: "It is painful to see how our people are acting: with what bad faith, craftiness, perfidy, meanness."—*Russian Archive*, 1880, vol. ii., pp. 285–289.

greatly perturbed at these changes, which, to them, were innovations. "We want to worship as our fathers did," they said to the Governor-General, Count Kotzebue. They were answered that it *was* their fathers' worship which was being restored. The Cosacks' whips silenced the more unruly. In many villages soldiers had to be sent to remove the organs and seats; in some, women were fired at as they defended the entrance to their churches.

When the external assimilation was accomplished, and the priests most devoted to Rome had been removed, the administration, in 1875, went to work to get addresses from the clergy and laity, petitioning for reunion to the mother church. Many of the signatures were obtained by wile or force. The return to Orthodoxy, as effected by Count Tolstòy and the prelate Popiel, was a sleight-of-hand performance. If the government was so bent on doing away with the United-Greek rite, it might have suffered its last adherents to pass into the Latin rite. Instead of which, it insisted on the Uniates going over wholesale to Orthodoxy, and effected this religious annexation after the manner of a political one, without allowing those directly interested as much as a voice in the matter.

Thousands of Uniates refused to accept the act which bound them officially to the Established Church. They were subjected to all the proceedings invented against the Protestants by Louvois, not excluding Cosack garrisons, in the second half of the nineteenth century, under a sovereign justly renowned for his humane feelings. Fines, incarceration, scourging, confiscation, transportation,—everything short of the scaffold was tried on them.* Refractory priests were discharged and banished. So were several hundreds of laymen, some to the government of Kherson, others to that of Orenburg, on the confines of Asia.

* The English Consuls, Messrs. Mansfield and Webster, have described these methods of conversion in their reports for 1874 and 1875, published in the *Blue Book*.

Those who would not become apostates are there still. Families have often been separated, the father being kept in one part of the country, the wife or sons in another. The lands belonging to such rebels have been sequestrated or sold at auction. As to the old Uniates who stayed in the country, they are fined if they do not celebrate Orthodox feast-days, or do not receive the sacraments at the hand of the Orthodox priest. Their own church is abolished and the Latin church is closed against them. They are to slake their spiritual thirst at the official fountain, even though its waters are, in their opinion, tainted, and they are forbidden to drink at the neighboring spring, which alone they deem pure.

A great many prefer to dispense with sacraments altogether. A friend of mine, an Orthodox Russian, has seen a woman dash her new-born babe's skull against a wall rather than have the child baptized by an Orthodox priest. There have been cases of parents committing suicide by asphyxiation, together with the infant who was to be baptized by force. If not all can escape schismatic baptism, many prefer a sort of half legal marriage to the regular Orthodox wedlock. They go off to some place in Galicia, where they get a Uniate priest to marry them. But their children are counted as bastards. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef coolly stated that there were 2365 of these so-called "Cracow marriages" in the government of Siedlce alone. Religious contraband is severely kept down on the Austrian frontier. It is easier for Rome to send missionaries to the remotest parts of China than to "Kholm Russia." A few priests have found their way thither, disguised as peasants or peddlers, hearing confessions and performing marriage ceremonies somewhere in the woods or in back-shops; but most of them were found out and expelled or imprisoned. As to the native clergy, it is sufficient that a Uniate should be seen by the police in conversation with a Catholic priest, or at prayer in a Catholic church, for the priest to be banished and the church closed. The persecution against the Catholics of the Greek rite thus recoils against those of the Latin rite. For-

merly, marriages between United-Greeks and Latins were of frequent occurrence; many Uniates frequented the Latin churches. Thousands passed in this way from one rite to the other. Since the reunion to Orthodoxy, the priests have started out to look for such converts. Armed with the parochial registers, they took up a sort of soul census, taking for granted that the families which had, since 1836, left the Greek rite, should be considered as Orthodox. Let them prove, if they can, that none of their ancestors were baptized by immersion.

The accession to the throne of Alexander III. revived the Uniates' courage. In several places, notably in Biala, many of them refused the ministration of the Orthodox priest for the ceremony of swearing allegiance to the new Tsar. The poor wretches were deceived in their hopes. Up to that time they imagined that their sufferings were unknown to the sovereign. The all-powerful *Ober-Prokuror* undeceived them. He visited Kholm. He studied on the spot ways and means to subdue stubborn resistance. To lend the highest sanction to the work, he ostentatiously associated with it the name of the Tsar. In September, 1888, Alexander III. came himself with solemn pageantry to the cathedral of Kholm. "Your visit," said Archbishop Leontius in his address to the Tsar, "will confirm the Orthodox faith in the hearts of the sons who have come back to our holy church. The people will see with their own eyes *that this faith is their sovereign's, and that they must hold firmly to it.*" Thus speak the clergy; these apostles know of but one argument: the people must be convinced that they have been brought back to the master's faith and shall not be allowed to swerve from it.

The fate of the Union is a warning to the Catholics of that which awaits the three millions of Austro-Hungarian Ruthenians, should they ever fall under Russian rule. It is also a warning to the Holy See against the introduction of the Eastern rite or of the Slavic language into Catholic churches. It is well known that Croats, Slovenes, and Tchekhs should like to substitute Old-

Slavic for Latin in the liturgy. Pope Leo XIII. has made this concession to Montenegro. That the Vatican hesitates to grant the same favor to others is due partly to the lessons taught by Russia. Such men as Tolstòy and Pobiêdonòstsef suggest the dread that Old-Slavic may pave the way for the Schism.

Will Russia, who is so hard on the last Uniates, ever be united herself to Rome? There are Catholics, there are even Russians, who do not despair of such a consummation. The great Slav patriot, Bishop Strossmayer, is not alone to nurse this dream. An Orthodox Moscovite, Vladìmir Soloviòf, sees in it Russia's providential vocation. Is she not manifestly predestined to reconcile the East and the West and—as was the wish of Aksàkof and the Slavophils—to found a truly œcumenic Christian culture, neither Latin nor Byzantine? Russia is "the third Rome," and must unite in herself the first and second. It is hers to throw down the wall, built up by eight or nine centuries, which cuts the Church in two. Thus only can the universal mission be accomplished which she loves to claim as her own.* To bring the two halves of the Church together were not to abandon the Slavic tradition, but to revive it, for Cyril and Methodius, the apostolic brothers, whose tenth centennial all Slavs, both Greeks and Latins, vied in celebrating, were in communion with Rome, and Rome still owns the remains of St. Cyril.

In such a union, Russia, it may be affirmed, would find many advantages, both religious and political. Would it not be the best, perhaps the only way to restore her church to dignity and independence? Would it not be the best possible means to win back the Poles and Western Slavs? possibly the only means to achieve the moral, if not the political, unity of the Slavic world? This seems so manifest that the mere thought of such a possibility

* Vladìmir Soloviòf; *History and Future of Theocracy*, (Russian) Agram, 1887; *L'Idée Russe*, Paris, 1888. *La Russie et l'Église Universelle*, Paris, 1889;—*cf. The Church, an Historical Sketch*, an anonymous work (in Russian), Berlin, 1888.

would terrify the foes of Russia and Slavism. Imagine a covenant between Rome and Moscow, the Pope become the ally of the Tsar; what formidable strength in such an alliance! What a tremendous sensation in East and West! But the foes of Russia need not be alarmed yet. The covenant between the Vatican and the Kremlin is not concluded yet; between the keys of St. Peter and the Russian eagle, religion is not the only barrier.

The religious differences, though aggravated by the promulgation of the infallibility dogma, bear not so much on dogma generally, as on a dislike of many centuries' standing, so deeply rooted in the people that the official church, by a reconciliation with Rome would inevitably strengthen the *raskòl*. Orthodoxy is, in this respect a good deal like Protestantism: the hatred of the papacy—the "No-Popery" feeling—is still with many people the very soul of the Eastern Church; and the Protestant tendencies of a portion of the clergy have still more fomented anti-Romanism. But the principal obstacle is not in the religious conscience; it is in what V. Soloviòf calls "nationalism," in the proneness to glorify everything that seems Russian and to rebel against everything that looks foreign. This national exclusivism finds it not unpleasant to be separated from the West by religion, and does not care to pursue on moral ground the fusion effected by Peter the Great on that of civilization. Isolation is becoming to Russian greatness. To recognize Roman supremacy, even while keeping an autonomous church, would be to lower Russia before the effete West, from which the Slav can borrow nothing more. Even should Moscow ensure thereby the union of all the Slavs, it would seem like an abdication of Slavism. It matters little that this religious nationalism is repugnant to the essentially cosmopolitan spirit of Christianity. Russia is bent on finding everything within herself; she considers herself as a world apart, or rather as the centre of gravity of the coming world. Believing herself called to the intellectual and political hegemony on the continent, she does not like the idea of entering Catholic unity

and becoming part of a whole; she prefers looking on herself as a complete whole, as being almost all by herself, the heritage of Christ, the one Christian nation.

There is another obstacle: after national idolatry comes State idolatry. The State is a jealous god, which brooks not willingly a rival. There is one thing about the Catholic Church which constitutes her superiority in the thinker's eyes, which makes her, so to speak, liberal perforce; it is that, by the nature of her constitution, she sets a limit to the State's omnipotence, that direst tyrant of modern societies. That alone must arouse the distrust of autocracy as well as democracy. The tsars want a church which they can hold in the hollow of their hand, as they do the symbolical globe. Russian autocracy, being in possession of a national church, does not care to transfer the supremacy over it to a foreign authority. Nor would it care to give up the power which centuries have conferred to it over the clergy—or even to share it. Between autocracy and the papacy, between what the Catholics describe as "the tsars' cæsaro-papism," and what the Russians designate as "the popes' cosmopolitan autocracy," there exists a natural antipathy, not to say incompatibility. Each of the two stretches its rights too far not to seem to encroach on the other. Any kind of alliance between Russia and the papacy would be an awkward thing, so long as autocracy remains intact, and on the other side an initiative in this direction could hardly be taken except by one whose will is all-powerful.

In the East politics overrule all possible church questions. And whatever be the nature of the secular power, the State will never willingly abdicate its authority over the clergy. An autocephalous church will always be considered a more docile one than a church "united" to Rome. It is the same with Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, even Greece. In the entire East the obstacle to a union with Rome is more of a political than a religious nature. It is easy to demonstrate to the hierarchy that it can have no independence as regards the civil power except by sacrificing its

ecclesiastical independence. In order to stand up before tsar or king, an Orthodox clergy would have to kneel before the Pope; but, even should it accept the alternative, it is not at all sure that the civil power, whether autocratic or constitutional, would give it the choice. The main advantage which a Christian would derive from the Union, the independence of the Church, is regarded as an evil by those politicians who prefer to keep the Church in a dependent position. If so many Russians dread the Union, it is in great part because it would endow Russia with what she has lacked through all these centuries: a spiritual power. The same feeling prevails in all the small Eastern states: not all Roumanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, would be disinclined to enter into closer communion with the West by making their peace with Rome. There are moments when they would willingly cut the religious bond which links them to Russia, in order to deprive the Moscovite eagle of one hold on the East. It is not so much tradition or national prejudice which keeps them back as the dread to build up a power, rival to the State. In this sense it might be said that the strength of the Orthodox Church really lies in her weakness. Peoples and governments hold her in affectionate regard because they do not fear her.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER III.

Non-Christian Cults—The Jews: their Great Number. Different Aspects of the Jewish Question. Anti-Semitic Disturbances. They have not always been Spontaneous Popular Movements—Russian and Polish Jews. Their Manners; Their Piety; Jewish Life. Legal Status of the Israelites. Restrictions of their Civic Rights. Prohibition to Them to Reside in the Interior of the Empire; to Buy or Lease Land; to Reside in Rural Districts—The Jews and Manual Labor—The Jews and Urban Professions and Trades—Restrictions on the Liquor Trade—Limited Number of Jews Admitted to the Colleges and Universities—Consequences of this Exceptional Legislation. How it Defeats its Own Ends—The Russian West and Jewish Parasitism—Advantage of Israelite Emancipation from the National and Economic Standpoints—The Mussulmans. Resisting Force of Islam in Europe and Asia—Legal Status and Religious Organization of the Mahometans in the Empire—The Orthodox Propaganda and the Mussulmans—The Russian Power and Islam—The Buddhists. Decline of Buddhism in Europe. How it Stands its Ground in Asia. The Lamas and the Christian Propaganda. Slight Direct Influence of Buddhism on the Russian Spirit.

THE Russian territory, as late as under the successors of Peter the Great, was closed against the Jews. At the present day, Russia holds as many Jews as the rest of the world put together. This is an inheritance from Poland which, towards the end of the Middle-Ages, had become the centre of Israel. There are three or four million Jews in the empire, some say quite five millions. Their real number is not known; the statistical data are not reliable. There are certainly more Israelites in Russia, than Swiss in Switzerland, or Dutch in the Netherlands. These millions are not disseminated all over the empire. They are huddled, most of them, in the old Polish provinces and the two or three adjoining governments. In these western provinces, therefore, they make out $\frac{15}{100}$, $\frac{20}{100}$, even $\frac{25}{100}$ of the entire population. As they live

preferably in towns and boroughs, the proportion is still higher there. In many a town of Poland, Lithuania, Little-Russia, the Jews are the majority. Numbers of boroughs, even cities with 20,000 inhabitants, with 30,000, even 50,000, like Balta and Berditchef, are so many sordid Sions where the Christians are lost in the midst of the sons of Jacob, who are here massed once more into a solid nation. The Jews being here more numerous than anywhere else, and the government insisting on keeping them fenced in, one particular region, the so-called (mis-called) Semitic question necessarily assumed an acuter form than in any other country. In Russia, as in Germany, in Austro-Hungary, in Roumania, even in Algeria, this question has several aspects. It can be investigated under three principal aspects, the relative importance of which varies in the different countries. It is at once a religious question, a race question, an economic or social question.* In Russia, as in the rest of Europe, religious feeling has least to do with anti-semitism. Although the popular outbreaks against the Jews mainly occur, from old habit, about Eastertide, it is not so much the non-Christian whom the people hate in the Jew, as the alien and the "exploiter."

Europe has not forgotten the anti-Jewish riots which disgraced the first years of Alexander III. These savage scenes were no novelty. The Jew, since he has come to dwell on the banks of the Dniepr and the Niêmen, has plied trades too hateful to the people not to have accumulated a large hoard of hereditary grudges against him. Under the Polish misrule, as later under Russian domination, he has been the historical tool of public or private extortion. He has been the grindstone under which the nobles or the State ground the people. To this day, in Little-Russia, the Jew is, indirectly, a fiscal agent. In the villages,

* This Jewish or Semitic question, which at the present time is rife in so many countries, is too complex to be covered in a few pages. We intend to return to it one of these days in a work on Judaïsm and the part which the Jews play in the modern world.

when the local police officer (*Stanovòy*) comes down to sell the cattle of an insolvent tax-payer, he brings with him a Jew. To these grudges, grown rife through centuries, against the farmer of the State's and the landlord's rights add those of the insolvent debtor against his creditor, the jealousy of the trader against a luckier or smarter competitor, not to speak of the utter contempt which the masses entertain for a race at all times predestined to be the victim of extortion.

In spite of so many leavens of hatred, the anti-semitic riots of thirteen years ago do not seem to have been a wholly spontaneous explosion of pent-up popular fury. It was in part the recoil of the anti-semitic agitation in Germany. Only, while in one empire the matter ended with newspaper articles and election ranting, in the other it culminated in violence against property and persons. The Russian press also had started a campaign against the Jews, who represent one of those foreign substances which it irks Moscovite patriots so sorely to feel in Russia's flesh. This fact was the more significant that the attacks came from papers wholly dependent on the administration and, at least in the provinces, subject to preliminary censure. It was only a few months after Alexander II's. tragic end. Russia, angered and panic-stricken, instinctively looked around for a scapegoat on which to heap her sins and her resentment. A few young Israelites of both sexes had taken part in the conspiracies against the Liberator. The press pointed out the Jew, "the dirty, mangy wretch" to the people's wrath. And the people made him the target of both their patriotic vengeance and their private grudges. The authorities, unnerved, haunted by visions of plots, connived or looked away. It seemed as though the men in power were glad, in those days of anguish, of something to divert their attention from political fears and terrorist conspiracies.

In many cities the riots broke out simultaneously, on a certain day, and almost everywhere after the same methods, not to say the same programme. They began with the arrival of bands of

agitators whom the railways brought. Frequently, placards had been posted the day before, accusing the Jews of fomenting nihilism and charging them with the assassination of the Emperor. To stir the masses, articles out of anti-semitic papers were read in the streets and tap-rooms, and given out as imperial *ukàzes* ordering the people to beat and plunder the Jews, with the wily addition that, if the *ukàzes* had not been published, it was because the authorities had been bribed by Israel. This is a bait to which the people almost always rise, especially when their greed or vengeance are aroused. And in fact, a rumour spread far and wide that an order of the Tsar gave three days to plunder the Jews. In sundry localities the carelessness of the police, the indifference of the authorities, the passive attitude of the troops, who looked on, gun in arm, at the sack of the Israelite quarter, were well calculated to confirm the belief in this injurious legend in a people who, as Yùri Samàrin remarked, never believes authorities are in earnest unless they use force.* More than once the Jews who attempted to defend themselves were disarmed and arrested ; those who dared to stand guard at the door of their dwelling, revolver in hand, were prosecuted for carrying forbidden arms. The clergy, both bishops and priests, Orthodox and Catholic alike, very different in this from the *tchinòvniks*, were honorably active in their efforts to restrain the rioters. Several stopped the plunderers by placing themselves in their path bearing the holy *eïkons*. Many a rabbi or *zadig* found shelter under a priest's roof.

In numbers of towns and boroughs the hunting down of Jews was allowed to proceed with impunity for several days. "After all, they have deserved a good lesson," functionaries were heard to say. In Kief, the civil and military authorities looked on as at a show ; it looked as though the soldiers were acting escort to the rioters. Balta, a town of over 20,000 inhabitants, the great majority of whom were Jews, was given up to pillage through thirty-six hours, like a place taken by assault, in time of war.

* See Vol. I., Book VII., ch. ii.

Out of over one thousand houses belonging to Israelites, not forty remained intact. On the other hand, wherever the authorities showed a sterner front, the people did not stir. So in the North-West, where the Israelites are most numerous, and where, therefore, the pent-up passion against them might be supposed to be most intense, a declaration of the Governor-General, to the effect that he would tolerate no excesses, was sufficient to stay any riotous beginnings ; the hero of Sebastòpol was known as a man of his word, and anti-semitism kept quiet.

In the South-West, where the Jews seemed given up to popular vengeance, there were scenes of desolation. The houses which were not marked with a cross were invaded by the mob. Doors were beaten in, show-windows demolished, window-frames torn out. Furniture was thrown out of windows, crockery smashed, house-linen torn up, with a joy in destruction both childlike and savage. The mob took untold delight in ripping open feather-beds and down quilts, and sending the contents drifting in the air like a fall of snow. In several places the pleasure the mob took in sheer destruction overcame their rapacious instincts. Peasants who came from their villages with wagons to take away their share of booty, were repeatedly driven away by the rioters. For in certain boroughs, after the house-gear was destroyed, the houses went—floors and roofs being carried away, and nothing left standing but the bare stone walls. Not even the synagogues and cemeteries were spared by popular fury. The tombs were desecrated and the rolls of the *Thora* defiled. The mob naturally made first for the taverns and tap-rooms. Barrels were staved in ; whiskey ran down the streets ; men lay down in the gutters flat on their stomachs, to gorge themselves with the stuff. In several localities, women, crazed with drink, gave pure spirits to swallow to infants two or three years old, that they might forever after remember these glorious days. Others brought their small children to the ruins of the Jewish houses, there to bid them "remember the judgment they had seen overtake the Jews."

Still, the mob vented their passion on property rather than on persons, as though reflecting that, by attacking their possessions, they would strike the Jews in the most sensitive spot. Many were maltreated; some injured for life; scarcely any one was killed on the spot; there was no massacring or tearing to pieces. There was no blood spilled—a thing which would have been impossible in nations calling themselves "civilized." The mob acted barbarously, but not savagely,—so naturally gentle is this people, even when exasperated; then, too, they may have been fearful of overstepping the supposed imperial *ukàz*, which commanded them to beat and plunder the Jews, not to kill them. In the very midst of these dreadful scenes, Israelites have told of traits showing the Russian's innate kindness of heart, and also his credulity. In the village of Oriêkhof some peasants invaded the house of a poor Jewish widow, who told them of her destitution and begged for mercy. The *mujiks*, not daring to pass her by entirely, as that would have been disobeying the Tsar's command just broke a few window panes, "so as to have done their duty anyhow," they explained.*

Still, however gentle and docile a people may be, those who have let it loose can never know where it will stop. The authorities began to fear lest the rising against the Jewish traders might extend to other classes—the nobles, the landholders, the government officials. Anti-semitism could at any moment turn into a genuine socialistic movement. This was precisely what the terrorist party, always eager to fish in troubled waters, were aiming at. I have myself seen a circular in the Little-Russian dialect, wherein the people were told that the Jew was not the only "exploiter," and were advised to turn their attention to the police and officials.

It was time that order should be restored. A few patriots, of those who could be least suspected of partiality towards the Jews, such as Katkòf, ventured to claim in their favor the protection of the law. The editor-in-chief of the *Moscow Gazette* felt that a

* *The Russian Hebrew*, June 25, 1881.

great empire could not proscribe at one sweep a whole race and its religion. The central power at last decided to step in. The mischief makers were apprehended,—true, to be, many of them, soon discharged. Light penalties were inflicted—so light as to be almost farcical; and that in a country where, for the least attempt at an agrarian riot, peasants are hanged, in spite of the official abolition of the death penalty. The real punishment was evolved out of the troubles themselves. The Jews being temporarily ruined or vanished, the rural products found no purchasers and dropped down to starvation prices, while those of merchandise and provisions rose immoderately in the towns, where the shops had been demolished and the shopkeepers put to flight.

The Polish and Russian are mostly very different from the French Israelites. The Alsatian Jews might give us some idea of them. Only a very few have assimilated modern culture. Living in compact masses, the Jews of White-Russia, of Little- and New-Russia form a separate people in the midst of the native population. They have not only a religion, but almost a nationality of their own. They are distinct and apart from the Christians in all their habits. They have their national costume, the long-skirted coat or gaberdine familiar to all the markets of Central Europe. They have their language, known as the "jargon," a sort of corrupt German with some Hebrew words thrown in. They have their literature and their periodicals, in Russian, in German, in Hebrew, sometimes even their theatres, and actors.

With the exception of the chosen few who lead (externally) the same life as the Gentiles, these millions of Abraham's sons are strict observers of the law. They are not less religious, nor less attached to rite, than the Orthodox or Catholic peasants in the midst of whom they live. Many among the poorest occupy their leisure in poring over the Thora and Talmud. Besides the *Schule* or Synagogue, which they attend most assiduously, they have, for purposes of study or prayer, filthy oratories, known as

minjanim or *beth-hamidrasch.* The poor Jews of the western towns form associations, not for amusement and music, but for the reading and expounding of the Hebrew books. In Vilna, a city honored in Lithuania with the title of "Mother in Israel," there were lately over twenty *chevropoalim* or associations of Israelite artisans, with each its *Klause* or chapel. The butchers of Vilna support, besides, a *jeschiva* or higher Talmudic school, which is attended by a hundred or so *bochurim* or Talmud students. It is the same in Warsaw, in Berditchef, in all the centers of Jewish life. These pious associations are encouraged by the idea, common to Israelites and Christians, that the combined prayer of many is more efficacious. They usually pray in groups, each group or *minjan* consisting of at least ten adult males, for among the Jews as among the Mussulmans, religion, meaning rather devotional practices, is cultivated more by women than men. The members of each *minjan* come together three times a day, bringing with them the prayer instruments—the *tephilim* and the *taleth.* In summer, the more zealous assemble at dawn, *i.e.*, at two or three o'clock, for the first prayer. Each *chevra* or association has its *maggid* or reader, whom it supports. There are a great many of these doctors of various degrees—*maggid rav talmid*—most of whom live by their labors, as many of the rabbis themselves. The latter, being generally graduates of official schools, appointed or approved by the government, are not always regarded with much favor. The most fanatical among the Jews, the *khassidim* or kabbalists, have their *zadigs* or saints, whom they surround with superstitious veneration and load with gifts.*

Thus Jewish life, with its peculiar culture, the product of twenty centuries of isolation, flourishes among the snows of the

* We cannot speak here of the *Karaïm*, the non-Talmudist Jews, of whom there are only a few thousands left, mostly in the Crimea. The *Karaïm* are different from the other Jews in all their ways. They are much better liked both by Christians and Mussulmans, and are better treated by the Russian law.

North, protected against external influences by the very dislike and contempt of the Gentiles. Side by side with the Christian Middle-Ages, and much better preserved, the Jewish Middle-Ages still survive in Russsia, imbued through and through with the traditions and the customs of the old ghettos. This life *more judaïco*, after the manner of forefathers whose bones are scattered over the East and West, these three or four millions of Israelites lead it as freely under the black Moscovite eagle as they did under the white Polish eagle. They have their cemeteries and their synagogues which rival in grandeur and splendor the Orthodox cathedrals ; they have their slaughter-houses to supply them with *kosher* meat ; their public baths for purification from legal impurities. They are organized in self-governing communities and have even retained the right of levying on their own people special taxes devoted to the support of their institutions. Their worship is free, and so is the observance of all ritual practices, with only the one restriction which the law imposes on all dissident religions : they may not make proselytes, nor oppose Orthodox proselytism among them. In 1887, in Warsaw, a Hebrew father and mother were prosecuted for having opposed the conversion to Orthodoxy of their daughter, Mme. Lysakôf. In the same year, in Kharkof, an old Jew, named Tichtenstein, was arrested for attending the synagogue after having allowed himself to be baptized a long time before. Few years do not bring some trials of this description. Such cases, unheard of elsewhere, are common in Russia. It is the common law, and the courts apply it equally to Jews, Catholics, or Protestants.

If they enjoy religious liberty, so far as compatible with Russian law, the Israelites are far from possessing civic liberty and equality.

The Hebrew subjects of the Tsar are placed under a special legislation, inspired partly by religious, partly by national and economic considerations. This very complicated legislation includes over a thousand articles scattered through the fifteen vol-

umes of the Russian Code.* These laws, continually re-handled, form an inextricable chaos. They are not the same for the empire as for the kingdom of Poland, where the Jews have benefited by Polish tolerance and the French traditions of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. To the laws are added ministerial instructions and secret circulars, which supplement and modify them, sometimes aggravating, sometimes alleviating them. It is more than a century since the partition of Poland gave Russia this Jewish problem, and she has not yet been able to solve it. The incoherence of the present legislation is recognized of all ; each reign promises a thorough overhauling. Alexander III. placed the reform in the hands of a commission which sat for years under the presidency of Count Pahler. In 1888 it was announced that the commission had ended its labors. May they not amount to the heaping up of a mountain of "materials," but may they give the question a solution worthy of the great empire !

The Jews are at present treated as aliens ; or, more correctly, they are treated as natives as regards obligations, as aliens as regards rights. This principle may not be expressed in so many words ; the law nevertheless is based entirely upon it. It lays on the Jews all the same burdens as on the natives, comprising taxes and military service, but withholds from them the fulness of civic rights.

The most elementary of liberties, that of coming and going, and electing a place of residence, is not for the Jew. He cannot live where he will ; the right of travelling and residing in all and any parts of the empire, guaranteed by law to all the other subjects of the Tsar, is denied by that same law to the four millions of Israelites. Only one region is open to them : the lands that were Poland, and a few adjoining governments of Little- and New-

* See the *Digest of Laws on the Hebrews*, (St. Petersburgh, 1885) by E. Levin ; Orshansky, *Russian Legislation regarding the Hebrews*. For the condition of the Jews prior to the Russian rule, see Huppe, *Verfassung der Republik Polens*, viii., p. 232.

Russia. The rest of the empire—*i.e.* the whole of Great-Russia, of old-time Moscovia, and almost all the Russian possessions in Europe and Asia,—remains closed against them. Exceptions are made only in favor of a very small privileged minority. By confining the Jews within the former Polish provinces, where they found them installed, the tsars apparently intended to preserve Holy Russia from the Israelite leprosy. The Jew, being looked on as a pest, was shut up in the western provinces as in a lazaretto.

But even within the pale assigned them, there are tracts and cities where the Jews cannot reside. So, since 1858, they are forbidden to reside within at least 50 versts (about 35 miles) from the frontiers of Austria and Prussia. This prohibition, suggested by dread of smuggling, could not long be kept up in practice, but it still exists legally, and once in a while the law is enforced with a rigour which seems the more cruel from its having been suffered to fall into disuse. In some localities, the Jews, after having been allowed to settle on this strip of borderland, were abruptly removed in obedience to some sudden ordinance. This very thing happened in Volhynia, in 1881: the expulsion ruined thousands of families. But it was only partial; the poor were ruthlessly expelled; the rich bought themselves off. It naturally is with the Jews as it used to be with the *raskólniks:* exceptional measures make them tributary to the police. They find themselves in a net with such small meshes that they can hardly stir without breaking one. The smartest is never sure of being on the right side of the law; the police always has some handle to him. This is so true, that one of the objections to their emancipation is that it is in the interest of the *tchinóvniks* and the entire administration to keep them in that legal net.

In the very heart of the region assigned to the Semites, the metropolis of Western Russia, Kief, the holy city on the Dnieper, claims the privilege of remaining closed against the Jewish dogs. Only Israelites belonging to certain categories are allowed there, but only in one suburb. The legal controversies arising from the

presence of Jews in Kief would fill volumes. A few years ago, during one of my trips to Russia, a banker from Odessa stopped at one of the best hotels in Kief. As soon as the hotel keeper saw on his passport the designation "Hebrew," he sent him away. Every year Kief glories in the expulsion of several of these contemners of the faith.

These domiciliary laws give rise to the most shocking anomalies. They place the Israelites below the par of criminals, who are forbidden to reside in certain cities, principally the capitals, only for a certain time after they have served their term. Still, among these pariahs of the empire there are some whom the law permits to reside in the interior. These are, on one hand, university graduates; on the other, merchants of the first guild, in other words merchants who pay a high license. The law shows the same favor to artisans entered in some trade-union, but only for a limited time. But few take advantage of it, because they don't dare to settle in a town, as they might be expelled at any moment. A Hebrew artist or scientist cannot legally reside in the capitals unless he has a diploma. According to the letter of the law, the greatest living Russian sculptor, Antokolsky, a corresponding member of the Institute of France, has not the right to live in Petersburgh.

It is but natural that the Israelites should strive to jump the legal fence which is arbitrarily built up around them. That sometimes compels them to the queerest shifts. Here are two instances. A young man, to whom his doctor's degree gave the right of free residence, could keep his aged parents with him in Petersburgh only by having his father registered as his valet, and his mother as his cook. A young girl who came to Moscow to study stenography found no other way of escaping expulsion by the police than to take out a prostitute's passport, this being the only class of Jewish women who enjoy the right of residing wherever they please. But the young girl, having undergone the usual medical examination, was expelled after all, as not belonging to the "pro-

fession" which would have ensured her the right of free residence in the capitals. It is easy to guess to what innumerable abuses such regulations lend themselves. Fortunately, the rigor of the legislation is tempered by the venality of the police, which finds ways of granting indefinitely renewable delays. The manner of enforcing the laws varies according to times and localities. Sometimes the wealthy are allowed to dodge them, sometimes again some ministerial circular enjoins the utmost strictness. Under Alexander III., after the anti-semitic troubles, thousands of Jews were suddenly driven out of localities where their presence had long been tolerated, such as Kief, Oriòl, even Moscow.

Within the narrow limits assigned them, at least, do the Jews enjoy the same rights as their fellow subjects? By no means. Several essential rights are withheld from them. In these western provinces where they are allowed to reside, they may not purchase lands. The prohibition was issued—or renewed—in 1864. A few had taken advantage of the Emancipation to buy some land. This was promptly put a stop to. Many took up lands on long leases, and worked them for themselves or sublet them in lots to peasants. This also was forbidden them by the "temporary provision" of 1882. They may not farm lands, nor buy any outside of towns and cities, nor may they fill the position of bailiffs or stewards. It is alleged that Jewish farmers, in their passionate greed for money, exhaust the soil; but in this respect the merchants and village usurers of Great-Russia are no whit better. Of course the Jew would be more careful of the soil if he owned it. As the law stands now, he can loan money to the peasants and farmers, but cannot take up a mortgage, so he has to charge higher interest. He can buy up crops, speculate on grain, but has not the right to foreclose. The law will let him be nothing but a middle-man; and it is a well-known fact that, throughout the West, all business transactions go through the hands of the Jews.

They do not till the soil, it is said. The law's object in for-

bidding them to own land is merely to prevent them from ruining the nobles and the peasants. True, the Jew is not an agriculturist. Indeed this is one of the greatest difficulties which the semitic question presents in the East of Europe, where urban life is little developed as yet and agriculture is the great mainstay. Why has the Jew forsworn the plow? History gives the answer. It is now near on two thousand years since he was torn out of the soil with the roots. All through the Middle-Ages the law kept him cooped up in city ghettos; and it is a well-known thing that urban populations never go back to work in the field. That is a historical law. The Jew, in this respect does not differ from other races. No man ever returns to the hard labor of the glebe once he has left it. Moreover the Jew has not the physical stamina for it. Muscular energy with him is reduced to a minimum. City life, the confinement of the ghettos, hereditary poverty, have enfeebled him. Russian military statistics bear witness to the fact: more Jews have to be exempted from service, in proportion, than Russians or Poles. Many have not the required size, or are found wanting in the width of chest. The race has been too long the prey of physiological degeneracy, the inevitable consequence of wretched economic conditions.

The greatest service that could be done the Jews of central and eastern Europe would be to take back large numbers of them to field labor. The semitic question would then be half solved. The attempt, started in other countries by the Jews themselves, was made by the government about 1810 and again about 1840. Alexander I., Nicolas I. especially, founded Israelite agricultural colonies on several points. But they did not prosper very greatly. It is true that not much could be expected from colonies kept by the authorities under strict regulations, with retired sub-officers to teach agriculture at the whip's end.

It is not by forbidding them to own land that the Israelites can be induced to take to field labor, still less by forbidding them to live in villages. Yet this is what has been forbidden

them over and over again, and lately again, by Alexander III. "temporary" ordinance in 1882. Since this last year they can no longer settle anywhere outside of town and boroughs. This is the best that the Tsar's counsellors could invent to forestall a repetition of the anti-semitic riots, as though it had not been the cities from which the signal had gone forth. All these measures are double-edged: they wound the Christian, whom they pretend to protect, as well as the Jew, whom they are meant to strike. In many a locality the price of land, for purchase or leases, has gone down considerably in consequence, while the rate of interest on money loaned to farmers or landholders has gone up.

If the State insists on keeping the Jews from rural occupations, it should make every effort to keep them in the cities by throwing open to them all the urban crafts and professions. But no. Even on this limited field their enterprise stumbles against exceptional laws, ministerial regulations, secret circulars. As to State positions, the Israelites need not think of them. The law declares them incapable of holding any public office, with very few exceptions. They can be State engineers, but as a matter of fact hardly any achieve the position unless they begin by getting baptized. They also can be military surgeons; but the regulation limits Jewish candidates to 5% of the positions to be filled. As to elective offices, salaried or unpaid, the law disqualifies them for nearly all. A Jew cannot be mayor of a town or "elder" of a village. Jews can never fill more than one tenth of the places on jury panels or one third of those in municipal councils, even in such towns and cities where they form the majority.

They are beset by legal or "administrative" restrictions even in private careers. Quite lately it was decreed that they should be expelled from the service of the railroads of the South-West. One trait will show in what way the authorities understand the liberties accorded to the Jews. The law concedes to those who are provided with a pharmacist's diploma the right of residing in

all parts of the empire. The Petersburgh authorities have nevertheless closed all the pharmacies kept by Jews, on the plea that the right of *residing* in the capital did not imply that of opening a pharmacy there. That is of a piece with all the jurisprudence which deals with these matters. Where Jews are concerned, the principle which lies at the bottom of every legislation is inverted: it is considered that everything is forbidden them which is not formally allowed them.

Here another instance of the restrictions imposed on Jewish enterprise: The law guarantees to the Jewish merchants of the first guild free residence anywhere in the empire, it places them on a par with those of Russian blood. Yet, in the face of the law, this or that trade, this or that industry, are arbitrarily forbidden them. So they are forbidden to ply the liquor trade and to keep distilleries outside the pale of Jewish residence. A great many Israelites in the West are inn-keepers, barroom keepers. Thousands of families have made their living in these trades for centuries; and now, under Alexander III. there was some serious talk of absolutely debarring them from it. And although this prohibition was not actually formulated, the same end has been attained, indirectly, by regulations concerning tap-rooms and taverns. They are charged with encouraging drunkenness. But that is the liquor dealer's way, not specially the Jew's. Statistics demonstrate that the provinces where the greatest quantity of alcohol is consumed and alcoholism claims the largest number of victims are those where there are no Jews.

An old law of Tsar Alexis Mikhaïlovitch, confirmed in 1835, by Nicolas I., forbids the Jews to employ the services of Christians, making it, up to 1865, a crime punishable with death. This law, inspired by religious considerations, was usually understood to apply only to domestic servants, and Jewish tradesmen and merchants could, unhindered, employ Christians in their business. Nevertheless, the authorities, still under Alexander III., occasionally would forbid Jewish employers to have Christians in their

factories or commercial houses. This amounted to making industrial enterprise impossible to them and taking the bread from the Christians in their employ. Such a measure could not endure. The obsolete law issued by Peter the Great's father was suspended in 1887. A Jew now can have Christian servants and employés, with the single obligation—and that is but right—that he will let them attend unhindered to their religious duties.

On the other hand, as though by way of compensation, a new and possibly harder restriction, has recently been imposed on the Russian subjects of the Mosaïc law. The government of Alexander III. undertook to limit the number of Israelites to be admitted to the colleges and universities. Yet what better than a common education could assist the fusion of the Jews with the other classes? What more apt to uproot their traditional prejudice and lift them out of their Talmudic exclusivism than classical studies and the university course? What, in other races, is universally regarded as praiseworthy—the taste for learning—becomes a crime in the sons of Jacob. In Russia as in Germany they are found fault with for their eagerness at learning, the unavowed truth being that their success on the humble arena of scholar contests is looked on with jealousy. The fact is that in sundry cities the gymnasiums for both sexes were simply overrun with Semites. In Odessa, the city of all the empire where the Jews are most prosperous, the proportion of Jewish students in the Russian colleges reached $\frac{6}{100}$ and even $\frac{7}{100}$. This was a scandal which had to be seen to. The Ministry of Public Instruction appears to have seen there a danger to national culture. It was accordingly decreed in 1887 that no gymnasium should henceforth receive more than $\frac{1}{100}$ of Jewish students even in those districts and cities where the Jewish element makes out $\frac{25}{100}$ or $\frac{30}{100}$ of the entire population. In the interior provinces the number of Israelite students must not pass $\frac{5}{100}$ and $\frac{3}{100}$ is the proportion decreed for the colleges of the two capitals.

This measure has been extended to the universities. The per-

centage of Israelites who are to be permitted to study law, medicine and the other sciences has been reduced to a farcical figure. So in 1887, of seventy-five Israelite youths who registered for the University of Dorpat, seven were admitted. How heart-sore and indignant must those young men be, who see themselves debarred from higher education and, consequently, the few liberal careers which the law proclaims open to them! There has been much complaint that among the foremost volunteers of nihilism Israelites of both sexes were found. But—are such proceedings calculated to make them love Russia and the Tsar? Truly, if the fomentors of the revolution had accomplices in the councils of the sovereign, no better measure could be suggested to him to swell the ranks of that intellectual proletariat from which their adherents are drawn. We must not forget that such restrictions are producive of more harm to a Jew than they would be to anybody else, since the Russian law make the refusal of a university to him tantamount to a refusal of the right of free residence in the capital and in the empire.

It is self-evident that all this special legislation defeats its own ends. It tends to foment in the Jews the very faults which are most justly laid to their charge. It does its best to throw them back on themselves, to isolate them in the midst of the other races, to make of them a separate people within the nation. What are the accusations most frequently and most justly formulated against the Jews? They all come under two principal heads, one of them economic, the other national. They are charged with exclusivism; with a propensity to hold themselves aloof from the people among whom they dwell; with forming, through the ages and the most different civilizations, a separate tribe, having its own laws, customs, interests.

There is truth in the charge, at least as regards the Jews of Eastern Europe. But the legal barriers raised up between them and the Christians, the effort to keep them confined within certain

boundaries, to limit them to certain trades, certain schools, the regulations issued with the object of debarring them from higher culture,—would it not seem that all these things were specially invented to perpetuate their isolation, to sink them more and more deeply into their Talmudic prejudices, to feed their grudges against the *Goïm*, to leave them no other national consciousness than that of Hebrew, no native soil but race—Israel—and their *kahal?*

A crime is made of their solidarity, their tendency to form themselves into corporations under the control of their own chiefs or their local board, the *kahal*, clandestinely re-instituted with the object of getting Christians into its toils. People forget that, for centuries, this corporative organization was forced on them; that it existed everywhere before the Revolution; that it was made more stringent by persecution or the ill-will of the surrounding population; that in Russia itself, as everywhere else through the Middle-Ages, it was long kept up by the State for purposes of tax-collecting; that from Catherine II. down to Nicolas I., the Russian laws placed the Jews under the yoke of their communities; that these Israelite consistories had even been given the right to appoint the Jews to be drafted for military service; that even at the present day, after the *kahals* have been officially abolished, the Jewish communities continue to collect for their special needs certain obligatory dues known under the name of "box-duties." If it is desired that they should cease to adhere so closely together and to form, in a way, a solid mass, the law should at least not make it necessary for them to do so, by isolating them from the Christians.

The same from the economic standpoint. To impose legal restraints on Israelite enterprise, to debar them from liberal and scientific careers, to systematically shut in their faces all intellectual outlets,—this means condemning them to the very trades which they are blamed for preferring, and which they are accused of monopolizing after being shut up in them. It is the general complaint that they are almost all tradesmen, middlemen, money-changers and money-lenders, peddlers, liquor dealers; yet let one

of them venture out of his shop or counting house, he is promptly pushed back. It is the general outcry that the Jews are nothing but parasites, yet they are strenuously imprisoned within those very professions which are designated as parasitical.

The Jew, it is affirmed, loathes any kind of productive labor; he is essentially an "exploiter," who lives and gets rich on the labor of others. There is truth in that also, at least in one sense. The Jew is mostly only a middleman between the producer and the consumer, and the fewer such middlemen there are, the better. But is it to be laid down as an absolute axiom that every tradesman, every merchant, every intermediate agent is necessarily a parasite? And if this is true of the Jew, the Semite, why not equally so of the Christian, the Aryan? Is not circulation an essential function of the social body, as of every living organism?

The Jew, it is claimed, tries, by every means, to shirk manual labor. This also is true. But is it a peculiarity of the Semite alone? He has, in reality, only stolen a march on us. Do we not see nowadays, in every civilized land, that the dweller in the country, as well as the dweller in cities, uses the utmost ingenuity to save himself muscular labor? Disgust with work done actually with the hands and arms, infatuation for commerce, "positions," any and every occupation which does not demand bodily exertion—these things, alas, are far from being peculiar to Israel. On the other hand, and in spite of the drawbacks of this growing repugnance to muscular labor, are we justified in asserting, with some of our own socialists, that the labor of the body is alone productive? Yet this is what all anti-semites imply, in Russia and in the West.

The accusation, moreover, is not quite founded in Russia. There, as everywhere where they are numerous and massed together in compact groups, by no means all the Jews live by traffic. Probably the greater number of these sons of Shem are compelled to earn their livelihood by the labor of their hands, at the sweat of their brow, just like the sons of Japhet.

In fact, Sarmatian Israel knows of few manual crafts which are not plied by the descendants of Abraham ; several, of the humblest or coarsest, are well nigh monopolized by them. Numbers are tailors, shoemakers, locksmiths, joiners, saddlers, coachmen, butchers, tilers, painters, dyers. Although they prefer trades requiring more deftness than strength, many are carpenters, smiths, masons, road laborers. Most stone houses in the western cities have been built by Jewish hands.

The Israelite communities are much concerned in their artisans' well-being. I have visited, especially in Warsaw, industrial schools wherein Jewish children were taught various trades. Unfortunately technical instruction is not sufficient to insure Jewish workingmen against poverty. Being too numerous for the needs of the urban or rural population in the West, they are mostly the victims of the inexorable law of demand and supply. The competition between them is homicidal, and the Christian workingman suffers under it no less than they do. The majority work at nominal prices. There are few countries where labor is cheaper. Accordingly, nine tenths of these Russian Jews are a prey to all the horrors of the sweating system. Crowded into close and fetid lodgings, unventilated, inaccessible to light, several families in one room—the families almost always numerous—these miserably lean Jews, married before they are twenty, wrestle with all the ills and diseases entailed by destitution. Nothing saves their bodies and souls from the deleterious effects of extreme poverty, but temperance, endurance, and religion.

The truth is, the Jews are suffocating in the legal boundaries within which they are confined. To live at all, they should have those regions thrown open to them where the demand is greater for urban labour and professions. The entire West is manifestly overstocked with tradesmen, small shopkeepers, small craftsmen, while in the East or Centre the want of them is often felt. Take a map of Russia : in the region where the Jews reside, the cities, in great part peopled by them, are much more nu-

merous and more closely crowded than in those portions of the empire which are closed against them. The merest glance at the statistical tables reveals a startling lack of balance, an artificial distribution of the urban population, held fast in the Western provinces by the law as by a dyke which prevents it from freely overflowing the adjacent regions. In order that the Jewish population may find its natural level, it is necessary to open out new fields to it. The Christian population is scarcely less interested in the matter. The Emperor Alexander III. appointed in the governments of the West commissions to study the Semitic question; they almost unanimously declared in favor of the suppression of the pale-line. And how could it be otherwise? These provinces are entirely Jew-ridden. They have been given to understand, almost officially, that the Jews are parasites, blood suckers, destructive locusts; they are naturally not pleased at being delivered over to them. It would almost seem as though, in settling the Jews in the provinces inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Roumanians, Little-Russians, and White-Russians, Russia gave them to devour those of her children who are least near to her heart.

In spite of the harm consequent on this accumulation of the urban Jewish element on so circumscribed an area, the Russian West is by no means entirely ravaged and denuded by these locusts which have been eating it for centuries. The earth is still verdant and the gold of the ears still shines in the sun. Several of these provinces, especially in White-Russia, are among the least fertile in the empire; yet the economic development is in no way way behind that of provinces protected against Israelite parasitism. Far from it, some of these Western *gubèrnias* stand in the front as regards agricultural as well as industrial development—witness the Kingdom of Poland, which, though possessed of a rather poor soil, is now one of the wealthiest portions of the empire.

Against opening the interior of Russia to the Israelites two

objections can be brought forward, of unequal weight: one of the political or national, the other of the economic order. From the national standpoint, there is reason to fear lest the Jews, with their high average of births, may denationalize the regions opened to them. Such a fear, indeed, is well founded in a small state like Roumania, but not in such a vast country as Russia; nothing ever will make an Israel of that colossus. It is the Jews instead who, if they are scattered all over the empire, will be more easily denationalized. The more widely and thinly spread the Semitic layer, the easier it will be to russify.

The economic objection is of a more serious nature. To throw Great-Russia open to the Israelites, they say, means delivering her up to Semitic greed. The time is far when Peter the Great asserted that one of his Moscovite merchants was a match for any four Jews. And yet the Russian *kuptsŷ* have shown mercantile abilities which seem to make them better equipped than either the White-Russian or the Little-Russian for a struggle against Israel. One thing, at all events, appears beyond doubt, and that is that competition would be the best possible stimulant for Russia and her commerce. Competition alone could impart to her the spirit of enterprise in which she is so lacking, and which is one source of her inferiority to that other colossus of the modern world—America.

Public wealth would certainly be the winner. But would not the people be the loser? Would not the peasant and the workingman be ground down by odious abuse of capital? To anybody familiar with the conditions of Russian life, this appears most unlikely. As regards the grinding of man by man, the Russian laborer has nothing to lose; the small village industries, especially the so-called "cottage industries," are in the toils of an organized system of grinding machinery, worked by middlemen for large wholesale houses. The extortions they practise and their dishonesty pass all belief, Mr. Bezobràzof assures us. "What goes on, on market days, in certain industrial centres, such as Pàvlovó,

the Russian Sheffield, defies description.* Men are like wild beasts gone forth to devour one another." There, in the heart of Russia, far away from the Jewish parasites, Orthodox "buyers" make 100 per cent. and more on their commissions or on moneys they advance. It is the same in villages and rural communes. The "fists" and the "mir-eaters" have nothing to learn from Jewish usurers. † For many communes numbers of peasants, undone by the inhuman rate of interest, only nominally own their lands; in reality they have became their creditors' bondsmen. The first effect of opening Great-Russia to the Jews would be a general lowering of the rate of interest, by which peasant and workingman would at once benefit.

It is alleged that the Jews demoralize the people. What have statistics to say to this? The proportion of crimes and misdemeanors is, on the whole, smaller in the Western governments. More than that—crimes are rarer with Israelites than with Christians. This, it is objected, is because the Jews dodge the laws—as if Russian laws were not in the habit of being dodged by everybody! Besides, the laws which the Jews elude are usually the special, arbitrary, oppressive laws issued against them; and in this case the law itself is the criminal. Moreover, the Jews, in violating them, have accomplices—the authorities and the police. It is all these exceptional laws, frequently awkward to enforce, which are demoralizing, both to the authorities and to the Jews. It is clearly not always easy to make of an imaginary geographical line an impassable Chinese wall. The simplest way out of it all would be to abolish all this bothersome legislation and to subject the Israelites to the common law of the country, which should be enforced in all its rigor.

There now remains the last, the great, the supreme objection: "Our Russian Jews," you will hear repeated in every key from

* Vladìmir Bezobràzof, *Études sur l'Économie Nationale de la Russie*, Vol. II., 2d part, pp. 173 and 174. Compare 1st part, p. 262.

† See Vol. I., Book VIII., Ch. IV.

Petersburgh to Moscow, "do not deserve to be treated as members of the nation. They look on themselves as aliens. They do not love the great Russian motherland. They know of no native land but Israel."—"But when," the Jews retort, "has Russia acted by us a mother's part? How are we to love a country which treats us as enemies?"

One proof of the Jews' want of patriotism is found in their repugnance to military service. The blood-tax is an obligation which they strive in every way to elude. No other religion, no other race, is so refractory in this respect. Sooth to say, this does not astonish us—the opposite state of things would. Here are men deprived of most of the rights which their Christian fellow-countrymen enjoy, and they are expected to respond to the call of the most onerous among a citizen's duties with the same cheerful abnegation! That is asking more than is within human nature to give. Suppose the dream of certain Eastern Israelites became a reality—suppose a Jewish state, a new Judah, ruled by Jews, with Jewish laws. And suppose this resuscitated Israel treated the Christians as Orthodox Russia now treats the Jews: would the Christian subjects of Israel hold themselves in conscience bound to serve under the banners of these successors of David? In order to feel bound to fulfil all a citizen's duties, a man, be he Christian, Jew, or Mussulman, must first be possesssed of all a citizen's rights. If you would expect as much from the Jews as from the Russians, begin by treating them as Russians.

Up to quite lately there was no wile a Polish Jew would not resort to, in order to escape conscription. It must be admitted that to Talmudist Israelites, strict observers of the law, military life is particularly hard. It is not easy, in camp or barracks, to remain faithful to the minute prescriptions of the Mosaic law. The Russian Jew's detestation for the service is intensified by memories of "cantonist" times. The first soldiers taken from among the Israelites were ten-year old boys, who were carried away from their families and baptized by force. These unfor-

tunates as also the orphan children of soldiers, were called "cantonists" and brought up in special schools or settlements, under inhumanly severe discipline. The army was till quite lately a real proselytizing agency. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that there is no advancement for the Jews. They cannot become officers, and the regulations exclude them from military academies. The Jewish soldier who has served for years under the imperial eagles has not even the right, after he has done his time, to live and die where he has been in garrison.

The conscripts of the class of 1886 numbered 832,000, of whom 45,000 were Israelites, enough to form an entire army corps. There were among them about 4,000 "refractories," or about $\frac{10}{100}$. The proportion used to be much larger, reaching up to $\frac{30}{100}$ and $\frac{40}{100}$. To obviate the Israelite's repugnance and prevent the Christians from being made incidentally the victims thereof, an *ukàz* of 1876 decreed that for young men recognized as unfit for the service should be substituted others of the same faith. But even this confessional solidarity was not deemed sufficient. Since 1886, the families of refractory Israelites were moreover made to pay high fines. For the class of that year, these fines made a total of 1,200,000 roubles (something like $600,000). This seems to have worked. In 1887, in the provinces of Mohilef and Minsk, the proportion of refractory Israelites had dropped from $\frac{68}{100}$ and $\frac{60}{100}$ to $\frac{5}{100}$ and $\frac{16}{100}$. Still the proceeding is wrong, because exceptional, aimed specially at the Jews. And it is not by exceptional laws that Russia will solve the Semitic question.

Of this we find a proof in the Kingdom of Poland. In 1864, when Poland still had an autonomous administration, a law was issued, which assimilated the Jews to the other inhabitants. The lands on the Visla never had reason to regret it. Of all the regions of the empire, it is here that the old law and the new clash the least together. Anti-semitic riots have been of rare occurrence, and even in Warsaw seem to have been provoked by strangers. The "Poles of the Mosaïc rite" have shown themselves grateful

to their Catholic fellow-countrymen. Indeed, at certain times, they have manifested something like Polish patriotism, the more meritorious that it was displayed in a lost cause. The Russians, who accuse the Jews of being incapable of becoming attached to a country, have complained repeatedly of this tendency of the Polish Israelites to sympathize with the Poles. Let Russia treat hers as Russians, and they will, from the Dvina to the Dniepr, gradually become "Russians of the Mosaïc rite." In Petersburgh, in Odessa, in Vilna even, many are already russified. Once he is the Christian's equal, the Jew will identify himself the more readily that it is entirely in his interest to conciliate the masters of the empire—and the voice of self-interest is one which the Semite is apt to heed.

The main hindrance to Israelite assimilation lies—we can never sufficiently insist on it—in the exceptional laws. Let this barrier be overthrown, the others will gradually lower themselves. Not that a fusion can be looked for in a long while. That, if ever it is completely accomplished, will take centuries. The rivalries, the jealousy, must fatally persist through many generations, for there is no process warranted to free states from the competition between races, religions, classes. The vaster an empire, the more it is liable to them, from its very size. But the conflicts will be less violent when the Christians will have learned to treat the Jews in a Christian spirit. Things will take their course more easily when the law ceases to put artificial obstacles in the way.

In Russia, just as in France, there is no other solution than civic liberty and equality. The Russians have not the alternative which Spain once had—of a wholesale expulsion of the Jews. That resource is not of our time, even in an autocratic country. Emigration has been suggested; but that is not a solution either. Another Moses would be wanted to take this modern Israel out of its Egypt; and where would he take them? The Russian press may invite them to go, the people may enforce the suggestion by molesting them,—the Jews have not yet begun their exodus.

Thousands have gone; millions have staid. They will not or cannot leave the soil on which they were born, and on which their fathers dwelt centuries before the Russian from Great-Russia set foot on it.* The Jews are there in Russia's borderlands, increasing in numbers with every year. She should not make enemies of them, if only from political considerations. What can she gain from letting the discontent of four millions of Israelites reinforce the refractory spirit of Germans and Poles?

One last remark, not without a feeling of mortification on behalf of our time and country. Within the last few years, men have appeared in the West, even in France itself, who, doubtless from honest conviction, ask that legal measures be taken against the Jews. Here is an empire where these exceptional laws, once universal, still exist. To what have they led? Instead of suppressing the Semitic question they have envenomed it. A relic of past ages, they have revived the violent scenes of another age. Russia's example should be a sufficient warning to Europe to beware of the anti-semites' superannuated recipes.

Russia, whose historical mission for centuries was to fight Islam, shows herself more friendly or just towards the Koran than towards the Talmud. She is to-day one of the great Mussulman powers on the globe, second only to England and Turkey. True, she has only about ten millions of Mohammedan subjects against Great Britain's fifty or sixty; but Islam is not only the ruling religion of a considerable portion of her Asiatic possessions; it has retained followers in the very heart of European Russia, and further West, even to Lithuania.

The Mussulmans did not always find in Russia a ruler as tolerant as France or England. Influenced by Byzantine traditions, she did not fail to try her proselytizing methods on the disciples

* Anti-semitism has started a regular current of emigration to the United States. But this yearly departure of a few thousand families increases the number of Israelites in America without noticeably affecting that of the Jews in Russia.

of the Prophet, at least on those she had at hand in Europe—the Tatars who have been three hundred years under her domination. These attempts cannot be said to have been very successful. Islam is everywhere the same—not easier to "convert" on the Volga than on the Nile. Left to itself, it would go on making proselytes on the confines of Asia and Europe, just as it does in India and in Africa. The semi-heathen populations along the Volga are frequently more drawn to Mohammed than to Christ. Numbers of Tchuvashes have gone over—or back—to the Koran after having been baptized.

Victory being Allah's sign manual, and the divine judgment being held as the proof of the Prophet's mission, the doubt was natural whether the true believer once being overcome by the infidel, the force of Islam might not be broken. Would this religion, of which fatalism appears to be the very essence, prove capable of standing the humiliating test of defeat? The Tatars of the Volga have shown that the Mussulman can live for centuries under Christian rule without for that doubting Allah and, at the same time, that the true believer can become a peaceable subject, asking of his infidel masters only one thing: freedom to live after his faith and his customs; for both with him are intimately connected, and about equally unchangeable.

It is well known how rare a thing it is for a Mussulman to be converted to the Gospel. We have, in this very work, given one of the principal reasons for the fact: he considers himself superior to the Christian in the matter of dogma*; in the matter of morals also, because the ethics of the Koran are molded after his manners. This morality may seem lax to us; all the same it protects the Mussulman against one of the most fatal vices of modern peoples. The prohibition decreed against the use of spiritual drinks is a boon which the Mussulman values through comparison with the condition of his Russian Orthodox neighbors. The Christian

* See Vol. I., Book II., Ch. II.,—the pages devoted to the Tatars.

propaganda has some chance of success only among populations but lately converted to the Koran, and whom Islam has not had time yet to stamp with its indelible seal. The Russian missionaries at one time entertained some hopes of the Kirghiz, as they are lukewarm Mohammedans and not much given to frequent the mosques. Thus, in Algeria, the Jesuits used to flatter themselves that they would win the Kabyls. But the Orthodox propaganda has gained no great hold so far even on these Kirghiz, and it is doubtful whether it will accomplish more in the future; for, just as fast as they give up nomadic life, they become better Mussulmans; they absorb the principles of the Koran in the schools which the Tatar mollahs open in their villages.

As to the Tatars who live in the midst of Russians on the Okà and the Volga, they are generally refractory to any kind of propaganda. Of the Tatars of Kazàn, about 45,000, or something like one tenth at most, have at various times been officially converted, but the majority—like the *Moriscos* of Spain—remained Mussulman at heart and in their mode of life. Most of them celebrate Fridays as well as Sundays. No matter that the services are read for them in their own language—they go to church half the time only to get married or have their children baptized. Unless—as often happens—they pay the priest to "let them off," and dispense with the ceremony altogether. It is no rare thing either for them to return openly to Islam. Nicolas I. once tried the expedient of isolating them, by settling them in separate villages, away from their Mussulman brethren and the influence of mollahs. The intervention of the authorities cannot prevent these recoils in favor of Mohammed from occurring periodically among the Tatars and the Tchuvashes. Mr. Pobiêdonòstsef himself does not disguise the fact in his reports to Alexander III. "These apostates," he wrote in 1885, "are deaf to the advice of their Christian spiritual chiefs. During the exhortations which they are compelled to attend, they make every effort not to think of the subject on which they are addressed, so as to remove from their minds even

the possibility of a doubt. These hardened offenders the Church, after vainly trying mild methods, delivers up to the secular arm, which makes them feel the rigor of the law. Many are transported to Siberia. In 1883 some Tatar peasants of the village of Apòzof were prosecuted in Kazàn for having lapsed from Orthodoxy. They declared that they had always been Mussulmans; seven of them were nevertheless sentenced to hard labor, as apostates. So that, under Alexander III., Islam still had in Russia its martyrs and confessors.

The consequence is that the Tatars of Kazàn are the most zealous and the most fanatical of Russian Mussulmans. Such is the usual effect of coercion. This is the more to be regretted that these Tatars are greatly respected by their co-religionists. They supply the whole empire with mollahs. The government tries to restrain their influence. It would be simpler not to alienate them by useless intolerance. The solidarity which exists in the Mussulman world is notorious. Russia's treatment of the Volga Tatars is not calculated to win her the Mohammedans' confidence, either at home or abroad.. At Mecca, the Tatar from Kazàn meets the Sarte from Samarkand, the Turk from Erzerum, and the Afghan from Kabul. True, Russia knows better than to do much proselytizing among her Mussulman subjects in Asia, especially in her newly conquered Aralo-Caspian lands. She would be still better advised in not giving cause to the 100,000 pilgrims who meet every year on Mount Ararat, to tell one another that there is a portion of the Tsar's dominions where the true believers are persecuted. It is fortunate for her that she has to stand comparison in Asia not with England only, but also with China. For from this latter side comparison is entirely to her advantage. The Mussulmans of Turkestan have only to remember the Celestials' treatment of their brethren at Kashgar, to thank Allah that they are subjects of the White Tsar.

In the Caucasus and in Central Asia, even more than in the Crimea, or on the Volga, Islam is equipped for war. Wherever

the Mussulmans have a numerous clergy—if the word can be used in speaking of a religion which admits of no intermediary between God and man—the mollahs are almost always the most learned men in their communities. They are, in this respect, frequently superior to the Russian priests. Many are versed in Oriental letters. There are, in Turkestan alone, four or five thousand *mektabs* or primary schools, not to mention the *medressehs* or schools of a higher grade. The mollahs, as is the custom in Islam, are at once preachers and teachers; they also act as judges and arbitrators, for the Mussulmans, even in Europe, cling to their statutes, which are almost a part of their religion. The government had no idea of leaving to itself a clergy invested with such influence. It placed at its head a Sheikh-ul-Islam or Mufti, who resides at Orenburg. There is another in the Crimea for the Tatars of Tauris. The Shiites of the Caucasus, of whom there are very nearly a million, have their own Mufti appointed by the government, and so have the Sunnites. The law decrees that each of these high functionaries shall be elected by the respective Mussulman communities, the government giving its sanction to the election; but, in reality, the Mufti is appointed by an imperial *ukàz*. His functions are mainly of an administrative and judiciary nature; he is the supreme judge in both civil and religious litigations. He is assisted by a sort of synod, the members of which are elected by the mollahs. The post of Mufti is usually given to men who have had a European education and have passed through the Russian service. The present Mufti at Orenburg has served in the imperial guard.

Except in the Caucasus, where Shamyl and the Tcherkesses (Circassians) kept up a desperate resistance, the Mussulmans of Russian Asia became easily resigned to the Tsar's rule. The reasons for this are several. The most rebellious tribes have emigrated into Mussulman lands, as happened repeatedly, in the Caucasus and the Crimea, and, more recently, at Kars and Batùm. Then, fanaticism does not seem to be as rampant, as forceful, in

this part of Asia as it is in Africa. At Samarkand, at Bokhàra those strongholds of Islam, the true believer has accepted the White Tsar's rule or suzerainty. And where fanaticism does subsist, it is modified by the great corrective—fatalism. The Sarte and the Uzbek are not insensible to the benefits of Russian domination, which put an end to the bloody lawlessness of the steppe, and brought to its oases peace, security, prosperity. The Russian is a master who easily makes himself understood of Orientals,—possibly because he is not so very far removed from them with regard to nature, national temperament, manners, bringing up. Lastly, it cannot be denied that the Mussulmans of Russia have many advantages over our Algerian Arabs or Kabyls. If they have no political rights, no more has their Christian neighbor. They are not conscious of being subject to another race: the Russian is their fellow-subject, not their master. They are still owners of their fields; they are not taxed more heavily than Christian colonists. They can, equally with Russians, be called to fill civil and military positions. All elective positions are open to them. True, they cannot, in Europe, any more than the Jews, form more than one third of a municipal council; but they enter it on a footing of perfect equality with the Christians.

The most delicate question was that of military service. In European Russia the Mussulmans must serve, the same as the Christians and the Jews; they are drafted promiscuously into the same regiments. In Asia they are usually exempted; or, if they do serve, it is in the special corps composed of Mussulmans only. The law of 1886, while extending the obligation of military service to the Caucasus, has temporarily exempted the Mussulmans from it. They may serve as volunteers or they may buy themselves off. It is just the other way in Turkey: there the Mussulmans alone may do military service, with this difference, all to the Caucasian Mussulman's advantage that the latter are given the option between personal service and the payment of a ransom. Resigned as they are to the Russian rule, this was no unwise

provision, if only to have reliable troops. Mussulmans who live on peaceably as law-abiding subjects of the Orthodox Tsar, will often find it repugnant to serve under his eagles. Even in Europe they come next to the Jews in the number of "refractories." The new military service law very nearly, under Alexander II., caused the emigration of the last Crimean Tatars. Under Alexander III., in 1886, the dread of being compelled to serve stirred up one Caucasian tribe, the Tchetchens, to the verge of an insurrection. The government merely had demanded of these highlanders a list of their families; the majority of the *aoùls* (villages) refused to give it, fearing lest they might be supplying a census to be used in drafting recruits. Some talked of going over to Turkey with their families, stock, and chattels; others announced the coming of a new Imam, who was to take command of the true believers. To overcome their credulity and stubbornness, an expedition consisting of ten battalions had to be dispatched into the wilds where the Tchetchens dwell.

It follows from all this that, solidly as Russian rule is established on both sides of the Caspian, it would be a slight exaggeration to say that the assimilation of the Mussulman natives is an accomplished fact. One thing however is certain, the Tsar has nothing to fear from his Mohammedan subjects, even when he comes in conflict with the Khalif. The last Eastern war has shown that. The mosques called down the blessings of Allah on the Orthodox arms, and large numbers of irregular Mussulman troops fought side by side with the Cosacks against their former comrades, the Tcherkesses who emigrated to Turkey. To shake the loyalty of the Mussulmans of the Caucasus, the Crescent would have to reappear, victorious, on their mountains. Russia is sure of them, so long as they believe in her strength.

It is the same with the Turkmans on the other side of the Caspian, who were conquered by Annenkof's railroad even more than by Skobelef's sword. The Tekkeh of Merv seems ready to bear arms, in the south of Asia, for his new masters. The victor

has known how to win the attachment of the vanquished by making room for them in his ranks. The Tekkeh chieftains, clad in rich and becoming Russian uniforms, hold commands in the imperial army; several have Christians under their command as well as Mussulmans. Ali-Khan, transformed into Colonel Alikhànof, is chief over an extensive district; he commands the same Russians whom he fought at Geük-Tepé some ten years before. That is a shining example. It is known on the bazars of Lahore and Delhi, where the Mussulmans of India chafe at being shut out of all higher civil and military positions. Does it follow that, in case of a conflict with England, Russia could count on a rising of Islam and turn Mussulman fanaticism against the rulers of India? That may be doubted: the proselytizing on the Volga would militate against such open partisanship. If ever Russia succeeds in getting the Turkman and the Afghan into the defiles of the Hindu-Kush, it will be by promising them the sacking of the Ganges valley. Skobelef announced that, at no remote time, England would lead Islam to attack Russia's Asiatic boundaries. One cannot exactly imagine an Orthodox tsar unfurling the Prophet's green banner, to rally around himself the Mussulmans of Asia. England would hardly do better in the part. But both Christian powers might carry along each her own Mussulmans. What neither should forget, is that a Mohammedan, while he may condescend to serve a *Kafir*, will finally side with the victor.

Buddhism, at least in Europe, has not the same resisting force as Islamism. Of all religions professed in the empire, it is, we believe, the only one the number of whose adherents is on the decrease. That comes perhaps not so much from the mysterious affinities of both form and spirit so often pointed out between Lamaïsm and Christianity, as from the isolation of the tribes which brought the Buddhist creed into Russia. Cut off from their Asiatic brethren, the Kalmŷks of the Lower Volga, but

lately all Buddhists, are already in great part baptized. In the twentieth century, Lamaïsm may be entirely driven back into Asia, and European winds will have ceased to turn its praying mills. The body of the last Kalmŷk Lama was cremated with great pomp in the steppe near Vetliànka, in December, 1886. No successor was given him. The dignity of Lama, up to that time recognized by the State, was officially abolished, and Kalmŷk Lamaïsm finds itself beheaded.

The Orthodox propaganda attacks Buddhism in Asia as well as in Europe, but in Asia, on the Altaï and around Lake Baïkal, Lamaïsm, supported by the Buddhists of Mongolia, resolutely holds its own. In Asiatic as in European Russia, the Buddhists, still numbering several hundred thousands, are almost all of Mongol stock. Of the fiercest among the hordes of Djenghiz Khan the disciples of Sakya-Muni have made the mildest people. Missionary zeal has worked many a wonder, but scarcely ever accomplished so complete a transformation. Buddhism has not only tamed the Mongol's barbarism, but so to speak, emasculated it.

Yet Buddhism is probably less corrupt amidst the ice and snow of the North than in Tonkin or Japan. The Buriàts of Siberia have some learned Lamas, well versed in their sacred books. They have a solidly organized hierarchy, which enjoys high authority and considerable revenues. At its head is a Grand-Lama, the *Khambo Lama*, to whom is allotted a demesne of about 1250 acres, besides a sort of tithe on the 35 *datsans* or dioceses subject to him. The heads of each *datsan* and, lower down, the plain Lamas, also are endowed with lands and receive a portion of the tithe. The *datsan* of Lake Gùssino quite recently still owned a Buddhist seminary containing some forty students, each of whom had the use of 15 *dessiatïnas* of land (about 40 acres).

This Buddhist clergy energetically resists the Orthodox propaganda. The struggle is lively over the Shamanist natives

whom the Lama frequently wrests from the missionaries of the Gospel. Like the latter, the apostles of the Buddha solemnly proceed to the destruction of the Shamans' idols and utensils. But for the government's opposition to the Lamas' propaganda, Shamanism would quickly disappear from the Altaï and the Baïkal region. The *pope* prefers the wizard to the Lama, finding the former easier to deal with.

The imperial government and the Orthodox propaganda aim at gradually disintegrating the Buddhist clergy and also the Buddhist tribes. The missionaries have carried their point of getting the authorities to forbid the opening of new pagodas, at the same time that every effort is made to reduce the number of Lamas and limit their authority and to remove the Buriàt converts from the jurisdiction of their heathen chieftains, who, in their turn, receive every encouragement to let themselves be baptized. True, the Lamas do not always obey the injunction not to open new pagodas. They do open them, even in the *ulùsses* or camps of baptized nomads, and not unfrequently succeed in luring back their former co-religionists. Numbers of Buriàts are so firm in the faith as to decline to enter into any controversy at all with the Russian *popes*. Yet the Buddhists, unlike the Mussulmans, once converted, are apt to make excellent Christians. There are some who forsake Siddharta to follow Jesus, apparently from sincerest conviction. Former Lamas, men learned in Mongol letters, have been known to become priests and zealous missionaries of Christ. One of the things which appear to strike these Orientals most forcibly, trained as they are by Buddhism itself to an admiring appreciation of rites, is the beauty of the Christian church ceremonies. If certain stories are to be believed, mass and the quires, which are taught to sing in Mongolian, accomplish more conversions than preaching.

Although certain secret affinities have been found to exist between Buddhism and Slavic mysticism, yet the Hindoo doctrine does not exercise on Tolstòy's and Dostoyèfsky's fellow country-

men the same fascination as on Englishmen, Americans, and Germans. If a few Russians, following in the footsteps of their two great novelists,* appear to be imbued with a sort of latent Buddhism, they are so instinctively and unconsciously. The faith in Buddha has won adepts in England and America, but not in Russia. I know of only one exception, a woman, Madame Blavatsky. Not content with proclaiming the superiority of Buddhism, she has sought to reconcile the East and the West, modern science and ancient theurgy. Having drained to the dregs the pleasures of a worldly life, Madame Blavatsky travelled all over India. There she communed with Brahmans and fakirs, and thence she brought back the principles of an esoteric theosophy which now numbers initiated adepts in both hemispheres. †

* For Tolstòy see above, p. 484. For Dostoyèfsky, see, towards the end of *The Karamàzof Brothers*, the apparition of the monk Zossìm, in a dream dreamt by the youth Alexis, where the monk teaches that animals—the horse, the ox—being sinless, Christ is with them before He is with men.

† Madame Blavatsky has published in the *Viêstnik Evròpy*, under the *nom de plume* "Radda Bày," studies on Hindoo occult sciences. Since then she became the foundress and, in a way, the prophetess, of the "Theosophical Society," whose successive organs have been *The Theosophist*, appearing in Madras, *L'Aurore du Jour Nouveau* (*Dawn of the New Day*), *Le Lotus*, published in Paris in 1888.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER IV.

Conclusion—Religious and Moral Unity—Religious Liberty a Necessity for a Great Empire—The Only Liberty that can be Decreed—Why it is Not Certain that Religious Liberty, in Russia, will Precede Political Liberty.

We have reached the end of this long investigation of the moral and religious condition of the vast empire. It is time to arrive at a conclusion. But is it really necessary to formulate one? It evolves itself out of the facts. Shall we ask ourselves the same question concerning Russia's religious institutions as concerning her political institutions?* Is it worth while to inquire whether, nearly two centuries after Peter the Great, Russia is really a European and a modern state? The answer is not doubtful. In religion as well as in politics, Russia belongs to the *ancien régime* by her manners, her customs, her laws. The principle of liberty of conscience, accepted by every civilized state, is not yet admitted by her. In this respect we find this great country below all the states of Europe or America, which is the more to be regretted that religious liberty is perhaps the surest sign of a people's intellectual development. It might be unfair to say that Russia still lingers in the Middle Ages; but she certainly is behind the others; and, more humiliating still, she will if compared to her own earlier self, probably turn out to be more backward in the matter of tolerance at the end of the nineteeth century than she was at the end of the eighteenth.

This huge empire, which harbors within itself the religions of Asia and those of Europe, is still seeking for state unity in religious unity. This takes us back, young as the nation seems to

* See Vol. II., Book VI., Ch. III.

us, all the way to Philip II., or to Ferdinand of Austria,—nay, further still, to Byzance and, beyond that, to the heathen communities and the antique *civitas*, for the conception is some two thousand years old and more. The idea of Unity is not devoid of grandeur, though too often only a deceptive phantom ; it may well have been the dream of great minds and great peoples. A church honors itself in pursuing it and it is its right to do so. But spiritual unity has value only if it is genuine. It must be a free, spontaneous, live unity, not external, factitious, supported by force and fear. From the inquisitors of old down to the modern Jacobins, few ideas have done so much harm to mankind as this specious notion of the state's moral unity, that eternal pretence for tyranny. The modern state can find its unity only in the free satisfaction of its people's moral and material wants.

Russia seems to consider religion as a sort of uniform, in which all are to be encased alike, no attention being paid to differences of race, temperament, or habits. She might just as well make all her subjects, from the Laplander to the Georgian, wear the *mujik's* red shirt and sheepskin. The Russian empire is too vast, touches too many climes, extends over too many races for the soul and body to bend themselves to such uniformity. Since Russia's great territorial expansion and the schism in her church, religious unity can no longer be anything but a legal fiction. Multiplicity has taken its place, and it were wisest, having lost the advantages of unity, to make the best of variety for the good of the national mind, the state, and religion itself.

Liberty once accepted, the national church would gain more in depth than it would lose in area. The names "Russian" and "Orthodox" are too closely associated in history for any danger of wholesale desertions among the people or the "intelligence." At the cost of a few souls, which anyhow do not belong to it, official Orthodoxy would be cleansed of the stains which disgrace it, and would rise above debasing meannesses. The interests of Orthodoxy and the other cults are not as much at variance as

bureaucrats imagine ; the dignity of the former can grow only with the emancipation of the others. There is a solidarity between the different confessions whether they will or no. The Established Church would find in the struggle and competition a stimulant worth all her present privileges. It was at the time when Protestantism was freest in France that the Gallican Church shone most resplendently ; it was with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the destruction of Port Royal that her decadence began. A clergy which shuts up its flock within prison walls guarded by the law does not need much science or virtue to keep it in the fold.

Russia's great inferiority, that which is in a way the token of all the others, lies in the lack of religious liberty. It is more shocking than the lack of political liberty, because religious liberty is both more essential and easier to establish. Of all so-called "modern" liberties, it is the most precious to the individual, and the least dangerous to the state ; it is perhaps the only one which has caused no disappointments, at least wherever it has not been perverted by the fanaticism of inconsistent "free-thinkers." It is but natural that a sovereign historically invested with unlimited power should hesitate to divest himself of it. Heavily as it may weigh on him, he cannot cast it off at one jerk ; he cannot even share it with the nation without much travail and struggling, without intricate combinations, without a thousand technical difficulties. A complete change of front in politics is inevitably a leap in the dark. However desirable, however fatally indicated it may appear, it is fraught, for both the state and the sovereign, with risks against which no human science can insure. It is very different with religious liberty. There are only advantages there ; no upsetting of existing institutions ; no danger to the state. It sets the sovereign's conscience at rest without any loss to his power. Lastly, and unlike political liberty, it needs no apprenticeship.

All this is self-evident. Yet it is not impossible that this most

harmless of all liberties may be one of the last conceded to the Russian people; that in Russia, as in so many other countries—England, the United States, Holland, Switzerland—it may be obtained only at the price of long and weary struggles; that it may not only not precede political liberties, but come after them and under cover of them. Contrary to a current prejudice, the history of the last few centuries has shown that in most states of both worlds, the liberty of thought and worship has been recognized only as a sequel to political liberties; that if, in some cases, they survived the latter, they always had been preceded by them. The fact is so universal that we have been tempted to see in it a sort of historical law.* To this law I know, in modern Europe, of but one exception: Prussia. Tolerance was built into the very foundations of the Prussian monarchy. Berlin had no occasion to regret it. Will Russia follow in the footsteps of Frederick the Second's Prussia? We must not be too sure of that. Nothing is needed but a tsar's will; but there is nothing to show that such a tsar will be found. And, unless it comes from an autocrat's spontaneous act, Russia may have to wait another century or more for the emancipation of her conscience; there is danger that national prejudice and mistrust may delay the day for several generations yet. For this is one of those reforms which it is easier for a sovereign than for a people to accomplish.

It seems at first sight, after Alexander II. and the emancipation of the serfs, as though there are no laurels left for a Russian sovereign to pluck with ease; as though an autocrat cannot innovate any more without cutting into autocracy, and consequently shaking the foundations of the empire. We said so: we were mistaken. We were thinking of political reforms only.† Within easy reach of the tsar's hand there is still another laurel branch, a task noblest among all: the emancipation of his people's consciences. It requires neither genius nor labor—only an

* See *Les Catholiques Libéraux, l'Église et le Libéralisme*, pp. 36, 37.

† See Vol. II., Book VI., Ch. III.

act of the will, a stroke of the pen. It is the one solitary reform which can be accomplished by decree. No need of long study, of elaborate institutions, of charts or statutes, of assemblies and tedious discussions. One word of the tsar, and it is done. All-powerful as he is, it is the only reform which he can achieve all alone, as by the stroke of a magic wand. All that is needed is an edict declaring that no Russian subject can be molested for his religious opinions. It is not even necessary to alter the constitution of the Church, to limit her legal privileges, to modify her position in the state. We see from England's example that an Established Church is not necessarily incompatible with the fullest religious liberty. No more is it incompatible—and that is an advantage in an autocratic country—with absolute power. For it affects a domain on which secular power, whether of prince or people, is notoriously incompetent.

The religious and intellectual emancipation of Russia would suffice to cover a reign with glory and win eternal fame for a sovereign. It would assuredly be an achievement no whit inferior to the emancipation of the serfs, and it would have the advantage over the latter that it would cost nobody anything. Of the 115 or 120 millions which make up the Empire of the Tsars, 45 or 50 millions would benefit by it personally and nobody would be victimized. And yet, easy, beneficial, glorious as this reform certainly is, it is by no means certain, we repeat, that a sovereign may be found willing to undertake it. It looks so simple. It seems as though nothing were needed to effect it but an upright mind, a noble heart, a conscience which respects other people's consciences. Alas! if it were so, it would be done already. Alexander III. would have hastened to issue the decree, or, indeed, Alexander II. would not have left that honor to his son. Unfortunately for Russia, this reform, so easy in itself, would, in the actual state of institutions and manners, be nothing less than a revolution. Against it are arrayed national tradition, official custom, the interests of bureaucracy, public prejudice. This country, where

autocracy is said to be all-powerful, will have to wait another hundred years for the sovereign or the minister who will dare the venture. He will need nothing less than the energy of will and the independence of spirit of a Henry IV., a Peter the Great, a Frederick II. It is only one brief act, but an act which can hardly be expected of the disciple of a Pobiêdonòstsef. His heart might prompt it, but he would find himself hemmed in by counsellors who would represent it as a crime and a blunder. All that can be hoped for soon is the suppression of such laws and measures as amount to actual persecution,—and even on that it were rash to count with any certainty. Yet even so much would redound greatly to a Russian tsar's honor, for Russia cannot for some time yet be measured with the same measure as Western states.

Two things militate against Russia's spiritual enfranchisement: national exclusivism and state reasons—both at times short-sighted counsellors. Consider the Russian state's real interests, at home and abroad—the scale will incline to the side of religious emancipation. Religions are live forces, the sap of which is not dried up, and it is not good to make foes of them. Can so vast a state as Russia, an empire which may indulge unlimited ambition in all directions, find it profitable to set against itself all the great religions of the world by ill-treating their followers—Catholics, Protestants, Jews? Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaïsm (we might add Islamism), represent influences of unequal vigor and calibre, all of which play a part still in human affairs. A provident policy should not treat them as factors of no account. Does it lie in Russia's interest to alienate, all the world over, the Catholic Missions, the Biblical Societies, the Jewish banking world? If one only stops to think, it will be seen that her confessional exclusivism has been one of the causes of her political isolation and economic inferiority. The Russian is too apt to put his trust in material force. Even his material interests would be benefited by a more tolerant policy. Let Rus-

sia treat the Jews better, and her credit would stand higher on the European exchanges. Katkòf realized that, and it was one of the reasons of his dislike of anti-semitism.

Setting aside the rights of conscience, the interests of civilization and of the national mind, the most realistic statesman finds himself facing this truth: a confessional policy may be good for a small state, not complicated in its national and geographical structure, with no broad prospects, no vast field of action; it can never do for a great state, a *Weltmacht*. It is not an imperial policy. Rome realized that when she admitted into her Pantheon the gods of all nations. The rights of conscience and humanity are at one with the interests, rightly understood, of Russia as a power. But it is perhaps too much to ask of a people or a state what are its interests, rightly understood.[1]

[1] It will be noticed that this volume has almost no notes by the translator. The reason is, there would be so many, they would form a ceaseless running commentary, which would greatly increase the bulk of the volume, besides burdening the text. Especially in the later chapters—those treating of alien religions—the author has evidently not wished to hear "the other side" or, hearing it, not thought it deserving of attention. Let so much be hinted: if Russia's Catholic and Protestant subjects did not maintain a stubbornly aggressive attitude, fraught with real danger to the state, and if their churches did not keep fomenting discontent, lending themselves to hostile political ends, many things would be different. It is a matter of history that the Polish Catholic clergy was the inciter and soul of all the insurrections and that the vaults of churches and convents were its arsenals.

THE END.

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

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